Organizational Structure of the US Army - Coursework Example

ARMY The United s army has a long and storied history. This history is marked by amazing accomplishments that have been a product not just of the brave men and women who have served in uniform over the years, but also on the way the army is organized. The efficient lines of communication, the vital hierarchical levels, and the common goals and purposes have all played an important role in the army’s successes. When the army has had difficulty achieving its goals—for example in the first few years of the Iraq War—we can see that these problems stem directly from organizational issues. This essay will examine the organizational structures of the United States army and examine how these structures have influenced the army’s performance both in the actions it has taken to help maintain America’s freedom and the freedom of citizens around the world. The Army, the land-based component of the American armed services, traces its origins back to the Continental Army that was founded by George Washington in the years before America won its freedom from the British. After fighting as a group in the War of 1812, the Army spent many decades helping to open up the West for American settlers and fighting skirmishes with Natives. The biggest crisis in the history of the Army was probably the American civil war which saw brother turn against brother and huge losses on both the Confederate and Union side. Many of the best generals in the Army, like Robert E. Lee fought on the Confederate side, and after the war a lot of work was required to repair the rift within the Army between the North and South. The Army had big successes, fighting valiantly, in the first and second world wars, and becoming the most powerful army in the world following this second conflict. It was able to fight victorious wars on two fronts. With the invention of the atomic bomb, American military forces were second to none and the Army was more and more powerful. During the cold war the Army deployed on what were called policing missions—like Korea in the early 1950s—before the next big deployment in the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 70s. This was a difficult war: the Army had trouble adapting to the Viet Cong’s guerrilla tactics.1 The truth was the Army’s organization was not flexible, was too old fashioned to fight these kinds of non-conventional conflicts. There was also a great deal of rivalry between the different services within the Armed Forces. These rivalries created a great deal of problems when trying to prosecute a war in a distant country. Something had to change. Throughout the late 1970s and 80s, the Army came under more civilian oversight. The Goldwater-Nicholls Act gave more power to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as opposed to the service chiefs who had squabbled over a number of aspects of military doctrine.2 These changes led to the successful prosecution of Desert Storm in the 1990s. There was a unified command under Army General Norman Schwartzkopf. Throughout the history of the 20th century, the Army as an organization became more and more streamlined. Lines of communication became more effective. As different races and genders joined the ranks of the Army, new protocols were adopted to allow people to live comfortably together and be aware of their responsibilities to one another as fighting men and women. It was the efficiencies that helped make the Army of the United States such a truly effective fighting force. The Army is a hierarchical organization and formal ranks are extremely important. Personal characteristics are downplayed through use of ranks and uniforms. Individuals are seen to be part of a whole. It is often said of basic training that the trainers break down to new recruits so that they can be rebuilt in the image of soldiers. An interesting aspect, however, of the American Army is its oversight by a bureaucracy and a civilian, appointed, head of this bureaucracy.3 Someone who is not a soldiers and who need not ever been a head of the Army, is actually its leader—the Secretary of Defence. The true Commander in Chief is of course the President: Barack Obama. The army is structured in three parts: the national guard, the reserves, and the regular army. If you combine the three the total personnel is more than 1 million soldiers strong. In many respects the events of September 11, 2001, transformed the Army. In the years building up to the attacks, there was a tendency to think the American Army had been perfected and was able to fight small scale conflicts quickly and easily. Donald Rumsfeld had done a lot of work to make the Army faster and lighter, modernizing their equipment and so on. However, these new organizational techniques did prove as good as they first appeared. In the words of defence strategist John Gordon: It took the realities of the post-9/11 world to show that much of warfare remains the realm of the uncertain and imprecise. Even during the American drive to Baghdad in March-April of 2003 the level of information on enemy forces remained amazingly low. Indeed, from the point of view of a tank commander advancing toward Baghdad, combat was far more similar to World War II (sudden, unexpected encounters with hidden enemy forces under conditions of considerable confusion) than to the concepts of “near-perfect situational awareness” as held forth by many advocates of transformation.4 The Iraq War and what is says about the organization of the Army will be discussed below. This conflict is very important in the history of the transformation of the Army and its continual upgrades. Gates vs. Rumsfeld: Organizational Styles Much of the way the U.S. Army operates is a reflection of the leadership style at the top. Over the last eight years two very distinct personalities have run the Department of Defence and left their stamp on the Army. It is instructive to examine the different ways the Army has behaved and acted and structured itself under the leadership of both Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates. When Rumsfeld was chosen by Bush to be Secretary of Defence in 2001, it was the second time he had the job. He was known to be a very hard-charging, ambitious, and intimidating figure. He had big plans for reforming the Army.5 He believed in a new form of warfare which would feature an extremely mobile and “small footprint” Army that could be sent on short notice to distant lands. Instead of going to war with a big, laborious force, Rumsfeld wanted to see the Army led by small, spear-head units that could be deployed in an instant. The big costs borne by