Agent Robert Hanssen Case - Essay Example

Agent Robert Hanssen Case Institution Name Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Successful counter-surveillance 4 Poor Performance Detection of security Penetration 5 Lack of Evocative Background Reinvestigations 6 Deficiencies in training on documentation of security violations 7 Poor management decisions 8 Parallels drawn from analysis of Hanssen case with police corruption 9 Hanssen motives in relation to police corruption 10 Group or peer influence 10 Opportunity 11 Discretion 12 Low public visibility 13 Managerial secrecy 13 Status problems 14 Conclusion 14 References 16 Introduction Counterintelligence consists of activities and information gathered to deter espionage activities by foreign powers (Hastedt, 2003). Leggit et al (2011) define counterintelligence as security measures and procedures designed to neutralise or liquidate attempts by foreign powers to acquire protected and secure information. Counterintelligence operations consist of specialised division of intelligence operations that when successful, have the capacity to create seamless and incessant feedback loops. However, their failure may be disastrous to the counterintelligence agency and national security. According to Kuntz (2005) and Welch (2011), espionage or counterintelligence failures may originate from the inside. Essentially, the sources and methods of counterintelligence, the professional conducts of counterintelligence agents and the objectives and tactics used n covert actions are typically hidden from public scrutiny, despite being worthy of philosophical and public debate. Recent researchers of intelligence have examined the issues surrounding the right level of oversight over intelligence agencies (Welch, 2011; Zegart, 2007). However, what has often been missed in these surveys is the significant ethical analysis of the intelligence officers themselves. Indeed, it has been suggested that the peculiar nature of security professionalism and expertise needs extraordinary morality. As Perry (2014) cited Hulnick and Mattausch (1989), professional standards in counterintelligence work require the agents to hide information, lie, protect their cover, use covert tactics and cover their sources. This perspective is shared by the United States Intelligence Community -- mainly the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation -- which teaches, expects, controls and promotes these tradecrafts tactics to ensure the lies are supported and consistent. The CIA expects intelligence agents to deceive, steal and lie (Bunker, 2005). However, can the objectives of intelligence really justify tradecrafts? It is based on this question that this essay argues that granting the intelligence officers high moral role-differentiation by allowing them make ethical trade-offs could lead to significant security failures, which contribute to the overarching problem’s in FBI’s internal security. What follows is an analysis of the Robert Hanssen to explore ethical problems that may arise in the work of intelligence officers. The Hanssen case highlights the long-term significant deficiencies in FBI’s internal security management, leading to security flaws that exposed the agency to the serious risks of compromises from the inside. Hanssen was able to operate as a spy due to the deficient SBI security standard operating procedures that permitted tradecrafts. Successful counter-surveillance Jones (2009) suggested that counter-surveillance can be used effectively against networks of cells that can effectively work in favour of counterintelligence, when used to monitor the leader or subordinates within the force, if they are to meet and engage in activities that may compromise the force. He further discussed that the technique could be used to move to and from dead drop sites. Beutel (2007) shared a similar perspective in supporting the view that counter-surveillance can be managed to achieve success in counter-surveillance missions. As indicated by the affidavit in support of Hanssen’s prosecution, the analysts and agents who undertook FBI’s penetrative investigations showed extreme dedication and hardwork. Additionally, they illustrated utmost commitment to counterintelligence mission. Their commitment produced many successes in apprehending Hanssen. To a limited extent therefore, the FBI’s counterintelligence could be attributed to success when the agency finally managed to apprehend FBI agent, Robert Hanssen in February 2001 for spying for the Russians. To a greater extent, the counterintelligence failed due to the overarching problem’s in FBI’s internal security that contributed substantially to breakdown of the counterintelligence. Poor Performance Detection of security Penetration Erhman (2009) emphasised security of records management as integral to the success of intelligence operations. A related view was expressed by Jones (2009) in suggesting that while every operation generates counterintelligence information, the counterintelligence specialists should continually monitor and use comprehensive systems for managing information that promote their security. Weaknesses in counterintelligence agency’s document and information security can lead to poor performance detection of penetration (Bennett, 2003; Burstein, 2009; Gertz, 2002). In commission of espionage, Robert Hanssen took advantage of the extensive weaknesses in FBI’s document and information security. He accessed classified national security information for digital and hard copies that were subject to limited control and monitoring over the 20-year period. This allowed him to casually walk out with FBI copies of the government’s most classified information. For instance, it had no system for keeping a list of employees who had access to operation that had been compromised. The inability to answer for sensitive documents and limiting those who should access information is a deficiency that characterises FBI’s breakdown in deterrence and detection. For instance, Hanssen had free and unlimited access to Automated Case Support System (ACS), which is FBI’s collection of computerised databases of investigative files. Audit of the logins showed