Adaptability in Wartime - Case Study Example

An essay on Learning and adaptation by military forces in wartime is a direct result of early failures on the battlefield. Discuss with reference to at least three case studies. One from either 1918, or North Africa or the South West Pacific. One from either Korea or Vietnam. One from either Falklands or Iraq. ‘Life isn't about waiting for the storm to pass; it's about learning to dance in the rain.’ Author unknown1 INTRODUCTION Adaptability, the ability to change as circumstances change around you and learn from your previous experience, is a key character of a successful army culture that revolves around policies, practices and beliefs. Failure to adapt, as evident by many wartime experiences, can be detrimental to an army spirit and could result is losing lives and capabilities. The enduring nature of war and the evolving character and conduct of war requires prominent commanders to dig deeper in military history and learn from their own and the experiences of others. Also, adaptation to the ever changing rhythm of battle and the forecasting of proper technique to counter the enemy is the way to victory. Learning and adaptation takes time during a battlefield, therefore, early failures can be turned around, as the tactics are uncovering. In the following paragraphs, I will be writing about three case studies through the prism of learning and adaptation. The three case studies are North Africa, Vietnam and Iraq. NORTH AFRICA World War II was forced into North Africa as Italy entered the war in June 1940. The Italians were so strategic in wishing to win the war. The Italians quickly offered citizenship to Libyans who had ambitions of rising in the military or any civil organization. Through its colony in Libya, Italy began a land offensive on Egypt in September 7, 1940. Their first plan was to divide their attacks into two divisions such that one could support the other in case the other one failed. The Italians made sure that the training offered to Libyan men was on the same foot as that of the Italian military men. It is this spirit commonly known as, ‘espirit de corps’ and the professionalism that the Italians had helped in successive wins against the British army. British counterattack was successful to flattened the Italian and force them to retreat. Hitler being so shocked by the Italian weakness engaged the African Korps commanded by General Erwin Rommel. The ‘Desert Fox’, as was described then due to his ability to adapt and manoeuvre in the desert, took the British by surprise by launching a blow against the Allies in February of 1941. The Germans were successful in capturing Benghazi and aiming toward Cyrenaica and Tobruk. When the British attempted to free Tobruk, battle of Battleaxe (June 1941), they were stopped by a well-prepared defences. However, that was followed by operation Crusader that took Rommel’s forces by surprise, and in spite the fact that the German 88mm guns caused big losses in the British tanks, the Axis forces were forced to retreat due to shortages of supplies, which was a crucial element of the war. While British army managed to receive all their supplies through depots nearby, the German supplies were interdicted by Britain’s aircraft carriers that controlled the Mediterranean. It was evident that the steady build up ensures culmination point not reached. Allows for attacking of weaknesses with high degrees of strength and links to the Strategy of Exhaustion. The coin flipped again, as the British supplies were overstretched as they were moving deeper, and Rommel was successful in forcing the British to retreat to the Gazala Line and Tobruk fell again into the control of the Axis forces. At that time, General Montgomery was assigned command of the Eighth Army by Winston Churchill. He was a well-experienced military commander, knowing that battle tank manoeuvre was Rommel’s greatest advantage, Montgomery started Battle of El Alamein as a war of attrition. The Germans had to adapt to desert conditions and became very good at they soon won over the British, who had to learn to overcome the Germans’ approach. Also, other leaning and adaptation techniques that were used during the campaign included; the use of firepower and Artillery. Integration of artillery power to support infantry action required. It was also evident that the use of air support and Air Power was required to enable maneuver and air integration was vital for decisive ground operations. The integration of the headquarters minimizes the issues with no joint commander. Moreover, Germany demonstrates strong combined arms and massed tank action throughout North Africa; however, the British disperse their forces and separate them from the other arms. This limits Armour capability and exposes infantry to shock action and out-maneuver. Finally, political understanding and strategic guidance must be clear. The strategic guidance is the foundation upon which the military end-state is mounted. Failure to links the two end-states (strategic and military) through strong support and common objectives will jeopardize mission outcome. Rommel, for example, was never properly informed of the strategic situation (he was never informed of Barbarossa and found out the day after it started, when he had already captured most of Libya). This then created a disconnect with the actions on the ground and the strategic ‘interest’ that is required to maintain it. VIETNAM As the ‘cold-war’ exploded in South East Asia, the National Security Council was concern of the ‘domino theory’, saying if one country, led by the United States, became communist, then neighbours will