Causes of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War - Coursework Example

CAUSES OF THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR Introduction On 6th October 1973, at 2 p.m. unified forces of Syria and Egypt launched simultaneous attacks at Israel. 6th October is the Jewish Day of Atonement, also known as Yom Kippur; hence the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal in the south while the Syrians invaded the Golan Heights in the north. The Israeli government was caught highly unawares – only in the early hours of the same day had the prospect of war seemed imminent. The order to mobilize the reserves, which form the bulk of Israeli forces, had been issued at 9 a.m. the same day1. The Egyptians and Syrians both enjoyed initial success, overrunning towns and inflicting heavy casualties especially on the Air Force and the Armored Corps. On October 9th, after 3 days, the Israelis launched a successful counterattack in the north. A simultaneous counterattack in the south, meant to “move the war to enemy ground,” failed in mysterious circumstances. It was only on October 15th and 16th that the first batch of Israeli troops was able to create a bridgehead west of the Suez Canal. On October 16th the Knesset met for the first time since the start of the war2. The commencement of the sitting was delayed for a few minutes until the Prime Minister, Golda Meir, was absolutely sure that it would not affect the safety of the soldiers who were west of the Suez. The Knesset passed a resolution to go to war and the engagement officially started. The Yom Kippur War went on for 19 days (6th-25th) when a ceasefire was brokered a signed. The war had a lasting impact on the Middle East and Israeli-American relations. The Arab world felt vindicated and satisfied by the outcome of the war since the previous one in 1967 was counted as a loss. Israelis, and the rest of the world, saw the conflict as a loss because of poor preparation, planning, and execution. General Description of the Scene On the Suez side there were 3 primary north to south roads. The first ran almost parallel to the Suez and partially marked by a series of telegraph poles. Another paved (metal) road known as Artillery Road in Israel, and designed for the quick deployment of tanks and artillery, lay about nine kilometers to the east of the Suez3. From the west was a six-hundred foot high ridge of tiny features which included Katib el Kheil, and Taba and Subha Hills. Katib el Kheil was also known as Triangle 100 among Israelis. Banks of sand and mounds had been placed on this ridge to hide tanks, movement and stores. It also offered the Israelis excellent vantage points not easily seen against the Khatmia Ridge’s higher background. The Khatmia Ridge lay farther to the east. In general, the ground sloped mildly upward from the Suez eastward. Tasa was a tiny military complex on Artillery Road. There were about six strongly-built Israeli command posts lying about ten miles back from the Suez4. These posts were spaced out along the entire front, well protected against shellfire and bombs by concrete roofs and walls, camouflaged, and reinforced with gabion stones. These command posts were equipped with sophisticated communication gadgets to man their respective areas. Bir Gifgafa, called Radafine in Israel, lay behind the Khatmia Ridge. It was a pretty large military complex. Four east-west roads traversed the Sinai. However, other roads branched off from them. For instance, the northern Coastal Road ran from Kantara East past Romani and then eastward to El Arish. Syria fought Israel on the Golan plateau. This is a very important stretch of terrain which obstructs the old route between Palestine and Damascus5. An escarpment descends sharply on its western edge creating the border with Jordan, which leads to sand larva fields. The large Mount Hermon massif, which rises to 9,223 feet and is known as Jebel Sheikh in the Arab world, obstructs the north of the plateau. The terrain of the Golan plateau was unfavorable for tanks and parts of it were impassable to automobiles. This was due to the presence of rock outcrops and huge basalt boulder, but the numerous defiles offered perfect attack locations. A few roads traversed the plateau from east to west, with bridges above the River Jordan. The northernmost of these, the Massada Road, ran from Dan and Borias and all the way to Massada6. Another road went from Kibbutz Gonen close to the River Jordan south of Massada Rd. and towards the cease-fire road. At the centre was Damascus Rd i.e. the generation-old route connecting Damascus and Haifa. It traversed the River Jordan next to the Benot Yacov Bridge, and then ended at Damascus after passing through Kuneitra and Naffak. Research Questions a) What caused the Yom Kippur War? b) Could the conflict have been averted? c) What were the consequences of the conflict? Discussion The territorial result of the 1967 war was Israeli control over Arab territories. The stretched borders incorporated the West Bank of the