Philosophy - Practical Ethics - Essay Example

Running Head: PHILOSOPHY - PRACTICAL ETHICS Philosophy - Practical Ethics Of Philosophy - Practical Ethics In this paper I will discuss the moral difference between abortion and infanticide with special reference to the views of Michael Tooley and Mary Anne Warren. Metaphysics is an area of philosophy that deals with questions having to do with the ultimate grounding and nature of things in the world. It is concerned with such diverse topics as the mind/body problem, identity, God, the existence and nature of universals, the existence and nature of the soul, and so on. Thus, the morality of abortion, if it is to be construed as contingent upon the nature of the fetus, is an issue whose resolution depends on which metaphysical view of the human person is correct. Given this, let us take a look at Michael's argument. Although he makes many provocative and interesting claims that deserve a reply, I will focus on a small portion of his essay that I believe is the core of his case. According to Michael, "the first principle of religious liberty is that laws will not be based upon abstract metaphysical speculation, but will be fashioned through the democratic processes in which every perspective is subject to critical analysis (Michael, 2000). Any proposal must be open either to revision or rejection." He then goes on to cite, as an example of what is not speculative metaphysics, the viability standard proposed by the Court in Roe. I will first critique Michael's use and defense of the viability standard and then move on to a general critique of Michael's view of "abstract metaphysical speculation." A. Abortion and Viability In Roe, the Supreme Court ruled that at fetal viability a state has an interest in protecting prenatal "potential") life, and thus may restrict abortion during that time as long as the restrictions allow for abortion to preserve the health and/or life of the pregnant woman In his dissenting opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Justice Harry A. Blackmun reasserted and defended the standard he first put forth in Roe: (Michael, 2000) For my part, I remain convinced, as six other Members of this court sixteen years ago were convinced, that the Roe framework, and the viability standard in particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively functions to safeguard the constitutional liberties of pregnant women while recognizing and accommodating the State's interest in potential human life. The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal development; it marks the threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman (Michael, 2000). At the same time, the viability standard takes account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the uterine environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential human life, and in fostering a regard for human life in general, becomes compelling. Michael's argument for the viability standard is nearly identical to the one presented by Blackmun: Part of the genius in Roe v. Wade (now affirmed in Casey) was putting forward the standard of viability: that stage of development at which the fetus has sufficient neurological and physical maturation to survive outside the womb. Prior to that, the fetus simply is not sufficiently developed as an independent being deserving and requiring the full protection of the law, i.e., a person (Michael, 2000). The notion of viability correlates biological maturation with personal identity in a way that can be recognized and accepted by reasonable people. Michael's use of the viability standard is seriously flawed. First, he praises the Court's legal use of the standard and then employs the standard as a decisive moment at which he believes it is reasonable to say that the fetus becomes a person, even though that is not the way the Court employed viability. In Roe, the Court divided pregnancy into trimesters. It ruled that aside from normal procedural guidelines to insure protection for the pregnant woman, a state has no right to restrict abortion in the first six months of pregnancy. In the last trimester (when the fetus is viable) the state has a right, although no obligation, to restrict abortions to only those cases in which the mother's life or health is in danger, since the state has a legitimate interest in protecting potential human life. If, however, the Court held that viability was the time at which the fetus becomes a person (which Michael apparently believes), then the states would have an obligation, not merely a right, under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the life of the fetus from unjust harm (Michael, 2000). Remember that Blackmun, in Webster, writes of the fetus's potential human life and not its actual Constitutional personhood. This follows from his comment in Roe that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." So, it is at the moment of birth, not viability, that the Court maintains that the fetus is a person. Viability is merely the time at which a state may increase its restrictions on abortion. Second, Michael's argument, like Blackmun's, is circular. Blackmun tells us that viability is the time at which the state has an interest in protecting potential human life because the fetus has no interests or rights prior to being able to survive outside the womb. But then we are told that viability is the best criterion because it "takes account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves...and loses its dependence on the uterine environment, the State's interest in the fetus's potential human life . . . becomes compelling." (Warren, 2004) In other words, Blackmun is claiming that the state only has an interest in protecting fetal life when that life can live outside the womb. But why is this correct Because, we are told, prior to being able to live outside the womb the fetus has no interests or rights. But this is clearly a case of circular reasoning, for Blackmun employs as a premise (that the fetus has no interests or rights prior to viability) the conclusion he is trying to prove (that the fetus has no interests or rights prior to viability). This argument is no more compelling than the one given by