Why Germany Was Unable to Use its Tactical Advantages to Attain Strategic Success during WWI - Essay Example

Major Mary-Margaret Ross “Why Germany was Unable to use its Tactical Advantages to attain Strategic Success during World War II” Introduction and Thesis During World War II, Germany was unable to gain strategic success during World War II. This was due to various factors such as limitations in industrial capacity, weak command structure, and faulty leadership. While the new military advances Germany developed ahead during the early years of World War II took the French and the British initially by surprise, problems became more apparent during Germany’s North African campaign wherein having an incompletely mobilized war industry, Hitler’s decision to engage in multiple war fronts, and also Hitler’s actions in meddling with military affairs and his initiation of the Jewish Holocaust, would result to the defeat of Germany against the Allied forces of United States, Soviet Russian, Great Britain and France. Issue Initially, during 1939 to 1942, Germany swiftly overran most of Western Europe. Germany succeeded for more than two years by relying on their new method of warfare called Blitzkrieg. This innovative way of waging modern war required the focused use of offensive forces against the weakest point in a battlefront. For this to be achieved, speed and coordination was needed, using combined arms that involved the use of strike aircraft, assault infantry, mechanized and armored units, and artillery support. This led to newer technologies for tanks, aircrafts, and other weapons for Germany, aside from better-trained personnel. First, German air forces would thwart enemy forces from effectively bringing supplies or prevent the deployment of reinforcements. Afterwards, the German army would penetrate enemy defenses or lines with their tank divisions, known as panzers, to break through enemy lines quickly and move around without restraint. The result of this method of attack would result in shock and disorientation among the enemy forces. In the German plan, it was anticipated that an enemy’s entire country would be so quickly over-run that little concern need be had for industrial and war production that was merely potential.1 Germany’s use of maneuver warfare was supposedly a quick and decisive solution to achieve a swift and total victory. As far as tactics were concerned, the Germans had better tactical application and advantages in the early years of World War II. However, it was too late when the Germans realized that their means to wage did not match their ends, and exceeded their capabilities. There was hardly anything wrong with the military strategic and tactical doctrines of the German Third Reich. The problems were in the military objectives that Hitler envisioned, and also the limitations of the application or means to achieve such goals. The emphasis is on the word “limitations,” and this could be placed on three factors that have been overlooked or completely downplayed by Germany during World War II. The factors that showed and led to Germany’s defeat in World War II were the limitations of Germany’s war industries, the flaws of Germany’s command structure, and the final factor that caused the two previously mentioned, that being the psychological shortcomings and hasty decisions of the Third Reich’s Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler. The initial accomplishments of Germany’s Blitzkrieg were mainly dependent on how much it can be supplied to maintain the momentum in keeping the offensive. To be able to maintain a war of prolonged campaigns or wars of attrition greatly depended on a large amount of resources to use for the production and manufacturing means of war materials and equipment such as tanks, aircrafts, artillery, and infantry weapons. The war industry should also be able to have the logistical capability to mobilize all armed forces quickly and battle ready. Germany’s early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to the idea of a long war.2 It was during Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union that German’s war industrial capacity hit a straining point. German failure in the Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union was decisive in the conversion of the war from a series of lightning campaigns to a prolonged war of productive effort and economic mobilization.3 It should be noted that Germany was already fighting in three war fronts prior to its invasion of the Soviet Union, namely the Western European, the Northern African, and the Atlantic Fronts. Hitler believed that a massive Blitzkrieg was simply needed to catch the Soviets off guard and to quickly and decisively overrun and take out Soviet Russia off the war. This did not happen since weather conditions bogged the German forces from picking up speed, and the terrain of Russia being too vast to maintain proper coordination of forces. The Germans forces, which were initially beating the Soviets cruelly, eventually faced much stiffer resistance from Soviet guerilla partisans and, later on, the Soviet Red Army itself. The prolonged war and defeat of Germany in their Eastern Front destroyed any chances of Germany from achieving a quick victory, forcing a