Personal Identity Is Not Reducible to Bodily Identity - Essay Example

Personal identity is not reducible to bodily identity The fundamental principles of Locke's philosophy are presented in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), the result of two decades of contemplation upon human issues and the origin of thought. He was a hardcore empiricist; the notion that human behavior could spring from anything other than innate experiences was the pride of his concept. Factually speaking, he is the forerunner who helped revolutionize the cause of psychology, to be taken as a separate entity other than philosophy. He was a forceful advocate of the cause of the sensory processes, claiming that human ideation is formulated only as a result of the experiences that are undertaken. Subsequently, he pragmatically thought over the concept of knowledge and language formulation, the core of which shall be discussed hereunder. According to Locke, what we know is always properly understood as the relation between ideas (the learned concepts of experienced reality), and in the said essay, he explained at length the stance that all of our ideation is a consequence of personal identity. The outcome of this objective method is that the human mind seems to get somewhat undermined in its abilities. While describing the domains of human capabilities in terms of knowledge, ideas and the like, he endeavors to challenge certain basic and traditional norms of communication, language and interaction constructs (Noonan, 1989). Here, the issue of contention is the fact as to how Locke tackles the term of 'bodily'. Locke describes or rather differentiates the qualities of bodily identity into two divisions: primary and secondary. The primary attributes deal with those traits of an entity, which forms its existence - the integral constituents of the object. However, the secondary attributes are those, which are qualified by our perceptual reality and which may be taken in a relative term depending upon the observer. The primary/secondary quality distinction gets us a certain ways in understanding physical objects, but Locke is puzzled about what underlies or supports the basic qualities themselves. He is also puzzled about what material and immaterial bodily functions might have in common that would lead us to apply the same explanation to both. On the significant role played by nature in the behavior of man, both these opinions interject. Though nature has been a sort of subjective reality for the sake of many philosophers, yet these two have come to the same resolution. Thus it can be said that the role of nature can never be undermined. What has been naturally created in the form of man by nature (and in effect God), can never be put away from its core. Nature is as close to man as man himself, because he is a product of the former. Such contemplations gave him the impetus to coin the relative and obscure idea of physicality in general. He referred to the ever dynamic use of the word 'bodily'. Locke claims that the mind supports the bodily qualities - these may be as infinite as one can imagine. For understanding of concepts, he believed, simply information about the object was not enough. There had to be some linkages in the information that we receive in clusters. These linkages had to be the essence of understanding the concept to its fullest. This is a result of the fact that he himself cannot purport a rationale for the existence of tropes (tropes are properties that can exist independently of bodily). Hence, he could not use of a concept in lieu of 'bodily'. He seems extremely cautious about our limitations of the ideas of bodily. He has been understandably criticized for blowing this debate out of proportion, yet the importance that he appreciates within this concept is what produces the entire basis for his conviction. It troubled Locke to consider this as being something without having any properties - this in effect would be unscientific and hence impossible according to the doctrine presented by him (Parfit, 1987). He attempts to give ideas of simple modes, mixed modes, relations and so on. Here, he intends to clarify the difference between real and nominal essences. Due to his obvious passion with empiricism, his primary interest always seems in defining the attributes of an entity before he can look at its functions. Locke admits that not all words relate to ideas. Though an adamant campaigner against innate experiences, yet he confesses that there are certain internal processes that are understood in terms of feelings and ideas alone, and are not directly related with the senses. In addition to the kinds of ideas noted above, there are also particular and abstract ideas. Particular ideas have in them the ideas of particular places and times which limit the application of the idea to a single individual, while abstract general ideas leave out the ideas of particular times and places in order to allow the idea to apply to other similar qualities or things. There has been considerable philosophical and scholarly debate about the nature of the process of abstraction and Locke's account of it. The idea to be identified with lies in the fact that his primary association remained with relating everything with empirical phenomena. The reality is that the integrity of the will