Battles Fought in the 1991 Gulf War - Thesis Example

?The Battle of 73 Easting The Battle of 73 Easting refers to one of the most important battles fought in the 1991 Gulf War. It led to the destructionof the most crucial unit of the Iraqi Republican Guard, the Tawaklna elite division. The Tawakalna had been the central unit of the Iraqi offensive that invaded Kuwait. In the Battle of 73 Easting, the US Army 2nd Armored Cavalry Division and 1st Infantry Division broke through the center of the Tawakalna position whilst two other Coalition force divisions moved on the right and left flanks to encircle and cut off the Tawakalna forces and destroy them. The 2ACD and 1ID of the US Army utilized advanced technology and superior military strategy to launch an intensive sustained surprise attack which destroyed the Tawakalna forces. This paper examines the main battles fought by the two US divisions that broke through the central lines of the Tawakalna force and the events that occurred in the two-day duration of the battle. The US-led Coalition Force victory over the elite Iraqi Republican Guard unit, Tawkalna division at 73 Easting is the most decisive ground combat that weakened the Iraqi military and gave way for the destruction of the other Iraqi Republican Guard units which ended the Gulf War (Borque 2). The Coalition victory in the 73 Easting battle is attributed to the superiority of the Coalition military forces, strong and decisive leadership and the utilization of a good battle plan. The victory of the Battle of 73 Easting is the result of the optimum combination of several Army Doctrines (Atkinson 9). First of all, the possession of modern equipment and technology is important in battles. Secondly, a superior military strategy, audacity, effective communication and co-ordination can help defeat the most resolute and bravest army. Surprise, followed by intensive assault is an important tool to destabilize the enemy and prevent them from gaining their tempo and ensure their defeat. Finally, there is the need to use specialized units to execute specific tasks in order to gain military success. The Battle of 73 Easting culminated from the need to destroy and weaken the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRP), which had been a tool used by Saddam Hussein to destabilize international peace by invading Kuwait (Atkinson 2). The battle started on the 26th through to the 27th of February, 1991 at a barren desert just 25 kilometers off the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. The 7th Corps of the US Army played major role in the Battle of 73 Easting under the command of Lieutenant General Fredrick Franks Jr (McGregor 2). General H. Norman Schwarzkopf held the Central Command of the operation (McGregor 2) . Jointly, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Division of the 7th Corps was the main unit of ground troops that was tasked with facing the Tawakalna central position in the 73 Easting Battle. They were ably supported by the 1st Infantry Division. A total of 4,500 troops made up the core of the 2ACD. However, for the purpose of the battle, 5,500 more troops joined the 2ACD in its three squadrons (Daily 52). Each squadron was equipped with a tank company, howitzer batteries, headquarters troops and three cavalry troops (MacMaster 1). Each troop cavalry had 120 soldiers, nine armored battle tanks and 12 bradley fighting vehicles (Daily 52). The British 1st Armoured Division in the south and the 3rd American Armored Division in the north supported the 2AD in the operation (Donaldson 182). The plan was to encircle the Tawakalna stronghold and meet the 2ACD and 1ID to cut off the Tawakalna stronghold. There is no report of the commander of the Tawakalna forces in the war (Adrian 362). It is logically inferred that it reported directly to and took orders from Saddam Hussein. In events leading to the battle, the Iraqi government, in defiance of international law had invaded Kuwait claiming it as an Iraqi territory (Musallam 1). The Tawakalna Division of the IRP was a significant elite unit that played a central role in the invasion and maintenance of Iraqi military presence in Kuwait (Adrian 362). The Tawkalna Division had gained a lot of experience in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 (Adrian 362). Kuwait's plea to the United Nations after the invasion led to the issuance of several resolutions asking Iraq to pull out of Kuwait (Musallam 2). Iraq however defied all these warnings which made military action the only option. The UN mobilized