long war in which the German national economy and industry could not support. Germany lacked the raw resources available on its own to stay in the war, unlike Soviet Russia. Great Britain was also able to fend off against Germany due to it being supplied by convoys from Canada, and later on the United States. The entry of the United States into the war against Germany increased the Allies’ war industry capacity, while Germany’s was being reduced since it was fighting in multiple war fronts and its industrial centers were in range of being bombed by Allied forces. Even if the Germans developed technologically better weapons, they did not have enough to translate into long-term advantages. There was also the issue on how the German chain of command performed, especially during and after the invasion of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the greatest weapon the Germans had in modern warfare was their military general staff. Prior to World War II, most of the military officers in the German General Staff exercised much influence on policies regarding warfare and how military operations should be done, and whether one should be enacted. In World War II, however, the General Staff lost much influence since Hitler paid more attention to his political allies within different branches of the armed forces, such as the Head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Goering and the Head of the Kriegsmarine, Karl Donitz. Hitler did little to mind his General Staff due to the group being very cautious and wary of his military goals. In lieu of this matter, Hitler intervened or interfered with much of the General Staff’s planning of operations. This placed pressure on many of the officers of whom Hitler later on distrusted when the war was prolonging. The result of this made the once highly adaptable General Staff lose its flexibility in dealing with tactical challenges, which was first experienced in Soviet Russia. The German Army, known for its organizational flexibility and ability to rapidly incorporate emerging developments in doctrine, simply was not able to react to near real-time developments in the Balkans, and modify the plan for initial operations in the Soviet Union.4 The last factor that caused Germany’s defeat during World War II was Adolf Hitler himself. Despite being a powerful and persuasive political figure, Hitler had several personal flaws that undermined many of his generals’ plans. While being gifted as a visionary and ambitious leader, Hitler usually wanted to get matters done his way and on his terms alone. This often came into conflict with his more experienced officers’ point of views. Eventually, Hitler would try to do the whole war operations himself without seeking much of the opinions of his General Staff, and only that of his military and political allies. Allied intelligence and espionage used this against Hitler. The Allies knew Hitler was growing paranoid; he was isolated and overworked, his imagination overheated, prone to emotional outbursts, and he was suspicious of everyone and everything.5 Also, many of Hitler’s policies made Germany lose support. For example, the killing of millions of Jews meant the loss of many capable men and women in various fields. Hitler made decisions based on his personal perception of the matter for the most part, and this exhausted his capability to make proper decisions. Conclusion It can be said that Germany was expected to lose the whole war if it was to keep its military campaigns longer than two years. Given that the German economy could not last long on its self-reliance, it had to conquer its adversaries as quickly and decisively as possible using the Blitzkrieg doctrines, and make use of the resources from the regions it controlled afterwards. This would be common sense since the objective is to knock the enemy out of the fight as quickly as possible. Even so, Germany made the mistake of trying to make a Blitzkrieg throughout all its campaigns at the same time that it did not see the value of strategic patience. Deliberate movement can have its own value. To appear as deliberate can lower the enemy’s vigilance. It also allows time to muster up more forces to continue the offensive. It also would have been considered sensible if Germany did not engage in multiple war fronts that stretched its war assets and capabilities to its straining limit. All in all, ultimately, the war would have fared better for Germany if Hitler did not interfere a lot with his generals’ operational planning, and also not giving much power and attention to his political allies in the military. In conclusion, if Germany practiced more strategic patience and had an effective command structure, it might have been able to conquer Europe in due time. Bibliography Greene, Robert. The 33 Strategies of War. New York: Penguin Group, 2006. Harrison, Mark. Resource Mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945. Coventry: University of Warwick, 1988. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Summary Report (European War). Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945. Willis Jr., B.E. After the Blitzkrieg: The German Army’s Transition to Defeat in the East. Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005. Read More