National Self-Determination in Europe - Essay Example

appears here] appears here] appears here] appears here] National Self-determination in Europe National Self-determination: A Definition The concept of national self-determination, like all theoretical political terms, has in the period of time experienced transformation in significance and implication. Its fundamental gist remains that the principle that every nation has an entitlement to form an independent state and establish its own authority. Generally the expressions 'self-determination' and 'self-determination of peoples' have been used in unison with 'national self-determination'. Nevertheless, these two expressions can also have broader and vaguer meanings, not essentially related with separate independent statehood for each state. Strengths of the Principle The principle of national self-determination, which acquired popular political prevalence in 19th century Europe, played a key role in the confederation of Italy in addition to that of Germany at that point in time. It was in no way been entirely unconstructive in the 20th century. Large colonial systems are usually intrinsically unsound, causing formidable demands for independence in their component parts. From time to time when great empires have been endangered with defeat and disintegration, as in Europe after two world wars, this principle has been usually supported as a basis for a new and improved order. This principle has assisted to manipulate the reaction of main powers to the disintegration of empires; and it has offered an outline within which the accomplishment of national objectives was assumed to take in self-determination in the shape of independent institutions. Weaknesses of the Principle The principle of national self-determination has no reliable explanation. There has been a need of transparency as to which 'peoples' or 'nations' are its owner and intended beneficiaries. Peoples are merely not arranged suitably on the map in a way that makes their creation into states achievable without calamities. Some of the most awful characteristics of 20th Century history included the quest of irredentist assertions, the materialization of authoritarianism in post-colonial states, and the brutal dealing with minorities - can in some way be credited to the principle and its imperfection. Problems with respect to the principle were involved, directly or indirectly, in the causation of the great majority of differences in the 20th century, including the two world wars. The principle has always been disputed, and not only by the European colonial powers. At best it is only one principle among many, and requires be balancing against other values and mitigated by other matters. National Self-Determination Since 1988 The great majority of the countries have in recent times emerged to new independent statehood, or claimed a statehood that was lost previously. This principle has helped these countries in their materialization of independence from long periods of foreign rule. Examples include the republics of the ex-Soviet Union and the republics of the ex-Yugoslavia. 'National self-determination' remains dominant as a slogan for political and armed action; however it has not been supported in the 1990s as a model for international stability or as a possible course to international harmony. The actions towards self-determination in the 1990s have taken place without the benefit of attractive general support of the idea by key statesmen. In many instances for example in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union wars resulted. The demand of some peoples to self-determination is still welcomed primarily by an embarrassed silence from the world community as the case of Chechnya demonstrates the point. National Self-Determination & European Integration European integration is conceivably the most debatable. However looking at the genesis and ancient history of the European Community it is clear that West European integration was, for a considerable period of time was believed as something more than just an effective maximization of national self-determination. The concept of European integration was one of principal rivalry and clash between nation-states by replacing the state-system with a qualitatively diverse system. Thus, the normative characteristic of the European idea - in fact the European idea itself - was fundamentally lost from sight as the stress was on practical logic and national interests. Nevertheless it is vital for this perception of integration that the practical path has simply been the process rather than the objective of European integration. If integration is warranted on merely functional terms, the elementary value of a durable and steady structure of inter-state cooperation founded on the rule of law is basically lost. To indicate that the primary function of integration was to exclude the potentiality of new war between Germany and France appears just ridiculous in the 1990s. However the issue of German unification in 1990 has underlined the importance of a powerful and firm European building able to absorb the shocks of variations in Central and Eastern Europe. There are perhaps many cases of the way in which the process of integration has facilitated to calm down domestic or inter-state conflicts. Nevertheless the fixation on practical integration and the concern of national interests has aided to complicate the enduring impact of European integration. In fact, EU politics repeatedly make a choice between the values of nationality and the values of integration. The public response to integration issues might even overstress the scale to which such an option has to be made. However clear of rationalization