a Coalition force from USA, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and several other countries. Aerial bombardment of Iraqi targets in Kuwait started in January 1991 with the hope of getting Iraq to withdraw from the country (Musallam 362). Nonetheless, the Iraqi occupation continued. A US-led a military force entered the Persian-Gulf region to restore Kuwait's territorial sovereignty (Biddle, 7). Two main armies made up the Coalition force (Borque 3) namely the Joint Forces Command under the command of HRH General Khalid bin-Sultan and the Second Army under US army and a minor British army command (Daily 52). The Coalition forces had two options dealing with the treat of the Tawakalna forces (McGregor 3). Option 1: to cross behind the Tawakalna forces, cut them off and engage them. The second was to confront them directly. The commanders of the Coalition force settled on a blend of the two options (McGregor 63). They set out a surprise attack against the Tawakalna force on 26th February with the aim of breaking through the Tawakalna defences by three divisions to cut off the Iraqi army unit and ultimately destroy it. 73 Easting is a barren desert region in Iraq that is about 25 kilometers away from the Kuwaiti border. Since there are no landmarks on the deserts in that area, it derives its name from the imaginary lines and grids of the US Army's grid square system (Krause 37). The Tawakalna division was divided into three zones stationed at the Iraqi side of the southern Iraq-Kuwait border (Zaloga 55). The core zone was the operations zone which held the main defensive positions of the division about 25 kilometers into Iraq. A ten kilometer area lay between the operations zone and the Iraq-Kuwait border lay. This area held the first line of defense that had a duty of preventing an attack to enable the operational zone to consolidate for the attack. The security zone also protected important Iraqi military depots and routes to other Iraqi units in Kuwait. Behind the core operational zone in the interior of Iraq was the rear area that held the important logistics and also linked the core zone with the rest of Iraq. General Schwarzkopf ordered the movement of ground troops of the 7th Corps eastwards into Iraq on the 23rd and 24th of February 1991 (Daily 52). The Coalition forces entered Kuwaiti from their base in Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Sabre. The role of the ground troops was to cut off the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to destroy the elite Tawakalna division that posed a threat to the Coalition forces. Upon entry into Kuwait on 24th February, the troops meant to fight the battle against the Tawakalna kept moving east, towards the interior of Iraq (MacMaster 3). On the 25th, the Coalition troops moved at a very fast pace towards the Tawakalna position at a rate of sixty kilometers in less than four hours (MacMaster 7). A few Iraqi troops in the outer region of the Tawakalna core surrendered peacefully whilst some others gave up their positions after light resistance (MacMaster 6). Till the afternoon of 25th February, the French 6th Light Division was stationed at the south of the Iraq-Kuwait border right in front of the Tawakalna division (Dunnigan & Bay 34). The Tawakalna forces therefore relied on the intelligence that the French were not much of a threat. They therefore did not have much to be worried about in terms of an imminent attack on the 26th of February. February 26, 1991. At 12:00 Major McGregor ordered the Eagle Troops to move from their position on 60 Easting towards 70 Easting (MacMaster 11). The advance halted an hour later when the Engineer regiment was ordered to dig a few defensive positions. The G, I & K Troops were also advancing gradually behind the E Troops. At 3.25pm, Captain MacMaster was ordered to start attacking enemies they would encounter. At 3.56, the E Troops dispatched a scout team of three platoons to that picked up a group of enemy soldiers who had surrendered peacefully in an enemy bunker (MacMaster 13). On their return, the platoon's Bradleys came under heavy gunfire from a village east of the bunker. With orders from Captain MacMaster, the third platoon moved in with all their nine tanks and returned heavy fire with 120 millimeter HEAT rounds which destroyed the enemy position in the village. By 4pm, the units of the US 2nd Armored Cavalry Division (2ACD) was stationed right in the core of Tawakalna Division security zone (Crawley 13). At the same time, the US 3rd Armored Division was stationed