Security Management in Maritime Organisations - Case Study Example

Compare and contrast the TT Club's loss prevention guide "Terminal Security" with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)'s ISPS The TTClub 'Stoploss' initiative manual has been published in order to prevent and create awareness among its members about various maritime losses and threats. Being a transport insurer, the Club wants to create general awareness about different kinds of security practice. It also claims to provide security recommendations for various circumstances and situations. Therefore the TT Club is a complete manual for practical measures of security. On the other hand the ISPS Code manual is published by IMO (International Maritime Organisation) with the coordination of its safety committee and maritime working groups. TT Club aims at providing practical security measures which are limited to particular countries while the objective of the ISPS code is to establish an international maritime security framework. With the mutual coordination of contracting and local governments of shipping port facilities, the ISPS Code provides a complete theoretical solution to maritime possible threats and risks. One of the main reasons for comparing the TT Club manual with the ISPS code is to determine the extent to which the implementation of International Convention for the safety of Life at Sea adopted on December 12, 2002 made possible and followed. Other reasons to follow the ISPS Code are to list out all those possible threats which have never been considered before. The Club is a maritime Insurance company which provides all kinds of transport insurance to 80 countries of the world while the ISPS code targets all the shipping ports throughout the globe. TT Club provides pro-active determination of loss at some cost to its business members, but is limited to 80 countries. Another reason for comparing both the manuals is that the ISPS code is applied to all passenger and cargo ships (3.1) and one cannot ignore the fact that TT Club as an Insurance company is limited to provide maritime Insurance. Therefore it is obvious that TT Club would not take into account the hidden real world problems. Let us begin with the functional requirements of both the manuals. The TT Club manual is published with a view of preventing loss at the utmost. Moreover it serves as 'loss prevention guide'. The best evidence for calling it as 'loss prevention guide' is that it avoids security threats by avoiding computerised systems at the utmost. On the other hand, the ISPS Code is all about security of ships and ports and presents all techniques of preventing threats and risks and follows the functional requirements of the port (1.3). Ship Security Plan (SSP) containing Audits According to the ISPS Code 16.58, it is the responsibility of the SSP to conduct regular or updated audit reviews with the help of Company Security Officer (CSO) and Ship Security Officers (SSO) whereas the TT Club Manual suggests that Audit surveys are not limited to the responsibility of any particular person. However the main concern for both the manuals behind conducting audits i.e., ISPS code and TT Club Manual is to assess security at all levels to determine vulnerable access points. According to Security Level 1 of Section 7 of the Ship Security which sets appropriate controlling, monitoring and supervising access to different areas of the ship including deck, cargo and ship's stores, TT Club manual takes hold and observes all access points of the ship. These include all kinds of used and unused gates, access to the port facilities, and physical and logical security threats. Security Levels of the ISPS Code The security levels are set by priorities of their associated risks. Like level 1 is the normal level which is usually followed by the ships and ports. Security level 2 is applied in a condition which in addition to the threat exposure is experiencing a critical risk. Therefore the level is applied as long as the risk is there. Similarly level 3 entail exceptional threats, which usually do not occur in normal conditions. Terminal Security Guide of the TT Club has not set any priorities and as the name suggests, rather the Club has not prioritised the security risks, it has categorised the threats and have implemented in their company's premises. Therefore the manual not only serves as a guideline or a catalogue, but a complete set of measures that must be adopted by any cargo, passenger ship, offshore ships or voyage in order to prevent loss. Company Security Officer The ISPS recommends a company, a ship and a port facility security officer according to code 11 and 12 whereas the TT Club manual has not mentioned any need for security officers. In case according to the ISPS Code security level 3 situation arises the port facility security officer along with the individual ship security officer take appropriate actions. The TT Club is limited to its own created security plan devoid of various situations. Records According to the Regulation XI-2/9.2.3 of the provision mentioned as 10.1.1 of the ISPS Code, it is necessary to keep the records of training, exercise, security threats, incidents and any change or updating in the security levels or plans in the ship security plan for a period of time as recommended by the Administration. The ISPS Code makes it obligatory to protect any unauthorised access to those records mentioned above. On the other hand, the Terminal Security Manual does not protect its' security records to such extent where it feels necessary to implement the 'unauthorised access panel'. No doubt the manual suggests recording each and every minute observation during ship security plans, right from the terminal fence to the used and unused gates of the terminal building but due to the high risk of computer unauthorised access, the manual still prefers to maintain a master ledger log book of all the activities records. The ISPS code states it obligatory to maintain the records in electronic format while the TT Club Manual maintains it manually, thereby ensuring and undertaking that its' employees will not use the records in their own interest. For this purpose, the manual states that the employees are not authorised to make duplicates of the records. Lack of computerised automation According to section 8.3 and 8.4 SSA and section 15.3, a PFSA must utilise computerised systems and networks within the port and shipping on board facility, while the TT Club does not neither recommend nor make use of computerised systems within the terminal. This refers to the fact that ISPS code is concerned about achieving greater levels of computerised automation with vulnerabilities detection. This could be envisaged with respect to both the manning of ships and port-based cargo handling and industrialisation. On the other hand, the TT Club is far from utilising the