Is the Current War Against the Taliban in Afghanistan a Just War - Essay Example

Running header: Is the Current War Against the Taliban in Afghanistan a Just War? Why or Why Not? Student’s Name: Name of Institution: Instructor’s Name: Course Code: Date of Submission: Introduction The attacks on the twin World Trade Centre towers and the Pentagon killed 3000 people (Wedgwood 2002). Wedgwood (2002) referred to it as an “attack on civil society, global economy and… innocence of noncombatants”. To date, the Afghanistan war has been fought under two presidents. As a first response strategy to 9/11 and a rising terrorism threat, George Bush decided to attack Afghanistan, where it was believed Osama bin Laden was then. And just having deployed more troops to Afghanistan, Obama spoke of defended the idea that sometime war can be a valid means for upholding a broader peace. The main objective of this paper is to look at that war and answer the question above. Justifications In attempting to answer this question, it is crucial to first answer the question on what the elements of the so-called ‘just war’ are, and whether the limits of such elements have been guarded. The notion of ‘just war’ is based on three main factors: ‘just causes’, ‘just means’ and ‘just goals’. It is not exactly clear on what basis a war is actually declared as just. But we can logically assume that if al the three are satisfactorily justified then a war is just. Many, like Wedgwood (2002) quoted above, have agreed that the 9/11 attacks indeed provided a sufficient basis to proclaim ‘just cause’. Zinn (2001), for instance, agreed, “9/11 attacks constitute crime against humanity”. And Smith (2009) wrote, “yes, indeed there was just cause”. In the acknowledgement of the role that balancing the three aspects of a just war, Falk (2002) argues that despite that the nature of such just cause in this context still requires that the means of military response become second to the extent. Determining the nature and scope of just means is based on the laws of war and the international humanitarian laws, giving special attention to the roles of the parties involved in respecting civilian innocence. In his address before the UN General Assembly on 10 November, 2001, Bush asserted that unlike the enemy, referring to the terrorists, the US involvement in the war sought to minimize, rather than maximize, the loss of innocent lives. But during the war, some of the tactics used by the US soldiers came to light and raised doubts over the good faith that Bush preached. For example, B-52 bombings, known as ‘daisy cutters’, and the use of cluster bombs caused a great number of casualties among the Afghan civilians against zero casualty amongst the US soldiers (Falk, 2002). This raised further doubts and questions on the way that the war was being fought and the level at which the US soldiers conformed with the laws of war and just means. However, many argued then that the improvements in guidance and targeting technology achieved greatly enhanced the accuracy of weaponry such as the ones used in Afghanistan. This argument was used to further the claims that bombings were limited to military targets. Many have disputed these claims. For instance, Zinn (2001) has questioned the meaning of ‘military targets’, arguing that the term includes various targets that include civilians. Others have questioned the possibility that some of the planned attacks were directed at mistaken military characters, and consequently directed military force against innocent civilians. But in defense of these possibilities, Falk (2002) argues that what separates the casualties suffered at the hands of the US soldiers from those suffered in the hands of the terrorists is intent. He writes: “what… establishes a clear and crucial legal and moral distance between the casualties in 9/11 and Afghanistan is that the latter were not a consequence of intentional or deliberate actions” (Falk 2002, p.5). Returning to the question of casualty numbers, many wonder how much so-called collateral damage must be suffered for the sake of peace. And when people talk about collateral damage, what does it mean? Generally, many refer to accidental civilian deaths. At this point many question the truthfulness of the ‘accidental’, including the casualties that can be avoided (Kozak 2009). But then again, we return to the simple question of whether speaking of casualty numbers at a time of war is relevant-if it is sensible. Falk (2002) notes that the occurrence of civilian casualties does not mean that a group has departed from the rules of ‘just war’. Besides, the notion of just war aims at encouraging practical reasoning, morality and establishing limits against deliberate killings of non-combatant civilians. And in that light, therefore, when that notion allows opposing sides to invoke combatant/military necessity to justify acts that are very likely to harm civilians, it equally recognizes and acknowledges that just war- despite that term ‘just’- permits great civilian harm and death, and devastation. In this debate, one must take note of two factors. One, the European Media gave attention to Afghan civilian casualties more than it did the American casualties. This implied that the US soldiers were not making any official efforts to avoid the casualties. Two, there was a seemingly little effort taken by the US government to ensure that its allies in the Afghan military acted in line with the international laws. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the failure of the US to stop the massacring of Taliban war prisoners by the Northern Alliance forces in the process of controlling a certain makeshift prison in Mazar-e-Sharif. This received a great amount of criticism from European journalistic observers 2(Falk 2002). Just Goals Perhaps the most important and relevant aspect of the just war framework has to do with just goals. In this case, the key question is whether the US’s reasons for going to war in Afghanistan are valid in relation to an effective response against the Al Qaeda. Indeed, the decision of the Bush administration to wage war against Afghanistan was valid and convincing. That has been argued for by many- if not all. At the time, there was a seemingly strong evidence that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda headquarters were in Afghanistan, made possible and helped further by the Taliban regime. In line with certain central Al Qaeda Islamic ideology, the Taliban was an embodiment of some severe Islamic variant, which they translated into a process of governing (Falk 2002). Indeed, the oppressive Islamic life model under the Taliban represented that visionary objective