How Important Was Citizen Participation in Soviet Decision-Making - Essay Example

How important was citizen participation in Soviet decision-making The crash of the USSR in December 1991 became a non-random consequence of the destructive era of the Soviet power. Among basic attributes of the Soviet system was a farcical political participation of Soviet citizens which some experts called "forced departicipation where and information was at a premium" (Conquest 1993, p. 91). In such a way the power was completely isolated from the society as the characteristic feature of the soviet system was a low reliance and dependence of its leaders on its citizenry. The people were highly exposed to regime's manipulation which monitored the course of socialization through the political regime's violent penetration into the society (Wallace 1994, p. 46). Only in the beginning of 1990s, citizens of the former Soviet Union began to speak about the 74 years of Soviet regime as a "blank space" in the course of national history, a blunder, a roundabout way, as something that virtually better hadn't happened. "Now 1991 is referred to as the "collapse" or "falling-apart" (raspad), a word with almost purely negative connotations, even though people also tell opinion-pollers that they would not want to go back to the old order" (Sherman 1990 p. 15). Besides there is no doubt that knowledge in this area is highly disordered disorientation and blurred as for a very long time nearly until the beginning of "perestroika" the Soviet Union remained a skilfully isolated and closed political system (Segal, Batt, Buzan, Duncan, Goodman, Price, Margot, Williams & Womack 1992). In our work we'll investigate the Soviet era itself with its "backwardness". We will view the question through the prism of the course of comparatively recent history from 1917 to 1991. In short, our incentive is not to prove that twentieth century Russia and the whole USSR was backward but to demonstrate how decisive this backwardness was and even is for Russian and Soviet self-understanding (Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 378). Russia's "backwardness" as compared with the West was a key prejudice of Russian intelligentsia of the 19th century, and it was this topic that became a background for a great amount of arguing in the second half of the 19th century. The ideas of a popular notion of Russia's peculiar mission in the world like (Laqueur 1994, p. 104) "Russia as third Rome" were still general and common, but even the supporters of such concepts like Slavophiles often had prejudice and concerning the universal Russian intelligentsia's sense of inferiority about west countries that were considered to be more developed (Motyl 1990, p. 211). Marxist revolutionaries as a group of the radical intelligentsia which appeared in the beginning of the 20th century got the name the Bolsheviks. Socialism implies for them a lot, but what appeared to be the most essential, as became clearly understandable after they gain power in the October Revolution in 1917, was the process of "modernization" or "modification" the whole society. Their fundamental incentive was the surmounting of historic backwardness of the country (Drakulic 1987). The Bolsheviks considered that this so-called economic and cultural backwardness was the result of quantity of the non-Slavic peoples of the North and East and "dark" peasantry. "Since Russia's population in the early twentieth century was 80 per cent peasant, and non-Slavs constituted close to half of the population of the state that in 1923 became the Soviet Union that meant that "backwardness" was the prevailing condition" (Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 378). The Bolsheviks considered themselves a vanguard party. Strictly speaking, this implied that they represented the vanguard of the proletariat; and in broader meaning, it implied a vanguard of education with the main aim to steer the public masses out of backwardness. And after the winning of Revolution they declared their vanguard in the whole world (Sherman 1990 p. 14). These events were profoundly based on their Marxist perception of history, with its ideas and postulates against capitalism while such tools were claimed to set the society in continuous motion from one level of development to another. "Russia, despite its backwardness, had been the first country to have a successful socialist revolution. The Bolshevik party was not only the vanguard of the proletariat "in Russia, it was also the vanguard of the international proletariat, exemplar and inspiration to the "progressive forces" of the world" (Wallace 1994, p. 47). During the first 12 years, all their catchwords were just proclaimed but not put in action thus remaining mostly rhetoric. Then in 1929 Stalin's so called Great Break began in the form of unexpected and precipitous transition to utterly ambitious tactics of economic and social modernization (for instance liquidation of private trade in the towns, collectivisation, fast industrialization, central economic planning etc), and the implementation, of course, demanded enormous dimensions of the regime violence against the citizens. The incentive, speaking in terms Marxist's philosophy, was to "build socialism" in the country; particularly, as Stalin stated, "it was a crash modernization program to build national strength and enable the Soviet Union to stand up to its capitalist enemies" (Motyl 1990, p. 117). This Great Break caused structural modernization as well as an abrupt and striking shifts in ways of life: for instance, collectivisation included peasants' working for common kolkhoz fields rather then for their own small lots; the liquidation of private trade in the included townspeople's necessity to queue up with those deficient ration cards in order to get some food and clothing from ineffective and usually worthless state manufacturers instead of having the opportunity to purchase them from private shopkeepers (Conquest 1993, p. 92). "The revolution had promised to destroy the old world and create a new one, and here, suddenly, that new world was - though whether it was the kind of new world that the