Okinawa: The Last Battle - Research Paper Example

Okinawa: The Last Battle Okinawa: The Last Battle The battle of Okinawa also known as Operation Iceberg (Nichols & Shaw, 1955) took place on the Ryuku Islands of Okinawa. This was the largest battle in the Pacific War of World War II. It was fought for 82 days from April to mid June of 1945. After implementing the strategy of Leapfrogging which is a military tactic, the opponents planned on using Okinawa which was away from the central Japan and utilize it as an airbase to take over Japan. This battle was considered the most ferocious of the battles ever fought in the pacific region. The US used four divisions of its 10th Army and two divisions of Marine in the battle. This met with the fierce retaliation of the Kamikaze warriors. Japan lost 77,166 of its soldiers whereas the opponents lost 14,009. Apart from this 42,000-150,000 civilians were killed most of which were from the local area (HISTORY.com, n.d.). The purpose of this paper is to analyze the tactics and implementation of strategies of the two opposing forces during that time in the battlefield. An injured soldier being transported to a medical camp (Sources: popmatters.com) HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT The basic problem that a country faces at the time of war is how to provide medical aid to its soldiers and how to organize the provision of these services. During World War II Norman Kirk who was the US general surgeon managed a medical team of 535,000 medics, 57,000 nurses, 47,000 physicians and 2000 veterinarians. The provision of the medical started with the treatment and initial checkup by the medics, it were the medics who decided whether or not the soldiers needed to be evacuated from the battlefield for further assessment. If the wounded soldier needed secondary care, he would be evacuated to a divisional clearing station, where the patients underwent a triage. This station served as a centre to perform minor surgeries on immediate basis. Further care would be given in one of the designated local or overseas hospitals. The treatment of the wound included five steps; first foreign bodies were removed from the infected wounds, severed tissues were stitched together to be rejoined, care of the wounded tissue to prevent any type of organ damage; and lastly, to prevent any type of further complications. Wine is applied to topical wounds to prevent spread of infection and development of pus. A wound caused within 24 hours was termed as hemorrhage, if it had occurred between the first and tenth day it was classified as secondary and after the tenth day it was called secondary. Braces and splints were used to manage fracture of bones. Medics were even trained to repair fractures in the dark. Microbial cultures determined if the wound was ready for closure. The Military Blood Program was established to provide blood transfusions during the war. The Okinawa battle required about 2000 units of blood transfusions per day. Tetanus antitoxin had also been discovered by the 1890 which reduced the number of cases of tetanus that were observed in previous wars. Vascular surgery reduced the amputation rate to 20.5%. Those who could not be treated by the medics were taken on gurneys to the nearest possible station where they were assessed and were given minor surgery if required. For serious injuries the soldiers were taken to the hospitals (Manring, Hawk, Calhoun & Andersen, 2009). The facilities for evacuation and hospitalizations were also limited due to the increased cost spent on the war itself. The battle casualties were higher than expected, non battle casualties were less due to the less incidence of disease. A soldier who was injured on the battle field was carried to a battalion aid station via jeep ambulance, weasel or weapon carrier. After receiving treatment, the wounded was then transferred to a collecting station to receive blood transfusions and then carried to clearing station for minor surgeries and then to a field hospital for major surgeries (Appleman, 1948). These plans and organization however may seemed to have failed in reality. According to some reports, bandaging of the wound was the limit of the treatment and those who were wounded to a severe extent were left behind or they committed suicide (History.army.mil, 2001). The most common disease that affected the soldiers in this war was malaria which is a parasitic infection caused by a mosquito, whereas the second most common disease was lymphatic filariasis. Due to the spread of these diseases, 70% of the troops got infected and had to be evacuated. This ultimately affected the manpower and compromise of the fighting abilities of the U.S. army (Melrose, 2005). The United States held an advantageous position because they were properly armed and had the latest weapons and had developed proper strategy whereas the Okinawan’s and the Japanese were not prepared for the attack and had not pre planned a strategy in mind which resulted in their defeat. Senior officers prepare for Okinawa (Sources: historyofwar.org) COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION The plan to capture Okinawa was based on CincPOA joint staff, the major commanders of this joint staff issued their own individual orders and prepared for the plan ahead. Each plan and order was derived from echelon, the next superior, and planning was always synchronized. Extensive coordination was required between the three staffs in both operational and logistic problems. Conferences were held which pointed out the problems in any section such as troops list, supplies or strategies. The plans for amphibious operations were carried out by both the Corps and task forces. The Army consulted Corps and division staff for orientation and planning