The US Failure to Join the League of Nations - Essay Example

US FAILURE TO JOIN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: EFFECT OF TWO-LEVEL GAME THEORY "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenantsfor the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." President Woodrow Wilson The League of Nations, an international organization, was established after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The Covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles on the insistence of President Woodrow Wilson, who tabled the Covenant at the Conference. The League of Nations brought a ray of hope to the war-weary nations of the world. War weariness is a common phenomenon, more so when the gains from such wars are intangible and far removed from domestic affairs. In the aftermath of prolonged periods of conflict, "war prevention assumes a high priority[and]the favoured technique is to institute measures of cooperation and consultationwith a view to preventing war"(Buzan 1983, 163). The League of Nations established in 1919 in the aftermath of World War I, was one such attempt to change the focus of war prevention from individual to collective security. For such an organization to be effective, it had perforce to have the backing of the major powers. Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and later Germany and Russia - all great powers in their own right - joined the League of Nations. The United Sates on the other hand, was the only major power not to join the League in spite of having been instrumental in creating it in the first place. According to Meg Harney, "While an excellent idea in theory, the League met with repeated problemssimply because nations had not adapted their foreign policy to change". The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was one such institution that could neither envision nor endorse this shift from a, 'balance of power' diplomacy to a new diplomacy giving greater weightage to collective security. This dichotomy i.e. the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations, in spite of being its staunchest advocate, could thus be ascribed to its inability to reconcile domestic political compulsions with its international obligations. This interaction between domestic and international requirements was highlighted by Robert Putnam in his 'two-level game' theory, and the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations could be analyzed in this context. To this end a brief overview of the theory would not be out of place to place in perspective the salient aspects of the theory, against the backdrop of the events leading to the formation of the League of Nations. The clash between President Wilson and the Senate over the formation of the League of Nations has been analyzed form many viewpoints. While some analysts see it as nothing more than the outcome of partisan politics, others view it as a clash of ideas between the 'internationalists' and the 'isolationists'. Though formally articulated only in 1988, the US failure to join the League of Nations can also be viewed through the lens of Putnam's 'two-level game' theory. It is a well-known fact that national leaders are simultaneously discharging their duties at two levels - the international level and the national level - with a dynamic interplay between the two. National leaders do not conceive of foreign policy in a domestic vacuum, nor domestic policies without considering the international ramifications. As far as foreign policy is concerned, they have to consider the interests of their domestic constituencies, balancing the 'costs' of implementing foreign policy initiatives against domestic imperatives such as national economy and social welfare. Thus, the right moves at one level (of the game) can affect the other level, ultimately impacting upon the deliberations at that level. An analogy could be that of a magnet held below a sheet of paper controlling the movement of a metallic token placed above the sheet. Keeping this in mind, Robert Putnam summarized the connections between foreign and domestic policy as a "two-level" game wherein: " The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign." (Putnam, 434). In the light of the 'two-level game' theory, as expounded by Putnam, it will be worth recollecting the situation existing at the end of armed conflict in World War I, but before a state of war had formally been called off. With emotions running high and with the victors looking for revenge, sane counsel was required to look for ways and means to ensure a lasting peace. As noted earlier, the League of Nations was founded after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Apart from the most obvious role of preventing war through collective security, other roles envisaged for the League included disarmament, dispute resolution through negotiation and global welfare. President Woodrow Wilson visualized the League of Nations as an independent body heralding a new phase of international relations based on cooperation between all states - great and small - of the world. The traditional 'balance of power' diplomacy embodied in the Westphalia system of secret treaties between elite groups had led to the division of Europe in to antagonistic camps, leading to needless conflict as one nation or the other sought to advance its national self-interest. The League of Nations was based on the, "assumption that peace-loving countries could collectively deter - and if necessary, counteract - aggression. Instead of accepting war as a legitimate instrument of national policy, collective security advocates sought to inhibit war through the threat of collective action" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 451-2). In essence, collective security would occur when "a group of states attempts to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish any member state that violates the system's norms" (Downs 1994, qt. by Kegley and Wittkopf, 452). The element of coercion - insistence on order at all costs is quite evident. However, what