the Department of Defence had traditionally been transportation costs and the huge infrastructure/maintenance costs of keeping an Army abroad for a long period of time. Rumsfeld wanted to change this. In the planning period of the Iraq War, there were many arguments between Rumsfeld and his generals. He had his own ideas and was not interested in listening to the military brass on these points of discussion. The generals felt that to successfully invade Iraq a large amount of troops would be required. Rumsfeld, however, had different ideas. He felt the Iraq War would be a great opportunity to test out his new theories. His hard-charging personality was able to intimidate the generals into agreeing. We see how one strong personality can shape a huge organization. As [General] Newbold outlined the plan ... it was clear that Rumsfeld was growing increasingly irritated. For Rumsfeld, the plan required too many troops and supplies and took far too long to execute. It was, Rumsfeld declared, the "product of old thinking and the embodiment of everything that was wrong with the military." [T]he Plan ... reflected long-standing military principles about the force levels that were needed to defeat Iraq, control a population of more than 24 million, and secure a nation the size of California with porous borders. Rumsfelds numbers, in contrast, seemed to be pulled out of thin air. He had dismissed one of the militarys long-standing plans, and suggested his own force level without any of the generals raising a cautionary flag.6 Similar problems arose regarding torture committed by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. So much power was concentrated at the top and orders were so vague, that crimes like this were able to happen. Rumsfeld’s style of leadership and organization was too top heavy and impractical. He did not inspire admiration; he only inspired fear. Many of his ideas were proven to be wrong. As the years went by, American generals finally found their voice and began to retake control of their own organization and stand up against Donald Rumsfeld and his style of leadership. They wanted consistency and more consensus building within the Army and decided to voice their concerns on these subjects. In the spring of 2006, many started to speak out. There are some who suggest that the generals, being military men, might have been brave enough to voice their doubts before reaching retirement rather than being cowed by a septuagenarian civilian such as Mr Rumsfeld. But this, their supporters say, fails to understand the constitutional role of the military, which can only offer advice and must follow orders from the political leadership. The problem with Mr Rumsfeld, they say, is that he neither heeded their advice nor took kindly to it.7 In November 2006, Rumsfeld was forced out. The Army needed change, and they got change with Robert Gates, a more soft-spoken, serious and respected man than Rumsfeld. He had a totally different style of organization than Rumsfeld. Robert Gates had been CIA chief under the administration of George H. W. Bush. He was seen to be an extremely competent and somewhat apolitical figure. There are reports that he was very happy with his job as President of the University of Texas and was not interested in the position of Secretary of Defence, which in 2006, following the Republican losses in the November elections was seen to be a losing effort. Iraq at the time looked hopeless and the Pentagon seemed broken. The Army had low morale: there was much talk in the United States about a precipitous withdrawal which would have been equivalent to turning tail and living Iraq to the Jihadists. Gates, however, proved to be a very effective organizing, immediately taking steps to improve the army, its strategy and its performance. This was done in part by giving more power to General Petraeus. As one newspaper article describes it: High-tech "transformation" was a Rumsfeld hallmark. Gatess goal is "exactly the opposite," says Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Less capital intensive, more labor intensive, with an emphasis on patience and lots and lots of close contact with civilians."8 Although Gates was less ruthless and theoretical and ambitious than Rumsfeld, he was still willing to knock heads together when required. Because there are so many divisions within the Army there is a tendency for people to try to shape their own personal fiefdoms. Gates was against this and held his generals to a high standard of competence. When it was reported that the standard of care was poor at an Army hospital in Washington, D.C., Gates fired the leadership there. He quickly proved that he was no pushover. The Army, as an organization, responded to his style of leadership very positively. The Iraq War turned around, morale improved, and the Army once at the breaking point under Rumsfeld became more effective and encouraged. The Army has a long, proud history. It has been an effective organization and excellent at protecting America over the years. But because it is so hierarchical an organization, much depends on its leadership. There is a temptation to hire a Secretary of Defence who is very strong, ambitious, and intimidating. But if this individual is too political and arrogant, this aspect will pass down the ranks and make the Army as an organization less effective. This was seen under Donald Rumsfeld. It is better to have a quiet, more competent leader that will allow the Army to do its good work. Works Consulted Baldwin, Tom. “Return of the Battered Generals.” The Times. April 18, 2006. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article706556.ece Cockburn, Alexander. Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007. Gates, Robert. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age.” Foreign Affairs. January/February 2009. Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Vintage, 2006. Gordon, John. “Transforming for What?” Focus stratégique, Paris, Ifri, November 2008. Hewes, James E.. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration. Washington: Centre for Military Studies, 1975. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History New York: Penguin books, 1983. Locher, James R.. Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon. Texas A & M University Press, 2002. Mulrine, Ann. “America’s Best Leaders.” US News and World Report. November 18, 2008. http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/best-leaders/2008/11/19/americas-best-leaders-robert-gates-us-secretary-of-defense.html Unger, Craig. The Fall of the House of Bush. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007. Read More