Battle of Leyte Gulf - Case Study Example

Battle f Leyte Gulf The disaster f Hurricane Katrina is one of the most devastating events in the history f the United States which would be remembered long. If journalism is the first rough draft f history, then Douglas Brinkley's The Great Deluge-released less than nine months after the disaster f nature and management that was Katrina and before the beginning f the next hurricane season- should probably be viewed as the first polished document. There may be some tinkering left to do regarding the story f the worst natural disaster in modern American history-some i's to dot and t's to cross-but the combination f Brinkley's skills as a historian and reporter, his proximity to the tragedy (being a New Orleans resident), and his willingness to call attention to the failures f virtually every key government official up and down the command chain yields a powerful, emotionally affecting book that virtually doubles as an Encyclopedia Katrina. Brinkley consciously limited the book to the first unthinkable week. Beginning on Saturday, August 27, when it first became clear that Katrina was going to strike again in the Gulf Coast after roughing up Florida, he traces the warnings, stories, fecklessness, and missed opportunities through the hurricane's five hours f wrath and the breaching f the levees. His account continues until the following Saturday, September 3, when buses finally reached the convention center and the Superdome to evacuate those stranded. By combining his own experiences during the storm and its aftermath-Brinkley returned to the city to help in rescue efforts after evacuating his family to Houston-with hundreds f interviews with citizens, first responders, and government officials, Brinkley paints a picture alternately heartbreaking, heartwarming, and enraging. The Great Deluge opens with models f excellent planning and action by the likes f the Louisiana Society for the Prevention f Cruelty to Animals (which had its 263 sheltered pets safely moved to Houston by the evening f August 27), the Entergy Corporation (which shut down its nuclear plant once Katrina became a category 3 storm), and Louisiana parish presidents (who issued mandatory evacuation orders to their residents and efficiently obtained special help for those who needed it). Although stories such as these, along with the valiant efforts f many first responders, are welcome doses f things that went right, The Great Deluge is primarily a story f how so much went wrong. Brinkley's meticulous assembly f the facts into a detailed chronology and analysis is devastating at times to virtually everyone in an official role-from New Orleans's mayor, Ray Nagin, to Louisiana's governor, Kathleen Blanco, to the secretary f the Department f Homeland Security, Michael Chertff, to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's "Brownie," to the man who gave him that nickname. And Brinkley pulls no punches: "Every time the Bush administration and the state f Louisiana hesitated, lawyered-up, and read the fine print f Homeland Security procedure, an American died prematurely," he writes. Brinkley's extensive footnotes deepen the sense f reading a cohesive and objective take on a complicated event. As the disaster continues to recede from the forefront f the minds f those who have that luxury and as inevitable election year finger-pointing provides ever more spin about what happened and why, The Great Deluge could hardly be a more timely, important, and effective antidote-to complacency, to poor leadership, and to the lack f accountability. To borrow a phrase: "Brinkley, you did a heckuva job." Brinkley criticized the Bush administration for its lack f reaction during the 72 hours immediately following the hurricane, when rescue is still possible. He also criticized elected officials for caring more about what their lawyers had to say about potential lawsuits than saving those in need. Instead, many victims were evacuated by private organizations or citizens like Jimmy. There was the Cajun Navy, a group from Lake Charles, La., who organized 38 boats and drove several hours to New Orleans to save their suffering neighbors. Or the Coast Guard, which didn't lose a boat or helicopter as they rescued hundreds. Katrina showed river towns need to have a local emergency plan in place because they know the area, Brinkley said. He encouraged people to pin down elected officials about disaster plans and take their answers into consideration during elections. He also stressed hospitals have their own evacuation plans, noting a Bay St. Louis hospital in Mississippi that contractually obligates doctors and nurses to stay during bad weather. Even with a flooded first floor and an unusable third floor, the staff treated 800 people and didn't turn anyone away during that 72 hour time period. Conference participant Richard Sparks said he felt compelled to return to home and ensure his family and town were prepared for a river emergency after hearing Brinkley's speech. (Bert 70-79) Sparks, the director f research at the National Great Rivers Research and Education Center near Alton, Ill., said Brinkley provided an "intimate picture f a city I wasn't aware f before." This is the third in a series f world conferences on rivers, following a 2002 gathering at Dubna University, along the Volga River in Russia, and the 2003 conference at Assiut University along the Nile River in Egypt. The University f Wisconsin-La Crosse and the National Mississippi River Museum and Aquarium in Dubuque, Iowa, are the main sponsors f this conference. (Marek 32-34) According to Brinkley, if the Bush administration and government would have acted quicker and called for an evacuation a few days before, the economic devastation would have been prevented. An increased number f people would have survived having enough time to evacuate the area, or to make plans to go live with other relatives in other states. The Bush Administration and the federal government could have also been more prepared by building the levee system to withstand a Category 5 hurricane storm, instead f building it with poor planning. The catastrophic erosion wouldn't have happened if better material was used, and the levees were completed in a timely manner. The material used to build the levees were taken from soil found in nearby locations to reduce the cost. If the federal government would have put more thought into building the levee system, the damage would have been reduced. According to book, numerous amounts f people were left unemployed, which has affected the economy, since fewer taxes have been paid to the local government. Several loved ones, families, friends, and relatives were separated and lost because f this disaster. The Bush Administration has already spent over $105 billion dollars for repairs and reconstruction in the region. Katrina also destroyed over thirty oil platforms and caused the closure f nine refineries, adding to the economic crises. The forestry industry in Mississippi was also affected, as 1.3 million acres f forest land were destroyed. The total loss to the forestry industry from Katrina is calculated to rise to about five billion dollars. Hospitals relied on bus companies and ambalance