Jordan, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. The two major aggressors, Syria and Egypt, had standing armies of 120,000 and 260,000 respectively. Syria reserves numbered 200,000 and Egypt 500,000. The military in both nations was essentially composed of members of the ruling elite7. However, the use of Soviet training programs and weaponry demanded substantially more manpower, and therefore morphed into some type of adult education initiative. On the other hand, both sides in the 1973 war dependent on external entities to supply and train their armed forces. Both countries also sought help to monitor their enemy’s activities8. The Yom Kippur War originated from three factors: a) The emergence of an Arab force which was capable and willing to wage war with Israel. b) The steady supply of arms from the superpowers (U.S. and U.S.S.R.) to their Middle Eastern clients. c) The failure of all international efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli differences. International efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute failed mainly because of intransigence on the Israeli side. After Anwar Sadat ascended to power in 1970, there was a marked shift in Egyptian policy from military aggression to political solutions. Sadat’s public statement in 1971 of his willingness to reach a peaceful agreement with Israel was a major turning point in the age-old dispute9. However, the impasse over the implementation of UN Resolution 242 could not be breached because the Israelis absolutely declined to backtrack to the lines of 4th June 1967. On 4th February 1971, Anwar Sadat presented his own plan for a temporary settlement based on a controlled Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal and its reopening for international shipping. However, this plan was also rejected by Israel. Persistent Israeli stubbornness convinced Sadat, by November 1972, that use of force was vital in stopping the trend of standstill diplomacy. Starting from this juncture, he started planning the attack on Israel. This attack was secretly known as “Operation Spark.” Under the government of Golda Meir, Israel kept increasing her demands for a political solution just as the Egyptians became convinced of the urgency for a historic deal. Meir’s foreign policy was marked by immobility and obstinacy. Retaining control of the lands acquired in 1967 slowly usurped the need for a compromise as Israel’s number one objective10. Meir continued proclaiming Israel’s want for peace but this was a faint hope rather than a course of action. Her actual plan was to ignore Sadat, let him struggle until his bucket of options was running empty, until he would be left no option but to agree to Israel’s conditions for a settlement. The result of this strategy was to miss the chances for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and push Israel’s foes to initiate another spate fighting. Israel’s behavior gave Arab leaders a powerful reason to cast their differences and create one plan for the recovery of their lands11. The early 1970s were a period of increasing collaboration and rapprochement in inter-Arab politics. Relations between Egypt and Syria grew into an effective strategic alliance while relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt also strengthened after Gamal Nasser’s death. Sadat was central figure and planner on the path to war on the Arab side12. His plan was to harness all resources of the Arab world, making use of the oil card, for the pertinent war with Israel. It was he who led from the front in creating the alliance with Syria in order to draft strictly limited objectives for the joint strategy. He believed that this would provoke an international dilemma in which the superpowers were forced to intervene in order to reach an agreement. Soviet policy from 1970-1973 was lukewarm and contradictory. The country’s general policy of détente with America convinced it to act with a lot of caution in the Middle East. It was the USSR’s refusal to provide Egypt with the arsenal she needed to build a strong military option against Israel that convinced Sadat, in July 1972, to do away with Soviet military advisers. By the start of 1973, however, USSR resumed supplying weapons to Egypt knowing that an attack against Israel was in the offing13. The Soviets kept urging their Arab friends to avoid war while arming them to ensure they were able to resume aggression. America, inadvertently and indirectly, played a role in the start of the Yom Kippur by backing the Israeli policy of attempting to maintain an unbreakable status quo. Republican leader Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his National Security Adviser, approached the Middle East from an international perspective and wanted to keep the USSR out of the region. They supported the Israeli concept that as strong Israel was the best barrier to war in the Middle East. Based on this thesis, they supplied Israel with economic and military aid in an increasing scale while refusing to put pressure on her