driving force of technological change. (Slack & Pinder, 2004, p. 3) Cargo Handling The main security concern behind ISPS Code is to ensure security not only to prevent threats but also in cargo handling in such a manner that cargo is not exposed to any kind of tampering. That condemns any kind of on board tampering. This situation of cargo handling is somewhat different in the TT Manual. The manual suggests fence and area alarms for the security measures of cargo handling even for those cargo containers that are grounded; the TT Club Manual suggests fence reinforcement with regular inspection of container seals. But despite such security measures, the manual states that cases have been found in the past when cargo containers were found open or stolen. Inventory Control Procedures In accordance with the ship security duties of ISPS code 9.7.7, it is the core duty of the SSP to list out and maintain dangerous goods in inventory. This is in accordance with the security level 3 of the ISPS code 9.32.2 to verify and locate hazardous goods. This point is simply overlooked in the TT Club Manual. Instead the Manual suggests that at present there is no standard of controlling inventory. Even the manual clearly states that no record of containers is kept once they leave the port. This dilemma is not restricted to the lower management of the Club. The senior management is also deprived about any guidelines or action to be taken in case of any suspicious incident. Ships Tracking It is mentioned in the Conference Resolution 3 of the ISPS code that long-range ship identification standards should be developed to easily track the ships and cargoes as well. The TT Club manual has not defined any tracking concerns for the cargoes or ships. One of the main reasons for not doing so is the deployment of manual records. However, tracking ships and cargoes is an integral part of the risk analysis which forms a strong tool to detect suspicious cargo in order to be able to intercept it. Though the ISPS Code acknowledges tracking as a vital part of assessing terrorist threat but still risk analysis as is currently performed in many ports frequently does not incorporate sufficient data to be able to detect the bulk of illicit trade. (Valeri et al, 2003, p. 8) TT Club has not mentioned tracking as a measure. According to the ISPS Code Section B 1.1.4 and 1.15, the contracting Government can exercise full rights in case of attaining any on board or off board investigations. Therefore, the contracting Government under no means compromise on security controls and measures and therefore acquire the right to amend the existing security measures as per situation. On the other hand, TT Club manual has no additional security measures or concerns. That is the main reason for why they suffer. Assets Evaluation The ISPS Code considers it important to evaluate security assessment of its assets and infrastructure so that it would be easier for the IMO to determine and keep updated about any possible threats occurrence. Section 15.5 states that this would not only identify the countermeasures but would also take steps to reduce vulnerability. According to section 15.7 such assets include all the entrances of the ports, ships and terminals including cargo handling equipment and other vessels associated with it. On the other hand the TT Club manual does not mention assets vitality. The ISPS manual highlights on the infrastructural needs and identifies terminal expansion and channel dredging as the authority's disparate responsibilities, clearly calling into question the natural superiority of privatised management. Indeed, one of the advantages of IMO in this form of governance is to ensure access to the very large sums required to invest in new projects including the development of initial container terminals; their subsequent expansion; further growth achieved by investment in additional terminals; terminal consolidation aimed at efficiency improvements; and, finally, the development of 'super terminals' to overcome the limitations of the latest generation of container ships. Traffic Management and Control Vessel traffic management according to the ISPS Code is controlled by the Government contracting agencies and PFSA while the TT Club manual suggests that it is the responsibility of their watchmen and guards to perform traffic control on and off board. According to the ISPS Code section 16.25, vessel traffic control rooms have restricted access due to security reasons while TT manual does not specify any restricted area. One reason for this seems to be lack of computerised system, as the club prefers to manage their system manually and are aware of the fact that many ports are now crucially dependent on information technologies for traffic management and safety, therefore there is no question of restricted access. However the traffic separation schemes of the TT Club manual suggests K-blocks to be used in separating traffic streams and separating entering containers from those which exit. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the ports have been subjected towards vulnerabilities. Containers are seen as especially at risk, since so few are inspected upon entry. The ISPS manual suggests that appropriate placement of its security and customs inspectors in major overseas ports to pre-clear containers before they are shipped is necessary. The code arranges agreements with many local port authorities to allow government personnel to operate in their terminals. To have remained outside the system would have been a severe competitive disadvantage to their shippers. One implication of this is that because ports without local screening may find their containers held up for security clearance, traffic may avoid them, thus accentuating the already marked pattern of concentration of container flows through a small number of hub ports. Looking to the future in the short term would probably complement the great maritime innovation of the late twentieth century deployed by the TT Club, container shipping by providing distributor services. But in the longer term it is quite possible that further technological progress deployed in the ISPS Code manual will also bring direct competition between fast ships and 'traditional' container traffic. (Slack and Pinder, 2004, p. 161) References & Bibliography ISPS Code, 2003 Edition (Dec 12, 2002) International Maritime Organisation "International Ship and Port Fecility Security Code". London Slack Brian & Pinder David, (2004) Shipping and Ports in the Twenty-First Century: Globalisation, Technological Change and the Environment: Routledge: New York. Terminal Security, (1992) Through Transport Mutual Services 1992. London Valeri Lorenzo, Rahman Adnan, O'Brien A. Kevin & Maarten Van De Voort, (2003) Seacurity: Improving the Security of the Global Sea-Container Shipping System: Rand: Santa Monica, CA. Read More