The Effects of Technology on Warfare - Research Paper Example

Have rapid technological advances revolutionized the conduct of war? What other alterations in our internal threads [organization, doctrine, and force structures] must accompany technological breakthroughs? Does technology require a reformulated conceptual change in war-making? Introduction Clausewitz, Maude and Graham define war as the “act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will”. War requires a party to defeat its adversary, till such time that the adversary does not offer any more resistance. Violence equips itself with the innovations of science and technology to compete against violence. Strategy is defined as the assimilation and deployment of the objects of war to thwart the opponent1. The conduct of warfare depends on the military tactics and strategies employed. Tactics help to put strategies into effect by making decisions that do not necessarily have a long-term effect. With changes in the character of war and advances in technology, strategies and tactics have seen a change in their meaning. This paper explores the effects of technology on warfare and alterations in the internal threads that accompany technological breakthroughs. The paper also addresses how technology requires a reformulated conceptual change in war-making. The first part of the paper deals with warfare in the early period, before Napoleon began his conquests. It then sheds light on the method of warfare used by Napoleon. The paper explores the use of technology in different wars such as the US Civil War, the First and the Second World Wars, the Gulf War and the Lebanese War, helping to establish how wars were lost or won by using technology and demonstrating its role in war-making. The later part of the paper examines how technology mandates a subsequent change in internal threads, followed by a conclusion. For most part of history, strategies were considered to be the art of how the general conducted warfare and were aimed to tackle problems such as breaking into a fort, arranging the armed forces in a tactical maneuver to give them advantage over the opponent force etc. Strategies began to change in the past two centuries primarily due to the concept of policies that had the support of the public, international coalitions and technological advances. As a result, it became increasingly difficult to tell national policies apart from military policies. Strategies became part of the grand policy, which requires the preparation and deployment of the entire resources of a society- military, technological, political and economic2. Strategies and tactics formulate the conduct of war. Changes in strategies and tactics have ultimately affected and changed how war is conducted. Strategies and tactics depend on the availability of weapons, access to enemy forces, topography etc. Where in earlier times armies used to travel on horseback- their progress slowed by bad topography or weather- armies nowadays are not faced by such problems. The invention of cutting-edge technologies like drone missiles, F-15 fighters, guided bombs and missiles and mortars have necessitated the use of different approaches to conduct war than those used in the past. Warfare of the past and Napoleon According to Mountcastle, new technology is one of the most compelling facets of the current Revolution in the Military Affairs (RMA). It has made one side advantaged over the other. Clausewitz wrote, “The nature of war is complex and changeable”. This makes warfare all the more complicated and variable. Technology can change warfare significantly. It was not until Napoleon’s time that the conduct of warfare saw some significant changes. Boot states that the Napoleonic era blazed the way for a true revolution in warfare3. The 19th century was the starting point of a new, technologically advanced age of warfare. This view has been contended by many historians. The weapons used in the yore included crossbows, halberd, gunpowder etc; society depended on manpower, waterpower, windpower, and animal power as sources of energy. As a result, armies could not reach the full potential of their attacks due to logistical constrictions. Goodman asserts that there were little differences in the military strategies of Julius Caesar and Scipio Africanus on one side, and the military campaigns of Marlborough and Frederick the Great on the other hand. Campaigners of 18th century Europe adhered to the view that following the great militarists of the past can would help them conduct a successful battle. Ever since that, technological advances resulted in cumulative changes. The invention of the stirrup and its use in battles allowed militarists to organize their battles and to raid now and again. Mobile heavy artillery altered the way warfare was being conducted since the Middle Ages. The improvement in the design of the ring bayonet and its union with the flintlock gave the infantry a force-multiplier and allowed the soldiers to be musketeers and pikemen both at the same time. By building upon the same force-multiplying technique in the middle of the 18th century, the cavalry headed by Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval was able to achieve more mobile and accurate field guns. There were little changes in the conduct of war due to technology as compared to those due to political and social reasons. It was the French Revolution that made Napoleon’s campaigns to add another aspect to how warfare can be conducted and allowed Napoleon to shake the very foundations of the political setup of Europe. It was the advent