International Terrorism (FALN) - Essay Example

International Terrorism: Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) Puerto Rico's political relationship with the United s during the past 100 years has been both a peaceful coexistence marked by hemispherical cooperation, as well as highly controversial with activists seeking to break the historical colonial linkage to the United States and claim independence through violence if necessary. While Puerto Rico has produced a number of violent political groups, the most highly organized and visible group that has advocated independence has been the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). During the 1970s and 1980s they were alleged to have participated in scores of bombings, numerous murders, and property damage that exceeded millions of dollars, before being broken up and its leadership arrested. The FALN was most active during the 1970s and 1980s, but their activities have drastically declined in the last two decades. In the FALN's Communiqu #1 of October 26, 1974, their Central Command states that they have been advocating an armed revolution since 1969 for the purpose of eliminating "yanki colonialism" from Puerto Rico, by committing acts of violence in the US and against US interests in Puerto Rico (Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation, 1974, p.2). The reference to yanki colonialism refers to the capitalistic dominance of Puerto Rico by the influence of the US economy. At this time they acknowledged the bombing of major US corporations, as well as bombings of department stores and the Newark NJ Police Department in the spring of 1974. By late 1979, the FALN had become Puerto Rico's most significant terrorist group and according to Francis (1979), "About 75 actions and at least five deaths resulted from FAL"s [sic] terrorism, the most significant being the Fraunces Tavern bombing in New York City on January 24, 1975, in which four died. In 1977-78, FALN carried out nineteen bombing actions in the continental U.S." (p.14). The decade of the 1980s would see an increased visibility of the FALN as they continued their violent movement advocating independence for Puerto Rico. The 1980s would see the FALN become the most threatening terrorist organization in this hemisphere, but by the end of the decade they had subsided in their activities. In March of 1980, FALN terrorists seized the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogot Columbia and issued a statement threatening to attack nuclear power plants within the US (Sater, 1981, p.vi). Through the 1980s, the FALN worked with other Latin American terrorist groups and struck targets throughout the region, in Puerto Rico, and on the US mainland. In the 1980s the FALN "claimed credit for more than 100 bombings at mainland train stations, airports, and multinational corporations" as well as US government installations in Puerto Rico (Morris, 1995, p.57). In 1980-1981, several key members of the FALN were arrested and convicted of multiple serious federal crimes that resulted in their incarceration for as long as 50 years (Kushner, 2003, p.129). During 1982 and 1983, the group conducted sporadic bombings, most notably the 1982 New Year's Eve attacks in New York City (Kushner, 2003, p.129). After further arrests in 1982 and 1983, and a 1985 raid on FALN headquarters in Puerto Rico, the activities of the FALN almost completely subsided (Kushner, 2003, p.130). During their period of activity, the FALN was blamed for approximately 400 bombings, 18 deaths, and millions of dollars in property damage (Hewitt, 2000, p.28). The FALN is noted as being one of the most violent organizations to ever operate on the US mainland. Membership An evaluation of the FALN's membership includes the numbers, their motivations, and the outside influences that facilitated their activities. During the FALN's most active period, the membership rose to well over 100 active members, and retained a membership of approximately 120 members after the arrests of the 1980s (Hewitt, 2000, p.33; Kushner, 2003, p.130). In addition, the FALN had as many as 65,000 sympathizers in Puerto Rico and the US (Hewitt, 2000, p.33). Its major bases of operation in the US were in New York and Chicago, but they were also active in Los Angeles, Denver, Milwaukee, El Paso, and Washington DC with as many as 2000 sympathizers in the US (Kushner, 2003, p.130). Though they had a significant number of supporters in Puerto Rico, their movement for independence was only supported by less than 10 percent of the population during this period (Sater, 1981, p.20). The membership of the FALN had the goal of independence from the US. Yet, they also sought economic independence and were swayed by Marxist ideology. According to the FALN's Communiqu #1, their goal was to "lead the masses to victory, and the development of a Marxist-Lennist Party, tried and tested under fire, which will educate and organize the people for the construction of a socialist society" (Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation, 1974, p.2). This socialist ideology worked to justify the violence according to the Marxist doctrine, as well as attract support from the global socialist movement. Though the FALN was primarily a Puerto Rican movement, the group received considerable outside support in the way of funding and resources. Though the FALN was considered to have a low level of financing, it did receive a significant amount of foreign aid (Hewitt, 2000, p.33). According to an FALN member interviewed in 1977, "friendly contacts in Cuba and the Dominican Republic provided FALN with arms and explosives, and that funds for the terrorist group came from wealthy radicals, bank robberies, and drug smuggling" (Francis, 1979, p.15). In addition, the FALN was cooperating with Chicano extremist groups in the US, other Latin American terrorist organizations, and were receiving outside aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union. According to Francis (1979), "Almost every significant Latin American terrorist group of left wing orientation has had or has today links with Cuba or the Soviet Union or with both" (p.15). In this way, the FALN was very much a product of Cold War politics in this hemisphere. It should be noted that the demise of the FALN coincided with the break-up of the Soviet Union and their unwillingness to provide Cuba with further economic or military support. Strategy The FALN, as with many other independence movements, believe that the more they can disrupt and destroy the status quo, the more media attention can be drawn to their cause. According to Sater (1981), "The Puerto Rican terrorists are similar to the