revolutionaries had expected, or that could properly be called socialist, or even that people could live normal lives in, was another question entirely" (Wallace 1994, p. 46). The main aim in the Stalin period was also building socialism. There was some comparatively positive result in this socialism-building like, for example, a highly-developed heavy and defence industry, situated in Russia's traditional industrial centres as well as outside them. But we should not forget about a great spreading of bureaucracy (Segal, Batt, Buzan, Duncan, Goodman, Price, Margot, Williams & Womack 1992). Besides some positive results were achieved using the processes that included dramatic violence in the form of practicing widely-spread exiles and deportations, creating camps and prison, operating of secret police and informers, even forming the "industry of death" directed particularly at separate groups like "class enemies", kulaks, priests as they were "enemies of the people" (broadly speaking scapegoats for the regime's leaders), but also generally affecting the citizens choosing the victim in a random manner (Drakulic 1987). Building socialism was proclaimed to be helping the Soviet Union to become the most "progressed" nation of the world, seemingly giving it the opportunity to "catch up and overtake the West" (Wallace 1994 p. 47). Soviet deficit of food, clothing and housing become a permanent component in the life of the Soviet citizens. For the firs time it was explained as short term problems of the modification and transition; later, when all this negative phenomena did not disappear, they were treated and accepted as a particular kind of constant norm (Laqueur 1994, p. 52). Survival under the circumstances of deficit originated a set of common Soviet practices which included using of personal contacts and bribery in order to outwit distribution bureaucracies. Another destructive consequence was the forming and penetrating of a dependent, suppliant psychology in the total moral and ethical values of population ruining them this way and on this fundamentals the assumption appeared that there was not much the people could do about all this situation themselves (Motyl 1990, p. 84). Simultaneously there virtually were those things that Soviet citizens could do and really did themselves to obtain at least the goods and services they were in need, for instance the use of "blat" networks and patronage, appropriation of state property in other words stealing and those were not rare practices. "The state made constant claims about the magnitude of Soviet economic achievements and also general improvement in life (Stalin's "Life is becoming better, comrades"), which coexisted with a reality of hardship and living standards" (Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 380). After World War II brought a Soviet victory, it was construed as an exculpation of the revolution itself and the Soviet regime; on this ground in the post-war period a new myth was formed, which to some extent substitute the myth of the Soviet revolution. The Soviet citizens were tried to convince that their life had positively more developed in any aspect forms than those that are in capitalist countries (Conquest 1993). Moreover very soon the secret surveys of public opinion carried out by the security police demonstrated, the citizens completely approve the regime's announcements about high World War II achievements and the essential role of the Soviet Union's key and decisive part in the post-war world (Laqueur 1994 p. 59). Thus it isn't strange that they even now differ from us. And at the Soviet period of their history the Soviet citizens obviously had special attitudes and values, special mindset, special behaviour. "They appeared to be arrogant, cynical, and somewhat morose with a penchant for dissimulation" (Sherman 1990, p. 14). "If the Soviets did little else well, they did manage, it seems, to successfully create a new human being, Homo Sovieticus, who in order to survive in Soviet society, would think one thing, say another, and do a third" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 382). Survival for the Soviet society implied outwitting the system, not obeying the norms, "na levo" as it was called. This was morally admissible as the system itself was corrupt. Citizens of the Soviet Union had little stimulus for working hard. They pretended to work, and their leaders pretended to pay them, and it was a common reality of life. Naturally dipsomania became widely spread. Once there was a joke that any person coming to work sober was considered to be a spy (Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 379). Dr. Voldemars Gulens, a Latvian Canadian psychiatrist who has investigated the Soviet personality and demonstrated the results in an article called "Distortions in Personality Development in Individuals Emerging From a Long-Term Totalitarian Regime" proposed some information for better understanding the problem. His investigation starts with the assumption that "in Soviet citizens we witness major distortions in psychological make-up brought about by their being born into, growing up in, and forming a family in a totalitarian society. The distortions involve the very core of the individual affecting not only his or her constant self-sentiment and attitude to life and to society, but also his or her orientation to change" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 381). It comes as no surprise, these perversions soundly decreased the ability of Soviet citizens to react constructively to the great number of economic, sociological and political events in their national order. One of the more evident characteristics of the Soviet and even post-Soviet citizen seemed to be highly depressed. "When questioned about their personal outlook on life, they reply with deep sighs, shrugs, and expressions of hopelessness and helplessness. The message is that of a bleak outlook on life and not being masters of their own fate" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 382). Those people who are continuously depressed find it hard to react adequately to any kind of new information and demands