Evolution of Conflict in Sudan - Essay Example

Sudan Affiliates Introduction On December 15, exactly a year after the old Sudan split into North and South Sudan, the civil war started. After years of international efforts to end the conflicts through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 negotiations to ensure that Sudan remains peaceful seemed too insufficient (Crisis Group interviews, 2013). The referendum that was stipulated by the CPA in 2011 and overwhelmingly favored separation. However, the prospects of a smooth separation were destroyed even before independence. There was fierce fighting that erupted between the rivals of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba (South Sudan: The Boiling Point, n.d.). The government and the opposition had different views of what happened, and this resulted in divergent understanding of the cause of the problem. The government maintained that the international communitys failure to condemn a coup encouraged Machar. On the contrary, the opposition maintained that Kiir and some members of Dinka used the fight as an excuse to attack rivals and carry out atrocities against Nuer in Juba. The government was at the same time looking for strategies to maintain an internal cohesion, appropriate political reforms, and diversity management strategies since it was perceived to be Dinka-dominated. Both Kiir and Machar delegations were sent for peace talks in Ethiopia. Evolution of Conflicts The conflicts occurred as a result of attempts to control territories along the border between North and South. The North was fighting rebellions around its periphery in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei (Fearon &Laitin, 2003). These are the same areas it fought against before South became independent. Conflicts in the areas resulted due to the presence of various armed rebels, which is much different from an economic warfare knowing the two nations focused on oil allocation. Thus, an agreement between North and South would not probably settle the conflicts at the border since the local populations were mobilized, and liberation movements formed. The CPA that had ended the 19 years civil war (1983-2005) was negotiated between the South Sudan movement SPLM/A, and Sudans ruling National Congress Party (NCP). This excluded other groups in both North and South. However, most groups from South were absorbed in the SPLM/A (Crisis Group interviews, 2013). During the critical period of CPA, most of the issues were not reconciled. Today, many communities in Sudan continue to align themselves with military factions. For this reason, the conflict has remained to be some sought of ethnic, military nature resonating previous conflicts of SPLA. The SPLM Unravels in 2013 The crisis in SLPM has continued to grow without reconciliation in 2013, involving various political disagreements over leadership, as well as the future of the country. The urgency to make a critical decision is significant. The decision on a national consensus began to focus more on support or opposition of the president. The SPLM has always struggled to establish a legitimate process, but have relied on alliances to maintain stability. For instance, the CPA was intended to transform SPLM from a liberation movement to a party that has the governing capability (Kalpakian, 2008). The SLPM was supposed to submit a constitution so that the party could be registered formally. However, there was leadership confusion, especially during the selection of the chairman; that led to the delay of SLPM convention since Kiirs rivals had more supporters. Building South Sudan State from Scratch Despite the common goal of South Sudan independence, the opposition was never unified. The population of the country is sparsely distributed with poor communication, making it more difficult to define a common identity (Temin & Murphy, 2011). After the death of John Garang, Silva Kiir was succeeded him. However, he was not given the same respect. Additionally, North took advantage to promote discord in the South. The political and tribal divisions in the South have continued even after independence, complicating efforts to build a new state. More importantly, South has always been the least developed. However, it has considerable revenue from oil. Marshaling an Armed opposition Both political and ethnic divisions that have threatened the country from its state-building efforts, and renewed fighting with the North. The population of the South is diverse, with Dinka accounting for approximately 40%. Nuer accounts for about 20%, and the remaining tribes account for the remaining 40% (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Dinka played a significant role in the SPLM/A while the Nuer supported a separatist movement, Anya-Nya. During the CPA period, the most dominant group was Dinka, although other liberation movements were also present. During the 2010 Southern Sudanese election, the SPLM/A secured more seats. However, the opposition was tribally based. The Dinka have always dominated in the SPLM/A, but it has made efforts to include other groups. A good example is that President Salva Kiir is Dinka, and Vice President Riek Machar is Nuer. Although, during the recent conflicts, President Salva Kiir declared that the vice president had attempted a coup, which resulted in violence. Machar denied the allegation, but later declared that he was the leader of an armed opposition movement. This movement occupies parts of Upper Nile, Unity States, and Jonglei, later the fighting spread