of the industrial age where the development of technology picked pace and transformed warfare. This was done by improving the lethality, accuracy and range of the weapons. US Civil War The US civil war, or the first total war, laid the groundwork for technologically enabled strategies to maneuver the armed forces and launch an attack on enemy forces. It was the first modern war and introduced 20th century warfare methods; it acted as the catalyst for social change4. Railroads and steamships added to the volume, reach and pace of mobilization and conscription. During the time between the advent of the industrial age and the First World War, advances in weaponry and logistical developments were the most significant elements that influenced warfare and paved the way for the transformed warfare of the First World War. The concept of fighting battles in the old times was the close encounter between the soldiers. They would fight each other at an arm’s distance. However, the development of firearms, magazine-fed repeating rifles and breech loaded guns did not allow armies to come close to each other, thus slowly abandoning the old strategies for battles. The rifle could fire at longer distances and with greater accuracy. The use of grenades and land mines became common. Moreover, advances in communication allowed parties to collaborate their maneuvers over long distances, and the spread of the war became even more extended. The only factors limiting the army became its size and the resources needed to train and equip the soldiers. The development of an advanced system of weaponry in that time was one of the major factors that led to victory by the North. The consequence of better weapons and logistical communications was the effect, Total War Mk. I. In Total War Mk. I, the entire resources of the state were brought together to organize a military campaign. This effect was notably used by Ulysses S. Grant and Douglas Haig and the policy that they used was that of attrition. The objective of warfare then did not remain the annihilation of the enemy on the field of the battle; rather, the enemy was embroiled in a long-drawn-out battle through which there was no way out. According to Howard and Guilmartin Jr, the warfare was meant to exhaust the enemy in terms of its resources and to “bleed the opposing society to death”5. The campaigns conducted by Grant during the years 1864 to 1865 were the first ones to be characterized for the use of such strategies. Later, mechanization, internal combustion engines and radio communications brought decisiveness to the armies. First World War The First World War is the absolute example of Total War Mk. I. The machine gun, used commonly for the first time in the First World War, played a pivotal role in the conduct of the war. According to Goodman, there were two main decisive factors that helped establish the course of war and which side would emerge victorious. These included the technology that was used in the war. The circumstances called in for a war of slow destruction and subsequently involved the governments completely. In Europe, the innovations of the later part of the industrial age culminated in the Total War Mk. II. In this effect, there was more mass participation of the community. This participation was not only limited to their role as supporters of the war, but civilians were also being targeted by enemy forces. This was because the public was involved in producing the resources that the armies needed but also because their drive and confidence was essential to the conduct of war. The advocates of the Total War Mk. II contended to the view that air force could help the army to win the war without using its navy etc. Many military theorists had emphasized upon the use of airpower as an effective war tactic. Amongst these theorists included Giulio Douhet (1869-1930), Billy Mitchell, Henry ("Hap") ARNOLD, and Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956). They stressed upon the idea that airpower could make good use of the aviation, and could win the war alone without any assistance from the navy etc. Air power can be used to strike enemy bases by strategically targeting bombs. Communication lines, residences and industries could be bombarded. The second technology that significantly turned the course of war was the use of tanks and other motorized armored vehicles. B. H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970), Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970), and J. F. C. Fuller (1878-1966) supported the idea of the use of tanks for warfare during the war. The most recent military-technological revolutions, two in this century and two in the last, are demonstrative of the fact that advantage in warfare goes to those nations who can most effectively make use of their technologies. The best example of using technology in warfare was the Nazi blitzkrieg. It made developing internal combustion engines a possibility, along with aircraft design, radio and radar, and other innovations that came into the market after the First World War. The technologies were available in many countries, but none of them made use of them to expand upon their operational concepts and innovative organization. Germany was the pioneer of using a tactical offensive hybrid of air and tank power in the battlefield in the blitzkriegs. Such a hybrid of strategies was used and implemented under the commandership of Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel. The success of such tactics can be assessed from the fact that both these commanders were able to take over a major part