Adenauers Foreign Policy - Essay Example

Adenauer's Foreign Policy It would not be wrong to say that Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt, both possess true patriotism, which is uncommon in politicians, for the tactics they practiced in order to evade Germany from further destruction after World War II. For this purpose the first achievement of Adenauer refers to the attempts he undertook for integrating East Germany with the West. This is remembered in history as a "wise decision" which not only democratise the German nation on a parliamentary level but also remerged as a separate political identity on a platform, where Germany was perceived as a looser and defeated nation. Since 1949, the emergence of German Federal Republic, Adenauer started a loyal pro-Western, anticommunist foreign policy for which Davison & Speier (1957) has expressed their opinion in the following words: "To a generation living with the memories of World War II, into which another German chancellor had plunged the world less than twenty years earlier, Adenauer has been the symbol of sobriety and moderation. His firm adherence to the principles underlying Western civilisation is beyond doubt, and his policies bear no trace of Hitler's nihilism and hybrid". (Davison & Speier, 1957, p. 2) And obviously both Adenauer and Brandt acquire this political characteristic that despite being chancellors of their eras, they only concern about ways to unite the broken Germany, not by aggression but by political diplomacy. Adenauer performed a historic role for confronting various challenging issues just after the Second World War. All his foreign policies lead him towards a single solution i.e., a united Europe and that is what he dreamt about throughout his life. Not only dreamt but also implemented his visions in the form of practical solution by developing certain policies, that remained successful in uniting both the East and West of the Germany. The best thing about Adenauer's regime was he did not receive resistance from a large communist minority. However, he received several obstructions on the basis of the opposition he received from the German Social Democratic party. Adenauer's Foreign Policy - German Sovereignty Adenauer felt the need to develop his own foreign policy in the late 1940s when he saw the German policies been threatened by France. At this stage he felt a real need to devise a new set of foreign policies but due to the restriction imposed upon him he was unable to do so. The only option he found open was to secure German sovereignty, and this could only be achieved by integrating FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) to Western Europe. Adenauer recovered Germany by effective foreign and domestic policy thereby standardising the German currency rate in 1948. It was in 1950s when Adenauer succeeded in recognising his new state's entry into Western institutions. In this context the first move he made was the acceptance of the partnership of those nations who at times were Germany's greatest opponents. France was at the top of the list. This was the first step towards establishment of a secure foreign policy that defended German sovereignty. Dissolving the Ruhr Authority Adenauer contributed towards gaining rights of the Ruhr's authority and was able to acquire freedom to the FRG thereby alleviating all provisions and statutes against European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). According to Schwarz (1995) "The economy of Western Europe had to be regarded as an interdependent system and could not prosper without the Ruhr. In his view it followed from this that a forced suppression of the German economy was in no-one's interests. Drawing on his experiences stretching back over almost three decades, he maintained that the establishment of a bloc-free Germany would be unwise, too. He pleaded for a reconstruction of the German economy; this meant that the Ruhr should be internationalised and linked closely with the Western European economic system". (Schwarz, 1995, p. 40) So, the foremost achievement of Adenauer was the independence of Ruhr authority, which without him would not have been possible, particularly in the then circumstances where Germany was weeping. The main benefit achieved by integrating the policies regarding Ruhr was that Germany was able to won the favour of France, who after passing the ECSC came forward to safeguard German interests particularly by securing national security. This France did by creating certain boundaries of the International Authority for the Ruhr after which Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg participated in defending the Ruhr area's resources. Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) Adenauer's party system contributed to a great extent towards his implementation of foreign policies and his CDU varied from that of his colleague sponsors. Most of Adenauer's partners expected from him to unite his efforts of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, while Adenauer from the beginning was seeking a polar rivalry. It seemed despite his successful policies he was continuously being threatened by the Nazis and Communists, which not only formed a strong coalition against his CSU but also imposed a threatening danger towards him from the east. Adenauer's 'two-and-a-half party system' made him confronted towards umpteen critics like 'hypocrite', 'neutral' etc, but he remained successful as a democratic chancellor. The CDU / CSU emerged as a turning point in Adenauer's nightmare after which he managed to treat 'reunification' in the context of German allies. According to Clemens, that Adenauer's party consisted of a vast majority who believed that if Adenauer would adopt any process of reunification, it would lead to a positive vote for reunification within one state. Even many agreed that if the nation chose to remain divided, the division would be only for a transition period preceding total reunification. But the rest of the Union leaders agreed upon the notion that Germany had the right to seek state unity and sovereignty. Potsdam Complex Adenauer, like his many other colleague Union leaders feared that the collapse of Hitler's era in 1945 would impact Germany pessimistically in relation to international politics, as they all were feared about the new coalitions of Germany and believed that it would affect the conditions pessimistically. The 'Potsdam complex' was basically the fear within Adenauer that lead him to dedicate his life for the sovereignty for the Federal Republic as a way of preventing total political emasculation. Clemens (1989) writes regarding this as "Yet in the long run the FRG by itself constituted too small a vehicle to influence world events or even control its own destiny. This sense of relative powerlessness grew as West Germany's economic miracle highlighted the disparity between the country's wealth and Bonn's still-modest political influence. (Clemens, 1989, p. 24) Brandt was anti communist and possessed the capability to get involve into socialist parties easily. Adenauer's policies where on the one hand aimed at improving its relations with the West, on the other hand Adenauer believed that it was the role of United States which confronted them to be treated like an 'outsider' ally to its associated states. This frustration caused Adenauer to couple with the party's self-denying ordinance with respect to traditional nationalism and Adenauer started seeking protection on a national level as he felt feeble on international European platform. Adenauer's policies were in favour of his dream to see the whole European continent as 'one' globally. This dream became a threat to him when Adenauer's party persisted in remaining as an opponent to see Germany's partition as a potential threat to the stability and peace of Europe. Adenauer believed it useless to think about security, without the concept of reunification of Europe. Adenauer often subjected to 'nightmares' when analysed the then political scenarios of Germany and consider Europe to be the state of disturbed equilibrium. According to 2007a, Germany confronted to many perils, which served as a lesson for the other European states to be united for the geopolitical situation ahead of them. (2007a) Adenauer's policy initiated by negative influences of critics, devoid of hopes of rebuilding a new nation-state, which resembled the old empire. However we was driven by the fear that such an entity would reawaken fearful memories of recent German expansionism in neighbouring states, or would destabilise the European balance of power in a way favourable to Soviet communism. He did not by any means wanted his 'nightmare' to be true. So, he tried his best by uniting France and all other opponents of Germany to think in the same direction. According to Clemens (1989) "His policy also excluded from the outset any manner of neutral Gesamtdeutschland, arguing that it would constitute neither a bridge nor a buffer between East and West, but a power vacuum inviting Soviet hegemony; a state in Germany's geopolitical situation could hardly be neutral like Switzerland without rapidly becoming neutralized like Finland". (Clemens, 1989, p. 31) All union leaders proposed their alternative solutions to unite Germany, East and West, in a broad, united, and democratic way and that with the assent of East and West Germans. In this way, the Union tried to create the political goals of Deutschlandpolitik. But Adenauer believed the safest route to fully equal status lay in reuniting Germany within the framework of a new Europe, even a European superpower. Although Adenauer continually agreed that resolution of the German question could come about only through a Four Power accord, his 'Potsdam complex'. This convinced him to use the option, which Moscow used once i.e., to use Four Power conferences to pressurise the Western allies into creating and signing a formal treaty with a neutralised Gesamtdeutschland. (Clemens, 1989, p. 31) Brandt's Foreign Policies Willy Brandt, a German chancellor like Adenauer possessed the anti Nazism opinion that German political reforms could not be achieved under any circumstances unless the Nazi movement is