The Language Game and the Problem of Free Will - Essay Example

Jurgn Habermas: A Critical Review Social Theory January 15, 2009 INTRODUCTION Jurgn Habermas made ground-breaking theoretical contributions attempting to clarify the controversial relationship between agency and structure. The current treatment will explore two of his pioneering manuscripts, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), and the Theory of Communicative Action (1985). These manuscripts will be used to explore important elements of complex social phenomenon that Habermas deemed relevant to demystify the linkages between social structure and human agency in everyday life. Contemporary social theory is constantly evolving, and these works represent a pioneering attempt to reconcile two disparate schools of social thought that were dominant at the time of his writing. According to Heiskala (1990), competing epistemological frameworks prevalent before Haberman, generally revolved around structural functionalism and action theory. [Through his work, Habermas] tried to fit together social structural functionalism (Parsons in particular) and action theory (Mead and phenomenology in particular) by creating the distinction between life system and the life world to correspond to them in social reality [and highlight] the distinction between the perspective of the external observer and the perspective of actor to correspond to their theoretical ways of study. 1 By integrating structure and action through communication and other factors in the public and private realm, the current paper will illustrate significant elements of Habermas's works in order to demonstrate its' profound impact on social theory that continues to this very day. CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL THEORY We begin the critical review by summarizing elements found in the public sphere. Habermas makes the powerful linkage between action and structure explicit through his notion of "mutual infiltration of public and private spheres" (1989, pp. 141-151). Here, Habermas suggests that it is the bourgeois, rather then any other class, that influences structures composing state and society. Legal, political, social and other specialized elements of public life come to fore as they impact the constructions of society in powerful but distinct ways. The fundamental separation of state and society in the bourgeois world was the result of a variety of phenomena within society, including legal, political, and social aspects. The interaction of these brought about a fundamental separation within various spheres of life. Specifically, the lack of political dominance also transformed the economic phenomenon and manifestation of production. In the legal and economic field however, the public and the private realms gradually became equal, with the state no longer dominating many aspects of life and production. The public and the private could not, however, remain separated as a result of civil society, as conflicts of interest often made it necessary for formal regulatory interventions to take place. Habermas refers to this as neomercantilism, which means that the political public sphere integrated with the interests of civil society in terms of interventionism. It is therefore a type of post-separation reintegration of the private and the public, but without any particular dominance of one over the other. The economic world begins to merge with the political world, where the state and business shared political and economic power reciprocally. By necessity, these circumstances stimulated state intervention [public sector] in business activities [private sector], in order to assure that certain interests were not threatened. The purpose of interventionism in this regard was to maintain equilibrium within the system, whereas in the past it had been to maintain the power of the political elite. Habermas argues that under new systemic institutional arrangements, more political and legal power is being reciprocally exchanged and reinforced among these public authorities than ever before. Another ground-breaking feature of his work lies in his description of the rise of capitalism, which is essentially consistent with Marx insofar as alienation of the producer from the means of production and related inequalities through extraction of surplus labour is concerned. Yet relations under modernity have changed since the time of Marx's writing, and Habermas astutely points out that rewards from work are no longer associated with quality of product delivery, but cash instead. As a result, relations among workers and employers are much more complicated then simple class-based means of production dimensions under simple industrial production. Property rights are similarly complicated under changing economic relations of modernity, conditions that Habermas calls the privatisation of public law. Contracts of both wage and property became such that the parties making use of services were protected, while the capitalist was assured of a continuing type of command of power. His pioneering insight illustrated that both public and private law have gradually became so inextricably interwoven, that the private and public spheres becomes virtually inextricable. Under modernity, most contracts require formal legal relationships which were restricted on the basis of legal stipulations. Subordination and related power are thus legally induced voluntarily, rather than enforced coercively through policing entities or other authoritative bodies of power. Despite their legal enforcement under private law, contracts have what Habermas refers to as a quasi-public character, vacillating and reinforcing authority among in public and private spheres. As a result of this wavering, contractual obligations among the state and society could no longer be separated, and have led to the emergence of an integrated reciprocal legal system that transfers and reinforces power and authority among actors through complex contractual obligations. This separation is exacerbated by the absence of dialogue, whose re-creation is essential, according to Habermas, if we are to restructuring more egalitarian institutional arrangements. The primacy of communication was also the focus of another of his ground-breaking works, The Theory of Communicative Action (1985). Here Habermas argues that these power arrangements and other impediments in complex social structures significantly hinder free and open communication. When communication is attempted, it is usually predicated or contingent upon restrictions based on shared meanings, mutual understandings, and other