Joint Operations Principles, NATO and the Ukraine Crisis - Research Paper Example

Joint operations principles, NATO and the Ukraine Crisis Joint operations principles, NATO and the Ukraine Crisis Introduction Joint operation are a general military term that refers to the kind of military actions that are planned and conducted by joint forces or service forces that have been deployed under command relationships. These operations are usually performed on areas and under circumstances of crisis involving a nation that is a member of the relationship deploying and an aggressor which is not a member of the same1. There have been several major incidents of joint operation application in the history of military activities. Through all these incidents, various lessons have been learnt which have always helped improved operations in terms of speed and control. The emergence of joint operations is a long story which developed over a long time. This emergence was related to the inherent challenges that affected the general coordination of military forces and their operations. These challenges led to the exploration of alternatives that included the consultation of like-minded partners to conduct operations that had results that affected them in common. The initial attempts however consisted the joint operations involving different forces. With the improvement of military technology, multiservice coordination became even more complex with air power coordination2. Throughout the history of war, various nations have been conducting joint operations and activities against a common enemy. This collaboration has always been related to success in battles. The first ever recorded joint operation in the United States was a dual-service operation in which the Union Army and naval forces in a federal campaign against Vicksburg3. This operation led to the development of unity of effort, mass, leverage and seizing initiative as the first principles of joint operations4. The operation Urgent Fury in Grenada was also an overall success for the United States. The operation introduced a new concept of combining air and land attacks in a coordinated manner and as such was a great success especially due to the use of furious or forceful entry. Over time, various countries have been using the concept of joint operations and its principles to organize and execute military operations and attacks. The most recent and ongoing application of these principles is seen in the Ukrainian crisis. The Ukrainian crisis, which is being executed by the Russians started with the volatile Euromaidan Protests that were witnessed in 2013, November. The involvement of military forces has culminated in Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. These activities have become a great concern and a major geopolitical shock in the entire European region in terms of security threats. By annexing a region, the Russians were prepared not just to reduce the enlargement of NATO but also to ensure that European Union does not extend its eastern borders closer to the Russian Territories5. Purpose of the paper According to NATO, Russia is using joint operation principles to take over the Crimea this has triggered a plan to make effective countermeasures address the crisis in the region. The purpose of this paper is to provide a deeper insight into the joint operations being conducted by Russia in Ukraine in terms of the joint operation principles being used. Further, the paper will look into the enforcement of these principles in this specific situation and how the enforcement affect or rather impact NATO operations and command structure in the Eastern Europe in the future. Research Questions and Hypotheses For the first time since the ending of the Cold War, the Ukrainian (Crimean) crisis has resulted to an effort by the western powers to seek a new equilibrium level that will balance Russia operations. The powers, under NATO, are exploring the possible use of countermeasures to stop the Russian operations. This is happening as one of their many efforts to promote the political-economic inclusion of the Eastern-Europe region. These efforts are however being threatened by Russia, through their involvement in Ukraine, and that appears to aim at preventing the integration of the Eastern Europe. The questions that this paper seek to answer are; 1. Is the Ukrainian crisis a result of the increased power competition between Russia and European Union? 2. Is there a possibility that foreign policy reactions of the Western great powers and their attention to sectional interests will increase predictability of action over time? 3. If there are military reactions to the crisis, how will they impact on Russia-Europe readjustments and institutional responses in the highly charged Eastern region? How will this impact on the power structure and command of NATO in the future? The guiding hypothesis of this research is that the joint operation principles being enforced by Russia in the Ukrainian crisis negatively impact NATO’s future operations and command in the Eastern Europe region. Review of Literature Power Competition between Russia and European Union Russia has been a super power in the eastern part of Europe for many years6. The country has controlled the region in terms of economy and military operations for decades. However, in 2009, the European Union sought to extend its involvement by launching the Eastern Partnership. This partnership was meant to increase the membership of the union by incorporating many of the small nations in the eastern region. The growing influence of EU in the region was a threat to the Russian power and control. As a response, in 2011, Russia launched a Eurasia Customs Union aiming at retaining its power and relevance in the region. This union combined Russia with other post-Soviet states starting with Kazakhstan and Belarus. However, EU was quick to woo Ukraine in the Eastern Partnership, a move that set-back Russia’s project. Ukraine was to sign an agreement with EU in November 2013. Moldova, Georgia and Armenia had also been wooed but had not signed to an agreement with EU. Russia pressured the countries to opt Eurasia over EU through sanctions and threats. Armenia opted Eurasia after threats by Russia to withdraw military presence in the country. Russia also tried to influence Ukraine by providing economic benefits to the country7. The then Ukrainian president Yanukovich opted not to sign with EU leading to the Maidanian crisis which revealed the EU presence and power in the region. Yanukovich’s reign was however coming to an end, and the new regime promised to sign with the EU. This triggered the Russian operations in Crimea in March, two months before the scheduled elections. The efforts by Russia were to pressure the new regime against any attempt to reverse Yanukovch’s decision. Russia’s