for the continuation of the national veto in the Council there is little orderly debate in the academic literature about such normative implications of European Union. Most authors assume implied positions on whether they believe the European Union serve the interests of states or whether states have to agree to limitations to their choices for a higher value. National Self-Determination vis--vis Integration & Democracy Traditionally, the creation of liberal democracy came to be tied to, first, popular sovereignty and, later, national self-determination. Popular sovereignty requires that 'the people' have control over the institutions of state. National self-determination requires that every country be recognized as 'a people' with the entitlement to decide their own affairs. These two doctrines have been merged in the authoritative mixture of ideas and values that is the nation-state. The turmoil of the 18th, 19th and 20th century each had their role in the formation of the amalgamation of "people's power" with "national liberation", combining citizenship with nationality and consequently uncharacteristic nation, natin and "the people". As a result these historical events are now confronted with a general view that the achievement of equal rights depends upon the establishment of a state - perhaps a state within a confederation, however rather an independent state. This is the meaning conveyed by the event of post-1945 de-colorizations as much as from post-1989 democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. It is, actually, the point from the discussion about the British constitution, where the survival of the Union is put next to the expansion of internal democracy. As democratization becomes a major concern in the EU, this conventionally built connection between democratization and nation-state-building. The German Constitutional Court judgment on the Maastricht Treaty, for example, elucidates the confines of more integration in terms of 'national democracy'. Part of the case was established on the thought that the power in Europe lay with the choice of state-peoples. If democracy is thus based on the National Self-Determination of the continent, then it would be, unrealistic to democratize the EU. Without people, state, and democracy this examination of the constitutional state of affairs in Germany and the Western Europe caused much disapproval (Bryde, 305-330; Weiler, 219-258; Joerges, 105-135; Ipsen, 1-21; Frowein, 1-16), particularly since it eliminate the prospects for increasing the progressive democratic restructuring of the European Union itself. The debate surrounding this ruling, besides the general review of the association between society and democracy has tried to explain that it would be misleading, in fact even dangerous, to consider the association between democracy and the National Self-Determination as fundamental. In fact, in the post-Cold War world, such processes encourage "societal insecurity" in populations which increasingly have to deal with the challenges of trans-nationalism without the protective shelter of 'their' state. A resurgence of nationalism in the 1990s has been one of the impacts (Connor, 1994). As mentioned, there is a connection between democracy, national identity and statehood is a historical structure. It has been an influential edifice which has made it hard to consider lawful government and democracy outside the structure of the nation-state. Nevertheless the reality that 'national democracy' is a social structure does not mean that it is easily overthrown by secular processes. Secularization in Europe, as Burleigh writes, was "not the ever receding tide but a movement of complex currents washing over a craggy shore, where the rock pools have been constantly replenished." "The only water rushing into Europe's inlets and tide pools comes from the south and east, and two centuries of war between Christianity and political belief seem to have finished with the disappearance of both, leaving a desert behind that some call peace". For instance we can see the aim of the French Revolution was not to wipe out the power of religious faith or form a state of enduring anarchy. It was in essence a change for political and social reform to raise the power and authority of the central authority. The main accomplishment of the French Revolution was the repression of those political bodies, normally termed as feudal, which for a long time had held unqualified control in most European countries. It embarked to replace them with a new social and political order, based on the concept of egalitarianism (Tocqueville, 1955). Moreover, Wasserstein writes, "evil stalked the Earth in this era," He adds "moving men's minds, ruling their actions, and begetting the lies, greed, deceit, and cruelty that are the stuff of the history of Europe in our time." Thus the force of social structure is such that their impacts are 'real'. The social and political practices encouraged and helped to continue, social structure such as the foundation of democracy in national self-determination must enter into the equations of constitutional engineering. In a constructivist perception of social life, social practice is established owing to elements of structure. At the same time, structures are the result of the actions of social agents. Thus they are dependent on change and alteration (Giddens, 1984). From such a constructivist standpoint it becomes clear that in constitutional choices for the European Union can, on the one hand, support changes in the traditional practices - that is it expands the possibilities for transnational democracy - however that these have choices have, in contrast, recognize the restrictions of those