of Europe during the war. Gulf War The Gulf War is an evidence of the fact that countries other than Germany did not harness the power of technology to make warfare more effective. Some US officials were of the view that a revolution in warfare had already occurred by the time the Gulf War started. Their view can be challenged by the argument that the operations and warfare of the US army was not falling into the criteria of elements that could initiate a military revolution. There were no significant changes in the preformed concept of traditional warfare. Organizational forces had not been undergoing any variations either. However the Gulf War reflects a glimpse of the technological revolution that could be harnessed in order to redefine military campaigns. Space systems were used on a large-scale in the war to carry out military operations. Moreover, technologies that enabled munitions to be more precision-guided, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile, the global positioning system, the stealth aircraft and theatre missile defense were increasingly made use of in the war. The Gulf War was an attestation to the fact that US technology and US military doctrine is a potent force that when applied to the world stage, can result in the most efficient war being conducted in history of America6. The use of technology in Operation Desert Storm can be assessed with the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917 that took place on the Western front. In the Battle of Cambrai, the British used wireless technology to communicate with large numbers of tanks and planes. This helped them to coordinate and maneuver them to distant strategic locations effectively. The British were able to break away from the quagmire of trench warfare and broke through the German lines on a 12km front in the matter of a few hours7. The breakthrough took the British by surprise, and they were not able to take advantage of it further. Thus one can see that the potential for greater success in the Battle of Cambrai was impeded due to the nascent nature of the use of new technologies in warfare. This is exemplified by the breakdown of technology for example the umpteen tank breakdowns, checks on the loads that can be transported by aircrafts and limitations on the range, transportability and dependability of wireless communication technology. The relatively reduced number of people who lost their lives during the Gulf War, along with the power of having alliances and the one-sidedness of the battle caught the leaders unaware and so they could not fathom the factors that came into play with the use of technology. The US officials were unable to recognize the potential of these new technologies in warfare. The Desert Storm, however, marked the height of the tactical use of technology. One could argue that technology alone contributed, more than any other factor, to the success of the operation8. The Gulf War was thought to be the precedent of a technological revolution in military affairs and can offer solutions to the dilemmas of the post-Cold War era9. Second World War In the Second World War, oil was used as the determinant of the capability of strategies and the effectiveness of the tactics. Countries were able to move raw materials that they needed during the war and it was no longer limited by distances or the sea. This was both a weakness and a major factor that decided the war in favor of the Americans. Oil was integral to warfare since the petroleum was distillated and the resulting fuel was used in vehicles. Aircrafts were the most important technology that was used in the War and helped shape the result of the war. Bombers, tanks, torpedoes, submarines, artillery pieces, assault-landing crafts and anti-submarine vessels followed soon after the development and use of aircrafts. During the World War II in particular, technology was used in combination with internal threads such as global alliances. One of the factors that distinguish the Second World War from other wars fought earlier is that the war saw the use of purely global strategies buttressed by global unions that were committed to the offensive. The Second World War embodies the concept of Total War Mk. II more so than any other war. The World War II is also notably famous for the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are illustrative of the largest breakthroughs in technology that have been utilized in the Second World War, and have remained the most destructive of the weapons used in the annals of history. While nuclear technology was being used in wars, the development of other technologies went parallel to nuclear weaponry. Although the purpose was primarily to assist in the War, these technologies were representative of the advances in technology that were taking place. According to Howard and Guilmartin Jr, digital electronic computers, new sensor systems especially the infrared spectrum, intercontinental ballistic missiles, war head heat shields, phenolic resin honeycomb, transistors, turbojet engines and miniaturized and more powerful and analytical computers generated the war paradigm. According to many theorists, the only way to restore the traditional tactics and strategies of conducting war is to set limits on the chances of escalation of war to the level that sides resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Where these innovations buttressed and nourished the paradigm in the start, later the war paradigm fueled the development of technological innovations. In the 1950s, the improvements in the jet engine technology and their