resumption of the pre-1967 terms14. Even after Sadat discarded the Soviet advisers, the Americans continued supporting this standstill tactic which finally pushed Egypt and Syria to reject Israel’s conditions for a resolution but to opt for war. While the Israelis were celebrating their victory in the 1967 conflict, Arabs in the Middle East were in a state of shock and sadness15. On the morning after the end of the 1967 war, Arab writer and Nobel Prize recipient, Naguib Mahfouz, stated commonly-held feelings: “Never before or after in my life had I ever experienced such a shattering of consciousness as I felt at that moment.”16 President Sadat was also influenced by the policies of his predecessor, President Nasser. Nasser had previously stated, prior to the 1967 conflict, that “the battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.”17 This was contradictory to his statement in 1970 which focused on the need to free Egyptian and other Arab territories taken in 1967. Sadat followed the same script in 1970, when war with Israel was imminent, stating that the objective of any war was to defeat Israel and reclaim lost territories. Egypt was not solo in its quest to recapture lost territories. For countries like Jordan the main goal became the reclamation of its lands. In the Arab world, they were heavily supported by Cairo-friendly regimes like the ones in Sudan and Iraq. A common theme for this group of countries was they wanted a political resolution to the crisis involving accepting Israel and reaching a peace agreement18. Another group, composed of Libya (up to 1969, when Qhadaffi joined forces with Egypt), Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was mainly concerned with continued oil export income and therefore maintaining connections with the unpopular West. At the same time, they had to avoid being isolated from the rest of the Arab world, and settled for a compromise involving financial aid for Egypt and Jordan while expressing opposition to any political remedy to the problem19. The financial assistance would guarantee good relations with key Arab protagonists, while opposition to a political remedy served to avoid criticism from extremists on the Palestinian problem. A third group included Iraq (after the Ba’ath coup of 1968), Syria, and Algeria that strongly and publicly rejected any non-military remedy to the Palestine. The 1967 conflict prompted and highlighted Arab disunity, which was exacerbated by the growing tensions among Arab countries. As Anwar Sadat assumed power in Egypt after Nasser’s death in 1970, he started moving Egypt to a whole new direction. Pan-Arabism, although diluted by the Arab 1967 loss, still remained a force among Arab people20. Sadat placed it under even more pressure. Locally as well as in collaboration with his Arab colleagues, Sadat, in a flurry of “Egypt-first” decisions, largely removed pan-Arabism as a core segment of government strategy and Egyptian public life. Sadat intended on disregarding relations with Egyptian Arab partners like Syria, proclaiming that “Syria cheated us in 1967. Why should I not cheat them now?” In the domestic arena, Sadat amassed power by Nasser loyalists and imprisoning them for treason. Sadat released leading figures of the previously harassed Muslim Brotherhood, and strengthened Islamist factions in universities while oppressing leftist and Nasserist factions. Since no major rival philosophy existed at the time, Sadat wanted to plug the gap that Nasser and his ideology (pan-Arabism) had left behind. He needed to replace it with an Egyptian-inspired pan-Islamist ideology. Gradually, it arrested Egyptian society and with the aid of Saudi Arabia started spreading throughout the Middle East. The 1967 conflict created a larger and bolder Israel that felt invincible as the most powerful state in the Middle East21. The war itself had triggered a split between Palestinian goals and the main objectives of the Arab nations, while Sadat’s rise gradually diluted the importance of pan-Arabism in Egypt and the Middle Eastern22. The events of the 1967 conflict were very instrumental in triggering the Yom Kippur War. Arab nations did not feel comfortable with Israel as the most powerful nation in the Middle East, while Israel basked in the glory of its victory. When Anwar Sadat succeeded President Nasser, he showed great flexibility in seeking diplomatic solutions but maintained the option of consolidating the status quo by force. Sadat embraced U.S-mediated talks but declared 1971 the “year of decision” if negotiations failed to remove the Israelis from Sinai. When 1971 elapsed with no clear Egyptian action, Sadat’s declaration was seen as a meager bluff. In July 1972 when Sadat fired over twenty thousand Soviet advisers, Egypt looked even less capable of enforcing military solutions23. Few people realized that the firing of the Soviet advisers, by offering more space for action for Sadat, was a preview of war. In spite of this expulsion, Sadat reached agreement for more Soviet arms supplies in late 1972, and