commonalities rendered highly problematic by a complex social structure; not exclusively determined by the actor attempting the communication. In communicative action a speaker selects a comprehensive linguistic expression only in order to come to an understanding with a hearer about something and thereby to make himself understandable. It belongs to the communicative intent of the speaker (a) that he perform a speech act that is right in respect to the given normative context, so that between him and the hearer an intersubjective relationship will come about that is recognized as legitimate; b) that he makes a true statement (or correct existential presuppositions), so that the hearer will accept and share knowledge of the speaker; and c) that he express truthfully his beliefs, intentions, feelings, desires, and the like, so that the hearer will give credence to what is said. 2 The structural elements that guide or otherwise influence communication are overwhelming and include the judiciary, the state, the economy, even the family. As these complex structures evolve, (what he calls system-worlds), it becomes more likely that they gain the ability to control human agency and other elements of the private sphere (what he calls life-worlds). The loss of control can be construed as a form of repression attributed to the "transformation of the structures of public communication." (Outhwaite, 2003, pp. 187-8). Both agency and social integration beyond structure (life-world) come under threat as communication is distorted and formal rationality restricts the ability for actors to convey pure discursive meaning. The problem for Habermas is that communicative consensus seem unlikely because the system has its own logic, and therefore can never be decisively transformed. Instead we are left with a semblance of communication that is filtered through a variety of restrictions, prohibitions, exclusions, privitisations, and deformations. Without communication, authentic interaction and other forms of human agency is virtually impossible. Habermas suggests that ideal speech should instead become our objective. Here participants enjoy mutual understanding and respect, engage in dialogue that is truthful and unfiltered, and engage in discursive exchanges that do not necessarily have to adhere to regulations associated with purposive bureaucratic action. The drive instead is the intention of demonstrating sincerity, consensus, and agreement through ideal communication. According to Wallace and Wolf (1999), the ideal involves a situation in which everyone would have an equal chance to argue and question, without those who are more powerful, confident, or prestigious having and unequal say. True positions would prevail under these circumstances because they are more rational. a situation in which everyone would have an equal chance to argue and question, without those who are more powerful, confident, or prestigious having and unequal say. True positions would prevail under these circumstances because they are more rational. 3 Through his notion of ideal speech, Habermas offers a strategy to resist the constraining social structure inherent in system-worlds, to convey pure meaning and truth reflected and needed to strengthen life-worlds; thus leading to the emancipation and reassertion of human agency to sub-vert an increasingly repressive, legal and politically-legitimated, authoritarian social structure. CONTEXT Habermas addresses the development of the relationship between state and society since the 19th century up to the present time. Relationships of power during the feudal era were concrete, simple, and straightforward. The state had full power, while society had none. All political and economic power resided within the state, which was not restricted by legal transactions. When the feudal system was overthrown, the separation of state and society gave rise to paradigms of equality, which was again overtaken by the inequality of the capitalist system. This system was still fairly simple, but complications arose once the state began to intervene in societal activities by means of contracts, which eventually became mechanism for allocating power and maintaining authority. These arrangements only became more complex as the terms, conditions, provisions, and other stipulations of contracts further integrating state and society. In this way, simple social structures of the past are shown to have substantially transformed to meet the changing legal and political conditions of modernity. According to Outhwaite (2003, p. 228), Habermas's framework can be understood as one of reconstruction. In order to regain a sense of equilibrium and agreement, we are provided the possibility of "human communication, cooperation and debate." Habermas deconstructs human social interaction and the problems of structure into a paradigm integrating communication, sociology, morality, politics, and law. Communication is the universal element driving all these epistemological branches of knowledge. Whether his analysis focuses on contracts, political exchanges, business dialogue, or other structural elements of the system-world; distorted communication permeates all these activities and has devastating consequences for the exercise of human agency. Coming at a time of Cold War politics involving suppressed communication thwarting international relations making unification of state and society highly unlikely; Habermas might presumably have been inspired by fear and social distances associated with the Reagan era, perhaps contributing to his need for pure unfiltered communication leading to human understanding and trust. Then and now, pure undistorted communication remains the elusive goal for both states and society. But why did he concentrate so heavily on discourse as the key to human emancipation For Habermas, the problems in the connection between agency and structure is primarily one involving the repression of social action. Certain kinds of social action are not repressed by the social structure. For example, he distinguishes between the use of language to make claims about the world and language used to issue orders or exclamations. Making claims about the world is seen as an interactive activity to a much greater degree than the other two language acts. Orders are given from a position of authority, while exclamations are made on the basis of individual experience. The foundation of this theory is rooted in his premise of restrictions on free will. This was more explicitly addressed in his subsequent work, where Habermas (2007) suggests that freedom enables us to exercise human agency, in language and beyond, in that it provides opportunities action-orientation that is reflective. The crucial element here is the awareness of being able to act otherwise. Self determination means having the strength of will to ensure that, in acting, one is determined by precisely those reasons that one has found convincing oneself. 