subsequent performance combined with innovative airframe designs and far-sighted military requirements led to the creation of jet bombers. The jet bombers were able to serve as an agent that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons from the opposite side. Beyond the Second World War After the Second World War, one could observe the rapid impregnation of technology into military spheres10. In a matter of fifty years, from 1910 to 1960, the striking power of the warships increased from c.10 to c.1200 miles11. The road to revolution in context of the modern society encompasses the elements that influence war and the nature of the revolution. These elements form the characteristics of the military-technological revolution. Technological change is perhaps the foremost characteristic of the revolution and promises a huge change in the conduct of war. These technological advances in military weaponry come from the advances in information technology. Improved and advanced technology can be used to locate, track and identify grater number of targets over larger distances and time periods and with more precision. Technology has also enabled the coordination and movement of targets with more effectiveness and in less time. The use of technology can also increase the difference in the level of information that is held by the two friendly and enemy parties and will play an integral part in establishing information superiority. Conventional munitions have also become more reliable and their range has improved dramatically. This has helped armies to use ranged fires and deep strikes over large distances. Warfare is therefore becoming a hide-and-seek game. Technology has allowed both sides advantages with regard to bombing technology. Where targets have become more precise, technology has also permitted the rival side to track and identify these target bombs and annihilate them. Technology is also changing the way soldiers are being trained. The invention and the subsequent use of computer-simulation have allowed soldiers to train as if they were in real-life situations. This also revolutionizes warfare since armies are able to maximize the effectiveness of their manpower. The integration of emerging technologies into military systems or munitions can further enhance the effectiveness of the warfare. This will require giving greater importance to organizational collaboration and incorporation. For instance, it would not be feasible to make a extended-range, surface-to-surface advanced tactical missile system without giving thought to how it would be incorporated into the military strategy and how will it work in conjunction with other organization systems such as the Navy and the Air Force. The sunrise systems have also helped armies to develop information superiority. These systems are smaller as compared to the ones used during the time of the Cold War. Therefore, they are difficult to locate and destroy. Military warfare today uses these systems with the help of stealth technologies and electronic warfare. The systems depend on automated operations and on disabling the systems of the enemy. They use non-line-of-sight fires, and little logistical technology, which has the advantage of making these systems less conspicuous and so decreasing the likelihood of being detected by the enemy. The incorporation of technology into weapons entails changes in the internal threads. To achieve the best mix of technological warfare, it is necessary to renew operational concepts. There will be increased competition between the opposing parties on gaining information superiority; this will be done by analyzing the high-priority areas of the enemy and targeting for their destruction. With greater integration, the roles of space, air, land and water will blend and it would be difficult to demarcate the boundaries separating them. Technological advances therefore necessitate the decrease in the number of levels of military hierarchy, with lower levels of commanders to have greater access to the military organizations’ information and fire-support architectures. Also, space will gain more importance in the conduct of war- the prime initiator of this concept being the Gulf War. Development of new technology to improve upon the warfare also depends on the degree of organizational adaptation. In order to introduce and implement new techniques in warfare, there is a need to modify the existing organizational structure to accommodate the changes. Drawing upon the British warfare during the 1920s and 1930s, it can be seen that although the British had advanced technology, they were unable to maximize the effectiveness of the technology because they did not make new organizations to execute new operational concepts. Krepinevich Jr contends that dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the military strategy can be harnessed not only from reorganization of the military forces, but also from changes in the defense strategy of the state and their method of operating their defense industrial base, recruiting service members and training them. During the periods between the First and the Second World War, the US did not have much budget to spare for warfare. However, they laid the groundwork for the concept of fast carrier-fleet operations, modern amphibious operations and strategic aerial bombardment. The US, however, did not put much emphasis on the development of forces; in fact, they paid more attention on tapping military potential rather than the capability of the forces. This approach has helped the US operate effectively and expand their technological