practices which persists to be repeated, deliberately or unconsciously in modern social life. If this acknowledgment of traditional social practice is disregarded, the European constitution is expected to be considered as unlawful by a major part of the population. The constitutionalisation of European integration will have to be aware of that the legitimacy of the EU cannot be disconnected from the social system fundamental to the polity. Taking into account that these practices are generally changing slowly, there is a strong case for introducing new, democratic measures slowly whilst remaining responsive to the values of integration and nationality in the legitimation of supranational authority. By disregarding the repercussions of nationality for the legitimation of rising polities is bound to bring about more critical problems than poor policy-implementation or to a 'bad press' of European institutions. On the international scale, the occurrence of democratization multi-national polities has frequently led to bloody and harmful disintegration processes. In Europe, the ghost of disintegration does not increase fears of turmoil, nevertheless is clearly hostile to the objective of integration which had the initial endeavor of overcoming war and turmoil. The crucial predicament that any constitutional choice of the European Union required to deal with in which supranational authority can be democratized, without endangering the integrative process. The predicament of European constitutional choice results from inherent variation between the values of democratic government, efficacy of supranational administration and continuation of national diversity. Major progress on each of these values is bound to endanger the recognition of the other two, and that because of one-dimensional reform the legality of the system will be in danger. What results from this discussion are that the legitimacy of the European countries is based on three distinctive values i.e. democracy, integration, and autonomy. Such a triangular notion of European nations is a manifestation of the "contradictions between intergovernmental bargaining, functional administration and democracy [which are] embedded in the treaties establishing the European Communities" (Wallace, 140). It is shown how the principles of democracy, integration and national autonomy are in clash with each another. A European constitution intended for improving the legitimacy of the system of supranational governance will thus require balancing these discreetly. The prospective of democracy and public accountability for the legitimacy of the Union is noticeable. The European integration needs affirmative results in the economic sphere for its validation. Providing welfare benefits and economic development is usually seen as a way of legitimizing developing polities. Lipset (1994) states that to "attain legitimacy, what new democracies need above all is efficacy, particularly in the economic arena, but also in the polity. If they can keep the high road to economic development, they can keep heir political houses in order" (Lipset, 1). While these remarks are aimed at new democracies those emerging from colonial or autocratic rule - it rings true also regarding the EU. Moreover, the use of opinions about the economic advantages coming from integration has been persistent in theory (Kirchner and Schwartze, 183-208). Thus, it has been maintained that the greater efficiency of supranational management can balance the 'democratic deficit' (Jachtenfuchs, 115-133). What remains is the European Union's acknowledgment of national identity and state autonomy. National interests are, certainly, well-established in Council of Ministers, however it is important to note that in spite of this entrenchment there is a growing distrust among national publics and leaders that national diversity is under threat from the integration process. It is normally easy, although unacceptable, to resist further integration and democratization. Bibliography Bryde, B.-O., 'Die bundesrepublikanische Volksdemokratie als Irrweg des Demokratietheorie', 1994:305-330, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, Vol. 5, No. 3. Connor, W. Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding, 1994, Princeton: Princeton UP. Frowein, J. A. 'Das Maastricht Urteil und die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit', 1993:1-16, Zeitschrift fr auslndisches ffentliches Recht und Vkerrecht, Vol. 54, No. 1. Giddens, A. The Constitution of Society, 1984, Polity Press: Cambridge. Ipsen, H.P. 'Zehn Glossen zum Maastricht Urteil', 1994:1-21, Europarecht, Vol. 29, No. 1. Jachtenfuchs, M. 'Theoretical Approaches to European Governance', 1995:115-133, European Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2. Joerges, C. 'Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration', 1996:105-135, European Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1. Kirchner, C and Schwartze, A. 'Legitimationsprobleme in einer europischen Verfassung', 1995:183-208, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, Vol. 6, No. 2. Lipset, S. M. 'The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited', 1994:1-22, American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 1. Tocqueville, Alexis de. The Old Regime and the French Revolution, 1955, New York: Anchor Books. Wallace, W and Smith, J. 'Democracy or Technocracy European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent', 1995:137-157, West European Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3. Weiler, J. 'The State "ber alles" - Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision', 1995:219-258, European Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3. Read More