was perhaps more necessary in the aftermath of great destruction was conciliation, "the organized opportunity for the processes of conference and peaceful arbitration, while leaving each nation absolutely free to determine its course if conference and arbitrament fail" (Pepper, 22). The obligation to be part of an alliance that carried an implicit threat of the use of force was not palatable to many. Although President Wilson was awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 1919 for his efforts in instituting the League of Nations, the United States neither ratified the Charter nor joined the League. United States participation in World War I signified a shift in the global balance of power, and an end of European dominance, as the United States became the guarantor of peace in Europe. The United States was meant to be the fifth permanent member, but a Republican dominated Senate after the elections voted in March 1920, against ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which included the Covenant of the League of Nations. This was primarily due to opposition form leading Republican Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William E. Borah who were opposed to the open ended nature of the League's charter. What is to be noted is that opposition to the League was not restricted to the United States or the Republican Party alone. In Great Britain for example, where the public supported the formation of the League, it was the incumbent government that viewed the League with indifference. This was largely due to the fact that men like Lloyd George, Stanley Baldwin and Curzon who dominated the British government preferred the 'old diplomacy'. As per Karl Schmidt, Lloyd George preferred, "Diplomacy by conference - where the great powers would meet in a less formal setting to discuss problems - to any such system as the League". France would have been satisfied by an exclusive French Security Treaty that guaranteed its security from any future German threat. Yet, Great Britain and France ended up joining the League of Nations while the United States did not. To be fair, the Republicans did suggest alternatives, which will be discussed later, but President Wilson refused to consider these. As later events were to prove in which the League was found wanting in resolving disputes, these reservations voiced by the Republicans were well founded, as were the amendments suggested by them, but in the absence of any consensus, the Bill was not ratified by the Senate. This led to the United States staying outside the ambit of the League of Nations. President Wilson's intransigence indirectly led to the demise of the League itself, which was in effect his brainchild. Had both parties been more amenable to compromise, a more acceptable international treaty might have been possible; one that may have forestalled the causes of World War II. Most studies have focussed on the fact that it was Republican opposition that led to the non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. What is less well known is that the Republicans had in fact suggested a viable alternative in the form of an alliance restricted to the victors of World War I. Many top ranking Republican leaders including Henry Cabot Lodge, "advocated the maintenance of the wartime coalition against Germany[and]favored a military alliance limited to Western Europe[but]opposed the indefinite commitments of a universal League of Nations (Ambrosius, 341-2). As many historians have opined, Wilson's advocacy of the League of Nations was the culmination of the United Sates policy of 'internationalism'. Far from being 'isolationists', the Republicans were equally concerned about peace in Europe and the security of France. The difference between President Wilson and the Senate was a fundamental one of how this was to be achieved, and not merely a fight between Democrats and Republicans; internationalists and isolationists. The Republicans were very clear that peace in Europe could only be guaranteed by making sure that Germany would never be in a position to wage war again. To this end, they favored an alliance between the United States and its wartime Allies, rather than any global system of collective security. Their specific objection were to those Articles of the Covenant, which obligated each member to respect and come to the aid of each other, irrespective of national interest, if called upon to do so by the League. Thus the Republicans can in no way be termed 'isolationists', but the open ended nature of the Covenant, they felt, would make the United States the 'world's policeman'. In fact, these fears mirror the situation as it exists today. By failing to appreciate the Republican viewpoint of an 'alliance of a few', rather than global collective security, President Wilson lost the support of Republican senators. Equally important was the fact was that the Republicans did not want to make United States intervention subject to the authority of the League, apprehending (quite rightly) that the procedures to be invoked before any action could even be contemplated were quite cumbersome and impractical. As it turns out, these apprehensions proved to be well founded. The League of Nations was singularly unsuccessful in dealing with many conflicts of the inter-war years that required a rapid intervention for speedy resolution of conflict situations. A case in point is the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. When the Chinese representative in Geneva appealed to the League Council for help, the League Council, confused by conflicting reports, asked the countries to resolve the issue bilaterally. Meanwhile, the Japanese continued to advance and the situation in Manchuria worsened. Finally, more than three months after the crisis, the League appointed a commission to study the problem. When the Commission submitted its report that Japan had violated the Covenant and the Assembly of the League of Nations voted to adopt it, Japan responded to by quitting the League. Moreover, the Republicans did not want to, "surrender