arms and advisors began coming in early 1973. These arms would make war more realistic and imminent. In Sadat’s view, the status quo of “no war – no peace” was temporary. Facing a deteriorating economy, robbed of Suez Canal income since its closure after the previous war, and still bearing 1967’s humiliation, Sadat felt compelled to do something. In October 1972, he organized a fateful meeting of Egyptian military heads24. At this meeting, Sadat declared his desire for short conflict with Israel as soon as Soviet arms supplies offered enough strength. General Sadeq, the minister of war, protested vehemently against a short war, convinced that Egypt was not ready to challenge Israel. Two days later, he was replaced by General Ahmed Ismail who backed Sadat’s strategy for limited war25. Sadat had resolved to change the status quo forcefully. From the Israeli view, “no war – no peace” was a good result. The Yom Kippur War gave Israel very defensible borders and more strategic depth for the first time in its history. It would take ages (if ever) before the beaten Arabs could imagine matching Israel’s excellence in mobile armored warfare and air combat. In addition, the apparent thawing of Egyptian-Soviet relations were welcome developments. Israel would be able to conduct strategic activities without the possibility of direct confrontation with the Soviets. Moreover, the preference of détente by the superpowers supported continuation of this ideal status quo26. The conditions seemed to offer Israel a wider range of options for a national security plan. The national security plan chosen by Israel was “complete deterrence” (threatening massive response for any aggression). Operationally the plan relied on three vital elements, in addition to stronger combat forces: a) Rapid mobilization of crack ground forces to execute decisive counterattacks (Israel’s ground troops more than tripled to 350,000 when fully mobilized). b) Enough strategic warning (a minimum of twenty four to forty-eight hours) to both mobilize the reserves and adequately deploy regular troops into the border defenses). c) Ready defensive strongholds along the hostile borders, which would allow Israel’s small standing ground troops (backed by a professionally-superior, mostly regular air force) to crush any initial attacks. In October 1973 all these factors failed in some way – the most vital lapse being lack of strategic warning. The Agranat Commission (Israel’s high-level post-war investigation committee) determined that the Israeli surprise was mainly due to their “idea” of a future Arab-Israeli war27. This “idea” held: a) Syria would not attack without Egypt. b) Egypt would not attack before remedying their “air superiority defect” (inability to launch attacks deep into Israel or secure Egypt and her troops from air attacks). The ‘idea” served Israel almost to October 1973. In the past three years there were at least three times Egypt was ready to wage war: December 1971 and 1972, and May 1973. In the May 1973 case, Israeli leaders did not listen to the advice of the director of military intelligence that war was unlikely28. They responded with a light mobilization costing over $11million. Besides, an October 1973 mobilization would carry political and economic consequences, with elections looming in late October. By October 1973 the “idea” had been “proven.” It was a foregone conclusion that Egypt would not go to war without air superiority. Consequently, although the Israelis were convinced that Syria was mobilizing for some kind of military action, by the conditions of the “idea,” Syria would not attack. Interestingly, the “idea’s” elements were still actually applicable in October 1973. The Arabs had remedied the “air superiority defect,” not with long-range jets to attack Israel’s airfields, but by buying Soviet SCUD missiles and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). In the six-day war, the Israeli Air Force was efficient in the quick victory, virtually wiping out the Arab air forces in the initial attacks and providing excellent air support for later Israeli armored penetrations29. By 1973, however, the Egyptian SAM canopy offered air cover for their ground forces and their SCUDs could launch deep attacks. Air was vital in the 1973 war, but certainly not the vital factor Israel imagined it to be. The second part of the “idea,” Egyptian-Syrian collaboration, also existed in October 1973. Syrian President Assad amassed his power at the beginning of 1971 and proved more comfortable with conventional military aggression than the previous president who preferred guerilla warfare30. Coordination between Syrian and Egyptian military personnel started in early 1973, and by 5th October Israel stared at a fully-coordinated collaborative attack. Sadat overestimated the acuity of his army by almost sixty hours (Israel was not fully aware that war was looming until 0430 on 6th October), but Israel’s failure to imagine war around the corner was not as a result of lack of information. Even considering clarity