follow. The US then supported the French with money and firearms, but they were decisively defeated in Dien Bien Phu. The country was divided to a Communist North and a Catholic South. As election was scheduled to unify the country, and as the fear of Communists may win was increasing, America started playing politics in order to shape the region. Guerrilla activities started and later Viet Cong was formed (known as the National Liberation Front), that was secretly supported by the American military actions. As the situation escalated, President Kennedy authorised a coup by Vietnamese generals. President Johnson felt obliged to defend South Vietnam and declared war on August 1965. The war lasted 15 years and claimed 58,000 Americans and more than 2 million Vietnamese. The complexity of Vietnam war, and how it was changing, and the underpinnings of all the militaries involved in the conflict remain an invaluable military history lesson of leaning and adaptation. Vietnamese masterminded general Vo Nguyen Giap, who let the Viet Minh during the first Indochina war against France, implemented his learning and adaptation skill as the best way is to wear down and create casualties to impact opinion. As it worked against the French, he implemented a strategy to fight everywhere in order to spread out the American forces that they could not support each other. Which proves to be very effective initially. The American at that time were not fully understanding the Vietnamese culture as their Western-styled nation building strategy did not work. The US counter-insurgency (COIN) manual was based on the Philippines experience, combined with the establishment of jungle training school by the 25 Division, outlined some foundations of how to fight COIN and conventional war at the same time. Which was later known as the ‘Balanced Approach’. The Australian, also, established their own counter-revolutionary doctrine, which was well-searched and well-developed. It worked well from COIN Point of view but was counter-productive in dealing with conventional threats. Unlike Malaya, insurgency in Vietnam was well established and was working from both population-centred areas and the jungle. As the Australian, wanting own area of operation to run their way, they tactically focused in Phuoc Tuy, where they did very little mentoring in the province. IRAQ The liberation and freedom of Kuwait through Operation ‘Desert-Storm’ was a great and unprecedented allies win. That was manifested by superior planning, manoeuvre, command and use of effective force. However, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was viewed by majority of the American as a mistake. The war was of two phases; the first was a conventional war which was characterised by being brief and scored a rapid win against the Iraqi military. The second phase was a complex and longer that formed after that in which the forces were opposed by an insurgency. The task was to secure and then rebuild Iraq with a force of 150,000 American led troops. Iraq being a multi-ethnic country and three religious groups tingled in a complex tribal loyalty and an extreme Sunni and Shiite sects. It would be of great challenge to develop an effective strategy to counter such a complex environment. Strategically the US was wrong in their attack since their major aim was to ambush the Iraqi oil wells and protect them using their own militia. However, this took longer than expected as due to the insurgency. The extensive military experience of the US military, evident in the Vietnam and the Korean wars, reshaped the way Americans fought unconventional war. However, as with all nations, it is difficult to continuously gather and maintain support for protracted and long counterinsurgency operations. Many scholars agree that the Americans made the utmost efforts in that difficult circumstances and that they embraced adaptation and learned from their mistakes in a war that have caused endless global controversies. For example, the first Faluja battle was an American loss as they did not spare the civilians, on the second Faluja battle, they learned from their mistakes and evacuated all civilians followed by massive fire support and air cover that resulted in winning. Similarly, the British faced great difficulties initially in Basra due to lack of proper communications with the American and once that was resolved Basra was won. The Iraq war presented the American military with the second and complex historical experience of counterinsurgency challenge after Vietnam. Despite an evolving counter insurgency methods, American did suffer in the war. The situation was made worse by the changing nature of the insurgency tactics but also by their own shortages. Above all, the most crucial learning failure was in formulating a clear exit strategy through better defining operational objectives and national end-states. CONCLUSION In conclusion, it is evident that one must be well advanced and prepared for war. It is clear from the incidences that while attacking any military force one must have counter plans in case your opponent changes defense mechanisms. Failing to provide enough supplies in terms of food and water led to many failures. For example when the British lost their control over the Mediterranean, they lost their control over many cities they had captured. Working as a unit was also a very importat strategy that we learn from the North African War. Libyans and Italians used the principle of espirit de corps and this helped them in overcoming the British. BIBLIOGRAPHY Wisdom Common website, accessed July, 29, 2013, http://www.wisdomcommons.org/virtue/6-adaptability/quotes Read More