to the League of Nations the power of Congress to decide whether or not to declare war" (Ambrosius, 347), as would be the case with an exclusive French Security Treaty. Most Republicans agreed that the security of Europe was directly linked to United States national interests. However, they were not sure whether the United States populace, in the aftermath of World War I, was ready to accept the role of 'global policeman' and the additional burden that this would entail both in terms of men and material. Thus state leaders were posturing at the domestic level on what was essentially an international matter. To the public at large, especially one, which in the early part of the 20th century, was not so well versed in foreign affairs as it is today, the future security of Europe, was of little consequence. The election of 1920 thus became a de-facto referendum on whether or not the United States should join the League of Nations. Whereas the Democrats were fully in favor of the United States joining the League, most Republicans favored United States entry only after specific amendments to Articles X - XVI of the Covenant. This became a major campaigning issue, with both parties expounding the merits of their respective policies in a bid to mould public opinion. Thus the stage was set where actions at the domestic level (Level II Game) would influence the outcome of United States foreign policy at the international level (Level I Game). The Republicans won the 1920 election with a huge margin and this victory was hailed as a vote against United States participation in the League of Nations. In April 1921, addressing a joint session of the Congress, President Harding said, " In the existing League of Nations, world-governing with its super powers, this Republic will have no part. There can be no misinterpretation and there will be no betrayal of the deliberate expression of the American people in the recent election; and, settled in decision for ourselves, it is only fair to say to the world in general, and to our associates in particular, that the League Covenant can have no sanction by us. " (Scott, 409). The application of the 'Two-Level game' theory is not restricted to the United States alone, nor is a new phenomenon. In the case of Great Britain, domestic compulsions led to Britain joining the League. Sometimes, actions by players at one level may appear irrational to the players and constituencies at the other level, as players seek to further their own agendas. Thus it becomes necessary to study the likely benefits at both levels to truly understand the issue at stake. Putnam's 'two-level game' theory can be applied to any number of situations past and present and the same interplay of relations between the two levels is clearly discernible. Various attempts to divert domestic attention by focussing on a real or imaginary external threat are prime examples of the 'two-levels' of the game in action. Whether or not all the political elites involved in the debate realized that they were playing out their roles at two levels is a matter of speculation. However, that these levels do exist and that there is an interplay between the two is quite evident. The Republicans were better able to judge the public mood and manipulate domestic opinion in order to secure their objectives at the international level. The final outcome was that the United States never joined the League of Nations as Congress felt that the United States was already too enmeshed in European affairs. Although President Wilson tried his best to persuade the people of the United States that the League of Nations was an idea whose time had come, this sentiment was not shared by the majority of the populace. Most voters did not want to be involved in European conflicts to the detriment of their own national interests, thus highlighting the inter-relation between domestic and international politics. A 'Win-Win' situation is possible only when the concerns of the various players at both levels overlap, paving the way for the formulation of treaties leading to international cooperation. In the ongoing global war against terrorism, e.g. the concerns of all players at both levels, not only in the United States but also in diverse nations across the globe coincided, making possible the 'coalition of the willing'. As the war drags on, fissures are beginning to appear as the domestic costs of such a coalition begin to be felt. In this context, the next election in the United States may well turn out to be yet another contest between the Republicans and the Democrats over the future of the war in Iraq. Works Cited Ambrosius Lloyd E., Wilson, the Republicans, and French Security after World War I, The Journal of American History, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Sep., 1972), pp. 341-352. Buzan, "People, State and Fear", 1987, Harvester Press, Sussex, England. Harney Meg, Ineffectiveness in Action: The Failure of the League of Nations. Retrieved from http://members.aol.com/megxyz/meg.html Holsti, KJ, "International Politics: A Framework for Analysis", 7th Edition 1995, Prentice-Hall, Inc, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., USA. Kegley, Charles W., Jr, and Wittkopf, Eugene R, "World Politics: Trends and Transformations", 6th Edition 1997, St Martin's Press, New York. Pepper, George Wharton, America and the League of Nations, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 3rd Ser., Vol. 3, No. 1 (1921), pp. 21-30. Potter Pitman B., The Present Status of the Question of Membership of the United States in the League of Nations, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr., 1932), pp. 357-362. Putnam Robert D., "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." International Organization. 42(Summer 1988), pp. 427-460. Scott James Brown, President Harding's Foreign Policy, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Jul., 1921), pp. 409-411. Schmidt, Karl J., The League of Nations. Retrieved from http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/E/league/leaguexx.htm Read More