Was the use of atomic bomb on japan justified - Essay Example

Due Means or End: Was the Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan Justified? Introduction On August the 6thand 9th 1945, the United States under the stewardship of President Harry S. Truman dropped two destructive atomic bombs on two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively. After nearly six years of a bloody, spirited battle that supped enormous resources from either of the allied powers, a world war instigated by a provocative Germany came to an abrupt end with the surrender of the Japanese Empire in the face of certain destruction aided by unimaginable force, the hitherto untested power of Atomic Bomb. But was Truman’s decision justified or was ill informed? A controversial event in history that has divided scholars right in the middle, the use of the Atomic Bomb was but a justified decision that spared the United States an estimated 250,000, perhaps more, sure fatalities in there planned invasion of Japan in addition to millions of Japanese [soldiers and civilians alike] destined for a bloody fight-to-the-death battle in defense of a beloved fatherland. The True Story While the weight of the fateful decision fell right on the shoulders of Truman, the origins of the weapon began with the Roosevelt administration’s fear of a parallel development of the same by Germany. Leo Szilard’s confidential letter to the then President Franklin Roosevelt, signed off by his longtime friend and collaborator Albert Einstein, outlining Germany’s concerted efforts on nuclear weapons formed the foundation of the Manhattan Project [S-1], “one of the largest, best-kept secret, massive resource consuming, scientific undertakings ever witnessed in history” (Walker 311-312). Indeed, even Truman, the then vice president had no knowledge of the project and only learnt of it in office. Though actively engaged in atomic research, German scientists, as it would later turn out right after Germany’s surrender, were far from reaching a fissionable chemical combination that could deliver results rivaling the United States’. Japan’s similar initiatives were thrown into disarray in April 1945 with a B-29 raid on Tokyo facilities leaving anything of the sort inundated (Frank 252-253). The fall of the previously Japanese controlled Marianas Islands early in the campaign gave the United States formidable footholds of bringing the war closer home to the remaining Japanese strongly-held islands. With surrender heavily disdained, reinforcement directives from Imperial General Headquarters [IGHQ] detailed in the “Plan for the Conduct of Future Operations” went out on the 24th July, 1944 with four points: 1. Patriotic defense of the Philippines, Ryukyu, Kurile, Formosa, Japan Islands and the entire Japanese homeland from the shoreline right into the interior. 2. Massive annihilation of the Allies by sea, land and by the remaining air power for any attempted advance through the United States’ planned amphibious assault to the crucial areas [the “Sho-Go” Operations]. 3. The last two points called for the prevention of American B-29 aircraft attacks operating from China to ensure better cover [overrunning China bomber bases to open up continental railroads as an alternative route to their Southern Resources Area]. 4. Identifying alternative southern sea routes [particularly to the China Coast] to safeguard important military shipments (Bradlley 189). With the new SHO operations that basically enlarged mobile defense writ, Japan hoped to gain decisive victory no matter the beachhead attacked by the enemy. SHO-1 and SHO-2, the battles of Philippines and Formosa-Ryukyu were planned for august; followed by SHO-3 and SHO-4 in the home islands and Hokkaido scheduled for October 1944. Having identified possible planned landing bases by the invasion forces, the supposedly defeated Japanese strategically stationed themselves to meet the visitors head-on at an equal strength. As a tactical approach, they [Japanese] planned to abandoned direct combat with the powerfully loaded American carriers in favor of erecting in-depth defense further inland. Shipment of troops and military artillery to the threatened areas [of Leyte, particularly the Philippines, Formosa, Luzon and Okinawa] were already underway even before the ratification of the new war plan. As if their calculations never worked right, Admiral William Halsey’s first carriers opened the Leyte campaign by invading Okinawa, Luzon and Formosa prompting the implementation of SHO-2 (Formosa-Ryukyu) before SHO-1 [Philippines] (Bradley 192). Indeed as fate would have it, Halsey forces’ seizure of the Japanese Combined Fleet into Leyte Gulf was but a blessing that kept the United States far from a deadly crossfire that would have, perhaps, inflicted the heaviest fatalities on the offensive forces. The combine four-day attack on Luzon and Formosa destroyed approximately 500 Japanese aircrafts, killing many of the newly trained carrier pilots, and therefore leaving a lasting gap that would conceivably demand a drastic change of tact (Hayashi, 122-127). Buoyed by the Formosa success battles, Lt. Colonel Henry’s Mucci’s 6th Rangers began the Philippine’s offensive only a week after embarking on the last decisive stretch of the battle with the Japanese. By this time, IGHQ had ordered the execution of SHO-1, which adopted the same ferocity used on the previous islands, except for one condition: the suicidal charges that would end the campaigns faster had camouflaged to guerrilla warfare, tying down American troops for the remainder of the warzones into a deadly “resistance to the last man, killing ten soldiers to one” tactic (Hayashi, 132). Iwo Jima provided the beginning test for the American forces; all