International Relations Theories: The US-Iran Relations - Coursework Example

US-Iran relations In this paper, I argue that Realism can explain the rise of Iran as a regional power, and that US policies towards Iran have been dominated by Realist assumptions (question 1). However, due to the limited success of Realists in tackling the issues related to Iranian nuclear program as well as military ambitions of Iran I would like to suggest that US policies should draw more upon the tenets of Liberal Institutionalism, and thus imply conducting negotiations with Iran through mediators (Question 2). Despite apparent contradiction of this approach to the Realist paradigm, Liberal Insitutionalism might provide the shift that can bring about an end to the stalemate in resolving the problem around Iranian nuclear ambitions. (Question 3) Nixon doctrine, applied in the 1970s during détente, is a good example of how incorporating Liberal Institutionalism into foreign polices can be constructive and successful (Question 4). Power considerations are usually regarded as the most important drives of the international relations according to the Realist school of thought. As many of the proponents of this school have asserted: “international affairs… [represent]… a struggle for power among self-interested states”1 and , therefore, Realists reject the possibility of full elimination of wars and conflicts. Within the US foreign policy establishment, the Realists usually firmly stand on the ground of expanding US military, political and economic engagement in the world. Particularly, they are more prone to the use of military power in different regions if it is necessary for the preservation of the national interests and the global leadership of the United States. For instance, during the Cold War, the US policies were often aimed at containment of the influence of the Soviet Union and preventing the USSR from becoming a global leader.2 Iran is one of the key powers in the Middle East today. This region is of particular strategic importance for the United States and for the West in general. On the one hand, it is considered to be a womb of international terrorist organizations. On the other, access to Middle Eastern energy resources – the largest in the world – is vital for keeping the growth of Western economies, which are the largest consumers of Middle Eastern energy resources. Over several decades before 2003, Middle East has been dominated by two major military powers – Iran and Iraq. These two countries have been engaged in the bloody war in 1980s, and the United States had been trying to keep the balance between the two local powers by assisting both sides military, technologically and financially in order to avoid the rise of one of them as the only leader. So far, US policy towards Iran has been mostly influenced by the Realist considerations. Currently, Iran represents a potential threat to the United States in two ways: military and economic. Potential military threats to the United States come form the Iranian nuclear program, which can be turned into the development of nuclear weapons. Potential economic threats come from the Iran’s capability to cut off the access to some of the oil fields in the region, whether on its own territory or on the territory of the neighbouring states. The considerations of military security and defence of economic interests are derived from two basic tenets of the Realist paradigm, which are most obvious in the case of US-Iran relations. These are the power maximization and prevention of the rise of potential competitors or challengers which result from security dilemma. According to this logic, there is a negative correlation between security levels of two states. More security for one of them would automatically imply less security for another. And less security for one means more security for the other.3 However, despite the fact US policies towards Iran have been significantly shaped by the Realist considerations, Iran has been capable to not only resist the US pressure but to threaten US militarily (the recent escalation happened in December 2011). For this reason, policy makers might consider a shift in policies which can, at least, calm down the diplomatic rhetoric between the two states. This shift might be taken from the basic arguments of Liberal Institutionalism. This paradigm is different from the Realist one in its evaluation of the persistent patterns of inter-state relations. Unlike Realism, Liberal Institutionalism attempts to find a way out of the vicious circle of conflicts between the states.4 It asserts that the inter-state conflict can be avoided by engagement of international organizations or through participation in multilateral negotiations.5 Truly, the United States has been involved in indirect negotiations with Iran through the United National Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But, as the researchers suggest, Iran has been dissatisfied with the way its nuclear program was criticized, as opposed to nuclear programs of others states, such as North Korea or Pakistan. In the case of these two states, the US showed its willingness to make concessions and involve into direct negotiations.6 Moreover, Islamabad has been treated by Washington as an ally. Iran, on the contrary, has been referred to as a “rogue state”, and its legitimate aspirations to have peaceful nuclear program, as Teheran claims, are treated with suspicion. Iran’s dissatisfaction comes not so much from US criticism of Iranian nuclear plans, but from the way this criticism is being voiced.7 For Teheran, having a nuclear program has become part of national identity and a symbol of a great power status.8 Abandoning these aspirations under the pressure from the West would be equal to national humiliation. In view of this, the best policy option for the US would