Gilson v. Metropolitan Opera - Case Study Example

Gilson v. Metropolitan Opera (15AD3d55) New York Appellate Division, First Department, 2005 Facts: Estelle Gilson sustained injuries while attending a performance at the Metropolitan Opera House at Lincoln Center. She incurred the injuries, when after the intermission and after the lights have been dimmed, Mr. Donald Taitts, with his wife returned tot heir seats. Mr. Taitts is said to be suffering physical disability and it is inopportune that upon their return to their seats which was down the roe from Ms. Gilson, Mr. Taitts lost his balance and thereafter fell into Ms. Gilson, who in turn fell down the stairs and as a result, she obtained injuries on her body. Procedural History and Posture: Gilson initiated an action against the Metropolitan Opera as well as the Lincoln Center for negligence and for violation of certain provisions of the City Building Code. Consequently, the trial court set aside the allegation against Lincoln Center, it being an out of possession lessor. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the trial court which denied the Metropolitan opera's motion for summary judgment pronouncing that there were questions of fact "including, but not limited to whether defendant maintained the stairs aisles in dangerous manner thereby causing a dangerous condition which caused the plaintiff's accident." Issue: Whether or not the Metropolitan Opera House can be held liable for negligence for the injury sustained by Estelle Gilson, by allowing Donald Taitts to return to his seat after the performance had resumed without an escort or usher Decision: The Court ruled in the negative. Based on the facts as alleged, there is no foundation which existed for a possible negligence claim. Reasoning: The Court pointed out that herein plaintiff Gilson did not asset a breach of any common law duty expected to the Opera House. The Court further elucidated that imposing a duty on the Opera House based on its house rules "would in effect, be punishing it for attempting to ensure an exceptional level of courtesy to the audience and the performers" which correspondingly will lead to a new and detailed standard of care for all theatrical venues. Similarly, the Court ruled that despite of the deficiency in the compliance with the City Building Code, the loss of balance and the fall of Mr. Taitts cannot be attributed to it. IT does not appear that it has been related to his inability to see his seat due to the inadequate lighting but it can be recognized as his difficulty in movement. Morgan Vertical Consultants, Inc. v. Arco Wentworth Mgmt. (2007 NY Slip Op 50554(U)) Supreme Court Queens County, New York. 2007 Facts: Plaintiff Morgan Vertical Consultants, Inc is a service provider for elevator maintenance and repair works, commences an action for the recovery of sum money for goods, labor and services among others pursuant to contracts with the sixteen cooperative which the defendant Arco Wentworth Mgmt. is the managing agent. It likewise includes allegation of unjust enrichment. Procedural History and Posture: Defendant Arco moves for a motion to dismiss the causes of action on the ground that there is no privity of contract between herein defendant Arco and Morgan. On the other hand, herein plaintiff alleges that herein defendant is estopped from asserting lack of privity of contract as an argument. Issues: 1. Is there a privity of contract between Morgan Vertical Consultants and Arco Wentworth Mgmt 2. Can Morgan interpose the defense of estoppel against Arco Decision: 1. The Court ruled in the negative. There is no privity of contract between the parties as evidenced by the separate contracts and the bills and invoices by Morgan Vertical Consultants. 2. The Court ruled in the negative. Plaintiff has failed to identify any representations or conduct of the defendant which caused the plaintiff to act to its detriments. Reasoning: The Court provides that obligations arising out of the contract are usually limited to the parties and only the parties to a contract are liable for its breach. In the instant case, there are distinct and independent contracts between Morgan and the cooperative corporations. When an agent undertakes an action for and in behalf of a disclosed principal, the said agent will not be legally responsible for such a breach unless it can be proven that there is a stipulation to the contrary or the agent personally obliged himself to be liable. Similarly, the bills and invoices showed that it was the various cooperative corporations who received the services and goods provided for by Morgan. Correspondingly, Morgan failed to identify that it was induced by Arco to act to its disadvantage. Aside from this, it also failed to allege its lack of knowledge as to the circumstances of the contract. As such, the principle of estoppel cannot be made to apply. The People of the State of New York v. Richard Aiken (6Ad3d 236) Court of Appeals, New York. 2005 Facts: Defendant Aiken and his victim were next door neighbors in the same apartment in Bronx for almost forty years. Their families were close until disputes and misunderstanding arise between them which included telephone and cable wirings among others. Sometime in 1997, after a heated verbal argument, the victim stabbed the accused in the back. In the following years, the victim repeatedly threatened to cause injury to the defendant. In December of 1999, the defendant and the victim had a disagreement because of shared bedroom wall of their apartments. Herein defendant hit his side of the wall. While the defendant was still holding his metal pipe, another argument proceeded between them. When the victim reached into his pocket, the defendant assumed that he was to be stabbed again, he attacked the victim in the head using his metal pipe and eventually killing him. Procedural History and Posture: The defendant interposes the defense of justification. The jury exonerated the defendant for murder, but it found the defendant guilty of first degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division confirmed the decision of the lower court. Issue: Does a defendant have a duty to retreat into his home when he can safely do so Decision: The Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative and likewise affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court and the Appellate Division. Reasoning: The Court consistently ruled that the defense of one's person and family as well as the defense of one's home is inviolable. Similarly, if the assault transpires in the dwelling, retreat is not required, but one may use reasonable force to prevent it. Evidence shows that herein defendant does not have a duty to retreat for the door way where he is alleged to be at the time of the occurrence of the offense. This is for the reason that the doorway serves as the mixture of the public a private place wherein the law provides for different refuge and defenses. Read More