Nature of the Sudan Conflict - Research Paper Example

Sudan Scenario Sudan Scenario Introduction and Overview of the Nature of the Sudan Conflict The Sudan dispute that has lasted for over two decades (Flint & De Waal, 2008; Youngs, 2004) is categorized as an intractable conflict (Coleman, 2003; Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2005). The researchers describe intractable conflicts as the disagreements that remain unresolved for considerably long periods of time that later become stuck at a great level of destructiveness and intensity. The authors add that an outstanding characteristic about these types of conflicts is that they often involve many parties disagreeing on an intricate set of religious, economic, political, cultural, and historical issues. Indeed, the entire human social existence is dependent on these issues; hence, it is typical for people to resist any efforts that are made to achieve a resolution (Maiese, 2006). In fact, parties to these conflicts often refuse to compromise or provide room for negotiation with respect to the said intricate matters (Brewer, 2007; Kinnvall, 2004). As a result, either party of the conflict maintains a rigid stand of the other because of the view that failure to do so would threaten their existence. The parties may develop a mutual fear of one another and an intense desire to inflict as much psychological and physical harm on each other as possible (Staub, 2004; Paris, 2001; Maiese, 2003;). Maiese (2006) points out that the gradual effect of these feeling of being under constant threat and hostility from the either group often occupies the daily lives of the parties involved in the conflict and as a result, supersedes their ability to identify any shared problems they might have. Over time, the conflict escalates resulting to the embedment of the facts about the problem within a larger set of identities, beliefs, cultures, and values (Paris, 2001). Additionally, conflicts concerning money, land, or other resources of economic importance begin to take a symbolic shape in amongst or between the parties under dispute (Kaufman, 2001). Maiese (2003) observes that as the conflict progresses over time, the original issues that may have ignited the conflict become immaterial as new causes for dispute are generated within the conflict itself. As a result, the individuals on the opposing side begin to regard each other as foes and may engage in extreme violence. Eventually, Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse (2011) opine that the parties become unable to resolve the various issues and seeing that there is no forthcoming solution of the conflict, they chose to go to war with a mindset of either winning or losing in the violence. Subsequently, there has been much debate amongst scholars for the past years on the actual cause of some of the conflicts becoming intricate (Kaufman, 2001). Collier (2003) and Kaufman (2001) describe intractability in the view of the destructive connection changes that influence the interaction of the adversary. For instance, if one of the parties involved in a dispute resorts to inhumane treatment as a means of resolving the conflict, the antagonism on the opposing side is likely to worsen leading to it retaliating in sought of revenge. Similarly, when dictators and anarchists promote a divisive ethnic ideology that arouses fear or security tension, it may increase widespread backing for the use of violence and thus, contribute to intractability. Maiese (2006) and Maiese (2003) posit that other factors such as the huge number of parties involved in a dispute, the vast number of complex issues that need resolving and a history of violent confrontation make some conflicts very hard to reach a truce. Accordingly, it is important for the State Department and the National Security Council (NSC) to collect considerable actionable intelligence information that would assist the United States protect its Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Sudanese civilians from the effects of violence that is likely to emerge as a result of intractable conflict. This Human Intelligence (HUMINT) report provides a comprehensive and detailed evaluation of the Sudan scenario for the purpose of establishing actionable intelligence to the State Department and the NSC. Critical Analysis of the Current Sudan Situation Even after the formation of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) that was preceded by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by both the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan (GOS) in 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya, the situation in the Sudan region is still volatile to violence (Joak, 2014). Joak (2014) argues that both Sudan and South Sudan trajectories are inherently intertwined based on their collective history, mutual dependence, and current economic and political situations. Although South Sudan has attained the self-independence which has been the primary cause of the long Sudan conflict, the country faces a vast number of political, economic and security challenges (Dagne, 2012). Dagne (2012) avers that the country has to develop its poor infrastructure from the scratch such as hospitals and roads. Furthermore, this newest nation of the world is tasked with the obligation of establishing credible institutions such as the Judiciary, Finance and assists the huge influx of returnees who had escaped to exile during the internal violence, and demobilize tens of thousands of militia men and women who still hold firearms.  