The United States Army Transformation - Essay Example

United s Army Transformation United s Army Transformation SGM United s Army Sergeants Major Academy X SGM February 10,2009 United States Army Transformation: Argumentative Essay The state of domestic and global affairs and international relations, nature of modern warfare, climatic changes, and experience in engagements during the Bush administration all point towards the need for the US military to transform itself. The world we live in is very dynamic and this necessarily impinges on every important institution, the US Army included. It is a stark choice for those who are at the helm: Either adapt to the ever-changing demands and requirements or fall behind with disastrous consequences, immediate obsolescence and becoming history. Examples of changing requirements placed upon the US Army nowadays are the following: Increasing demands upon and exhaustion of ground forces in Iraq, Guerilla and cyber warfare, counter-terrorism, changing threats, mounting operations in mountainous areas and caves where the US Army has little experience, the challenges of insurgencies, the non-fearing combatants too eager to give up their lives as an honor, increasing number of natural disasters on the West Coast, and so on. The operational failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have particularly highlighted the need to enhance effectiveness of stability operations. Retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor examines two fundamental assumptions distorting army transformation: The illusion of ‘perfect situational awareness’ and the misguided belief that rapid deployment of forces has priority over protection and firepower. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, “despite unparalleled intelligence assets, most of the fighting on the ground was characterized by the participants as resulting from meeting engagements-battles in which American forces unexpectedly bumped into the enemy. “1 (Mcgregor, 2004) This is hardly a demonstration of a perfect awareness of the situation! In Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan too, organizing for the stabilization and reconstruction force was ad hoc (Johnson, 2005). Furthermore, it can be claimed that the US Army actually nurtured the insurgency against itself due to its own indecision on the ground in Iraq. Also, “what the army does after it arrives in a theater of crisis or conflict is much more important than how fast it gets there.” (Mcgregor, 2004) He also mentions the limitations of strykers for close combat in urban and complex terrain. The US Army has a lack of understanding of historical and cultural contexts of many of the areas of operation. Even at home, the US Army demonstrated its incapacity to develop an effective communications network in a disaster scenario as during Hurricane Katrina. The problem actually was to “integrate numerous other organizations and agencies into its normal military network” (Epperly, 2006), which hitherto had been a closed one. So they had no experience in this when it was required of them in a national emergency. The National Guard units did not have access to the latest digital communications equipment as they were being used in foreign operations. Disaster preparedness also requires training, which was lacking. During the stabilization and reconstruction phases in Iraq and Afghanistan too, there was a need for improvements in interagency cooperation within the different elements of the US government. The Clinton Administration did issue guidelines in this regard entitled ‘Managing Complex Contingency Operations’ to assist in developing, planning and executing contingency operations. But it has been found to be inadequate for domestic disaster relief and large scale military operations. The Bush Administration introduced a series of bills to remedy the deficiency, and in 2006 issued the National Security Strategy “to integrate all relevant United States Government resources and assets in conducting reconstruction and stabilization operations.” (Carreau, 2007) This highlights the importance being given to improving interagency cooperation in complex contingencies. These are positive developments but still “many issues remain unresolved or untested…” (Ibid) The need to combat terrorism requires more than better information technology and military strength. Military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) must be enhanced specifically and be able to support more agile and versatile weapon systems capable of handling the new ‘terrains’, techniques and ‘rules’ of warfare. The acquisition of latest advanced technologies and modern information and communication networks is an ongoing process. It is necessary in order to keep these technologies and networks up to date and take advantage of what they have to offer. Greater efficiency and effectiveness are always the drivers for change. The desire for more military might in terms of both speed and strength has been an agent for transformation throughout history. However, there are also other areas in which changes can and are being implemented. The nature of 21st century warfare has also called for rethinking of long established structures. The new technologies have made it possible to obtain and analyze information quicker than before. This in turn has allowed different command and control set-ups that were previously impractical. Besides technological and structural transformation, systems and procedures can also be adapted or improved upon in the light of modern day needs. Enhanced intelligence, improved operational and logistics networks, more integrated communications etc. are other examples of present day concerns. A popular idea for a structural transformation of the US Army is the creation of modular forces as outlined in the US Army Transformation Plan forged in 2003-04. It proposed ‘modular brigade combat teams’ (BCTs), which are now being established. These differ from the old combat brigades in being self-deployable with entirely self-contained combat and support units. The purpose of this widespread change “is to make the army more flexible, agile, and rapidly deployable for expeditionary missions and better able to carry out modern doctrines and force operations for the Information Age.” (Kugler, 2008) In short, to “improve the Army’s near-term strategic responsiveness” (War College, 2001) The need for rapid deployment was particularly evident in the 1990s preceding the Gulf War. It was found that “the army could perform expeditionary operations in distant areas, but only after taking considerable time to arrive on the scene with its traditional, well-endowed structure” (Kugler, 2008). It was after this war that the move towards lighter brigades began. The sluggishness was still a problem though as demonstrated in 1999 when attack helicopters were slow to deploy and make operationally available – but by that time “the war ended before they were used in combat” (ibid). But impediments to the ground forces too were apparent when “heavy M-1 Abrams tanks sometimes were unable to cross weak bridges in Kosovo” (ibid). The debacles of the US Army following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, as well as the DOD approach to defense transformation further highlighted that transformation of the traditional force structure had become imperative. In the aftermath of destroying Iraq in 2004, the need to maintain a large ground force, carry out S&R missions and counter insurgencies called for new demands on the US Army. It was not simply more manpower but structural changes that were needed - such changes that would enable the US Army to tailor its forces to the task at hand. “The new focus of capability-based planning and expeditionary