is imperishable. In the perspective, the meaning can be inferred in the same line. The will alone can have no integrity - it has to be linked with man himself. Therefore, again extrapolating the fact that the mind is sure to dominate the proceedings of life, despite what course of actions are to be taken, the case against hurting people becomes clear. The soul as an entity can never destroy, as it is the true emblem of existence for man - his distinguishing factor. These factors give an intrinsic line of reasoning for the person who is about to or intends to harm somebody. When the established pattern of thought is already present, then the person will automatically restrain himself from doing the superfluous. In his discussion of personal identity and in the contrast between names of bodily and names of modes, a number of interesting features of Locke's views about language and knowledge emerge. Physical bodily are atoms and things made up of atoms. But we have no experience of the atomic structure of horses and tables. We know horses and tables mainly by secondary qualities such as color, taste and smell and so on and primary qualities such as shape and extension (Shoemaker, 1959). So, since the real essence (the atomic constitution) of a horse is unknown to us, our word 'horse' cannot get its meaning from that real essence. What the general word signifies is the complex of ideas we have decided are parts of the idea of that sort of thing. These ideas we get from experience. Locke calls such a general idea that picks out a sort, the nominal essence of that sort. This is simply due to the reason that it helps in identification of the same factor as was being sought. It is basically the issue of classification and the qualification of issues, objects and entities that generates this viewpoint in Locke. Previously, it was thought that if a set of essential characteristics is shared by a number of individuals, then that set of properties constitutes the essence of a natural kind. But then there would also be some accidental properties, which may appear or vanish but still the essence of a bodily would remains the same. Locke does not agree with this stance. He defies the notion that an individual has an essence apart from being treated as belonging to a kind. He also rejects the belief that there is a single classification of things in nature that the natural philosopher should seek to discover. He holds that there are many possible ways to categorize the world each of which might be particularly useful depending on one's purposes. Locke's realistic account of language and the distinction between bodily and personal essences attempt to clarify the classification concept. He claims that there are no set limits in nature to be discovered; that is there are no clear discrimination points between species. There are always intermediate cases. This in turn generates the debate whether Locke's view is that this lack of fixed boundaries is applicable on both the level of appearances and nominal essences, and atomic constitutions and real essences, or on the level of nominal essences alone. Firstly, he believes that there are no natural kinds on either the level of appearance or atomic reality. Secondly, he thinks there are real natural kinds on the atomic level; it is simply that we cannot fully appreciate their existence. On either of these interpretations, the real essence cannot provide the meaning to names of bodily. On the contrary, the ideas that we use to make up our primary essences come to us from experience. And here the personal aspect comes into play. Locke claims that it is the function of the mind to formulate the ideas of sorts and that there are so many complex characteristics to choose from, that it is justifiable for different people to make quite different ideas of the essence of a certain bodily. Upon this, certain critics argue that the making of sorts is entirely subjective and conventional for Locke, and that there is no basis for condemning a specific nominal essence. However, Locke elucidates that the making of nominal essences is constrained both by usage wherein the words stand for ideas that are already in use (Williams, 1973). Hence, and by the fact that bodily words are supposed to copy the properties of the persona they refer to. The difference between personal and bodily is surely central in Locke's beliefs. In contrast with bodily, personal identity is a reliant entity; they can be thought of as the crux of the existence of man. When we make ideas of them, the mind is again active, but the prototype is in our mind. The question becomes whether things in the world correspond with our ideas, and not whether our ideas relate to the disposition of our physical self. When we make ideas from the world, the mind is again active, but the archetype is in our mind. The question becomes whether things in the world fit our ideas, and not whether our ideas correspond to the nature of things in the world. Our ideas are adequate. Thus we define 'bachelor' as an unmarried, adult, male human being. If we find that someone does not fit this definition, this does not reflect badly on our definition, it simply means that that individual does not belong to the class of bachelors. This ideation gives us the ideas of mathematics, of morality, of religion and politics