Alongside the various constant security threats from the external and internal militia across the South Sudan, the country also has to start accommodating its tribal and ethnic diversity and work towards achieving sustainable peace in future (Desta, 2015). In the Republic of Sudan, issues of governance related to the marginalization of many groups are still rampant (Desta, 2015). The vast majority of the rich and powerful individuals are concentrated around Khartoum. The communities in the Darfur region feel alienated and deprived of their economic and political rights. Consequently, it is because of this disparities and issues of rights deprivation that the conflict witnessed in Darfur is still persistent. Since the issues embedded in the dispute arise from matters of rights, as pointed out earlier, the conflict is intractable and has no possibility of ending until a long-term solution of inclusivity in governance and equal distribution of resources is reached (Kunda Komey, 2015). Additionally, a new wave of violence has erupted along the border in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei as the marginalized Sudanese and South Sudanese continue to agitate for more participation in the political and economic affairs of their respective countries as agreed in the CPA of 2005 that demands popular consultation process (Behera, 2014). So far, the Darfur peace process has stagnated and the conflict in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States have resulted to severe impacts for long-term stability (Johnson, 2014). Due to inaccessibility to reliable information, it is difficult to ascertain the number of people who have been killed, tortured, and injured in the present fight between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLMN) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states (Sudan Tribune, 2014). However, aid agencies working in the affected region claim that the government forces are killing targeted ethnic groups. As a result, a humanitarian crisis has developed through the displacement of hundreds of thousands of the locals and the massive destruction of livelihoods and homes Moreover, following the secession of South Sudan, the Sudan Republic is facing increased economic hardship as a result of the lost oil revenues that are now under the control of the GOSS and the Arab Spring revolts in its neighbors such as Egypt and Tunisia have the potential to impact adversely the current National Congress Party (NCP) regime (Hawi, 2015). Also, to these economic challenges, since South Sudan’s secession, tensions between the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan have ignited. For instance, in May 2011, there was an intense emergence of violence in the vehemently disputed border region of Abyei which resulted to over 100,000 people being displaced from their homes and unknown number of civilians losing their lives (Sudan Tribune, 2011). While Khartoum and Juba conceded to the withdrawal of all military forces including interim security arrangements for Abyei, deployment of peacekeepers from Ethiopia in the region, and the establishment of a demilitarized zone under the oversight of a security force approved by the United Nations (UN), there is still uncertainty of how long these arrangements and status of Abyei area will last (Blanchard, 2014). Similarly, in January 2012, the GOSS shut down its oil production voluntarily amid accusations that the Republic of Sudan was stealing its oil (Pedersen & Bazilian, 2014; Manson 2012). As a result, tensions mounted leading to the eruption of violence between the North and the South in April 2012. However, this time round the hostility was not over the Abyei region but instead, concerned the oil installation based in the Heglig region. Through significant pressure from the international community, including resolutions passed by the UN and the African Union (AU), the violence in Heglig was de-escalated and some normalcy retuned after both the Sudan and South Sudan Governments were compelled to resume negotiations (Johnson, 2014). Fortunately, a compromise was reached on September 27, 2012 with each party agreeing to restart its oil production and establishment of a demilitarized zone along the border shared by the two countries. However, there has never been any implementation regarding the same up-to-date. Subsequently, President Salva Kiir disregarded his Vice President Dr. Riek Machar Teny by failing to take him seriously at any rate (Joak, 2014). Joak (2014) points out that President Kiir kept reminding the Vice President of the 1991 splits that occurred within the SPLM/A ranks between him and the late Dr. John Garang. Such scornful humiliations by President Kiir resulted to Dr. Riek Machar and President Kiir disagreeing publicly. Consequently, the President sacked him as Vice President on July 23, 2013 (Machar, 2014). Soon after being sacked, Dr. Riek Machar attempted to oust President’s Kiir’s government through a coup de-tat that was unsuccessful (Goldman, 2013). The aggression caused by the fights between President Kiir’s loyalists and Dr. Machar’s loyalist in this oust attempt created a humanitarian crisis entailing loss of thousands of lives and many civilians being displaced from their homes and fleeing to neighboring countries such as Kenya for safety. In addition, many scores were injured, and an immense value of property destroyed during this new clashes. Moreover, it is speculated that the violence that took place on 15th December 2013 at around 9.00 pm at the Tiger military barrack in Juba was orchestrated by President Kiir (Joak, 2014). According to