that the Al Qaeda preached, and practiced around the world. As Falk (2002) puts it, the leadership of the Taliban regime was symbiotically tied to Al Qaeda and its top leadership. Until then, Osama bin Laden had been quoted on several occasions showing and expressing his admiration for the way that the Taliban ruled. He said that the rule embodied and prefigured accurately the required Islamic political order. As early as late December of 2001, that war had met most of its initial major objectives. For instance, the war has significantly reduced Al Qaeda’s ability to engage in and conduct global terrorism. It is generally visible that the US soldiers did not seriously- if at all they did- regard rationale for humanitarian intervention. But one benefit that the US’s military operation has had is emancipating the Afghans from the cruelty and brutality of the Al Qaeda rule. This has greatly enhanced chances for rescue against starvation and poverty made even worse by many years of war. These successes, it must be noted, do not exactly extinguish the threat of 9/11. But they have weakened the capacity of the Al Qaeda to conduct mega-terrorist activities from Afghanistan. The war was meant to do more; not only aimed at destroying the presence of Al Qaeda and killing Osama bin Laden, but also bring down the Taliban rule and put in its place a government that would destroy the elements of its territory that favor terrorism, as well as implement respects for the basic rights of its citizens. Difficulties The entry of the US into Afghanistan was mandated by the UN Security Council. And there is no clear evidence to show that the US government considered its probable violation of international law in the process. More than these, there has been no clear evidence that the Taliban regime was directly linked with the 9/11 attacks, or it even had prior knowledge about the attack. In that light, Afghanistan’s legal responsibility in the whole case was indirect, part of that being the fact it domiciled terrorists who were known to have prepared attack missions and still trained for more of such missions. Even as people view and discuss this, they must recognize certain geopolitical difficulties involved (Falk 2002). One such a difficulty has to do with the interplay between a country’s right to self-defense and the generally non-territoriality of Al Qaeda. This then presents the second difficulty; assigning limits in the declaration of war against a non-state or transnational network with a global geopolitical presence and a leading state. This conceptual difficulty is novel. It further raises questions on the persuasive and practical relevance of both the international law and UN charter, especially since these two have based their norms completely on the assumption that force-governing rules are intended for conflicts between two sovereign states at war. Furthermore, even the UN setting constrains the claim of control in relation to a superpower as reflected by the veto. In what Lopez (2002) refers to as "making rules as we go proceed" the approaches employed by the US government to the new anti-terrorism warfare, from the moment of its inception to its recent police-style measures, have had to be modified from time to based on changing circumstances, such as heated criticism. Some areas of the anti-terrorism war have, unfortunately, not evolved for the better. For instance, despite initial commitment to limiting collateral damage, under the interim government of Afghanistan, 2002 saw rising civilian deaths by air and ground. Infact, it is only with regard to military tribunals that the wider media and civil society has had much success deciding the rules that really apply in this new warfare. Discussion Having looked at some of the factors surrounding the notion of just war and the facts surrounding the Afghanistan war, it is important to come to a conclusion. This conclusion will be based on a number of criteria for measuring just war. The first criterion is whether the US involvement followed the right channel. Largely yes. It was indeed sanctioned by the United Nations. This is the most notable factor that sets Afghanistan apart from Iraq. Two, whatever intention Bush had in Afghanistan cannot be easily categorized as having been right or otherwise. But diverting forces from Afghanistan to Iraq suggests that perhaps Bush did not perceive any key interest in Afghanistan besides toppling the Taliban. Perhaps it is accurate then to infer that Bush only wished to remove immediate threat to the US by establishing a stable government (Lewis 2001). Three, ‘last resort’ is also another Criterion for measuring just war. Here the argument is that a government can declare war only when all other options have failed (Nash 2002). It is largely agreed that war may have been the least resort for the first attack in 2001. However, there are questions as to whether the war into which Obama deployed more soldiers is the only option. Smith (2009) especially suggests that had the US taken more ambitious measures to tighten and stabilize security around Kabul in 2002 and 2003, as well as being pragmatic about the people in the reign with whom it could make more consistent deals Five, when it comes to ‘reasonable expectation’, one is faced with a tough case. Most argue that the ambitions in Afghanistan, the need to turn it into a stable and peaceful state are unattainable. The US faces an “unprecedented case, against a thoroughly armed opposition, in a largely unstable state and with little support from allies” (Smith 2009). And with the US already pulling out bit by bit and leaving policing in the hands of the Afghan soldiers, that dream looks even more farfetched. References Falk, R.A., 2002. Identifying Limits of a Borderless Map. Ethics & International Affairs, 16(1), Spring 2002. Kozak, W., 2009. The Real Rules of War. The Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870430450457461066000837288 6.html Lewis, B., 2001. Did You Say 'American Imperialism? National Review, October 17, pp. 26-30. Lopez, G.A., 2002. The Style of the New War: Making the Rules As We Go Along. Ethics & International Affairs, 16(1), Spring 2002. Nash, W.L., 2002. The Laws of War: A Military View. Ethics & International Affairs, 16(1), Spring 2002. Smith, D., 2009. Obama in Power: is the War in Afghanistan a Just War? Open Democracy, Dec. 17. www.opendemocracy.net/dan-smith/obama-in-power-is- war-in-afghanistan-just-war Wedgwood, R., 2002. The Law’s Response to September 11. Ethics & International Affairs, 16(1), Spring 2002. Zinn, H., 2001. A Just Cause, Not a Just War. The Progressive, Dec. 2001 Issue. http://www.progressive.org/0901/zinn1101.html Read More