and indeed of human conventions in general. The ultimate attainment in life therefore would be in the fact that one can appreciate its true essence, and not be afraid of the process of dying or death itself (Perry, 2006). It is only after this, that one would be able to overcome all the subsidiary issues of life, and would proceed to a stance wherein he would seek to discover the power within himself. Once this is accomplishment, nothing else would seem difficult. To be able to appreciate and attain the highest order of fulfillment, the greatest virtue here would be to not pay heed to social and extraneous challenges, and keep representing one's own personality as it is. If in the face of conflict, one tends to shy away from the true sense of being, then it can never really come out. Under normal circumstances, it is always simple to portray oneself; however, the true test of character is when there is antagonism, and yet still a person can attain virtue by means of beings what he truly is. The most significant factor here becomes knowing about oneself and the identity thereof. A person, who realizes himself, is truly the most potent of all. Desires, passions and restraints of the material world, can only be understood with reference to the person. Therefore, if and when a person appreciates his own personal standing and inception, it subsequently becomes the greatest source of endowment and fulfillment for the person. Since these ideas are not only made by us but serve as standards that things in the world either fit or do not fit and thus belong or do not belong to that sort, ideas of self are clear and distinct, adequate and complete. Thus, we get the real and nominal essences combined. Locke sometimes says that morality too is capable of deductive demonstration. When Locke defines the states of nature, slavery and war in the Second Treatise of Government, for example, we are presumably getting precise definitions from which one can deduce consequences. It is possible, however, that with politics we are getting a study which requires both experience as well as the deductive modal aspect (Jolley, 1999). Although on a personal, mental and emotional note, what he has declared is very good and perhaps necessary for the context of self-actualization, however when one endeavors into relating the facts to one's own reality, the end result is far from similar. True, the perspective upon the meaning of issues is mandatory for correct perception of reality, but this is where all the distortion takes place. However, when this factor is to be linked with personal perceptions of life and reality, ten this small mathematical fact turns into simulations of desires, dreams and fears. As a philosopher Locke insisted on the dominance of experimental science and philosophy over the subtle hedges of conventional modes of thought. He believed, that man had once existed in a state of nature, and hence man was possessed of reason, and therefore capable of cogent behavior, which permitted him to cooperate with other men to form societies and to determine the laws of nature, the most important of which guaranteed him living, freedom, and possessions. Man acquired knowledge not by means of extrasensory means, or because he had intrinsic ideas, but because his senses allowed him to learn from the external world, and put him in true perspective with the world. Whenever a person gets to understand his true self, then he automatically would learn to learn the domain of action while dealing with others. It is simply not possible that a person would go to the extent of conflicting with his own existence. This goes on to the same fact that man is driven by his internal good, and hence cannot and does not remain an adversary to the same. Violation of the nature would in turn mean getting in disagreement with oneself, which is theoretically and pragmatically not feasible. One can only do and perform as much as the limits of self deem appropriate. Nevertheless, Locke held that we have no grounds for complaint about the limitations of our knowledge, since a proper application of our cognitive capacities is enough to guide our action in the practical conduct of life. Locke spent much of the rest of his life responding to admirers and critics by making revisions in later editions of the book, including detailed accounts of human volition and moral freedom, the personal identity on which our responsibility as moral agents depends, and the dangers of religious enthusiasm. References Jolley, N. (1999). Locke: his philosophical thought. Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (1690). 25 Mar 2007. . Noonan, H. (1989). Personal Identity. London: Routledge, p. 16. Parfit, D. (1987). Personal Identity and Desert. Lloyd Fields. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 149 (Oct.), pp. 432-441. Perry, J. (2006). Identity, Personal Identity and the Self. European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 14,Number 3, December, pp. 434-437(4). Shoemaker, S. (1959). "Personal Identity and Memory," Journal of Philosophy 56: 868-882; reprinted in Perry (1975) Personal Identity. Williams, B. (1973). 'The Self and the Future', in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 79, No. 2. (Apr.1970), pp. 161-180. Reprinted: Problems of the Self (CUP), Chapter 4, pp.46-63. Read More