missions meant that the Army would be compelled to treat each strategic mission as unique, to shape uniquely tailored forces for each case, and to deploy them more rapidly than in the past. For the Army, this was an unfamiliar environment for which its traditional forces structure was not always well-suited.” (ibid) Those who are concerned about the trend for a modular structure report, “As our commanders in the field repeatedly tell us, today’s battalions and brigades are already too small for either sustained combat or post-war security operations. To be independent, combat formations must be able to sustain casualties and keep fighting. Making brigades smaller is not the answer. It just makes us weaker.” (Mcgregor, 2004) So, lighter forces can potentially make themselves more vulnerable. A re-examination of the relationship between rank and responsibility is another area that could undergo change given that “new information technologies lift the fog of war”. (West, 2006) And, “although the IT revolution has flattened the command structures of corporations, the military has persisted with a pyramidal structure designed brilliantly by Napoleon within the limits of the command, control, and communications means available to him.“ (ibid) Times have changed. “Technology has radically extended the human voice and sight, yet the old organizations persist.” (ibid) It would minimize the vulnerability of military leadership. The Command Post of the Future (CPOF) concept relies on immediate information. But with the communication technologies that are now available, this is certainly a feasible option. It will enable skilled knowledgeable people at the scene of tactical battles where they are most required i.e. at the front. The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) aims to combine the existing array of systems. It is thought that this will be easier to employ, will require fewer personnel and be cheaper. However, it is more likely that it will only increase the complexity over the present emphasis on coordination. Moreover, the suggestion that contact can be minimized through exploiting opportunities cannot help win battles where ultimate ‘contactive’ engagement is what is really decisive. R&D is essential but it is better targeted at prototyping systems whose performance can be demonstrated. Thus, we have seen a need to improve technologies but also to transform structures and operational procedures, and to maintain the right balance between the command and operational levels. However, a conservative culture is the biggest obstacle to transformation. The army traditionally has a culture of extreme caution, unquestioned compliance and conservatism. This may be essential to make it robust but it can also be counter-productive to the free flow of new ideas and innovations to improve existing systems, processes and technologies, and in combat inhibits the agility of forces to engage in decisive action. Both these qualities of innovation and agility are necessary for effective transformation. In this regard the US Army can learn a lot from the emphasis that are placed on these in business organizations nowadays. You have to be realistic too when proposing transformation and come out of the cocoon of satisfaction with the status quo or else allow others the freedom to make suggestions. Only then can real transformation come about and one that is responsive to our changing needs. The modular system is an innovative structural transformation that deserves more detailed investigation of its potential, shortcomings and challenges. It is suggested that dividing the forces into smaller lighter units makes them less effective. But this should not be so when there are also corresponding increases in firepower and improvements in precision targeting. The advantages of “making the army more swiftly deployable, better able to handle multiple different contingencies, and more effective on the battlefield” (Kugler, 2008) are considerable. However, the greater focus of this transformation should be on the ability to ‘tailor’ the forces. That is, making it flexible and adaptable to situations and scenarios that are themselves always varied and unique. Deploy separate lighter units where needed but be able to amass formidable forces when needed too should be the policy. In practice, the modular approach has proved to be of limited success but this transformation is still in its early stages and it has greater potential over the traditional structure for many modern day situations and scenarios. The US Army has made great strides in ‘precision bombing’, in reducing the duration of combat operations, minimizing casualties in major combat operations etc. Transformation alone is insufficient though. There must also be greater integration between land, air and naval forces. “To cope with the new strategic environment, a new operational paradigm based on air, space, missile, and information power must emerge to support military operations scaled to meet the requirements of any given contingency.” (Binnendijk, 2002) What the US perceives as terrorism poses unique challenges for which transformation is not just essential but critical. Greater flexibility and agility is the way forward but military strategists must also start thinking seriously about foreseeable scenarios where enemies are not states but groups and even individuals; where the battleground is not defined but unbounded; where the targets are not external but hidden within; where the timeframe will not be determined but can play itself out in bursts at any moment; where the sources of strikes will not be able to be pinpointed but can be from anywhere, and where death is not a fear but a sacrificial goal. I reiterate the stark choice for the US Army: Either transform or perish. References Books Binnendijk, Hans (Ed.). (2002). Transforming America’s Military. National Defense University Press. Centre for Technology and National Security Policy. Reports and Theses Chizek, G Judy. (2003). Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service ÷ The Library of Congress. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Jan. 17, 2003. Dickinson, SGM Martin D. (2007). The U.S. Army Transformation. United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, Class 57, SGM Osvaldo DelHoyo. Apr. 6, 2007. War College, US Army. (2001). Army Transformation: A View From The US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Carlisle. July 2001. Presentations and Statements Johnson, Dr. Stuart. (2005). Transforming Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations. The NWC Alumni Association. Apr. 27, 2005. Macgregor, Colonel Douglas. (2004). Army Transformation: Implications for the Future. House Armed Services Committee. Statement of Colonel Douglas Macgregor, PhD, USA (ret.). July 15, 2004. Rayburn House Office Building. Case Studies Carreau, Bernard. (2007). Transforming the Interagency System for Complex Operations. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Case Studies in National Security Transformation, No. 6. Mar. 2007. Epperly, John M. (2006). Transformation for Disaster Relief: Developing a Hastily Formed Network During Operation Vigilant Relief. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Case Studies in National Security Transformation, No. 2. Dec. 2006. Kugler, Richard L. (2008). Case Study in Army Transformation: Creating Modular Forces. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Case Studies in National Security Transformation, No. 14. Apr. 2008. West, Bing. (2006). Transforming the Structure of the Military: Combat Decisions—Rank, Responsibility, or Frontline Position? Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Case Studies in National Security Transformation, No. 4. Dec. 2006. Read More