he had made amongst the highest searches and retrieval of information that could have indicated whether Hanssen was a mole. It also appears that FBI’s security management program was based on trust rather than practical steps that needed regular financial disclosures, counterintelligence polygraph examination, significant background checks and information audit of computer usage. As noted in the case, it is believed that Hanssen had high level of computer technology knowledge and may have been storing the computers to run his espionage activities, as demonstrated by the mails to KGB/SVR that were found on his computer memory card, inside his briefcase. Instead, the FBI trusted that employees would have unquestionable loyalty in their careers. Indeed, the Hanssen case indicates the risks of trust as a security approach. Lack of Evocative Background Reinvestigations Based on Perry’s (2014) analysis of ethics, Covert Action and Espionage, it is reasoned that operational vetting is a critical success factor for counterintelligence. Perry (2014) concluded that what critical analysis of intelligence operatives and operations is often missed by counterintelligence agencies. Fleisher and Blenkhorn (2001) provided support to this perspective when they concluded that counterintelligence agencies should have well-established policies that vet operations and assets, as well as monitoring individual employees to ensure validity of their assets and their security. Lack of financial disclosure at the FBI was a critical indicator of the failure in operational and asset vetting at the agency. Regarding personnel security, it can be ascertained that Hanssen was never subjected to a range of basic security measures or procedures that could have prevented espionage. For instance, despite his broad and undeterred access to human and technical evidence of technical nature, there is no evidence of any records of polygraph examination in the case, meaning he had never undergone a polygraph test throughout his 25-year career with the FBI. Lack of financial disclosure presents an example of failure to evocative background reinvestigations. In the present case scenario, it appears that Hanssen had never been asked to submit to detailed financial disclosure throughout his career with the FBI. Financial disclosures as security measures could have provided greatest deterrence to Hanssen’s espionage activities. As indicated in the case, there is no evidence of analysis of his bank records and financial statements. According to the US Department of Justice (2003), since financial gain is among the most prevalent motives for commission of espionage, creating credible financial disclosure can significantly improve the personnel security. Deficiencies in training on documentation of security violations Erhman's (2009) analysis of the critical issues plaguing counterintelligence agencies provided insight into how reluctance to train, learn and innovate leads to failures. Erhamn (2009) illustrated that the United States Intelligence Community had strong organisational cultures created from incentives against training and innovation, which had contributed to deficiencies in training. Deficiencies in training are also critical issues that emerge in the Hanssen case. In a document analysis research to investigate cyberculture and personnel security issues, Leggit et al (2011), concluded that the personnel security may encounter behaviours of concern that happen within the cyberspace and which can spill-over to real life, unless the employees are trained to counter their effects. Based on these findings, Leggit et al (2011) demonstrated that personnel security measures should be implemented in such situations targeted at protecting sensitive national security information against espionage. From analysis of the case, it could be perceived that the FBI personnel specialists, in charge of background investigations, lacked the necessary analytical training to critically analyse the issues that dominated in the course of background investigations. It is based on these weaknesses that Hanssen’s frequent use of ACS system had not been monitored to note that his search results patterns marched the compromised operations. Additionally, they lacked sufficient knowledge regarding the precepts for handling classified information, specifically at the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) level. They also lacked training on how to follow up likely ‘red flags’ and to report security violations. Poor management decisions Based on a survey of counterintelligence activities of the British, Russian and the United States government, Ehrman (2009) argued that the management of counterintelligence agencies tends to be mediocre, as street agents and strong performing officers rise through ranks and management positions without formal management positions. Like Campbell and Jodz (2011), Atkinson & Moffat (2005) suggested that poor management may cause services of the senior- and mid-level managers to have limited interest in overseeing essential administration details before crisis force them to do so. Similar concerns plagued FBI. During the 20-year period Hanssen engaged in espionage activities, overarching problems existed in FBI’s internal security management. A greater proportion of the deficiencies were as a result of longs-standing issues in the management and depict cumulative decision made by some FBI employees, including the senior managers and directors who failed to remedy obvious weaknesses in FBI’s personnel, information security, document management, as well as failure to commit adequate attention and resources to the penetrating espionage issues, triggered by communism during the 1980s and 1990s, to audit human resources. Other critical failures in the management include unwillingness of FBI and CIA agencies to corporate in countering espionage activities. This is indicated in the Hanssen case where Hanssen and Aldrich Ames compromised Intelligence Community’s human resources, leading to arrest of three employees. However, unwillingness of the line personnel that operated on espionage investigation of the CIA suspect, Ames, failed to reconsider initial