of hindsight, the signs during the run up to war were peculiar31. Most narratives of the war begin with a September 13 1973 air engagement over the Mediterranean in which Syrian pilots ambushed an Israeli reconnaissance flight32. This ended in disaster however, as they lost twelve jets against just one Israeli loss. AMAN (Israeli military intelligence) expected some kind of revenge for the incident, and in light of this, Syrian deployments could be perceived as either readiness for a limited revenge strike or defense against any Israeli responses. Later Egyptian deployments were viewed as normal for an announced operation, but might also be defensive for fear of being dragged into the Israeli-Syrian engagement. The expected Syrian mobilization opposite Golan was monitored over the next week, and Israel did take the precaution of increasing ground troops on the Golan Heights. Conclusion Both nations claimed a victory in the war, and both sides had a justifiable case. Israel, after being almost overwhelmed, launched a remarkable response, taking new lands in the north and isolating a whole field army in the south. Based on “numbers,” Israel emerged victorious. Israel suffered eleven thousand casualties (two thousand eight-hundred killed), and lost over eight-hundred tanks and over a hundred aircraft33. The Arabs suffered combined casualties of over twenty-eight thousand (eight thousand five-hundred killed), and lost one thousand eight-hundred and fifty tanks and four-hundred and fifty aircraft34. Although the Arabs lost more soldiers and equipment, the effect on Israel with a smaller population was definitely worse. In spite of the losses, Arab claims of victory are not illusionary. In the north, the Syrians and their partners had battled the Israelis to a stalemate. In the south, Israel had surrounded the Egyptian Third Army, but it is unclear that the Israelis could have guarded their forces on the west bank of the Suez from a persistent Egyptian assault and still hold enough strength along the remaining front. In the final picture, Syria basically maintained the status quo concept, and Egypt reclaimed the Suez35. Undoubtedly the best argument for an Arab triumph is the altered political status. The Arabs had achieved their objective of disturbing the status quo, and the Yom Kippur War was a direct precursor to the 1979 Camp David Accords. The situation was summed up well by Trevor Dupuy: “Thus, if war is the use of military force in support of political goals, there can be no question that in strategic and political circumstances the Arab States – and especially Egypt – won the war, even though the military result was a standstill allowing both sides to claim triumph.”36 The 1973 War has been studied extensively for both its political and military lessons, but it is similarly revealing as a case in human decision making. The pathetic 14th October Egyptian attack, which was opposed by Ismail, the Egyptian Minister of War, is one case. The Syrian SOS, combined with the hype over initial Egyptian victories felt by most senior Egyptian staff, necessitated this poor move37. Parallels to the change of objectives in Korea following Inchon are visible, as is recognition of the discipline it must have required to stick to the original goals in Desert Storm. The case also explicitly demonstrates the human tendency to “wage the last war.”38 Israeli dependence on mobile armored warfare backed by air was vital to the 1967 triumph, but also the antecedent to the 8th October loss. The biggest lesson, however, is the element of lack of appreciation for the enemy’s point of view. Israel was genuinely caught napping in October 1973 because it viewed Egypt’s aggression as an illogical move. Based on its calculations, there was no possibility of an Egyptian victory, therefore, no logical need to use force. From Sadat’s view, extension of the status quo could not be tolerated, and even a military loss (provided it could be controlled) was better than surrendering without a fight. The parallels to American analyses of Saddam Hussein’s predictions are visible39. The tools and technology of war can change, but the calculations and miscalculations of country leaders remain a permanent element of global conflict40. A brief examination of the Middle East reveals a wide array of political entities operating in the region. The 1967 War, inter-Arab relations and superpower involvement are undoubtedly all critical in explaining the causes of the 1973 Arab Israeli War. However, the relative influence of each factor varies greatly from war to war. Bibliography Bregman, Ahron. Israel's Wars, 1947-93. London: Routledge, 2000. Gawrych, George W. The albatross of decisive victory: war and policy between Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000. Hitchens, Ralph. "The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (review)." The Journal of Military History 70, no. 4 (2006): 1185-1187. Ostre, Israel Oron. "Wars and Suicides in Israel, 1948-2006." 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