the zealous Los Angeles basketball fan who argues that the Lakers are the best team because no team is better (which, of course, is the same as being the best team) (Warren, 2004). Or the argument given by the political science professor who argues that democracy is the best form of government because the best form of government is one run by the people (which, of course, is democracy). Each of these arguments, like Blackmun's, falls prey to the fallacy of circular reasoning because each assumes what it is trying to prove without providing any independent evidence or reasons for its conclusion. Michael writes that prior to viability, "the fetus simply is not sufficiently developed as an independent being deserving and requiring the full protection of the law, i.e., a person." And this standard is reasonable, according to Michael, because "the notion of viability correlates biological maturation with personal identity in a way that can be recognized and accepted by reasonable people." (Warren, 2004) For Michael, a non-viable fetus should not have legal standing because it is not an independent organism (that is, non-viable). Thus, the circularity of Michael's argument is easy to discern: a non-viable fetus should not have legal standing because it is non-viable. Third, although Michael writes that the viability standard "correlates biological maturation with personal identity in a way that can be recognized and accepted by reasonable people,"(n20) many reasonable people reject it on the grounds that the standard is, in fact, unreasonable. Some reasons for this judgment include the following: (Warren, 2004) (1) Because viability is a measure of the sophistication and/or accessibility of our neonatal life-support systems (including both technological and human, e.g., parents, caregivers), the fetus remains the same while viability changes. For this reason, the viability standard seems to be arbitrary and not applicable to the philosophical question of whether the fetus is a human person. In fact, when Michael claims that the fetus undergoes change--goes from non-viable to viable--he is implying that the fetus is in fact a being distinct from, though changing its dependence in relation to, its mother. (2) Michael equivocates on the word "independence," for he confuses physical independence with ontological independence. He mistakenly argues from the fact of the fetus's lack of independence from its mother that it is not an independent being. To employ an analogy, a pair of conjoined twins may share so many organs that they are literally physically dependent on each other; that is, they cannot be surgically separated without killing both siblings. But that does not mean that they are not separate beings, ontologically independent persons. Granted, the fetus may not be a person for other philosophical reasons, but clearly not because it depends on another for its continued existence. (Warren, 2004) (3) Because viability is largely contingent upon our medical technology, it would seem to follow, according to Michael's argument, that a child born at 22-weeks gestation in 2000 is a human person while a 30-week fetus in 1900 is not a human person. This is absurd. (4) One could argue that the non-viability of the fetus, and the dependence and vulnerability that goes with that status, would lead one to have more rather than less concern for that being. That is, a human being's dependence and vulnerability is a call for her parents, family, and the wider human community to care and nurture her, rather than a justification to kill her. (5) Each of us, including the fetus, is non-viable in relation to his environment. If any one of us were to be placed naked on the moon or the earth's North Pole, one would quickly become aware of one's non-viability. Therefore, the fetus prior to the time she can live outside her mother's womb is as non-viable in relation to her environment as we are non-viable in relation to ours. (Warren, 2004) It seems, then, that the abortion debate can not be politically and legally resolved by merely appealing to a "first principle of religious liberty," as Michael calls it, for there does not seem to be any neutral ground. After all, to say that a woman should have the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy without public justification is tantamount to denying the anti-abortion position that fetuses are human persons who by nature are worthy of protection by the state. And to affirm that fetuses are human persons with a natural right to life that ought to be protected by the state is tantamount to denying the pro-choice position that a woman has a fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, because such a termination would result, in most cases, in an unjustified homicide (Warren, 2004). Consequently, when abortion rights advocates, in the name of tolerance and religious liberty, call for anti-abortion citizens to completely cease employing the legitimate avenues of our constitutional democracy for the purpose of protecting fetuses from harm, these pro-choice supporters are in fact instructing their fellow citizens to silently, politely, and without resistance acquiesce to the metaphysical status quo, namely, that fetuses are not full-fledged members of the human community and therefore are not entitled to protection by the state. To the opponent of abortion, this request hardly seems tolerant or liberating. References Michael 2000: "Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy," Rapid City Journal, 3/12/00; Calvitto, Celeste, 71. Scott, Moreland Rae 2000: J.P. Moreland in Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 2000), 52. Baruch Brody 2000: Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A Philosophical View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000. Mary Warren, Anne 2004: "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion," in The Problem of Abortion, 2nd ed., ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 2004). L.W. Sumner 2002: Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). Michael, 2000: "Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy," 72, n. 6. The book cited is Beverly Harrison, Our Right to Choose (Boston, Mass.: Beacon, 2000). Read More