Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle - Research Paper Example

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Full Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Introduction The Marines Corps uses Amphibious Assault Vehicles to stage attack on the shore. The Marines need to be transported to the shore for the early stage of amphibious operations. The Assault Vehicles are therefore, an important part to execute these operations and demand certain unique capabilities that can perform on land as well as the sea. It is a difficult combination to make and furthermore, the vehicles are to be fine tuned as per the operational requirements. Since the role of these vehicles is planned in the early stage of the battle, they must have suitable armor protection against attacks in sea and land as well. The Marine Corps uses Amphibious Assault Vehicle which is in service since 1972 (Zaloga, Hadler & Badrocke, 1999, p.39). It has been upgraded over time with a more powerful engine and weapons system to cope with the operational demand. The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle was planned to replace these assault vehicles. The program was initiated in 1988 and was known as the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program (Feickert, 2011, p.2). In 1996 the progress of the program was analyzed and the same year contract for full scale development of the engineering models was signed with General Dynamics. The program saw early success and progress. In 2001 its Systems Development and Demonstration phase started and input from the Marine Corps was added to its development. Design changes were made after planning and on ground test results. The program was given three years for the Systems Development and Demonstration Phase which proved to be inadequate to mature the early design. The program was renamed in 2003 by the Marine Corps to Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program. The prototypes analyzed in 2004 proved to be unreliable and experienced problems with its Hull Electronics Unit, coupled with hydraulics failure and leakages (Feickert, 2011, p.3). Mission The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is aimed for two main functions. First transport a Marine Corps Rifle Squad from the sea to the shore and second provide armor operational capabilities on land. The assault vehicles are transported in ships and can be launched beyond the visual horizon. The visual horizon is the visible limit to detect presence of ships at sea from the shore line. This distance is translated as 25 kilometers as per the planning and development of the program. The assault vehicle can be deployed by the ships and swim 25 kilometers at a speed of 25 to 30 knots. The vehicle has the capacity to carry a rifle squad of 17 Marines along with three crew members. The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle provides flexibility by its high speed performance in the sea as compared to the in service Amphibious Assault Vehicle with a speed of 8 knots. The second part of its operational mission is to perform on land. The vehicle provides armor protection to the crew and has the land range of 200 miles after swimming to shore (“Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), United States of America” 2011). The vehicle has a total range of 340 miles on land with a full fuel tank. It provides armor protection against armor piercing rounds and fragmentation shells. The turret contains a 30/40 mm Anti-Tank automatic gun which can fire at a rate of 200 rounds per minute. A 7.62 mm machine gun is installed along the turret, whereas smoke grenade launchers are present at the hull. The main gun is stabilized with a gyroscope and can therefore, fire rounds while moving. The gun is accurate till 1,200 meters. The assault vehicle runs on a 2,700 horse power diesel engine and can reach speeds up to 45 mph on land. The vehicle is planned to perform 80 percent of its mission on land whereas 20 percent in sea. Purpose and Use The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is part of the Marine Corps’s Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Doctrine (Goodman, 2010). The vehicle along with hovercraft and a tilt rotor aircraft are the basic elements responsible for mobility of troops from the sea. The doctrine is aimed to provide military cover along a wide shoreline. The amphibious assault ships are responsible for the transportation of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle till the visual horizon. The troops can then be shifted to shore through the assault vehicles. They provide protection to the troops in the sea and have considerable speed for maneuvers. On the shore, the assault vehicles have mobility to by pass any defensive concentration and provide armor protection against enemy resistance. The vehicles can move inland to secure an objective. It has the capability to run over an objective and the Marine troops are to seize the objective till the main force arrives. Because of added protection and mobility available to the Marine Corps on the shore, it is now possible to move forward without the need of a beachhead. The complete strategy is based on the concept of sea basing (Peck, 2003). The operations can be planned and launched from the sea instead of typical land bases. In this scenario the transportation of troops is the basic requirement. The currently used Amphibious Assault Vehicle provides little protection and has limited speed at sea. It does not support the new strategy and the Expeditionary Assault Vehicle is specifically designed as per the requirements of this new strategy. Operational Assessment The Expeditionary Assault Vehicle was tested for its operational capabilities in 2006. The testing was aimed to access the progress of the program to start the production. The vehicle was proven to be unreliable during the tests and experienced critical failure coupled with frequent breakdowns. The tests showed that the vehicle needed 3.4 hours of maintenance for every one hour of operation. The vehicle was unable to complete quality requirements and failed nine out of eleven amphibious tests (Feickert, 2011, p.3). Supporters The supporters of this program