north of the Tawakalna Division and ready to advance whilst the British 1st Armed was stationed south, ready to advance (shown in figure 1 below) Figure 1, taken from Bryant, 2007 After the assault on the Iraqi village, the Eagle Troops moved further east (MacMaster 14). An enemy tank moving westward was destroyed by an E Troop platoon after it fired TOW missiles at the platoon. At 4.18pm, the E Troops' eastward advance was halted when they came in contact with a group of 8 Iraqi Tanks the Iraqi forces began to fire at them (MacMaster 18). The E Troops fired back and an intense battle began. G Troops of the Second Squadron moved north of the E Troops. This was obviously unexpected by the Tawakalna forces. They responded rapidly by deploying 3 heavily armored brigades, the 18th, 29th and 9th Battalion of the force to maintain their hold on the security zone (Dunnigan & Bay 35). The E Troops were confronted with fire as they approached a Tawakalna stronglold of buildings (MacMaster 20). E Troop bradleys and tanks fired back and captured the cluster of buildings and Iraqi forces. They moved deeper into the Tawakalna camp. They then bumped into a group of Iraqi tanks and destroyed them as well. After attaining these victories, the E Troops sent scouts to make contact with Troop G in the north. The scout platoon encountered tank position involving 13 T72 tanks. They quickly destroyed the tanks with TOW missiles (MacMaster 22). Troops I, K and G were deployed shortly afterwards (Bryant1). The I Troops halted at 67 Easting to give standby support to the advancing troops. The rest moved north and were faced with fires from the a cluster of buildings but they returned the fire and secured the northern edge of the offensive (Bryant). The I Troops began destroying the defenses of the Iraqi troops that the advancing troops had failed to destroy (Bryant). There was a company of T72 tanks just behind the E Troops that the I Troops moved in to destroy. The K Troops joined the I Troops and 16 Tawakalna tanks were destroyed. The intermediate I and K troops identified another formation of Iraqi tanks moving towards it, to give back up to the other position that they had destroyed. They engaged the advancing Tawakalna troops and destroyed it with tank and TOW fire. In the process, a friendly fire from the K Troops hit an I Troop Bradley and wounded three US Army soldiers (Bryant). Meanwhile, the G Troops gained a position on a high ground north of the E Troops (Crawley 11). By 4.45, they were well stationed and ready to do battle. The Tawakalna Division however retreated and sought to regroup up in the north just where the G Troops were stationed. Around 6pm, a large contingent of T72 and T-55 tanks from the Iraqi Army began moving northwards towards the position that the G Troops were stationed. This resulted in the exchange of heavy fire between the approaching Iraqi tanks and the G Troops . Due to the large influx of Iraqi tanks, there was the need to prevent them from closing in on the G Troops (Crawley 12). The 4th Squadron of the 2ACD, which was the Airforce wing of the Regiment was deployed to use air bombardments to prevent the Tawakalna forces from closing the gap with the G Troops. However, the firing of the Iraqi forces was so much intense. After about three hours of battling, the G Troop fire support team requested for help from the headquarters of the regiment. 720 howitzers and MLRS rounds were deployed from behind the lines to support them (MacMaster 28). The G Troops nearly exhausted their supplies around 9.30pm and had successfully destroyed two Iraqi armor companies. As they waited for the ammunitions to arrive, the Hawk Tank Company was deployed to support the G Troops. This enabled them to carry on engaging the Iraqis whist waiting for supplies. When the supplies arrived, they increased the offensive and destroyed the remaining Iraqi tank squads. The G Troops lost a single soldier and an M3 Bradley which was destroyed by an Iraqi IFV fire. However, hundreds of Iraqi troops were killed whilst many armored vehicles were destroyed by the superior American fire power. By 11.30pm, the actual battle had ended (MacMaster 29). This was followed by the sporadic exchange of fire from both sides. Due to the major surprise element of the attack, the Tawakalna soldiers became individualistic in meeting the American forces (McGregor 2). They had not had the time to prepare mines and positions in the security zone before confrontation began. Many jumped from their tanks to avoid fatalities and it seemed there