Palestinians in this regard; they seemed convinced that the actual process of the struggle they are waging creates a national identity for them" (p.9) They may also believe that the prolonged period of violence will convince the US government that granting them independence is preferable to the ongoing deaths and destruction of property (Sater, 1981, p.9). This is a miscalculation on the part of the FALN, as the US has traditionally and historically resolved to not give in to terrorist's demands at any cost. In addition, the politics of the Cold War, and the Cuban and Soviet involvement with the FALN, made the dismantling of the FALN in this country a law enforcement priority. In many ways, the FALN was viewed as a Soviet puppet, as "the Soviets see the Third World as an essential prop of the advanced capitalists states and the proletariat of the Third World as an ally in the final struggle against the forces of world capitalism" (Francis, 1979, p.21). The FALN's tactic of tying their struggle for independence to the global Marxist movement doomed the group to failure as evidenced by the FBI's anti-FALN activity in the early 1980s and its ultimate demise. Tactics Though the FALN has been blamed for as many as 18 deaths during their existence, their activities were designed to primarily hit property targets with some strategic appeal. They tended to attack targets that reflected their anti-US and capitalist stance, such as military bases, department stores, banks, and corporations. The target of preference was usually one that was lightly defended, in which they could escape an armed confrontation, death, or capture (Sater, 1981, p.10). In the 1970s, after the October 26 bombings of the New York City banks, they conducted a number of symbolic bombings of targets that represented US interests, drew attention to their movement, but caused no loss of life (Sater, 1980, p.6). However, they would work outside this pattern on extreme occasions. The most deadly bombing, the attack on Wall Street's Fraunces Tavern which killed 4 people, was an act of retaliation "for the deaths of two persons as a result of a bombing at a restaurant in Puerto Rico frequented by pro-independence groups which the FALN claimed had been ordered by the CIA (Jenkins, 1980, p.15). The preferred weapon was the pipe bomb, which allowed them "to attack without warning and to use timers so that they can withdraw long before an actual explosion" (Sater, 1980, p.10). In addition to the actual bombings, the FALN was known to conduct 'bomb scares' as a way to disrupt the activities of business and instill fear in the civilian population. Following two explosions in New York City in 1977, telephoned bomb threats from the FALN resulted in the evacuation of over 100,000 people from downtown office buildings (Jenkins, 1980, p.15). Analysis Though the FALN was a relatively short-lived organization, it was able to attract considerable attention and legitimize itself in the minds of many Americans. The group attempted to appeal to many left leaning people in Puerto Rico by advocating a Marxist philosophy, but working for independence. This left many citizens confused about the motives of the FALN. In addition, their willingness to work with Cuba and the Soviet Union diminished their credible call for independence. Because their funding came from outside sources, and they were armed by other organizations, the FALN was largely viewed as a tool that the Soviets used in this hemisphere for the purpose of fighting the global onslaught of capitalism. In total, the Puerto Rican's were satisfied with their political relationship with the US, as well as their economic system, and the FALN was never able to recruit large numbers of active members. With the thawing of the Cold War, and the Soviet's reduced influence and aid to Cuba, the organization was left to struggle on its own. By the middle of the 1980s and the end of the Soviet regime, the leadership of the FALN had been captured or killed and the group was left unable to effectively function. The FALN's tactics of preferring property damage to death probably worked in its favor. The use of pipe bombs was an economical means to extract massive damage at a minimal cost. The low death rate further did not demonize the FALN in the eyes of the public, the media, or fellow Puerto Ricans. This helped to account for the over 2,000 supporters in the US and played a part in the eventual clemency of their leaders (Kushner, 2003, p.130). The movement to pardon the FALN members that were incarcerated in the US was able to generate 15,000 petitions to pardon and 100,000 letters supporting the release of the 16 FALN members still held in 1996 (Cottle, 1999, p.21). This eventually led to the controversial release on the FALN leaders under the presidency of Bill Clinton. Conclusion As with many terrorist organization, the FALN had as one of its goals the drawing attention to the political status of Puerto Rico and the movement towards independence. Their tactics and strategies were effective at gaining attention, and the low level of deaths was acceptable to many sympathizers. However, their Marxist ideology and their willingness to work with the Soviets on US soil brought about their downfall. The movement was never to gain more than about 10 percent of the Puerto Rican public in favor of independence. In addition, through the early 1980s the FBI targeted the FALN and their leadership as a dangerous terrorist priority, which led to the arrest of several of their leaders. The end of the Cold War, the unpopularity of Marxist politics, and the focus of law enforcement conspired to render the FALN as almost completely ineffectual and was nearly dissolved by the end of the 1980s. References Cottle, M. (1999, October 4). Of Clintons and clemency: Liberation movement. The New Republic, 20-22. Francis, S. T. (1979). Latin American terrorism: The Cuban connection. The Backgrounder, 1-23. Hewitt, C. (2000). Separatism, irredentism, and terrorism: A comparative study 1945-2000. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Countering terrorism through enhanced international cooperation. Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 25-38 Jenkins, B. M. (1980). Terrorism in the United States. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Kushner, H. W. (2003). Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Morris, N. (1995). Puerto Rico: Culture, politics, and identity. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation. (1974). Communiqu #1 (pp. 1-3). FALN. Sater, W. (1981). Puerto Rican terrorists: A possible threat to U.S. energy installations Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Read More