purposes. In order to ensure coordination between different leaders, Navy and Marine officers were asked to work with the special staff and the Tenth Army general. The Tenth Army were unable to receive combine training due to lack of time however, they did receive individual training, combined arms training and special training in various methods of warfare such as amphibious, cave and mountain. Training was also provided to the ground troop to use snooper and sniper scopes and the tank battalion. Many service units also received specialized training due to the burden of their regular duties. A communication net was established by the 1st and 6th Marine division from 2nd to 7th March whereas the line of communication of the enemy was severed. This Logistic support was given by General Richardson. The Army of Japan was based upon a light infantry doctrine and was victorious in small battlefields. Only 200 men of the force and in depth training in ground combat. General Mistsuru Ushijima had taken command in 1944. His chief of staff Lt. Gen. Isamu Cho had replaced his old soldiers with new, bright and young officers. The Japanese army was poorly trained and lacked the defense weapons that the Americans possessed which made them fragile and weak. They did not have proper logistic support and their communications were jammed by the opposing force (Morton, 1962). The command, control and communications of the American army were efficient as ever. The advancement of communication process in independent small units provided a high level of efficiency to the Americans in the battlefield. However command level issues still existed and decision making process was hindered but most of these were eliminated as all the commanders involved in this were experienced in warfare; additionally, the independence of these small communication units were managed by their own commanders who solved any problem as it occurred (R. Frame, 2012). Okinawans were dependant on their sea and air communications, and these served as their primary method to communicate, but when the Army forces of the U.S. cut these sources of communications the Japanese had no alternate options to communicate with each other whereas the opposing force had advanced setup of communication (Appleman, 1948). Sources: Official department of Defence Photo (USMC) 123170 INTELLIGENCE The United States was unable to gather much intelligence information despite the meticulous attempts made by the intelligence officers. Not much was known about the tactics or even the size of the Japanese army (Militarybattle.org, 2012). The intelligence reports collected from sources were not valuable enough because of the seclusion of the Ryuku Island chain. Some of the intelligence was gathered from Japanese newspapers and also from the prisoners that were captured from other battles that occurred in the Pacific region. Aerial pictures were also taken of the region but none of them gave accurate results. The qualities of the photographs were hindered by the cloudy weather of the area. The Shuri line was properly hidden with most of it being underground obstructed its discovery. Intelligence reports estimated 80-85% casualties on beachhead whereas in reality there was no backfire. The intelligence knowledge was collected slowly and gradually over a period of several months and years. Other methods of obtaining information were through interrogation of residents of Ryukus. B-29’s and carrier planes were used to capture photographs, B-29’s covered only low altitude areas and provided small scale coverage of the area while the carrier planes were used to estimate schedule of air strikes. The information regarding coastal areas was complete but the accuracy of these reports could not be estimated. The most dependable piece of information was on the depth of the water over the reef which was obtained from Sonne strip photography. The information collected was timely but was not reliable enough. The leaders used these intelligence reports wisely. The line of Shuri seemed to be protected and gave little hint about what it contained which is why the Tenth Army officer decided on gradually surrounding the Shuri. But there were times when these reports were not relied upon or were lately informed and hence could not be enacted upon. Such as in the invasion of Sugar loaf industry, the intelligence reported strengthening of Japanese forces but the information was not followed and the army withdrew from the area leaving 160 marines wounded or dead (R. Frame, 2012). References Nichols, C., & Shaw, H. (1955). Okinawa. [Washington]: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. HISTORY.com,. Soviets declare war on Japan. Retrieved 18 March 2015, from http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviets-declare-war-on-japan-invade-manchuria History.army.mil,. (2001). Chapter XVIII: The Battle Ends. Retrieved 18 March 2015, from http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/okinawa/chapter18.htm Melrose, W. (2005). Lymphatic filariasis: disease outbreaks in military deployments from World War II. Military Medicine, 170(7). Morton, L. (1962). United States army in World War II. The War in the Pacific. Strategy and command : the first two years. Washington : U.S: Government printing office. R. Frame, R. (2012). Okinawa: The Final Great Battle of World War II. Professional Journal Of U.S. Marines, 96(11). Retrieved from https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2012/11/okinawa-final-great-battle-world-war-ii Appleman, R. (1948). Okinawa. Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Dept. of the Army. Militarybattle.org,. (2012). Battle of Okinawa - World War II. Retrieved 19 March 2015, from http://militarybattle.org/battle-of-okinawa Read More