was little co-ordination between the Tawakalna commanders and the Iraqi troops on the ground (McGregor 16). The US attack was however violent and intensive. This gave little chance for the Iraqis to regroup. Lieutenant General Franks ordered Colonel Holder, the commander of the 2ACR to hold his current position by midnight and not go any further into Tawakalna territory (MacMaster 29). This is because there were at least six battalions in the Tawakalna territory that the 2ACR could not destroy alone due to exhausting and ammunition constraints. At this time, the other divisions, the US 3rd Armored division in the north and the British 1st Armoured Division in the South were also progressing steadily whilst other movement of Coalition forces was going on in the central zone of the Tawakalna position (MacMaster 28). February 27, 1991. In the quiet of the night, the US 1st Infantry Division moved in to assist the exhausted 2ACR. When they got into position, they had 6 Battalions ready to face the 18th and 37th Brigades of the Tawakalna forces. However, in the face of this superior military power, the Tawakalna forces did not withdraw. They stayed on and put up a brave fight (MacMaster 31). Once in position 1st Infantry Division began to use superior technology to detect and fire at Iraqi tanks. This detection system could sense tanks whose engines were on (Biddle 301). Identifying this technique, the engines of some Iraqi tanks were switched off and due to this, the 1st Infantry Division failed to identify them in the dark (Biddle 301). The bypassed Iraqi units fired at the 1st Infantry Division at the rear. However, Colonel Weisman of the 1st Infantry Division pulled back the troops, reinforced, identified and destroyed Iraqi troops that had been bypassed earlier (Biddle 302). By 12.30 am, the 1st Infantry Division had broken 2 kilometers into the Tawakalna division operational core zone. In the next three hours, they crossed another 10 kilometers deeper and attained Objective Norfolk, which was meant to break through Tawakalna strongholds and cut of the RPG from the interior of Iraq (Pollack 620). By dawn, Objective Norfolk had been fully attained by the 1st Infantry Division. At other parts of 73 Easting, the 2 ACR had completely destroyed two Iraqi armored Brigades, the 18th and 37th Armored-Brigades. With the weakening of the central structures of the Tawakalna Division, the US 3rd Armored Division in the north and the British 1st Armoured Division in the south could move in and meet the 1st Infantry Division and 2nd Armored Cavalry Division to successfully encircle the Tawakalna Division (Bryant). With the division encircled and their supplies to Iraqi units in Kuwait cut off, the most important asset of the Iraqi military was rendered ineffective and powerless. This gave an easy passage for all other Coalition units as they attacked the various Iraqi military wings scattered across Kuwait as well as those in Iraq that posed an immediate threat to Kuwait. Conclusion The Battle of 73 Easting was a major American led victory that enabled the Coalition forces to achieve their aim of forcing Iraq to withdraw and comply with UN resolutions on the sovereignty of Kuwait. Militarily, the US forces used army doctrines of audacity, good communication between commanders and combatants, surprise, advanced technology and well trained soldiers to fight and defeat the Tawakalna forces. These important principles and practices need to become an important part of military tactics. The victory proves that the most important Army doctrine can allow an army to defeat an army of brave soldiers who fail to use these doctrines sufficiently. Works Cited Adrian, Lewis. The American Culture of War: The History of US Military Force from World War II To Operation Iraqi Freedom. Routledge. 2007. Print. Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian-Gulf War. Houghton-Mifflin. 2004. Print. Biddle, Stephen. “Victory Misunderstood: What The Gulf War Tells us About the Future of Conflict” International Security. Fall 1996. Journal Borque, Stephen, A. “Correcting the Myths about the Persian-Gulf War: The Last Stand of The Tawakalna” The Middle East Journal Volume 51 Number 4 Autumn 1997. Journal Bryant, Terry. History's Greatest War. Virginia: Global Media. 2007. Print. Crawley, Vince. “Ghost Troop's Battle at the 73 Easting” Armor. May – June 1991. Journal. Daily, Edward. We Remember: US Cavalry Association. Turner Publishing Company. 1996. Print. Donaldson, Gary. 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