For example, B-52 bombings, known as ‘daisy cutters’, and the use of cluster bombs caused a great number of casualties among the Afghan civilians against zero casualty amongst the US soldiers (Falk, 2002). This raised further doubts and questions on the way that the war was being fought and the level at which the US soldiers conformed with the laws of war and just means. However, many argued then that the improvements in guidance and targeting technology achieved greatly enhanced the accuracy of weaponry such as the ones used in Afghanistan.

This argument was used to further the claims that bombings were limited to military targets. Many have disputed these claims. For instance, Zinn (2001) has questioned the meaning of ‘military targets’, arguing that the term includes various targets that include civilians. Others have questioned the possibility that some of the planned attacks were directed at mistaken military characters, and consequently directed military force against innocent civilians. But in defense of these possibilities, Falk (2002) argues that what separates the casualties suffered at the hands of the US soldiers from those suffered in the hands of the terrorists is intent.

He writes: “what… establishes a clear and crucial legal and moral distance between the casualties in 9/11 and Afghanistan is that the latter were not a consequence of intentional or deliberate actions” (Falk 2002, p.5). Returning to the question of casualty numbers, many wonder how much so-called collateral damage must be suffered for the sake of peace. And when people talk about collateral damage, what does it mean? Generally, many refer to accidental civilian deaths. At this point many question the truthfulness of the ‘accidental’, including the casualties that can be avoided (Kozak 2009).

But then again, we return to the simple question of whether speaking of casualty numbers at a time of war is relevant-if it is sensible. Falk (2002) notes that the occurrence of civilian casualties does not mean that a group has departed from the rules of ‘just war’. Besides, the notion of just war aims at encouraging practical reasoning, morality and establishing limits against deliberate killings of non-combatant civilians. And in that light, therefore, when that notion allows opposing sides to invoke combatant/military necessity to justify acts that are very likely to harm civilians, it equally recognizes and acknowledges that just war- despite that term ‘just’- permits great civilian harm and death, and devastation.

In this debate, one must take note of two factors. One, the European Media gave attention to Afghan civilian casualties more than it did the American casualties. This implied that the US soldiers were not making any official efforts to avoid the casualties. Two, there was a seemingly little effort taken by the US government to ensure that its allies in the Afghan military acted in line with the international laws. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the failure of the US to stop the massacring of Taliban war prisoners by the Northern Alliance forces in the process of controlling a certain makeshift prison in Mazar-e-Sharif.

This received a great amount of criticism from European journalistic observers 2(Falk 2002). Just Goals Perhaps the most important and relevant aspect of the just war framework has to do with just goals. In this case, the key question is whether the US’s reasons for going to war in Afghanistan are valid in relation to an effective response against the Al Qaeda. Indeed, the decision of the Bush administration to wage war against Afghanistan was valid and convincing. That has been argued for by many- if not all.

At the time, there was a seemingly strong evidence that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda headquarters were in Afghanistan, made possible and helped further by the Taliban regime. In line with certain central Al Qaeda Islamic ideology, the Taliban was an embodiment of some severe Islamic variant, which they translated into a process of governing (Falk 2002).

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