argue and justify the flexibility that the assault vehicles provide to the Marines. The over the horizon launch capability provides protection to the amphibious ships till 25 kilometers from the shore. Furthermore, once deployed the vehicles have enough speed to make enemy tracking and defensive measures in the sea difficult. The time to reach the shore has also been shortened. The electronic capabilities support net centric warfare. Each vehicle is aware of the battle situation and its location is shared with other vehicles (The USMC’s Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, 2011). This provides flexibility to land on shore separately and assemble at a convenient point. The capability makes enemy defensive measures difficult to implement as each unit provide minimal target instead of a collective target. The alternative is to make a beach head by the vehicles collectively. The vehicle widens its operational capabilities once on land. They can keep up with M1 Abraham tanks and provide suitable armor protection to its troops. It performs the role of an Armored Personnel Carrier. The vehicle can also be used for anti tank protection role. They provide flexibility and protection to the forces. Adversaries Apart from the build cost which will be discussed later, the vehicle has a flat belly which gives it no protection against IEDs (Baas, 2010). Over time the battle tactics have changed from conventional to close quarter or low intensity conflicts. IEDs along with RPGs are used effectively against the vehicle and therefore, the troops are vulnerable to these threats. Protection against these threats is the requirement of urban warfare and is critical in today’s battlefield environment. The inclusion of these capabilities will further increase the cost of the project. The vehicle is specially criticized for sacrificing protection to attain higher water speed. Another major concern is the planning of the over the horizon range. The project planning started in years when this range was considered sufficient to allow for protection against anti ship missiles. Recent developments in anti ship missiles have raised serious concerns about this project planning. An example of Hezbollah’s Cruise Missile attack in 2006 can be taken into account. Two missiles were fired and one of the missiles hit an Egyptian ship 36 miles from the shore (Feickert, 2011, p.1). This raised serious questions as to the effectiveness of the over the horizon range planned for this project. Cost The initial planned order for the vehicles was 1,025 vehicles for a cost of $8.5 billion. Due to extended research and development along with a redesign raised the project cost. The order for the vehicles was reduced to a batch of 573 pieces for a total cost of $11.63 billion as of 2010 (Feickert, 2011, p.5). The price per piece at this cost comes at around $24 million. This initial batch was planned to be available for service by 2015, but in 2011 the Marine Corps announced termination of the project because of its high cost. As per Gates (2011) the reasons were; “The EFV, originally conceived during the Reagan Administration, has already consumed more than $3 billion to develop and will cost another $12 billion to build - all for a fleet with the capacity to put 4,000 troops ashore. If fully executed, the EFV - which costs far more to operate and maintain than its predecessor - would essentially swallow the entire Marine vehicle budget and most of its total procurement budget for the foreseeable future.” Replacement Other armies rely on much smaller amphibious vehicles for transportation of troops. Smaller amphibious vehicles typically provide less protection along with slightly less water speed. Furthermore, they carry fewer personnel per vehicle and therefore, casualties due to mines or IEDs are comparatively less. With the termination of the program, the Marine Corps is looking towards less expensive amphibious vehicle K-21 KNIFV by South Korea (“The USMC’s Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle” 2011). Alternatively, the Marine Corps plans to upgrade the Amphibious Assault Vehicle currently in service to meet the requirement. Additionally, the Marine Corps has planned Amphibious Combat Vehicle which is scheduled for demonstration in 2012. Conclusion The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle was an ambitious program that provided lethal capabilities and its design matured over years. The program, however, could not prove its reliability and did not come up to the desired standards of the Marine Corps. The in service Amphibious Assault Vehicle has gone through various life extension programs and upgraded over time to meet operational requirement. The termination of the program was a serious setback to the Marine Corps and its replacement must provide with upgraded hardware to cope with the evolving Marine Corps strategy and doctrines. References Zaloga, S., Hadler, T., & Badrocke, M. (1999). Amtracs US Amphibious Assault Vehicles. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. Feickert, A. (2011). The Marine’s Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), (2011). United States of America. army-technology. Retrieved from http://www.army-technology.com/projects/efv/ Goodman, G. (2010). Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle: A Second Round of Tests for a Core Capability. defensemedianetwork. Retrieved from http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/expeditionary-fighting-vehicle/ Peck, M. (2003). Marines Sketch ‘Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare’ Scenarios. nationaldefensemagazine. Retrieved from http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2003/October/Pages/Marines_Sketch3753.aspx The USMC’s Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). (2011). defensiveindustrydaily. Retrieved from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usmcs-expeditionary-fighting-vehicle-sdd-phase-updated-02302/ Baas, D. (2010). The EFV. mca-marines. Retrieved from http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/efv Gates, R. (2011). Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies. defense.gov. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1527 Read More