judgements and conclusion after investigative failures of furnishing the Justice Department with accurate information on Hanssen’s apparent patterns of security violations. This could have led to the arrest of Hanssen. Additionally, the FBI management provided lax supervision of Hanssen, allowing him to spend much of his time on non-work related matters by encouraging his technological pursuits and talents, which opened grounds for espionage. Parallels drawn from analysis of Hanssen case with police corruption Corruption, which reflect deep-seated breakdown in professional ethics, is described as the abuse of authority or power for profit gain. It is among the law enforcement agencies’ oldest pervasive and predatory malpractices. While some researchers such as Bayley and Perito (2011) have argued that corruption within the law enforcement institutions is rare, some like Miller (2003) have argued that such incidents are uncommon. Despite attempts to promote transparency, incidences of police corruption have significant negative implications within the law enforcement agency and between the agency and the public (Newburn, 2009; Treisman, 2000). An example of high profile incident of corruption within the agency is the Hanssen case. The term police corruption describes many malpractices within the police force, including bribery, fabrication of evidence or brutality (Tavits, 2005). Revelations of the alleged 15-year espionage by a senior FBI counterintelligence agent on behalf of Russia and the Soviet Union raised critical issues on the nature of corruption at FBI. Hanssen motives in relation to police corruption Hannsen traded military and counterintelligence secrets for personal gain. He engaged in espionage unceasingly and only stopped few times during his 25-year career with the FBI. Based on analysis, of the Hanssen case, the underlying reasons that explain why he committed espionage are complex. While a range of factors have influenced or motivated the police to engage in espionage for personal gains, such as ideology, resentments and career disappointment, drug abuse and greed, such do not apply to the case of Hanssen. An analysis of the affidavit reveals that there was basically no deterrence to espionage between 1979 and 2001 and that the information and personnel security measures presented few detection and deterrence measures. At any rate, several parallels may be drawn from an analysis of the Hanssen case with police corruption within the context of both detection and prevention. Group or peer influence Previous researches have endeavoured to determine the reasons for police corruption (Lamani & Venumadhava, 2013). An early theory called ‘bad apples’ hypothesized that corruption may prevail in the police force due to group behaviour that is rooted deeply into the established practices of the force. However, in the Hanssen case, it is difficult to verify whether other FBI agents engaged in espionage. These draw a difference between typical police corruption and the Hanssen case. In respect to ‘bad apples’, Newburn (2009) suggests that clean officers who have never engaged in corrupt dealing are forced to engage in the practices to keep up with the team spirit. Porter (2005) also reviewed social factors, including social customs and cultures among officers that promote solidarity and disprove reporting fellow officers. Porter (2005) identified the likelihood that serving officers could hand down corrupt practices to new recruits. If this perspective is to be taken into account, then it could be argued that Hanssen’s corrupt practices could have been handed on by serving officers from colleagues. However, there is no evidence to support this assumption. In any case, such trends limit deterrence and detection. Newburn (2009) noted that they may have various implications on deterrence or prevention, where removal of bad officers can remedy the problem. Opportunity Opportunity, as a cause or factor of corruption within the police force has been well-documented (Lamani & Venumadhava, 2013). In a document analysis, Porter and Warrender (2007) reviewed a report by US-based General Accounting Office that was published in 1998. The report found that the police engaged in corruption due to exposure to opportunities for corruption. Moran (2005) provided support for the findings when he stated that areas with more opportunities for corruption tended to have higher number of police officers who engaged in the vice. The implication for opportunity is that they provide barriers to detection, the same way it is depicted in the Hanssen case. Hanssen was presented with an opportunity for corruption during the Cold War era. He knew that US military and counterintelligence information was a critical source of income, as Soviet Union and Russia were willing buyers. According to Newburn (2009), to foster detection and deterrence, it would be more productive to encourage stricter procedures for duties that are susceptible to opportunities for corruption. Discretion According to Moran (2005), police officers have significant liberty to exercise their decision-making on whether to implement certain laws in certain circumstances, giving rise to opportunities for the decisions to be subject to considerations of gain, instead of professional judgement. This may substantially prevent detection or deterrence, where senior officers are not policed, despite how sensitive the resources they can access (Domoro & Agil, 2012). Newburn (2009) supported this perspective when he observed that police agencies tend to have a range of peculiar characteristics that hinder effective administration. He suggests that since police officers tend to be spread out in the field, directly supervising them is difficult. At the same time, a degree of complicity in bending rules may exist, which is encouraged by high discretion. Indeed, these reflect what happened in the Hanssen case. He was a key FBI official and freely accessed ACS without supervision from the FBI information systems personnel. His extraction of tens or hundreds of classified dossiers from the FBI system, including Top Secret documents, in addition to inappropriate searches of computer system