capacity in non-war period. Lebanese War The Israeli war on Lebanon is another war that serves as an example to the use of technology in warfare, and how it has revolutionized the conduct of war. One of the strategies that the Israelis employed was shelling the coast of Lebanon, and cutting them off from the rest of the world. Surface-to-surface missiles were also used commonly in the War by the Lebanese government, allowing destruction of a modern vessel that the Israelis were using. The Israeli air force was the most active military organization in the War. The air force had used the airpower to spy on Lebanon and gain information superiority. The personnel conducting these operations were highly trained and expert at their job. Moreover, they were supplemented with cutting-edge technology in communications, command and control and the latest precision-guided munitions. The brunt of the military campaign from the Israeli side came from the airpower. The air force launched a campaign against Hezbollah, for which the Lebanese government was not prepared. Most of the medium-range missile-launchers of the Lebanese government, with a range of 50km and more, were destroyed by the Israeli air force in a matter of 48 hours. The Israeli air force employed another military tactic to weaken the rival side. They targeted the communications centers of Lebanon, particularly the concentration of communication centers that were present in the Shia quarter of Beirut. The Lebanese government retaliated successfully by targeting the civilian residences of Israel by short-range rockets. These rockets, totaling 3500 in number, caused significant amount of damage to the infrastructure and roads of the country. These also moved hundreds of individuals from their homes. The rockets were easily transported and difficult to locate, and so the Israeli air force could not stop them. Both the sides were embroiled in the bombardment of the enemy country. Hezbollah members used Kornet missiles made by the Russians to stop the Israeli Merkavas. This helped to destroy many tanks of the Israelis. There was little organization of forces in the war. This is known from the fact that Israel used very large forces, of 500 to 600 tanks, in Southern Lebanon. Therefore, the element of catching the enemy off guard was lost. There was also little organizational integration since the participating formations did not boast of high levels of cooperation. The war was able to highlight the institutions that were lacking of the support that was needed to act synergistically with technology for effective of warfare. The War raised the need to train and better equip the forces. Moreover it brought the importance of an effective logistics system to limelight. The logistic system, tactical intelligence on the fortifications of Hezbollah and civil defense along with emergency depots need to be modified to not only support the use of technology in weapons, but also to stage a defensive attack at the technologically-enabled weapons and military technology used by the opponent side12. Martin van Creveld was an anti-Clausewitzian theorist, and was of the view that proliferation of nuclear weapons and advancement in technology has altered the meaning and function of strategy13. US in the world today Roland contends to the view that technology plays a decisive role in war14. It is, however, not the only determining factor of war; it can influence when and where wars occur, and the way they are fought. He states that the role of technology in warfare has become prominent ever since man has given up tooth and claw for club and stone. The influence of technology is true for the hoplite warrior of the ancient Greece, and also for the rifleman today. Technology has helped craft the image of the US as the world’s invincible power. Through miniaturization of nuclear weapons and aircrafts, the US pushed technology to its limits15. The US claim at being immortal is represented in their free enterprise and democratic government, but its world leadership and power depends primarily on scientific and technological competence. Although the country was blessed with natural resources, it was able to gain so much power through the effective use of its industry and forces. Kainikara asserts that in the case of warfare, there was an abrupt change in the military-technological environment that resulted in a paradigm shift in the nature of war16. Since the 1990s, the revolution in military ways has revolutionized the means of war through sensor technology in satellites, improved command and control strategies and precision in bombing17. Clausewitz and technology in warfare Echevarria II writes about the politics and ideas about war by the great military theorist Clausewitz. He writes how Clausewitz regarded technological advances as having an impact on the grammar of war, and not its logic. He was of the view that there is a great tendency to overestimate the role of technology in war18. Clausewitz viewed the role of technology with in light of the trinity concept. Blind emotion, politics and chance are the three elements that make up the trinity concept ad formulate the nature of war. According to this concept, new and emerging technologies are seen to shape the form of the war, not its nature. The war has several dimensions to it; the precedence of one dimension over the other makes it more changeable. War has both subjective and objective traits to it. Subjective traits can very over time, while objective ones encompass violence, uncertainty and friction, and therefore remain more or less the same over