Cultural Impacts of Sino-Japanese War - Essay Example

Guide's Cultural Impacts of Sino-Japanese War Introduction Historically the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 is an influential episode, yet it has been largely overlooked in the Western literature. This is not the case in the East only, where, from the time when the war struck, the focus of Chinese overseas policy has been to get rid of its consequences whereas the focus of Japanese overseas policy has been to corroborate them. Japan succeeded China as the overriding regional power. Such a seismic U-turn in the long-established power balance cracked down the previous international accord within the Confucian world and left an after effects of continuing defensive and political fissures that have enmeshed China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan ever since. Historical Factors in Sino-Japanese Discontent At the same time as both - China and Japan - had benefited from a mostly symbiotic, i"big brother-little brother" rapport in prehistoric times, and the twist of the 20th century marked the commencement of their disturbed rapport up to now. Japan's imperialist triumph over China in the earliest Sino-Japanese War (1894-1985) upturned China's preceding supremacy within the bond and lay down the tenor for Japan's domination over China for the century ahead. China's consequential bearing of Achilles' heel and persecution was worsened by enforced lenience to Japan at the "Versailles Peace Conference post-World War I"ii, which sparkled crowded anti-Japanese lobbies terminating in the 'May Fourth Movement of 1919' and a countrywide imposed sanctions of Japanese merchandise that pursued (Shih 1986). Later on, Japanese carnage in the following Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) also seeded crowded anti-Japanese movements and cemented China's hatred of Japan, eventually fueling the anti-Japanese constituents of Chinese jingoism. Till 2005, 'the Rape of Nanjing of December 1937'iii - the most horrible single event of Japanese bloodbath in China, where 300,000 Chinese nationals were cruelly assassinated throughout six weeks - persisted to exist on in Chinese reminiscences as a mark of Japanese brutality and a stimulation for continuous anti-Japanese ways of thinking in China these days (Backman 2005). The intensifying Sino-Japanese conflict is driven both by larger historical factors and by East Asia's changing strategic balance. World War II and the Cold War left the Sino-Japanese rivalry unresolved (Backman 2005). Japan's surrender in 1945 did not result in regional reconciliation or integration in East Asia, or a common acceptance within Japan of the ravages perpetrated by the imperialistic regime. Although most Japanese supported the U.S.-created peace establishment and vowed never again to engage in warfare, the values, perceptions, and leaders of the period of imperial expansion were not categorically washed their hands of, as their fascist equivalents had been in Europe. This was partly the result of U.S. decisions to retain the emperor and permit politicians and bureaucrats associated with the imperial wartime regime to regain positions and organize political parties in the "new" postwar Japan (McCluskey 1999). More broadly, postwar Japanese society did not entirely jettison its distorted self-image of Japan as a struggling Asian nation beset by Western imperialists and eventually forced into a defensive war. Many Japanese also prefer to see themselves as victims of the war and not as aggressors, largely as a result of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, the Communist victory in China in 1949iv created lasting geopolitical divisions between the two Asian powers that made reconciliation even more difficult. In order to strengthen their own nationalist credentials, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deliberately sought to sustain and strengthen a public image of Japan as a potentially aggressive, militaristic nation. During the Cold War, the U.S.-Soviet strategic conflict in East Asia not only overshadowed but effectively sublimated the unresolved Sino-Japanese dispute (Paine 2003). Shielded by its security treaty with the United States and constrained by its pacifist constitution, Japan was preoccupied with economic rebirth, while China remained isolated internationally and engulfed internally in political radicalism. Although China and Japan restored diplomatic relations in 1972, genuine reconciliation remained elusive (Paine 2003). Beyond the official rhetoric about friendship and Japanese economic aid and strategic complacency toward China, it was hard to detect mutual trust and respect at either the national or individual citizen level. China kept warning about a possible revival of Japanese militarism and attempted to play on Japanese war guilt to obtain concessions, while many Japanese elites, though profoundly skeptical of China's ability to achieve real economic modernization, were equally uneasy about a potentially strong China (McCluskey 1999). Indeed, neither country appeared ready to embrace the other as an equal partner in sharing regional security and economic responsibilities. Impacts of Sino-Japanese war The Sino-Japanese War marked the end of the old Confucian order and its tributary system for conducting Far Eastern relations (Shih 1986). As indicated by the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the reorientation of Russian foreign policy, the war also heralded a new era of global politics in which Asian events would have a direct impact on Europe. Sino-Japanese War was a conflict between Japan and China for dominance over China's tributary, Korea. In reality, it was a Japanese attempt to preempt Russian expansion down the Korean Peninsula to threaten Japan. It was also the first of a two limited wars in pursuit of an overarching policy objective: Japanese policymakers believed that dominance over the Korean Peninsula by any great power would directly threaten their national