for references to himself, as well as to FBI’s sensitive espionage investigations remained undetected. These allowed him to steal sensitive data for KGB clandestinely while remaining undetected. Newburn (2009) suggests that for detection and deterrence to be restored, effective policies should be implemented that subject all officers, despite the rank, to monitoring. Low public visibility Low public visibility has also been extensively suggested as an underlying cause of police corruption. Tate (2003) pointed out that in addition to the intrinsic discretion enjoyed by police officers, there is a limited degree of public visibility, which makes supervising them by the public difficult. This gives them space to engage in corruption. Masse and Krouse (2003) supported this perspective when he argued that most of what police officers do is only visible to those they are intimately close to. Additionally, they have access to private space where their corrupt practices cannot be observed, hence limiting detection and deterrence. This perspective reflects what happened in the Hanssen case. For instance, Hanssen had almost discovered by his wife Bonnie in spring 1981 when she found him reviewing GRU communication in the home’s basement. Further, low public visibility had allowed Hanssen to establish several dead drop sites where he passed the information to the KGB, including one called “BOB” under a footbridge in Idylwood Park in Virginia and another he named CHARLIE under a footbridge in Eakin Community Park in Virginia. Managerial secrecy Managerial secrecy is widely accepted as a cause of corruption among the police. According to Newburn (2009), the code of silence encourages the police officers to take an adversarial position to any party that seeks to challenge their activity. At the same time, Tate (2003) made reference to police culture that encourages loyalty and pointed to the idea that it promoted corruption to flourish, due to silencing honest officers who are ready to blow the whistle, as well as the fear of the implications of corruption on the image of the force. While this perspective is strongly supported by several researchers and authors (Masse & Krouse, 2003), it has no grounds in the Hanssen case as it was believed that no one was aware of his Clandestine activities. Status problems An extensive body of researchers has supported the conception that bribery and general cases of corruption is common in situations where the police are inadequately paid. Newburn (2009) cited low-pay as an obvious driver to lack of integrity for all public officials, specifically in societies where consumption is greatly valued while salaries remain low. Despite this, even in societies where police officers are highly paid and where the vice is unacceptable, a perceived disparity between responsibilities and income may trigger corruption (Lauchs et al. 2011). At the same time, perceived income disparities within the police force may also trigger corruption among the highly paid individuals. Status problems may therefore cause problems in preventing corruption, or subverting the course of counterintelligence within the law enforcement involved. While the issue of status is extensively supported, it is reasoned that it may not have been a factor in the Hanssen case. In Hanssen’s package to KGB, codename “B” he advised that he had been promoted to a higher position where he had attained a higher salary status. This is proof that Hanssen was satisfied with his salary and status at FBI, and therefore status problems could not have been the issues. Conclusion Granting the intelligence officers high moral role-differentiation by allowing them to make ethical trade-offs could lead to significant security failures, which contribute to the overarching problem’s in FBI’s internal security. The Hanssen case highlights the long-term significant deficiencies in FBI’s internal security management, leading to security flaws that exposed the agency to the serious risks of compromises from the inside. Hanssen was able to operate as a spy due to the deficient SBI security standard operating procedures that perceived permitted tradecrafts. In commission of espionage, Robert Hanssen took advantage of the extensive weaknesses in FBI’s document and information security to access classified national security information. It also appears that FBI’s security management program was based on trust rather than practical steps that needed regular financial disclosures, counterintelligence polygraph examination, significant background checks and information audit of computer usage. Lack of financial disclosure presents an example of failure to evocative background reinvestigations. A greater proportion of the deficiencies was as a result of longs-standing issues in the management and depicts cumulative decision made by some FBI employees Therefore, to a limited extent, the FBI’s counterintelligence could be attributed to success when the agency finally managed apprehended FBI agent, Robert Hanssen, in February 2001 for spying for the Russians. Two critical issues come into perspective in regards to the parallels drawn from analysis of Hanssen case with police corruption. First, the FBI as a counterintelligence institution lacked moral principles which could have been applied to set loyalty standards on the part of the employees. For instance, the nature of corruption of the institution is viewed to be so pervasive and to run so deep that the case of Hanssen should be viewed as a legitimate implication of this enduring flaw in institutional character. Second, no institution, not even government agencies, can be entirely free from corruption as there are no foolproof security measures that can completely detect and deter such a kind of security breach. A superseding reality of the two points have shown that FBI lacks the moral character as a law enforcement institution, and therefore, the idea of being loyal to the bureau by the staff has no moral basis. At any rate, several parallels may be drawn from an analysis of the Hanssen case, with police corruption within the context of both detection and prevention. 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