to other areas. Additionally, some rebel groups continue to operate in South Sudan today. For instance, South Sudan Defense Forces that participated in its second civil war. Even though most of them were incorporated into the SPLA, recently these groups have reemerged within South Sudan forming a coalition with other groups. The South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), which operates in the Upper Nile region, now opposes the SPLM rule of South Sudan. Currently, it has captured bases that belong to SPLA, and it is involved in the conflict in Jonglei State (South Sudan: The Boiling Point, n.d.). Also, the SSDM is also rebelling against Salva Kiir government. This movement has remained active even after the death of its leader, George Athor, and it is considered as the most prominent insurgencies in the country. It is believed to have played a significant role in fanning the tribal conflicts between Jonglei between the Murle and Nuer. The conflicts are further complicated by the fact that both SPLM and the northern government are still seeking to own their arm tribal militias. These arms are then leaked out, making it easier for the groups with grievances to turn into violence. These tribal conflicts are based on historical problems that have always led to clashes such as access to water, land, and so on (Fearon &Laitin, 2003). In other words, the clashes occur due competition for means of livelihood to the populations. Multiple armed groups and Ethnic violence The conflict in Jonglei state between the Nuer and Murle are highly dependent on farming and has claimed approximately 3000 lives and replaced about 130,000 people. The conflict has existed for a long time, but sometimes it is linked with political issues. The most recent violence started in 2011 when Nuer attacked Murle that caused many deaths. In response, Murle attacked back, killing an estimated of 600 people. Since then, the two tribes have pillaged each other. However, the youths from both tribes have been mobilized, and security of Nuer pastoralists guaranteed by their militia organization. The militia organization has now resurfaced after being suppressed by the SPLM, and Dinkas have started to join the army. This has changed the conflicts from cattle raiding to the rivalry between Dinka and Nuer on one side and Murle on the other side. The United Nations was mandated to support South Sudan government in its state-building and economic development, to control clashes (Ochieng &Yoh, 2007). Nevertheless, raids and violence have continued to claim the lives of thousands and displacing more than 100,000 people. The South Sudanese government announced an SPLA- led disarmament campaign, clashes with SPLA have continued as both Murle and Nuer are not willing to surrender their weapons in fear of their rivals. Also, the presence of rebel groups like the SSDA and the SSLM, who are in rebellion against President Kiir and his government are making it difficult to end the conflicts (Kalpakian, 2008). They have contributed to increased clashes. For instance, SSLM has pledged to provide support to parties involved in conflicts. The new government is facing more obstacles in stabling control in these communities, and dealing with rivalries between the two tribes. Political Opposition As opposition to the government increased, some senior members of SPLM became the new face of the opposition. Many of them were leaders who are committed to Garangs vision of a multi-ethnic SPLM. However, their opposition does not mean they are supporters of Machar, rather than a representation of dissatisfaction with the status quo in the movement. The formation of a multi-ethnic negotiating group, the "SPLM 7", is a clear illustration of the complex division among various ethnic communities. Their mission for the support for non-violent political change shows the beginning to bridge the gap between government and the SPLM in Opposition (Ochieng & Yoh, 2007). However, some of the members are linked with corruption, support for ethnic violence, prescriptive decisions. Mediators should thus include in the talks those issues of the general nation importance. Conclusion The 2013 conflicts was years in the making. The SPLM and SPLA collapsed so fast showing that CPA reconciliation was not successful. The transition to a broader political party remained unfinished, due to lack of functional SPLM and SPLA reform. The failure to reconcile these grievances that have built up over the years is reflected in the rapid ethnic violence. The most difficult challenge in mending relationships between communities will require long-term commitments of all South Sudanese, as well as international leaders. References Crisis Group interviews (2013). SPLA chief of staff warns against politicizing army. Sudan Tribune, Sudan. Fearon, D. and Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review, 97(1): 75-90. Kalpakian, J .(2008). The narrow prospects of the SPLA/Ms transition into a political party in the short term. South African Journal of International Affairs. 15( 2): 159-183. Temin,J and Murphy,T. (2011). Toward a New Republic of Sudan. U.S. Institute of Peace. Retrieved on 2 July, 2015 from http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR278.pdf. Ochieng, P and Yoh, J. (2007). Building a new and prosperous society in Southern Sudan in the post conflict period. African Research and Resource Forum (ARRF), Nairobi. South Sudan: The Boiling Point. (n.d.). Retrieved 2 July, 2015 from http://allafrica. com/stories/201201110842.html. Read More