Joak (2014), it is believed that President Kiir briefly instructed his trusted General, Mariol Cinuony, who commands the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU), to unconditionally disarm particular Nuer members serving in the army. The instruction was founded on suspicion that these Nuer members might resist the planned arrest of Dr. Machar, the sacked Vice-President. On learning the intended ploy of unconditional disarmament, the Nuer soldiers immediately resisted the disarmament, and that instigated the fight, particularly when one of their tribesman soldier was shot dead by their colleague of Dinka background. The soldiers from the Nuer community managed to take control of the barracks the entire night but were overpowered and dislodged by the reinforcement comprising of Presidential Guards from the Luri Mountains. The Luri Mountains is the location where President Kiir has established a military base for his Dinka soldiers whom he has put on standby to protect him in the event of a revolt developing in the country. The number of these heavily armored soldiers is approximated to be around 15 thousand and was mainly drawn from the Northern Bahr El Gazal and Warrap (Joak, 2014). Interestingly, the rest of the Dinka soldiers that are not based at the Luri Mountains were not included in the selective army recruitments (Joak, 2014). It is believed that President Kiir selected the soldiers from the said States because it is here he has immense support. Notably, Joak (2014) points out further that the soldiers based in Laru Mountains is more of a private army of President Kiir because it does not operate within the confinement of the SPLA forces. At one instance, it is reported that the Chief of General Staff 1st Lieutenant General James Hoth and Lieutenant John Kong Nyuon, a former Defense Minister, adamantly refused to pay salaries and provide these soldiers with military hardware despite the directive by President Kiir. Eventually, President Kiir acquired for these soldiers the military hardware from Uganda and paid them salaries through a system that is completely different from the SPLA forces system. Accordingly, it is evident that the South Sudan army is polarized with tribalism and ethnicity, a matter that raises serious security concerns for the communities that are not sufficiently represented in these government forces. Similarly, it appears that a paramilitary sanctioned by the sitting President, Kiir, and operating outside the confines of law exists in South Sudan. Because these soldiers are not accountable to the law because they are not recognized by both the South Sudan Constitution and laws, there is great risk that they perpetuate killings, torture, and maiming of civilians who do not ascribe to the ideologies of President Kiir. Sadly, Joak (2014) reports that there are instances when these soldiers from the Dinka community, including the police, collected Nuer civilians from the neighborhood of Gudelle, congregated them in Gudelle Police Station between 16th – 19th December, 2013 and later shot them dead indiscriminately. It is estimated that over 300 people were killed in this heinous incident. Data Sequencing, Recommendations, and Conclusion In brief, there are several pieces of evidence on the ground that demonstrate that the Sudan region is a volatile ground embedded in intractable conflicts that often result to routine violence. The majority of the violence reported in the past indicates extensive loss of life and property. Presently, this HIMINT report identifies the region as a violence hot spot that requires immediate intervention not only by the United States, but by the international community in general as well. The report observes four main scenarios that threaten the unity and stability of the region which are sequenced as follows:(1) the strengthened links between the SPLA/M in the Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and the South portrays a possibility of a war retuning; (2) Lack of certainty on the role of SPLA/M Blue Nile and Nuba threatens to result to an emergence of a conflict; (3) there is a potential of a conflict developing again in the Abyei region if the grazing rights dispute remains unsettled; and (4) there is a highly potential that the NCP shall renew its proxy war tactics because of the unsettled oil problem (Gabrielsen et al., 2009). Accordingly, it is significant that the United States places appropriate travel advisories to its citizens and NGOs personnel as it initiates preventive mediation in the region with the help of the international community. Subsequently, this report recommends Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) to be conducted in the region because the Intelligence and security services in the region appear to be uncooperative in divulging intelligence report to the US assets and when they do, the information they offer contradict with the open-source information appearing in print and electronic media. This report speculates that these intelligence and security services are involved in covering up the atrocities committed by the GOSS and the GOS. References Behera, J. K. (2014). Book review: Abdullahi A Gallab, A Civil Society Deferred: The Tertiary Grip of Violence in the Sudan. International Sociology, 29(2), 135-137. Blanchard, L. P. (2014). The Crisis in South Sudan. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Brewer, M. B. (2007). The importance of being we: human nature and intergroup relations. American Psychologist, 62(8), 728. Coleman, P. T. (2003). 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