Crimean Annexation The presence of Russian troops in Ukraine is legitimate, having been established under an agreement between the two countries. However, the deployment of forces and ordering the Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Crimean Peninsula and its annexation of the Crimea is a violation of international laws. Russia has used several principles of joint operations in this crisis and has even presented its defense of the acts. First, under the principle of objective, the country argues that the presence of its forces in the Peninsula is a response to the Crimean majority who opted to separate from the rest of Ukraine and its efforts to join EU. Secondly, the Russian forces are using the principle of legitimacy to remain in the region. There is a signed agreement between Russia and Ukraine to have the Russian forces in the country8. Using this as a defense, Russia is retaining its presence in the country. This strategic positioning of the forces in the region appears to communicate something to the European Union. That Russia has the power to control the Eastern Europe and is even ready to use any form of power and coercion to make sure that NATO does not increase its influence in the region. Initially, the Russian government claimed that the military intervention in Crimea was in an effort to protect Russian nationals and Russian speakers from the crisis in Ukraine following Yanukovich’s ouster which they claimed were fueled by EU after Yanukovich rejected to sign an agreement with the latter. Russia argued that was necessary to defend them from targeted attacks by the pro-Ukrainian extremists9. Whether or not the Russia annexation of the Crimean Peninsula are legitimate, out to increase control or part of a self-defense activity or not, the effects on NATO are massive. First, the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine prevents any operation on the Eastern Europe by NATO and the EU forces. This is because of the level of threat that Russia poses in the region. Secondly, any physical confrontations with Russia is unwelcome by most of the Western power countries such as United Kingdom, Germany and France, who are not willing to gamble their economic dependence on Russia. However, this may not remain the case in the long-term because there is a possibility that if Russia is to annex more territories in Ukraine, an open confrontation may be inevitable. This is the kind of confrontation that has been planned by the western power in a recent meeting. According to EU and NATO, sanctions imposed on Russia have done little to reduce the annexation threats and confrontation through a counter operation is the next move to be taken. Military Reactions to the Crisis Recently, the much-awaited response to the crisis was announced. NATO leaders promised to respond to the Ukraine crisis through the creation of a rapid reaction force, dubbed “spearhead” that will include thousands of troops10. This kind of troop is a joint operation project that is reactionary to the joint operations that are characterized by the Russian troops’ presence in the Crimean Peninsula. The troops are expected to be equipped with technology and force that will enable them to make quick responses to confrontations by the Russian forces. This is a readiness plan by NATO to ensure that all is not lost in Ukraine crisis, and its power and control of the Eastern Europe region is not diminished11. It is a project that will see improvement of military infrastructure in Poland and Baltics to enhance the rapidity of military response. However, NATO is bound by an agreement signed with Russia in 1997, which prevents it from permanently positioning significant combat troops in the east. Any such reactions will have negative effects on the European countries who depend on Russia for economic collaborations. These countries that include some of the most powerful in the region will have lost, through sanctions an important relation in ship ware, military facilitation and other forms of trade. However, the attempt has been backed by the United States to appear like the European Union, and NATO are assisting Ukraine rather than punishing Russia to give in and let go of the Peninsula. The attempt is aimed at serving two purposes. First, any support offered to the Ukrainian government, which is opposed to the Russian Eurasia project will be allowing closer ties with the EU12. Secondly, the operation will be increasing the control of EU and NATO in the region. Whether or not the operation will be a success in the long run, the effects are long term. First, the future operations of NATO in the Eastern Europe and Asia will be faced with a military opposition from Russia, which could result to war. Secondly, NATO may be losing the command battle in the region because most of its member countries are still dependent on Russia for economic support13. Russia being closer to the Eastern Europe nations in terms of support and attack may be preferred by many nations for partnership hence the command of NATO in Eastern Europe reduce significantly. Bibliography De Haas, Marcel. 2012. “The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-Sovereignty in International Relations. By Hiski Haukkala.” The European Legacy. doi:10.1080/10848770.2012.721745. 2,3 Iskold, Luba. 2011. “Intermediate Ukrainian.” CALICO Journal 28: 546–560. http://search.proquest.com/docview/869638345?accountid=13380 . 4 Kuzemko, Caroline. 2013. “Ideas, Power and Change: Explaining EU–Russia Energy Relations.” Journal of European Public Policy 21: 58–75. doi:10.1080/13501763.2013.835062. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2013.835062. 5 “Crisis in the Crimea: The Showdown Between Ukraine and Russia,” available at http://storymaps.esri.com/stories/2014/crimea 6,7Motyl, Alexander J. 2010. “Ukrainian Blues.” Foreign Affairs. 8 Daisy Sindelar, “Was Yanukovychs Ouster Constitutional?” Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe (23 February 2014), available at http://www.rferl.org/content/was-yanukovychs-ouster- constitutional/25274346.html 9 “Ukraines Yanukovych asked for troops, Russia tells UN,” BBC News Europe (4 March 2014), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26427848. 10,12 D’Anieri, P. 2011. “Structural Constraints in Ukrainian Politics.” East European Politics & Societies. doi:10.1177/0888325410388559. 11“Russian forces move on Crimea air base, European monitors head to Ukraine,” AlJazeera America (22 March 2014), available at http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/22/osce-russia-crimea.html 3 D’Anieri, Paul. 2012. “Ukrainian Foreign Policy from Independence to Inertia.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45: 447–456. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.06.008. 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