for changes. They are less likely to participate in the political process considering that no matter how they vote, the corrupt will always win. Without any hope for the future, "priority is given to satisfaction of personal momentary needs, without considering one's own long-term goals, the feelings of others, or societal benefits" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000). Another striking characteristic of the Soviet and post-Soviet society "is the juxtaposition of profound distrust of, and anger at the authorities, with the contradictory feeling of dependence, and the belief that 'someone up there' ought to make the right decisions and set things right" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 383). "Closely related to feelings of dependence is the lack of individual autonomy. Soviet citizens were used to expecting directives from authorities. Thus they have little experience in taking initiative and responsibility" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000). Problems can be readily identified but few solutions are offered. "In the past, once a problem has been identified and someone else blamed for it, all attempts at problem resolution would cease" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000). An inability to seek communal solutions is a function of post-Soviet difficulties in evaluating reality. "In the Soviet Union, the individual was never expected to make observations, draw conclusions, and decide what the truth is" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000). That was the prerogative of the state which defined reality according to political considerations. Small wonder that some people in the former Soviet Union are disoriented, "unable to distinguish facts from rumors, wishful thinking, paranoid explanations, and disinformation" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 379). One of the more debilitating features of the post-Soviet psyche is the kind of arrogance and posturing which is the result of a feeling of inadequacy. "It is difficult for former Soviet citizens to work toward a common goal when everyone feels personally inadequate for the perceived job because of a lack of experience with assuming responsibility, risk-taking, or decision-making" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000). This inadequacy, however, is never admitted. On the contrary pretence, arrogance and denial are common defence mechanisms. Having experienced empty slogans and the corruption of all personal and common ideals, many post-Soviet citizens have difficulties accepting altruism, especially from outsiders. "All foreign aid is assumed to be given for purely selfish, self-serving, ulterior motives," writes Dr. Gulens (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000). This attitude, in turn, makes it difficult for them to be appreciative of assistance, to simply say "thank you." And finally, there is anger. "Individuals who have experienced a lifetime of humiliation, harassment, persecution, injustice and betrayal develop an understandable sense of outrage" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000). Dr. Gulens offers more penetration into post-Soviet society but suggests that more study is needed to assess the damage. "The forces that have deformed the personality of the Soviet citizen are complex and long standing. The damage is so pervasive that one can entertain the idea that it contributed significantly to the collapse of the Soviet empire" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 380) He concludes that "the evident differences between 'them' and 'us' are manifestations of deep psychological distortions in personality and social relations that have arisen from decades of humiliation, harassment, persecution and betrayal. Damage to conscience formation and function has led to severe impairment in morality, altruism and fairness" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2000). Thus summarizing the characteristic features of the Soviet regime and their influence on its citizens particularly their possibility for decision-making we may state that: In the Soviet society, only the leaders, who had political power, were able to take part in national decision-making. The citizens had no influence on national decisions. The leaders were not guided or controlled by public opinion as well as were not accountable to the citizens. The Soviet citizen's behaviour, values and the whole life were under strict state control. The education system provided no possibilities to discuss, view and investigate ideas and concepts not approved by the State. The ubiquitous secret police and government informers made citizens unwilling to openly expressing individual thoughts and opinions. The legal system didn't provide citizens with any protection from possible arbitrary arrest and imprisonment (Wallace 1994, p. 46). "Though no longer totalitarian and demonstrating a decreasing capacity to mobilize its citizens effectively the Soviet Union remained until the last years of perestroika an effectively closed political system" (Laqueur 1994, p. 77). WORKS CITED Conquest, Robert. 1993. Academe and the Soviet Myth. The National Interest, Spring. Drakulic, Slavenka. 1987. Wanted: A Nude Glasnost; Soviet Chic. The Nation, 20 June. Fitzpatrick, Sheila. 2000. Russia's Twentieth Century in History and Historiography. The Australian Journal of Politics and History 46, no. 3, p.378. Laqueur, Walter. 1994. The Dream That Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union. New York: Oxford University Press. Motyl, Alexander J. 1990. Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR. New York: Columbia University Press. Segal, Gerald, Judy Batt, Barry Buzan, Peter J. S. Duncan, David S. G. Goodman, Adrian Hyde-Price, Margot Light, John Phipps, Michael C. Williams, and Brantly Womack. 1992. Openness and Foreign Policy Reform in Communist States. New York: Routledge. Sherman, Howard J. 1990. The Second Soviet Revolution or the Transition from Statism to Socialism. Monthly Review, March. Wallace, Bill. 1994. The Democratic Development of the Former Soviet Union. History Today, July. Read More