4 Habermas addresses morality upon this basis. Claims can be made about the world, as long as consensus is reached upon the principles that should serve as morals. Morals are then what would unify agency and structure in society. This is the moral basis upon which both agency and structure should be built. The absence of consent results in a moral dilemma. Driven by free will and exercised without repressive structures, communicative action become an potentially powerful mechanism by which consensus can be reached and societal equilibrium reestablished. DISCUSSION In terms of the relationship between agency and structure, Habermas focuses an inordinate amount of attention on the power of the state, claiming that dialogue towards mutual agreement can free society from automised substructures and bring about both equality and democracy. He substantiates his claim on the basis of historical evidence, drawing on the classic theories of Weber, Marx, and Kant when necessary. His focus, however, on the separation and reunification of state and society is at times ambiguous, since it was not until his work in 2007 when he capitulated that not all participants are capable of exercising free will to emancipate themselves from an oppressive social structure. Yet he reminds us that everyone is, nevertheless, capable of exercising communicative action, which, in the absence of total free will, still affords the individual with tremendous potential to engage in forms of unifying interaction that can still be highly rewarding if occasionally subversive. Habermas suggests that it is possible to attain social equilibrium thus unlocking our human potential for action, by sincerity, understanding, mutual agreement, and authenticity. Although his theories are constructed upon solid historical evidence and classical philosophies, he offers little evidence that his road to emancipation of human agency through undistorted communication could authentically reduce the repressive impact of hostile social structure. Indeed, Habermas appears to assume that human beings are capable of reaching mutual agreement, particularly on issues relating to politics and morality. By his own admission, these objectives will have an emancipating effect, albeit a problematic one. Furthermore, they are subject to arbitrary rather than rational judgment. Observation appears to suggest that pure communication, while perhaps clarifying meaning, might nevertheless, make mutual agreement highly unlikely (Morrow and Torres, 2002). This flaw in Habermas's work is made more explicitly by Macedo & Gutmann (1999) who not only point towards the fact that Habermas's mutual agreement paradigm is somewhat unrealistic, but also that Habermas is rather vague in his prescriptions for achieving such agreement. Linguistics do little to penetrate the political sphere and dissipate the often strong disagreement and orientation toward debate that might be found in this arena. Politicians and legal specialists will, after all, continue to develop highly exclusionary language that will hardly unify humanity through pure unfiltered communication in everyday life. Most promising in my reading is Habermas's ideal of deliberative democracy linking structure and agency. If undistorted communication could be achieved, coupled with the exercise of broad freewill at the community or life-world level; the public might someday make demands for political parties, if not the individual politicians themselves, to clearly articulate platforms, agenda, and policies that represent the authentic will of the people. Complexities in the social structure make such scenarios increasingly difficult under conditions of modernity. Social structures of law and politics might nevertheless, be capable of substantial improvement through the tremendous potential inherent in the circulation of real meaning and truth through undistorted communication. REFLEXIVITY Compared to Giddens, I found Habermas to be much more of a challenge in terms of abstract thinking. Although I had to think deeply to fulfil the expectations of this assignments, this cautious approach enabled me to significantly expand my understanding of concepts. I agree that our human potential can be optimized through unification, the dissemination of truth, and mutual respect brought on by pure communication; and I intend implement these revolutionary tactics in my own life. After careful consideration, I unequivocally state that I am now completely in opposition to the majority of Habermas's critics who take the cynical posture of determinism, suggesting that structure will inevitably influence and constrain agency. This is not necessarily true. One needs to look no further then ethnic migrant enclaves who have created their own cohesive communities through the power of communication. Given the circulation of people and ideas due to a combination of globalisation and internet communication, Habermas's undistorted communication, coupled with free will, will surely continue to have a profound impact upon both agency and social structure for the future. REFERENCES Habermas, Jurgen. 2007. The language game and the problem of free will: How can epistemic dualism be reconciled with ontological monism Philosophical Explorations 10(1):13-51. Habermas, Jurgen. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 1985. Theory of Communicative Action Beacon. Heiskala, Risto. 1990. Sociology as a Discursive Space - the Coming Age of a New Orthodoxy Acta Sociologica 33(4): 305-320. Macedo, Stephen & Gutmann, Amy. 1999. Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morrow, Raymond Allen & Torres, Carlos Alberto. 2002. Reading Freire and Habermas: Critical Pedagogy and Transformative Social Change. Teachers College Press. Outhwaite, William. 2003. Jurgen Habermas. In Ritzer, George ed. 2003 The Blackwell Companion to Major Contemporary Social Theorists. Blackwell. Niemi, Jari I. 2005. Habermas and Validity Claims. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13(2): 227-244. Wallace, Ruth A. and Alison Wolf. 1999. Contemporary Sociological Theory: Expanding the Classical Tradition, fourth edition. Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice Hall. White, Stephen K. 1995. The Cambridge Companion to Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Read More