be something reminiscent of the so-called détente with the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Détente was a policy of peaceful coexistence between two antagonistic systems. It implied mutual recognition of concerns and interests, direct negations on problems in bilateral relations. Détente helped to cool down the Cold War tensions for almost 10 years as well as to advance economic agenda of both states through mutually beneficial trade agreements. What can be learnt from détente in 1970s is that negotiating on the equal basis and recognition of legitimacy of each other’s concerns can be a good starting point. Washington can try to reach out to Iran without further threat of sanctions as well as to provide guarantees that military actions against the Islamic Republic are not being considered. Since, these kinds of direct negotiations would be impeded by broken diplomatic ties between the US and Iran, other world powers and international organizations can assist in this effort. It might be necessary to have preliminary unofficial talks with Iranian government on the conditions of such direct negotiations. The UN can not serve as a platform for unconditional talks, and hence the United Sates can ask Russia to be a mediator in these talks. Russia, being eager to be recognized as important international player, would not refuse to serve as a mediator in the US-Iran talks, and, moreover, Moscow has partner relations with both Teheran and Washington. This kind of negotiations based on the principles of mutual recognition of concerns as well as US guarantees to abstain from preventive military actions might cause criticism from that fraction of establishment in Washington which insists on more Realist approach to Iranian nuclear program. Realist thinking would be in favor of a more confrontational approach since Iran currently represents a military threat to the United States and its allies in the region. Realists would argue that only by putting maximum possible pressure on Teheran can the US force it to shut down its nuclear program. In other words, Realists assume that under the threat of a military attack or in case of a real military strike on Iran, its government would give up, and curb its own nuclear aspirations. This criticism can be countered on the grounds that Realist approach has not proven itself constructive despite many years of US pressure on Iran. On the contrary, last year was marked by significant deterioration of situation around Iranian nuclear program. The problem of the Realist approach is that it does not take into consideration that it is actually confrontation what Iran is seeking right now, since confrontation with the US can only reinforce anti-American sentiments in the region and in Iran itself, and hence increase credibility of Iranian anti-American rhetoric. Therefore, military conformation with Iran would mean a loss for the US in terms of public image. As opposed to confrontation, a more diplomatic tone on the US part would actually undermine the anti-American rhetoric of Teheran and credibility of its accusations. The fact that United States has invaded non-nuclear Iraq in 2003 while engaging into negations with nuclear North Korea might be telling to Iranian leadership that it can provide its own security only in case of developing actually nuclear weapons, or at least having a capability to develop such. Therefore, the US should try to persuade Iran that there is no military scenario on the table as long as Iran does not attempt to attack any of its neighbors. It does not mean that US will abandon its security obligations in the region, particularly as far as Israel is concerned, but it will temporarily calm down Teheran, and thus create a platform on which more open and trustful negations can be conducted. The initial conditions of these negations might be conveyed to Iran unofficially, “behind closed doors” through Russia. Once the conditions of the negotiations are agreed upon, they can be conducted via regular channels, i.e. the UNSC five permanent members plus Germany. Once the guarantees to Iran are conveyed, and given the high chance these guarantees might calm down Iranian government, it will not only help to provide more stable and secure Middle East, but also to improve the image of the United States, being currently presented by the Iranian leadership as “imperialist, aggressive” power. This kind of policy would be reminiscent of the Nixon doctrine. One of the basic tenets of this doctrine is the normalization of relations with rival states. In 1970s Nixon managed to normalize relations with two Communist superpowers, and he even started talks on arms reduction. The official negations with the Soviet Union and China were preceded by a number of unofficial meetings and exchange of delegations. But once all the participants of the unofficial talks saw readiness on both sides to engage on more open and more public basis, it proved to be beneficial for all of them.9 Iran currently is concerned with domestic instability and the threat of violent riots in the country did not go away. Thus, Iranian leadership might be interested in normalization of relations with the United States since Teheran can present these negotiations to domestic audience as a success of Iranian regime. To sum up, while Realism suggests a credible guide for actions in many foreign policy dilemmas, Iranian case is really specific. Teheran actually expects a Realist response from the United States, trying to provoke Washington to use more militant rhetoric. This rhetoric makes Iran present itself as a legitimate opponent of the “US imperialism”. However once Washington would actually demonstrate its good intentions to the world, the US will get an upper hand in the negotiations with Iran since credibility of Iranian accusations would be undermined. Read More