civilians were evacuated from the island paving way for a sustained massive, stubborn defense aimed at inflicting maximum fatalities and wearing down the invaders (Spector, 494-495). The several days of aerial bombardment virtually made little impact; the bloody battle for Iwo Jima ended as “the single most painful campaign in the war where American casualties exceeded the Japanese dead, 27,499 to 23,300” (Walker, 130-131). The battle of Okinawa, the largest amphibious assault of the Second World War, was not just another island battle with the Japanese soldiers. Situated only 350 miles [550km] southwest of the mainland Japan within range of kamikaze airfields in southern island of Kyushu, Okinawa was, at best, considered part of Japan. As if Iwo Jima was a sample determination of a people, Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima, the 32d Army Commander, ordered his men out of the oceanfront managing to establish a “strong concentric defensive perimeters” that would cost more lives than the beginning battle (Spector 533). Nicknamed the "typhoon of steel", the Japanese fought from prepared positions, occasionally marshaling massive counter attacks, which often ended with tremendous losses of lives from both sides. Vice Admiral C.R. Brown notes in his accounts of the war that: “There was a hypnotic fascination to the sight so alien to our Western philosophy. We watched each plunging kamikaze with the detached horror of one witnessing a terrible spectacle rather than as the intended victim. We forgot self for the moment as we groped hopelessly for the thought of that other man up there” (Toland 711). Kamikazes [suicide attackers] stationed in Kyushu attacked the American forces in waves, numerously managing to register heavy penalties that included but not limited to the destruction of vital ammunition ships; a derailing scenario that kept the carrier planes preoccupied with defending the American fleet than paving way for the invasion ground troops. In this battle alone, twenty-nine battleships went under water, 120 left nonfunctional, 3,048 sailors killed leaving another 6,035 nursing serous wounds (Walker, 144). In this battle alone, the enemy felt the full weight of the war that lay ahead with the Japanese fighting almost to the last man. The bloodiest battle of the war for the US forces in the pacific, A.B. Downs writes that: “The battle for Okinawa, which began in April, truly demonstrated what an invasion of japan might look like: American forces suffered 51, 000 casualties in subduing 120,000 Japanese defenders. Tens of thousands of civilians also met their deaths in the furious crossfire. The staggering death toll led President Truman to liken the intended invasion as “an Okinawa battle from one end of Japan to the other” (121). By mid-1945, the once powerful Japanese Empire that surprised the United States by a crippling Pearl Harbor Fleet bombings was no doubt in a state of despair. Indeed with its dependable navy forced backwards right down the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, particularly the Japanese docks stretching to the mainland waiting for a final life battle, an ultimate defeat was within sight. However, surrender at the terms of the allied powers was never an option, thus their [Japanese] resolve to fight against the overwhelming odds. Even with no offensive firepower left, any anticipated invasion [either by the soviets, Americans or by a combined strength] was lethal in every sense; prior bloody, fight-to-the-death battles in Iwo Jima and Okinawa presented a horrifying picture of what a possible touchdown at the Japanese main lands awaited the visitors (Ienaga 143). To be sure, casualties from the two battlegrounds turn out to be the heaviest the United States had ever suffered in the entire war, and the experiences, without a doubt, provided fodder for more perfect, suicidal, tactical decisive defenses. With the loss of four irreplaceable aircraft carriers that provided the necessary air support to the on-the-ground and naval forces, the United States’ firepower became evidently overwhelming to any imaginable Japanese defense. Nonetheless, victory was not to be handed to the American forces cheaply; the seemingly death-glorifying Warrior Code signed by every Japanese soldier gave no room for surrender. A soldier’s Field Service Code, extended to the mobilized entire populace for a decisive battle, stated, “If alive, do not suffer the disgrace of becoming a prisoner; in death, do not leave behind a name soiled by misdeeds” (Allen and Polmar 166). Accordingly, the invasion forces were headed for a fanatical, fight-to-the-death combat on every single island conquered; a scenario much evident in Guam, Saipan and Tinian where American forces had to eliminate virtually every Japanese soldier for a secure behind (Hayashi 107-108). Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saito Commanding the Saipan Battalion is reported to have issued orders to his troops with the words: “we will attack the invasion forces and all die, if forced to, an honorable death; a Japanese soldier will go down with ten Americans” (Hayashi 108). The results, indeed, were catastrophic; besides the American soldiers, nearly 10,000 Saipan civilians shared the fate of the enemy; the extermination without mercy (Allen and Polmar 67). Given the encouraged hatred of Americans, particularly after the April 1942 Doolittle Raid over Tokyo, any captive of war felt the highest order of ill treatment; Japanese buried them alive, bayoneted or shot them with bows and arrows, decapitated, boiled them in hot water or subjected them to brutal experimentations that had guaranteed painful deaths (Frank 161-162). Indeed as it is, of the more than 20,000 U.S. sailors comprising