Names Are Rigid Designators So the Description Theory of Names Is Wrong - Essay Example

- Discuss: s are rigid designators so the theory of s is wrong" Introduction During the 1970's, the so called New Theory of Reference became widespread and is still flourishing today. This theory forwards the notion that that many locutions such as proper names refer directly to items or are "rigid designators". In contrast to the New Theory of Reference, the "Old theory" implies that names and relevantly similar locutions express descriptive senses or are disguised descriptions. (Humphreys and Fettzer, 1995) The New Theory encompasses notions such as direct reference, rigid designation, identity across possible worlds, the necessity of identity, a posteriori necessities, singular propositions, essentialism about natural kinds, the argument from the failure of substitutivity in modal contexts that proper names are not equivalent to contingent definite descriptions and related ideas and arguments. Some of the contributors to the development of this theory' is attributed to Kripke, Putnam and Wettstein. According to Kripke, proper names and definite descriptions are designators. That is, in every possible world they designate the same object. Kripke distinguishes the meaning of a designator and the way its reference is determined. Then he puts forth his causal theory of naming: initially, the reference of a name is fixed by some operation such as description then the name is passed from link to link. A name is not identified by a set of unique properties satisfied by the referent: the speaker may have erroneous beliefs about those properties or they may not be unique. The name is passed to the speaker by tradition from link to link. Kripke rejects the view that either proper or common nouns are associated with properties that serve to select what they are referring to. Both proper and common names have a referent. The property cannot determine the reference as the object might not have that property in all worlds. For example, gold might not be yellow in all worlds. Kripke's causal theory of names assumes that names are linked to their referents through a casual chain. A term applies directly to an object via a connection that was set in place by the initial naming of the object. A nonrigid designator is a term that changes its referent across possible worlds. The Nature of Names Consider, for example, a Biology class out on a field trip. Walking in the woods, the professor asks the students to identify the plants that they encounter. A student is asked to identify a plant. Seeing that the plant has thorns, has red flowers that are well known to be a symbol of love and lives in the wilderness, the student names the plant as a Wild Rose. Thus, the naming was based on descriptions that were learned and passed on to the student. Can we therefore say that naming, specifically proper names, are based on descriptions That is, is the Old Theory essentially correct In this paper we, argue that naming is not essentially descriptive but is actually an exercise of designating rigidly. Nevertheless, in this paper, we also argue that naming does have some degree of descriptive being. Naming Without Conceptualization In this philosophical argument, we find that there is a need to use real world examples to do away with the abstractions and complications that a discussion such as this would entail. The unifying string of this paper's argument is that a person could refer to an object by indicating its name without actually knowing the descriptions of the object that he doesn't have a concept of - no knowledge of any descriptions or whatsoever that may give the person naming an idea of the object/person being named. It would then follow that it is possible to name an object without substantial conceptualization. If it is possible to name objects without such conceptualization, then a theory of the meaning of names should not be secluded to such elements. Note that we use the word secluded. By conceptualization, we actually mean a knowledge or description of the object. Would it then follow that theories of the meaning of names can be a direct and unmediated relation alone Names can be used in a meaningful fashion but we may not actually know only little or nothing of the "cluster of descriptions" that the old theory would assign to such an expression. For instance, a friend of mine may remark "I hate Henry" to which I would reply "Why do you hate Henry" without actually knowing the person or if it's a person as well. I was able to refer to Henry without knowing whether Henry is a name of the person, a pet, a social practice, or any of countless other possibilities. It would be wrong to assume that it is necessarily the name of a person alone. The important thing to realize here is that I was able to name something without actually knowing anything that may describe him. I referred to that something directly. This type of argument of the absence of a particular sort of knowledge with respect to a referent was forwarded by Kripke's (1982) and recently discussed in Wettstein's (2004) discussion of reference. As we have said earlier, different people may understand descriptions in different terms. Kripke and Putnam basically argue that not all speakers who succeeded in naming and referring to things could be said to have the same content to their thoughts and those who did still might not refer to the same things. Descriptions could therefore not serve as the basis of naming things. As Putnam puts it, "meanings are not in the head". (Putnam, 1975) From their arguments arises the concept of "revisability" which goes this way: Descriptions associated with a purported referent may be completely discordant. The person would not change the names. Rather, it would be the descriptions that would be revised. As an example, we know of a person name Lindsay who is blonde and is petite. After years of no correspondence, we see the person again. The problem is that the person has dyed her hair black and had slimmed. Yet we do call her Lindsay because we know it is the Lindsay person that we associated the name with. Our descriptions now change. Can we therefore say that we may not be thinking of some descriptions when we are naming things Are descriptions really not used to name things Do we rely on rigid designations alone Does it follow that when descriptions may change, they may not be the basis of naming things The Descriptive Nature of Naming In the example of naming Lindsay, it was said that it was not descriptions that enabled us to name the person because the descriptions that we previously associated with Lindsay were not present. Yet we were able to name the person because we know it was her. Now here's the paradox, how did we come to know that it was her in the first place Most probably, we were able to identify any other features associated with the person like her voice, expressions and even some intonations of the voice. I'm not saying that this may all be present; it's just that when we see a person whom we knew in the previous past will always appear to be familiar in one or another. The process of descriptions is very much exemplified in the cognitive learning of a child. When a mother teaches her son the numbers such as the number 4, which has many variants, she draws on the paper a figure composed of straight lines which intersects each other and with a triangular area enclosed such as the following: 4 In class, the child comes along the figure: Remembering childhood, we were able to recognize that the name of the number is still four although the descriptions that we were accustomed to such as the closure of the triangle and the straightness of the lines were not present. Because of our awareness that the number strongly resembles the descriptions such as the straight lines and the form of intersections that we associate with the number, we can still identify it to be the number "4". We recognize, therefore, that the dichotomy between descriptivism and direct reference is non-existent. When we name a person, we scan our mind for past information and description regarding the person but we do not actually solely rely on the descriptions. In fact, we may name a person just by actually knowing his name. In some sense, descriptive resources should be the focus of attention in naming objects. We must also consider the referent itself. Classical descriptivist theories may be lacking and the revisability issue is indeed logical but this should not necessarily lead us to assume that difference between description theory and the referent theory cannot be mediated. Surrounding the naming issue is a cornucopia of ideas and the subject that was dealt in this paper is just two of the issues. There are still issues such as whether we take meaning to be individually determined or is it a function of social networking as what Wittgenstein (1953) and Sellars (1963) have forwarded. At the end of the day, for naming to be successful, one must not rely primarily in descriptions because they are subject to change. One must directly recognized the referent itself. What do we get from understanding the process of naming In the social aspect, we tend to have better and meaningful relationships In the fields of Science, we may make important discoveries. Awareness leads to wisdom. References: Humphreys, W and J.H. Fetzer (1995). The New Theory of Reference. Great Britain: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kripke, Saul. (1982) Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Putnam, Hilary. (1975). "The Meaning of 'Meaning'." In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Sellars, Wilfrid. (1963). "Some Reflections on Language Games", in Science, Perception and Reality. Atuscadero, CA: Ridgeview Press. Wettstein, Howard K. (2004) The Magical Prism: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953). Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Read More