there. Brandt contributed towards SPD (Social Democratic Party) as a leader and work side by side with Adenauer. Brandt, like Adenauer also worked throughout the execution of foreign policy to a trusted subordinate outside of the institutionalised policymaking structure. (Sarotte, 2001, p. 32) Brandt's Ostpolitik The set of policies, which Brandt designed, were 'Ostpolitik' aimed at civilising relations with East Germany, Soviet Union and Poland. The main difference between the working policies of Adenauer and Brandt was both were working towards freedom of German reforms but on opposite levels. Adenauer's foreign policies targeted the Western part of the Germany while Brandt's policies focused more on the Eastern side of Ostpolitik than on the Western part. Adenauer's policies targeted at uniting the former allies of German state in order to build up a more sovereign and secure state and to achieve the goal he dissolved all the ties with its allies, which included France. Brandt on the other hand merged East Germany with Soviet Union by indulging into East German politics and by adopting a diplomatic role. Brandt also brought a threat to the Soviets, as they feared that East Germany if united with the West, would be a symbol of peril to the Soviet. East Germany was able to cross the boundaries in maintaining friendly relations with the West due to the efforts by Adenauer. So, many critics have labeled Brandt as a 'real diplomat' in making its negotiations with the West as well as with Soviet Union. Brandt when entered into SPD in 1966, he was also a member of Christian Democrats so a hope emerged that he would like, Adenauer adopt approaches to unite both the Germanys. The coalition of SPD and CDU was by no means a simple task which SPD politician Herbert Wehner, who had broken with the Communist Party during the war, challenged. Brandt was a man who had spent World War II in exile organising all forms of resistance to the Nazis; Like Adenauer, he trusted his own intuition in tricky political situations. He decided that the ability to lead a coalition government with the liberal FDP was preferable than to make the compromises needed to be part of another Grand Coalition with center-right parties. "The conservatives in Germany, headed by the CDU, saw Brandt's initiatives as a threat to West Germany's ties to its Western allies, as a morally unjustified act of recognition of an unsavory regime, and as a confirmation of controversial borders, which might hinder eventual unification. (Sarotte, 2001, p. 27) Like Adenauer, Brandt also confronted many critics while attempting to merge both Germany together. In March 1970, the opposition praised him by claiming that in fact Brandt actually doesn't want to make both the ends meet. Brandt avoided making any kind of firm commitments in meetings, which he found, were of no use but just mutual statements of demands and hopes for East and West relations. According to Sarotte (2001) "Stoph, in a summary of his personal exchanges with Brandt during Erfurt, concluded that Brandt was trying to set up minor agreements or commissions to discuss specific issues but that he completely avoided 'the main issue', namely, the establishment of full legal recognition and formal relations between the two Germanies". (1a) (Sarotte, 2001, p. 50) All Brandt wanted was the concern that communist countries should move ahead to a fully constructed freedom state that provides democracy to their people in all aspects of life, so that wilting economies might be reshaped to be lived by a democratic nation. Thus Adenauer and Brandt were such personalities without which Germany reconciliation with the European world would not have been possible. References & Bibliography Berger Thomas, (2001) The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995 In: German Politics and Society. Volume: 19: 1 p: 80 Clemens Clay, (1989) Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik: Duke University Press: Durham, NC. Davison W. Phillips & Speier Hans, (1957) West German Leadership and Foreign Policy: Row, Peterson: Evanston, IL. Morgan M. Patrick & Nelson L. Keith, (2000) Re-Viewing the Cold War: Domestic Factors and Foreign Policy in the East-West Confrontation: Praeger: Westport, CT. Sarotte M. E., (2001) Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik, 1969- 1973: University North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, NC. Schwarz Hans-Peter, (1995) Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution, and Reconstruction. Volume: 2: Berghahn Books: Providence, RI. (1a) "Niederschrift der wichtigsten Probleme, die im persnlichen Gesprch mit dem westdeutschen Bundeskanzler Brandt am 19.3.1970 in Erfurt behandelt wurden, " p. 332, in DC20-4680 (Stoph), BA-V. Ulbricht sent a copy of this to Brezhnev; see his letter to Brezhnev of 1 Apr. 1970, in J IV 2/202/103 (Bro Ulbricht), SAPMO In: Sarotte M. E., (2001) Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973: University North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, NC 2007a, Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953-1955, 454. Read More