services for evacuation, but weren't able to evacuate their charges. Many forms f transportation had been shut-down, and fuel and rental cars were in short supply before the storm arrived. Brinkley criticized the government and said that the failure f communication from government, caused a slow response to the storm. Several problems that came up developed from poor planning, and the failure f back-up communications systems at various levels. Many telephones, including most cell phones and internet access, weren't working due to line breaks, destruction f base stations, or power failures, even though some stations had their own back-up generators. Many people were unprepared for such a disaster. Being unprepared has caused many deaths, and many other people stranded with no way to get out f the area because transportation in the area was already shut down. The government and Bush administration could have prevented this. By responding quicker and getting citizens out f the area before the hurricane started, many American citizens wouldn't have been stranded or left for dead. Louisiana's evacuation plan called local governments in the area, leaving the area with only fifty hours before the tropical storm intensified into hurricane Katrina. Reporters were asked to brief public officials on the conditions in the area, but the information wasn't relayed any other way. (Bert 70-79) Brinkley in his book have discussed the problems f the people in detail. Having more time to spare would have suddenly decreased the amount f people lost and trapped without anywhere to go. People living in the area were unaware f when Katrina strengthened from a tropical storm to a hurricane, since it did so, in one day, and struck Southern Florida, near the Miami-Dade County line. Shelters were opened and schools were closed in the Southern part f the state. The Miami-Dade County in Florida depends on pumps to push water uphill, away from the city and back into the surrounding lakes and rivers. However, these pumps operate on electricity, which had been entirely cut off when the hurricane struck. Therefore, the pumps apparently ceased operating. This simple fact emphasizes the lack f thought and planning by the government and the President for such a devastating storm. No one was prepared at all for a catastrophe like Katrina, but rather many survivors were just lucky. According to Brinkley, the impact f Hurricane Katrina left the world in tears, as most f the cities were flooded and death tolls stood at 1,836 people, most f which were in Louisiana with 1,577 deaths. Also, 705 people remain missing in Louisiana, and at least one million people were left without electricity. In Mississippi they suffered total devastation pushing casino barges, boats and debris into towns, and leaving 236 people dead, 67 missing, and an estimated $125 billion in damage. Clean water was scarce, and the flood waters covering city streets were contaminated with ruptured gas lines, chemicals, and human waste, raising a serious danger f infectious disease. Parts f Mississippi on the Gulf coast were hit by the center f the hurricane and destroyed. Entire neighborhoods were wiped out. Where there were once houses, now there is only debris and scattered belongings f residents. Even though it would have been impossible to prevent all damage from the hurricane, steps weren't taken even after the fact to aid the area that suffered massive hurricane damage. There were definite measures that could have been taken to minimize the impact f the storm and chaos after. Government officials failed to perform the necessary maintenance to shore up the levee system, so that the magnitude wouldn't raise the height f the barriers. This would have prevented the flooding that occurred in the Lower Ninth Ward. Many levels f government should have prepared instead f saying there was nothing else we could have done, or waiting for something to happen. The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1-5 rating based on the hurricane's present power or strength. This is used to give an estimate f the damage and flooding expected along the coast from a hurricane landfall. Wind speed is the determining cause in the scale. Hurricane Katrina was the strongest hurricane, which is a Category five. Category five storms are capable f winds in excess f 200 miles per hour and a storm surge f 35 feet, as with Hurricane Camille in 1969. The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale was adopted in 1972 by the Tropical Prediction Center. The economic devastation f Hurricane Katrina could have been prevented if the Bush administration and government would have acted quicker. If the government would have prepared for this and build a stronger levee system for the Category Five Hurricane the damage wouldn't be as bad as it is. Brinkley has criticized the Bush Administration on many occasions in the book. According to him, the Bush Administration failed to make an emergency evacuation plan for people who were in the path f the storm and unable to evacuate the area on their own. Federal authorities enforced conditions and eventually carried out an evacuation that separated families; including separating small children from their parents and infants from their mother. This separation left many people not knowing where their loved ones were located or even if they had survived the storm. The levee system in New Orleans was created to protect the city and the surrounding area from such floods. New Orleans levee failures were found to be primarily the result f the system design flaws, combined with the lack f correct maintenance. Those responsible for the conception, design, construction, and maintenance f the region's flood-control system apparently failed to pay attention to public safety, according to an investigation by the National Science Foundation. While discussing financial losses f the disaster, Brinkley said that the economical affects f the storm were horrible. It's estimated that the government needs $105 billion dollars, and this amount doesn't include the price for the interruption f oil supply, or the destruction f the highway system along the Gulf Coast. The environmental effects were also considerable. The storm caused major beach erosion, and in some cases ruined entire coastal areas. Of the lands that were lost, many were also breeding grounds for marine animals, brown pelicans, turtles, and fish. Many people were unprepared for this disaster. The warning left citizens with little time to pack and evacuate. Having increased time to spare could have prevented some f the economic effects f Hurricane Katrina. A lot f these disastrous deaths could have been prevented if many citizens would have had transportation to get out f the area. Bush could have called for evacuation a few day in advance, but instead he shut his eyes not only to the human damage, but the economic damage as well. The President should have taken a situation like this more seriously. Works Cited Bert, Ray., The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Civil Engineering (08857024), Aug2006, Vol. 76 Issue 8, p70-79 Marek, Angie C., Learning The Hard Lessons f Katrina. U.S. News & World Report, 6/5/2006, Vol. 140 Issue 21, p32-34 Read More