Philosophy of Morality by David Hume - Essay Example

David Hume’s Philosophy of Morality An analysis of Hume's writings on religion must begin with a consideration of his moral theory. According to Hume, reason alone is incapable of serving as the foundation of morality. He asserts that "morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Although reason plays .an instrumental role, only sentiment can generate the approbation and blame necessary to make moral distinctions. Hume suggests that virtue can be defined as "whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary" (ECPM, p. 289). Simply put, moral approbation and blame are feelings or sentiments which naturally arise in human beings when evoked by certain stimuli. According to Hume, we naturally approve of actions and qualities which we find either immediately agreeable or useful. Wit and eloquence are examples of the former; industry and honesty are examples of the latter. Although these sentiments of approbation and blame arise internally; they are by no means primarily self-centered or relative to each individual. Hume avoids these pitfalls by suggesting that human beings possess a general feeling of sympathy. Not to be confused with universal benevolence or generosity, sympathy allows us to share in the happiness and misery of those around us. Hume contends that the "minds of all men are not similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature" (T, pp. 575-76). In his more mature writings, Hume describes this sympathetic impulse as a sentiment of humanity. He points out that the very notion of morals implies some "sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. Without this ability to appeal to common sentiment, to recognize the fundamental likeness of human beings, man would be nothing but a "fancied monster," indifferent to others and totally incapable of making regular moral judgments (ECPM, p.235). It is this sympathetic impulse, this shared sentiment of humanity that serves as the foundation of all moral concord. Although the sentiment of humanity is "kneaded into our frame" and diffused so widely that "no man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others" (ECPM, p. 220), Hume is well aware that human beings do not live in conditions of universal benevolence and amity. His History of England is filled with examples of callousness, cruelty, and moral confusion. However, Hume avoids this apparent contradiction by suggesting that our sentiment of humanity is frighteningly fragile and can be perverted by external factors. Although the most prevalent and powerful of these factors is religion, it would be a serious mistake to conclude that Hume considers all forms of religion morally destructive. While some religions--those described by Hume as superstitious or enthusiastic--tend to undermine the common sentiment of humanity, Hume recognizes that religion is sometimes capable of promoting our recognition of similitude and bolstering the fragile moral sense. It is the latter species of religion that Hume recommends for public establishment. There is no question that Hume often writes with great vitriol when he addresses the subject of religion. What is less obvious is that Hume's most vicious attacks are aimed at two species of false religion, not at religion itself. These two perversions of religion are superstition and enthusiasm. According to Hume, superstition occurs in response to the vicissitudes and tribulations of life. This weak and apprehensive temperament leads to the most humble and submissive manner of worship. Because the superstitious worshiper judges himself unworthy to approach the deity, he "has recourse to any other person, whose sanctity of life, or, perhaps, impudence and cunning, has made him be supposed more favored by the Divinity" (E, p.75). Hume contends that this servile reliance upon priests corrupts morality by replacing the natural workings of sentiment with an unnatural and dogmatic regard for "monkish virtues." The realization of this frightful scenario is described in gruesome and exacting detail in Hume's account of the Crusades and the persecutions unleashed by Mary Tudor. Even the most heinous crimes are sanctified when ecclesiastics convince their servile flock that the glory of the cause atones for "every violation of justice and humanity" (H, 1: 237). Enthusiastic religions, on the other hand, are the product of unaccountable rapture and inspiration. The enthusiast's hope and rapture extend so far that he raises himself almost to the level of the deity. All external ceremonies and timorous prostrations are superfluous (and even profane) to the individual who achieves such heights. Although the enthusiast is free from the gloomy influence of priests, Hume is quick to point out that religious independence is not an unmitigated good. The great danger comes in turning all religious questions over to the private judgment of individuals. This religious emancipation necessarily leads to endless innovation and radical sectarianism. In the worst cases, we find that "every man had adjusted a system of religion, which, being derived from no traditional authority, was peculiar to himself; and being founded on supposed inspiration, not on any principles of human reason, had no means, besides cant and low rhetoric, by which it could recommend itself to others" (H, 6:3). If each man is committed to his own unique and incommunicable religious principles, all of the salutary qualities of religion are lost. The imperceptible yet indispensable links which render us sympathetic to others are weakened and perverted when individuals become theologically isolated. At this point, it would be easy to endorse the common view of Hume as an enemy to all religion. However, this interpretation overlooks the fact that Hume, ever mindful of the human condition, cannot ignore the great power and allure of religion. Hume recognizes that "the belief of invisible, intelligent power has been very generally diffused over the human race, in all places and in all ages" (NHR, p.3). And although this general propensity to believe can easily be perverted, it is only through the most "extraordinary concurrence of circumstances" that religious belief can be altogether extinguished (NHR, p. 3). Whether or not Hume secretly longed for such extraordinary circumstances, he talked himself out of advancing such an ill-advised project. Simply put, Hume accepts the fact that religious belief is an enduring part of human existence.(n15) Hume goes so far as to conclude that "the universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent power, if not an original instinct, being at least a general attendant of human nature, may be considered as a kind of mark or stamp, which the divine workman has set upon his work" (NHR, p. 74). The remaining task is to insure that this unremitting religious sentiment is consistent with a healthy moral order. On one hand, Hume offers a negative teaching here: moral sentiment is best preserved by a moderate religion, untainted by either superstition or enthusiasm. Less obvious is Hume's positive teaching: our sentiment of humanity can be bolstered when religion unites believers under a shared set of principles and beliefs. A middling established church satisfies both requirements. The ancient liturgy was preserved, so far as was thought consistent with the new principles: Many ceremonies, become venerable from age and preceding use, were retained: The splendor of the Romish worship, though removed, had at least given place to order and decency: The distinctive habits of the clergy, according to their different ranks, were continued: No innovation was admitted merely from spite and opposition to former usage; And the new religion, by mitigating the genius of the ancient superstition, and rendering it more compatible with the peace and interests of society, had preserved itself in that happy medium, which wise men have always sought, and which the people have so seldom been able to maintain (H, 4: 119-20) We do well to pause and consider whether Hume's support for an established church should be accepted at face value or if he is merely flattering the prevailing ecclesiastical powers. Despite the plausibility of the latter view, we can reject it for the following reasons. First, although Hume was a careful writer, he was not afraid to court controversy; especially controversy of the religious variety. With the inclusion of the section "Of Miracles" in the first Enquiry and his later publication of the Natural History of Religion, Hume demonstrated a readiness to shock the orthodox elements within the Scottish and English churches. It is difficult to imagine what Hume could hope to gain by flattering the religious authorities at this late date. This point becomes stronger when we consider that during the last decade of his life--in which he lived comfortably as a man of letters and the Church of Scotland was increasingly dominated by Moderate clergy friendly to Hume-he did not significantly alter his writings on this topic. Finally, as we will see, Hume's friend Adam Smith developed a very different, and arguably less orthodox, view of religious establishment yet suffered no serious religious backlash; there is little reason to doubt that Hume could have done the same. References Hume, Davis. Edited by Nidditch and Selby-Bigge (1751). Enquiry concerning the Principles of Moral. Oxford University Press Norman Kemp Smith. (1999). The Philosophy of David Hume. Stanley Tweyman. (2001). David Hume: Critical Assessments. Barry Stroud. (1998). Hume. Read More