Principles of Leyte Gulf Operation - Essay Example

? Political Science LEYTE GULF OPERATION Introduction The Naval operational decisions made by naval commanders at the battle for Leyte Gulf can be discussed by carrying out a comparison of modern art to command organizations, designs and plans the US and Japanese forces adopted during the operation. The analysis is vital in determining common mistakes for purposes of authenticating modern operational principles. One principle error in examining planning and effecting operation for both forces in the Leyte Gulf battle was disunity of command which led to divisive authority, running operations and communication. The U.S. victory can be attributed to their decisive plans for naval control on the western pacific wing during the World War II. This operation was carried out with little knowledge of modern operational ideas. It is for this reason that both sides experienced tactical shortcomings that halted the entire mission and objective of the operation. This paper shall analyze the battle for Leyte Gulf with its main focus on the principles and art of military operation by the U.S. and Japan. In this regard the paper will focus on command decisions by the U.S. and Japanese naval commanders with a view of coming up with modern principles that can be applied in future operations. Principles of operation The success of any warfare mission depends solely on the ability of the commander to identify the aim, decipher the strategic factors of his operation, select and organize his forces and design a plan to achieve the objective of the operation. Normally, the commander’s role involves integration and coordination of an operation in a way as to inflict shock, disrupt and defeat the enemy. This is possible when the entire operation injects force on a totally different measure. In so doing, the commander ought to choose the correct course of action as dictated by ground factors by selecting factors pertinent to operations guided by the philosophy of operational art. The planning, synchronization and the conduct of operational functions have some impacts on the belligerents. This paper intends to discuss the aftereffects of the operational functions of the military in relation to planning, synchronization and execution. To achieve this aim, the impacts of the operational functions to belligerents in the Leyte Gulf operation will be discussed. The Leyte Gulf operation, also termed as the battles for Leyte Gulf, was a battle that occurred during the Second World War, from the 23rd to the 25th of October 1944. It aimed at the liberation of Philippines. Allied forces of the U.S.A and Australia and the Imperial Japanese Navy were the protagonists in the battle (Adamsky, 2010). The battle started with the invasion of Leyte’s island by the ground forces of the allied forces led by general Douglas Mac Arthur. The Japanese fleet took up the battle to defeat the invasion, but got defeated by the U.S. seventh fleet led by Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid and the fleet led by Admiral William. The battle got divided into four engagements which were the battle of Samar, the battle of cape Engano, the battle of Surigao strait, and the battle of the Sibuyan Sea. Preparation and Planning The main objective of the operation was to capture Leyte Gulf. The U.S. naval forces approached the attack using two axes, one under the leadership of Admiral Nimitz. This was designed to advance its operations towards a westerly strategic axis with the sole purpose of capturing the Marianas, Palau, Gilbert and Marshall Islands. The second set of forces, the southwest pacific forces, under the command of General Douglas followed a northwesterly tactical axis all the way through Guinea and Morotai. The two axes were expected to intersect at Leyte. According to the leading commanders, the intersection would act as a stepping stone for effective takeover of Philippines. This was a strategic move in the heart of the operation as this was designed to cut off communication of Japanese sea lines disadvantaging their retaliation. In addition, the capture of Philippines would further cut off delivery of oil from Netherlands. Moreover, Philippines would offer a base and preparation area from which to hit on China, Japan and Formosa. The Japanese responded to the U.S. attack by establishing a retaliatory line southwards through Hoshu, Formosa, and Philippines. Four victory plans were designed to act against the allied invasion. The operation plans consisted of SHO-1 that would advance towards Philippines, SHO-2 towards Formosa, Nansei and Kyushu area, SHO-3 towards Shikoku, Kyushu and Honshu, and SHO-4 towards the Hokkaido area. These forces were to operate under the command of Admiral Toyoda. Execution The operational command and control showed the ability of commanders in making operational decisions for both the U.S. and Japanese naval forces. The decisions played a crucial role in execution of the attack and defense. This concept of command and execution plays the roles of allowing the commander to maximally recap the resources he has in terms of time, machinery and resources to frustrate the efforts of the enemy. Furthermore, Command and control act to reduce levels of tension and uncertainty in the field of operation (Schuster, 2003). Its significant role is to propel the development of an efficient framework for control and command. This operational function integrates all other operational functions. In the control composition of the allied forces, general Douglas Mac Arthur, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid and Admiral William were in charge. The allied forces had little information on the command structure depicted by the imperial Japanese navy and this consequently led them to spend much in the intentions of the IJN than its capabilities. The Japanese fleet command structure got organized from the headquarters and was very secretive. The command structure got categorized into a number of groups; one of the groups was the mobile fleet led by Vice Admiral Jizaburo Ozawa. The second was the first striking force under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita. The first striking force had two categories. The first category was under vice admiral, whereas the second was under VADM Yoshio Suzuki together with Kongo and Haruna. The category of the first striking Force C was under vice admiral Shigeo Nishimura. The land based aviation was another category of the IJN commanding structure; it was led by vice admiral Gunichi Mizawa. The next category in the IJN commanding structure was the naval forces under the command of Vice Admiral Heigo Tominaga and Vice Admiral Ohnishi. The last category was the army led by lieutenant general Kiyoji Tamingo Vego, 2009) Factors that influenced the command and control compositions were almost similar for the two protagonists. Those factors included reliability; the person in the line of command had to be dependable in case urgent decisions had to be taken in the course of operation. Another factor was experience of the personnel in the military field and discipline to respond to commands. Despite all the efforts by either side, there were still some flaws; the major flaw was divided command. The impacts of command and the control can be felt even to this day, especially by the belligerents. Large financial losses occurred; the allied forces lost two hundred and eighteen warships compared to sixty four from the imperial Japanese navy. Japan also lost four carriers, ten cruisers, eleven destroyers and three battleships. American losses included one light carrier, three destroyers and two escort carriers. The effects of the bombing had an impact on the genes and chromosomes of the people involved, and this can be transmitted from generation to generation through reproduction (Ireland & Garrard, 2006). Conclusion In conclusion, both the Allied and Japanese commanders often adjusted their tactical approaches based on current strategic factors and advances of the opponents. For instance, the Allied modified their attacks in line with the strong Japanese air wing. The four intermediate operation phases which had been designed earlier to capture Philippines had to be abandoned in order to free a critical landing craft for the operation. However, the intelligence informing the decision did not provide accurate analysis of the new target. It therefore relied on the information provided by Filipino guerrillas via the Australian intelligence. This was the biggest mistake the Allied naval forces made. On the other hand Admiral Ozawa’s decision to train and generate air craft’s as per SHO plan. It is sad to note that the force never recovered. The decision by the Chiefs of Staff to slit the U.S. army into independent units was a misinformed move. This was because it lacked unity of command. Additionally, Admiral Kinkaid assumed the work of superior commanders. References Adamsky, D. (2010). The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Friedman, K. I. (2001). Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Novato, Caliph: Presidio. Ireland, B., & Gerard, H. (2006). Leyte Gulf 1944: The world's greatest sea battle. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd. Schuster, C. R. (2003). Military transformation: Army actions needed to enhance formation of future interim brigade. S.l.: Diane Pub Co. Vego, M. N. (2006). The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese plans, preparations, and execution. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press. Read More