The European Defense Community - Case Study Example

The European Defense Community Introduction The European Defense Community (EDC) was an excellent but aborted plan to counter the planned rearmament of West Germany. Its plan was proposed in 1950 René Pleven, the French President of the Council (known as Prime Minister after 1958). The impetus for the creation of the EDC is to provide a pan-European defense force which will serve as an alternative to the proposed accession to NATO “meant to harness its military potential in case of conflict with the Soviet bloc” (Wikimedia Foundation, Inc). It was established by the Treaty of Paris on 27 May 1952 by the six members of the ECSC (Palmowski). The European Defense Community is considered by many as the most ambitious project which was launched by the proponents of European unity. It was an attempt to form a European army, just barely five years after the end of World War II. Indeed, the creation of EDC was highly symbolic but it was “a fundamental part of national sovereignty that few countries were prepared to give up” (European Navigator). Main Body The History The United States has designed a policy to get France committed to a supranational army in the European Defense Community in 1953. The French government was the one who initiated the EDC in the early 1950’s based on the European Coal and Steel Community. It was designed to allow Germany to re-arm under a supra-national structure (Anderson). The Impetus for Creation The Korean War in 1950 awakened the fears of the western leaders and convinced them of the increasing threat of international communism. It was then that the United States started to encourage the Europeans—particularly, the FRG—to contribute to their own defense. In the case of Germany which experienced a lost in the most devastating of all wars, the formation of an army is unthinkable. This step was unthinkable for many of the Germans. The German rearmament was also considered abhorrence to its European neighbors, especially for France. “As the Korean War continued, however, opposition to rearmament lessened within the FRG, and China's entry in the war caused France to revise its negative position toward German rearmament” (The Library of Congress Country Studies). The re-armament of Germany made France propose a European Defense Community under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Konrad Hermann Josef Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, quickly agreed to join the Community because he saw membership as likely to increase his country's sovereignty. “The treaties establishing the EDC were signed in May 1952 in Bonn by the Western Allies and the FRG. Although the Bundestag ratified the treaties, the EDC was ultimately blocked by France's parliament, the National Assembly, because it opposed putting French troops under foreign command. The French veto meant that a new formula was needed to allay French fears of a strong Germany” (The Library of Congress Country Studies). The Failure of ECD However despite efforts from the U.S government – both pressure and incentives given to France, the EDC ceased to exist in 1954 under the hands of the French parliament (Anderson). Using newly declassified documents from the Eisenhower Presidential library, this paper uncovers American and French perspectives and motivations from 1952 to 1954. In opposition to US policy today, during the 1950’s, the United States was a strong, even the primary supporter, of a supranational European defense force with the goal of creating a European power bloc. Ironically, French mistrust of the integration process killed the EDC. Moreover, the failure of the French to ratify the EDC was a major step on the road to mistrust between France and the US that continues to exist today. In the 1950’s, the United States was seen as a strong, “even the primary supported, of a of a supranational European defense force with the goal of creating a European power bloc” (Anderson).However, the French distrust of the integration paralyzed the European Defense Community. “Moreover, the failure of the French to ratify the EDC was a major step on the road to mistrust between France and the US that continues to exist today” (Anderson). The EDC: The End of Franco-American Trust The United States and Europe needed to create a security structure to stabilize their territories after the World War II. This necessity was even heightened by the outbreak of wars in Asia. Among the European countries, Germany was singled out as the enemy to control. This is particularly mentioned in the Brussels Treaty of 1948.” However, after the Korean War, the threat of communism seemed more immediate than ever. Containment was the policy. A rearmed Germany was deemed necessary to deter the Soviets, and the Eisenhower administration pressured the other European countries to allow it. German soil had to be defended; the Germans were willing to do it, and capable of it. Germany was reindustrializing itself at a rapid pace, and, becoming more aware of its bargaining power, was pushing to have its essential sovereignty restored. After seven years of occupation by four powers, the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty, and the de facto revision of the onerous provisions of the Italian peace treaty, it seemed a reasonable request” (Anderson). U.S. Prime Minister Churchill supported the move, saying, “We [can]not go on for three more years without a German army; even with it the front would still be thinly held. But it would be a deterrent to the Soviets” (Eisenhower Library, 1953). Furthermore, the resuscitation "of a Germany military force which in turn would divert a part of Germany's economic activity from competition with the United Kingdom into rearmament” (Eisenhower Library,1952). Historically, the French country has been invaded by Germany three times in less than 100 years. Understandably, “the French government was reluctant to allow Germany to rearm” (Anderson). “As a compromise, the French proposed the European Defense Community based on the European Coal and Steel Community, which would allow Germany to rearm, but under a supra-national structure. All members, except Germany, would be allowed to have national militaries outside the European Army. Adenauer, as well as Eisenhower, was not pleased by the unequal status given Germany in this forum. Once France dropped this requirement, the U.S. supported it wholeheartedly” (Anderson). The U.S government was more concerned with what is the best way to guarantee European security while France was more individualistic as they move for what would best safeguard the interest of France. While U.S sees Germany as a defeated power, therefore not should not be a cause for concern for the other European powers, France still felt the fear and doubt. For U.S., Germany was not as dangerous as the Soviet power. “Certainly, if Europe were to defend itself from the communist menace, the Europeans would have to put up a strong united front. From the global perspective, perhaps communism was indeed the most dangerous threat to the free world. However, it was not for the French whose communist party played an active role in its democratic government. For France, unrest throughout its empire and a rearmed Germany