security. They sought to protect Japan first by expelling China in the Sino-Japanese War and, then a decade later, by expelling Russia from both Korea and southern Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 (Paine 2003). A quarter of a century later, continuing Russian involvement in China and Japanese perceptions of the threat that this entailed culminated in a second and much longer Sino-Japanese War (1932-45) (McCluskey 1999, 4). Although the policy of Russian containment is generally associated with U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, in reality, from the first Sino-Japanese War to the end of World War II, Japanese policymakers had consistently applied containment to Russia (Sarah 2002-03). In the 22 years prior to the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, China never seriously objected to the Japan-Taiwan trade in purely economic terms (Gene 1974, 735). Rather, it was Japan who, sometimes acting under the pressure from Taiwan and the United States, discriminated against China by enforcing western embargo regulations (some of which are still in force), refusing to conclude a governmental trade agreement involving the mutual grant of certain privileges, and denying Japanese exporters the privilege of using government credit facilities in transactions with their Chinese counterpart (Jane 2005). Thus, much of China's criticism about Japan's trade with Taiwan and the alleged Japanese intention to reduce Taiwan to an "economic colony" was basically a reaction to Japan's political hostility rather than a deliberate attempt to disrupt the Taipei-Tokyo trade (Gene 1974, 730). In Japan, lineage or 'race' is regarded as the primary determinant of Japanese. An individual is treated as 'Japanese' or 'semi-Japanese' on the basis of his lineage, regardless of his social or cultural background. In contemporary Japan, the presence of the large number of non-Japanese people (racially) cannot be overlooked (Jane 2005). Thus, when a community lives in a country for several generations, they become naturalized citizens of that country. The notion of Japanese homogeneity is a post-modernization phenomenon. The strict uniformity imposed by the central government left little space for the common man to think that there could be 'other' people living in the same society who might be socially, culturally and even racially different from the Japanese. What helped this belief to strengthen was the conscious effort made by the ethnic minorities to hide their 'other' identity for fear of being discriminated (McCluskey 1999). It is only recently, with the growing number of movements of various minorities for as mentioned earlier for their cultural and ethnic identity, that international political attention is drawn towards considering Japan as a multi-cultural nation. The relative balance of power between China and Japan underwent a dramatic shift in the 1990s (Sarah 2002-03). The Chinese economy began its rapid takeoff, while the Japanese economy descended into a decade of stagnation. The fortunes of the two countries diverged so quickly that after a single decade the difference was enough to shift the regional balance of power and affect Sino-Japanese relations. Even though Japan remained well ahead of China in absolute economic and technological capabilities, China was narrowing the gap at an impressive pace (Jane 2005). This trend led to an adjustment of geostrategic calculations. The strategic value of Japan, which Beijing had admired as a model of economic modernization in the 1980s, declined dramatically (Jane 2005). The Way Ahead Given the heightened tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, a cooling-off period, during which both sides refrain from provocative actions, is critical to restoring stability. China must show maximum good faith in seeking a mutually agreeable resolution to the disputes over the natural gas fields in the East China Sea. Deploying naval forces in the area, as it did in September 2005, is counterproductive. The latest three-part proposal by Japan for joint development of the fields represents new flexibility by Tokyo and should be taken seriously by Beijing. For his part, Prime Minister Koizumi must acquire a deeper appreciation of the strategic stakes involved in relations with China and repair the damage caused by his ill-advised visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (Jane 2005). With his landslide victory in the September 2005 parliamentary elections, he has enough political capital to take risks in improving ties with Beijing. China must also exercise restraint in protesting if such visits recur, because these protests could only backfire, as they have in the past. If China and Japan manage to stabilize their ties after a cooling-off period, they will then need to join with other Asian countries in tackling three long-term problems that deeply affect Sino-Japanese relations: Japan, China, and South Korea should establish a tripartite commission to examine the history textbooks used in all three countries and propose a set of standards to address the most controversial issues involving their content (Jane 2005). China must significantly curtail the amount of cultural programming (especially film and television) devoted to the Japanese invasion of China because such programming, long a staple of anti-Japanese propaganda, is backward looking and needlessly fuels public hostility toward Japan. Despite China's huge population, military, and resource base, and in spite of its shorter lines of communiqu, more battleships, and years of military upgrading, it lost every encounter and lost poorly (Sarah 2002-03). Its armies run away from the grounds in confusion, dumping very important supplies, and took advantage of the local inhabitants (Sarah 2002-03). The war distorted the perceptiveness of both the East and the West, upsetting the overseas policies of the entire of those betrothed in the Far East (Sarah 2002-03). Perceptiveness of Chinese failing caused