of airmen and marines who went into captivity during the fall of the Philippine in May 1942, less than 60 percent survived (Spector, 396-397). The Japanese hatred for foreigners went far deep than the Americans, so to say; earlier in 1937 the Chinese population received as much ill treatment. The combat operation [Second Sino-Japanese War] aimed at bringing China under the Japanese control lasting for eight years left horrifying trails of experiences, and one such was the falling of ROC’s capital, Nanjing, dubbed The Rape of Nanjing, in December 1937. In seven weeks of unrelenting Japanese carnage, soldiers raped, tortured, and executed approximately 377,400 Chinese men, women, and children (Chang 101). By August 1945, the barbaric Japanese military “three-all” policy of “kill all, burn all, and destroy all” had resulted in death of millions either from the sustained injuries or trauma, reducing a once robust population of 44 million down to an estimated 25 million inhabitants (Allen 157). Eugene sledge, a veteran of the battles in the Pacific wrote: “The savagery beyond necessity changed the way we fought. We began killing without regret or remorse, routinely shooting both the dead and wounded enemy soldiers after seizing a position to make sure they were dead. Survival was hard enough without taking chances being humane to men who fought so savagely” (Miller 178). Surrounded by a host of civilian as well as military advisors, Truman was presented with varied options towards the defeat of a seemingly defiant Japan: a tightened naval blockade with a series of unrestrained aerial assaults of the remaining Japanese home islands; a revised surrender terms mediated by the Soviets [as earlier requested by the Japanese leadership] including the guaranteed safety of Emperor Hirohito; and a forceful invasion that would engage the remaining solders and the civilian dissidents on a direct combat. The first option was not only expensive, but was somehow a show of cowardice with the memories of casualties still fresh and fundamental in the difficult decision that lay ahead. The second was but a risky precedent that would place the United States at an awkward position with regards to its relations with the intended arbiter, the then powerful Soviet Republic. Though uncertain with regards to the time span, Truman approved the third option; a decision that was costly as much as the other two options but with assured results. Nevertheless, American casualties in the region of a quarter of a million in addition to the already suffered losses and the increasingly lethal nature of the war played along in Truman’s final signature. Criticisms The July 16, 1945 successful test of the atomic bomb that had consumed roughly $2 billion without the knowledge of the public brought up a new dimension that was hitherto unavailable in the table. With the already delivered Potsdam Declaration having been rejected by the top Japanese leadership, Japan’s plans of a suicidal defense was no child’s play that anybody in his right senses could trivialize. Scholars have theorized Truman’s decision to utilize the atomic bomb with quite a number criticizing the decision as either racially or politically motivated given that none of the Truman’s advisors ever recommended against the use of the secret weapon. Opposition that largely marginalized the quarter of a million casualties only came long after Truman’s ultimate choice of bombing the Japanese two cities (Walker 21). Given the utmost secrecy that kept even the top diplomats out of knowledge of the weapon’s existence, recent revisionists have had quite a number of theories. To the extent that the Manhattan Project was no doubt a military necessity at the war front, Takaki notes that the political pressure weighed heavily on it given the bureaucratic industrial colossus that supped a whopping 120,000 employees with facilities spread all over the country (38-39). Takaki adds that the near 2 billion already spent were massive enough to arouse curiosity and that ‘relentless investigation’ and possible criticisms and subsequent cancelation were, perhaps, on the way. The writer, however, fails to answer the extent the foregoing factored into Truman’s final decision. Another version projects the US’s impressing the soviets; that Japan’s surrender was imminent in the summer of 1945, thus US rushed to use the weapon to impress the Soviet Union, whose entry into the war would have produced speedy Japan’s surrender (Bernstein xvi). Were they [the soviets] prepared than the Americans for the war? Well, only an alternative route would have adequately provided the answer to the question. Overlapping the obvious volatile political situation, Takaki adds another dimension: the hitherto existing racism in American culture (7). The Japs, according to revisionists, were considered no less than “demons, savages, beasts or best as sub-humans” right after the Pearl Harbor attack, with more recent writers picking Sledge’s confessions detailing the mindset of a typical American soldier in the pacific at the time as a sample racism in the extreme (Turkel 200). As to how much racism contributed to that hard choice is anybody’s hypothesis. Conclusion Quite frankly, the embarrassing Pearl Harbor attack, the brutal treatment of Allied war hostages coupled with the fight-to-the-death attitude were signals that obstructed any form of peace settlement. Japan’s defeat was never in doubt though. Nevertheless, the time and associated costs [more so of American lives] towards that ultimate end were indeterminate, yet an alternative was within reach. The use of the atomic bomb was but the right means to end the war. Work cited Allen, Thomas B. and Norman Polmar. 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