were much more immediate threats. Asking France to give up its national army and to put it along side its eternal enemy's, under supra-national control, while France was fighting a war in Indo-China and combating unrest in North Africa, was simply too much. Although another solution to German rearmament was ultimately agreed upon, this difference of perspective would plague European defense talks forty years later when France and the U.S. would continue to speak past each other” (Anderson). Ramifications of the EDC Defeat: The Franco-American Split After the EDC was rejected, Germany’s rearmament came with its accession to the NATO. Although the EDC has failed, both the French and the American government kept their faith in the potential for European integration. For the Americans, as always, European integration was a signal to the Soviets of Atlantic resolve and unity. However, U.S. support for integration went even further: "Except where its vital interests are concerned, the U.S. should avoid pursuing any course contrary to the enlightened self-interest of Western Europe. To pursue such a course would be to deny Western Europe the rights that the U.S. insists upon for itself. Such a position would be difficult to defend and in all probability politically injurious to the long range interest of the U.S.[.]” (Draper). Throughout the entire sixties, the United States proved faithful to its word by welcoming steps toward political union. As Kissinger wrote, “as late as 1962, Under Secretary of State Ball warned against the danger of treating the Common Market simply as an economic enterprise and opposed efforts of the Scandinavian countries and Austria to enter it without making a commitment to political unity” Throughout the sixties, the U.S. kept its word and welcomed steps toward political union. Kissinger wrote, “As late as 1962, Under Secretary of State Ball warned against the danger of treating the Common Market simply as an economic enterprise and opposed efforts of the Scandinavian countries and Austria to enter it without making a commitment to political unity” (Kissinger). However, it was observed that the U.S Policy towards France has changed. The rejection of the French government of the European Defense community has badly affected the Franco-American relations. US used to see France as “having the role of leadership on the European continent and a partner’s share in world leadership with the United States and the United Kingdom” (Draper). Sadly, the French “rejection of the EDC would mean that, although allies, neither side could, in the future, trust the other” (Anderson). As early as February 1954, Dulles wrote Eisenhower that “If France acts negatively on EDC, United States will have to do its best to salvage what it can from wreckage of our policy toward Europe and to reshape its policy. In particular, this will mean coordinating out policy with United Kingdom so that at least United States and United Kingdom can act together to take important decision on matters relating to European and world affairs. Whether one likes it or not, inevitably under such circumstances, United States and United Kingdom by necessity forced on them by France, will revert to that form of bilateral cooperation which existed during war years and which by its very nature would exclude France from an equal place” (1954). In a meeting with Dulles expressed relief that the EDC Tomfoolery was over. He said that had only supported it because Eisenhower wanted it, but that he never had faith in it. “At this point in Churchill’s eyes, Germany was seen as a more reliable partner than France. In the same memorandum, Dulles tells Eisenhower of his mistrust of France: “It seems that Mendes-France has been most evasive. He may be working out his own project on terms which profess to provide for sovereignty of Germany in NATO by attaching conditions unacceptable to Germany, U.S. and perhaps others. He could present these French terms at prospective London conference and, if they are not accepted, attempt to pass blame to others. This was his Brussels conference tactic. I find evidence of a rising tide of concern about Mendes-France’s Russian contacts. He has killed EDC at least for now and he may be out to kill German admission to NATO (Eisenhower Library, 1954). On the other side, “the weak French Fourth Republic was plagued by never-ending foreign policy crises beginning with the EDC, Indo-China, Algeria, and finally Suez. In each case, the Americans seemed not to side with the French government. Suez was the final straw: French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay called it the final nail in the coffin of French-American relations. Interestingly, this move ultimately pushed France to the cause of European integration that the U.S. so strongly supported. However, under the Fifth Republic, European integration would be on French terms and under French leadership” (Anderson). One analysis simply stated that the realization of the French government that the outcome of the EDC would signify a decrease rather that an improvement of the French power made Paris reject a project that it initiated four years ago (Gavin). Conclusion “There has been little debate over European defense and its way forward in the media in recent months. As such, it is a topic which engages only a small portion of the public's imagination, but there may be other reasons why the debate has gone quiet” (Bailes). Indeed, though a European Union is in place, inter-state conflicts and competition are inevitable. This case is specifically observed in big countries such as France and Germany. As to the European integration issue however, the formation of a European Union as one region is already a big leap. Works Cited Anderson, Stepahine. Developing Europe into a “Third Great Power Bloc”: The United States, France and the Failure of the European Defense Community. Wyoming, n.d. Bailes, Alyson J.K. " What news of European defence?" RUSI Journal (1998). Eisenhower Library, International Meeting Series, file: Bermuda - State Department Report, plenary session, 5:00p.m. December 5, 1953, p. 8. Eisenhower Library, Dulles-Herter Series, box 1, file: Dulles, John, F.: Prior inauguration, letter from Dulles to Eisenhower dated November 14, 1952. Eisenhower Library, Whitman Administration Series, box 13, file: Draper, William H., Jr., (2), p. III-9. Eisenhower Library, Dulles-Herter Series, box 2, file: Dulles, Feb. '54, (1), telegram from Dulles dated February 16, 1954, p. 2. Eisenhower Library, Dulles-Herter Series, box 3, file: Dulles, J. F., Sept. '54, (1), memorandum from Dulles marked as seen by the President on September 20, 1954, p. 1. European Navigator. 26 October 2009 . Gavin, Victor. "POWER THROUGH EUROPE? THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY IN FRANCE (1950–1954)." Oxford Journals (2009). Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, (Garden City, NY: Anchor/ Doubleday books, 1966) 33. Palmowski, Jan. 2004. 25 October 2009 . The Library of Congress Country Studies. "Germany Rearmament and the European Defense Community ." 4 July 2002. http://www.workmall.com. 25 October 2009 . Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 1 June 2009. http://en.wikipedia.org. 24 October 2009 . Read More