far more violent overseas interruptions, shepherding in the era identified as "the jumble for allowances" when overseas powers separated China into spheres of sway. On the contrary, perceptiveness of Japan's power set in motion its insertion in the lines of the majestic powers (Sarah 2002-03). The 1902 Anglo-Japanesev coalition established Japan's new standing. This was Britain's only coalition from the ending of the Napoleonic Wars awaiting World War I (Sarah 2002-03). If the war hurled Japan into the defenses of the powers, it plunged China on a long downhill twist. It devastated any root for China's dogged sense of unbreachable dominance and enforced Chinese re-evaluation of their position on the earth (Sarah 2002-03). Trounced by Japan, a previous member of the Confucian world, did this much more resolutely than any Western trounce, counting those in the Opium Warsvi, ever did or ever could (Hans and Franks 2002). This particular war had huge impacts on Russia as well. It brought about a basic reorientation of Russian overseas policy ahead of Europe to Asia. The Russian administration wrapped up that Japan posed a main menace to its imperceptibly fortified Siberian border (Hans Franks 2002, 3). So, it quickly hastens its tactics for Russian colonization and expansion of Manchuria, making the momentous judgment to run the Siberian railway track (Hans and Franks 2002, 3), not alongside the Northern corner of the Amur River as it does nowadays, but directly through Northern Manchuria to build a shorter linkage between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok (Sarah 2002-03). When the Boxer Rebellion of 1900vii seriously busted the railway track, Russia retorted by setting up over 100,000 troops to dwell in the entire of Manchuria. The Japanese could only construe these huge monetary and armed pledges in Manchuria to connote one thing: Russia planned to lessen Japanese permeation of the Asian mainland. These challenging Russian and Japanese goals raise their fists in the Russo-Japanese confrontation. In 1895 the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Hilary A. Herbert, wrote: "Japan has leaped, almost at one bound, to a place among the great nations of the earth. Her recent exploits in the war with China have focused all eyes upon her, and the world now comprehends the startling fact that this small island kingdom, so little taken account of heretofore in the calculations even of students and statesmen, has within a few decades stridden over ground traversed by other nations only within centuries" (Sarah 2002-03). The British journalist and specialist on Asian studies, Sir Henry Norman, wrote mid-war: "The war with China and the treaty with England [of 1894 according Japan juridical equality] will at last force foreigners to see Japan as she is. The Japanese are a martial and proud race, with marvelous intelligence, and untiring energy and enthusiasm" (Sarah 2002-03). Contrary to Japan, the post-war European view of China was anything but flattering. According to the official newspaper of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Journal de St-Ptersbourg, "Since the beginning of this war, the Chinese have provided a lamentable spectacle. No one suspected such weaknessviii." One British expert on Asia, Alexis Krausse, described China as "[c]orrupt to the core, ill-governed, lacking cohesion and without means of defending herself...to believe in the recuperative power of China is mere wasted faith... China as a political entity is doomedix." Conclusion As the saying goes, "there are no winners in war", it hold right from perspective of both sides engaged in war. Ever side loses resources in the form of men, machinery and land. And still it seems inevitable to stay away from war like situation. If we see the historical perspectives, there has been a very short interval of time in years for each century in which there was peace all over the world. Sino-Japanese war was also the contributory effort to compliment the records of losses incurred by nations in wars. The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China, then under the Qing Dynasty, was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede Taiwan and recognize the independence of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Qing Dynasty was on the brink of collapse from internal revolts and foreign imperialism, while Japan had emerged as a great power through its effective measures of modernization. To solve tension in China-Japan relations, the most important thing is that the Japanese government must take actual deeds. Bibliography: Hanes, William Travis, and Frank Sanello, 2002. Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another, pg. 3. Shih, See Hu. 1986. The Chinese Renaissance; V. Schwarcz, Chinese Enlightenment Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May 4th Movement of 1919, 2d ed. 1964. Backman, Michael. February 23, 2005. "Bad memories stir Japan in chase for China." Asia Online February 23, 2005. http://www.theage.com.au/news/Business/Bad-memories-stir-Japan-in-chasefor-China/2005/02/22/1109046913810.htmlfrom=moreStories&oneclick=true (accessed March 19, 2008). Hsiao, Gene T. Dec. 1974. Prospects for a New Sino-Japanese Relationship, The China Quarterly, No. 60, pp. 720-749. http://links.jstor.org/sicisici=03057410%28197412%290%3A60%3C720%3APFANSR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 (accessed March 17, 2008). Paine, S. C. M. 2003. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, U.S. Naval War College, Cambridge University Press. Paine, Sarah. 2002-03. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, US Naval War College, Rhode Island, Foreign Visiting Fellow, SRC http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/eng/news/no10/enews10-essay2.html (accessed March 17, 2008). Rebecca A. McCluskey. March 25, 1999. Sino-Japanese Relations, From Strife to Strides. http://www.lehigh.edu/rfw1/courses/1999/spring/ir163/Papers/pdf/ram2.pdf (Accessed March 17, 2008). Read More