time. War also has the traits of escalation and reciprocation. All of these traits make the nature of war brutal, fickle and susceptible to intensification. Echevarria II states that technology is rampant in all the elements of the trinity concept, but does not alter the inter-relationship of these elements19. Military technology, for instance, is that technology that is used by the armed forces of a country for military purposes. Missiles are purely military in nature, but the microchips that are installed in them develop in a different industry. Similarly, communication technologies can be applied and made use of by all the elements of the trinity. The interdependency of the different constituents of the trinity ideology remains inherently unaffected despites changes in technology. Advances in technology can have the impact of enhancing upon the features of the existing technologies. Clausewitz was of the notion that advances and developments in technology can only serve to expand the immediacy for each part of the trinity by reducing the response times and increasing sensitivity. The great military theorist considered information technology to simply necessitate an increment in the intelligence levels and competencies of the military staff, but will not change the political institutions. Since these institutions have the ultimate authority, they will decide on when, where and through what strategies military campaigns are to be conducted. The Cuban Missile Crisis and October 1973 are representative of the incorrect notions that continue to intensify wars. Although technology will continue to increase the speed at which information can be exchanged, and may reduce or increase the time for making decisions, decision-makers will take other factors into account before deciding upon the warfare and military tactics that they employ. Therefore, one can see that Clausewitz was insensitive to the effect of technology on the conduct of warfare. Conclusion Thus in conclusion, one can see that technology has revolutionized the conduct of war over the passage of time. The importance of technological innovation in the scope of military use is that new instruments provide an utter benefit that is translated into decisive military triumph20. Technology requires armies to reformulate the concept of war-making as well. The Gulf War is evidence to how technology mandates a revision of the traditional war-making strategies. When considering warfare over the past hundred years, societies have shown to possess huge capacity for adaptation and endurance and bombing strategies have helped to harden the resolve to resist21. The use of technology for military purposes entails changes in the organization, doctrine and forces structures of the army. Since World War II, armies are now involved in drawing their opponents into escalated wars, often using deadly technology to debilitate the enemy financially, economically as well as socially. Works Cited 1. Clausewitz, Carl Von, Colonel F. N. Maude, and J. J. Graham. On War. Wilder Publications, 2008. Print. 2. Goodman, Ronald E. M. Military Strategies and Tactics. Molossian Naval Academy, 1993. Web. 19 June 2010. 3. Boot, Max. War made new: technology, warfare, and the course of history, 1500 to today. New York: Gotham, 2006. Print. 4. Phillips, Gervase. Was the American Civil War the First Modern War? History Review, 2006. Web. 20 June 2010. 5. Howard, Sir Michael and John F. Guilmartin Jr. How much can technology change warfare? Strategic Studies Institute. Print. 6. Rayment, W. J. Gulf War. Indepthinfo.com, 2010. Web. 20 June 2010. 7. Krepinevich Jr, Andrew F. Keeping Pace with the Military-Technological Revolution. Print. 8. Kaszuba, Karl A. “Military technology: Has it changed the rules of warfare?” Maxwell Air Force Base, 1997. Print. 9. Metz, Steven and James Kievit. Strategy and Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy. Strategic Studies Institute, 1995. Print. 10. Devezas, Tessaleno C. Kondratieff waves, warfare and world security, Volume 5. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006. Print. 11. Gray, Colin S. Weapons for Strategic Effect. Occasional Paper No. 21, Air War College, 2001. Print. 12. Creveld, Martin van. “Israel’s Lebanese War”. Rusi Journal (2006): 40-43. Print. 13. Harris, Brice F. America, technology and strategic culture: a Clausewitzian assessment. Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2008. Print. 14. Roland, Alex. “Technology, Ground warfare, and Strategy: The Paradox of American Experience”. The Journal of Military History 55.4 (1991): 447-468. Print. 15. Parker, Geoffrey. The Cambridge illustrated history of warfare: the triumph of the West. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Print. 16. Kainikara, Sanu. Red Air: Politics in Russian Air Power. Florida: Universal-Publishers, 2007. Print. 17. Matláry, Janne Haaland and Ø̈yvind Ø̈sterud. Denationalisation of defence: convergence and diversity. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007. Print. 18. Strachan, Hew and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. Clausewitz in the twenty-first century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print. 19. Echevarria II, Antulio J. “War, Politics, and RMA- The Legacy of Clausewitz”. JFQ (1995-1996): 76-80. Print. 20. David, Ho Jia Qi. “Technology, not strategy and tactics, has become the determining factor in warfare in the 20th century”. NUS History Society E-Journal. Web. 20 June 2010. 21. Willmott, H. P. and Michael B. Barrett. Clausewitz Reconsidered. California: ABC-CLIO, 2009. Print. Read More