Flexible Deterrent Options - Essay Example

? FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTION FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTION Overview Flexible deterrent options (FDO) have been used at different times and for different purposes within military operational practices. Commonly though, FDO has been said to be necessary in the provision of escalation options at the early stages of a conflict1. Because some other military actions take place at the initial stages of conflicts, which may also be targeted at escalation interventions, FDO is often differentiated from these other actions by the observance of some key principles and values. For example FDO ensures that various political, military, information and economic deterrent measures are made available to the President2. FDO is therefore a more collective and integrated approach than other military actions. In this essay therefore, an existing flexible deterrent option is scrutinized by use of initial force analysis to understudy how the FDO increases defense support to the key determinants of FDO mentioned above. The emphasis of deterrence is a Task Force to deter Ahurastani aggression from aggravating. Initial Force Analysis for a Flexible Deterrent Option Capabilities needed to accomplish the specified key tasks For the flexible deterrent option to be successfully executed, there are key capabilities that must be accomplished for each key specific task. An important aspect of the flexible deterrent option is that even though the flexible deterrent option (FDO) has an aim of securing Nakhchivan airfield to facilitate force and sustainment flow into the entire Nakhchivan region, this aim would be seen as a collective goal that cannot be achieved by performing only one task. Once this happens, the FDO becomes an event rather than a process. The aim can therefore be broken down into specific objectives, which are each backed by a specific key task. The collective achievement of the tasks then represents the achievement of the aim3. To each of the tasks, a specialized capability must be assigned. This means that the capabilities are a means to the end; with the end being the achievement of military end state. Within the contest of the security of the Nakhchivan airfield, three key capabilities can be identified in association with the specific key tasks. These are sustainable competence, guidance, energy and materials (engagement), combat readiness, information acquisition and processing, environment (knowledge), systems and modeling (maneuver), and force structure. Because of the interrelated nature of the mission of the FDO, these capabilities will be treated as related components of the mission rather than individual capabilities that apportioned forces must exhibit. Resources in apportioned forces There are three major apportioned forces, which are army, air force and navy. Among each of these forces, it is expected that all six capabilities identified above will be exhibited. But in order to make this possible, it is expected that certain resources that enhance the development of the capabilities will be in place. This is particularly necessary as the capabilities cannot be acquired or learned on an independent basis in the absent of resources. Currently, within the army, it is noted that there is an existence of huge problems with training, equipping and motivation for soldiers. Meanwhile for capability such as sustainable competence to take place, it is important that soldiers receive training on a constant basis so that their competences can be guaranteed and sustained. The same argument about training is true if capabilities like engagement, combat readiness, knowledge and maneuver can all be acquired4. For the capability of knowledge, which deals with information acquisition and processing to take place, it is expected that the army will be well equipped in the delivery of its duties. A similar case can be made for force structure, sustainable competence and combat readiness, which are all capabilities that cannot be guaranteed in the absence of motivation for soldiers. As far as the army is concerned therefore, it will be said that even though it is a good indication that the AZ Army is currently better organized and more professional in service than it was in the 1990s, resources to cover the needed capabilities are very much lacking. The Air Force may not be plagued with much logistical and resources constraint as the Army but as far as FDO is concerned, there cannot be room made for excuses and mistakes to take place. It will be noted that as far as the Air Force is concerned, their major challenge with resources has to do with poor state of training and readiness. Meanwhile, even though this may not affect all areas or aspects of the capabilities, there are very crucial unpardonable aspects of the capabilities that it may affect. These include combat readiness, maneuver and sustainable competence. Given the task of the Air Force to defend the borders from air incursion and provision of close air support to the ground forces, there is no way the force can be combat ready to execute these tasks as part of the FDO in the absence of training and readiness. For the Navy, resources will be needed in the areas of maintenance and serviceability for most of its non-operational tasks. This is because it has been identified that there are currently massive lapses with maintenance and serviceability. In relation to the capabilities, it takes a very good maintenance culture for the force structure and engagement to be held in place. Finally, severability cannot be absent when maneuver and knowledge are targeted5. Limitations incurred based on the resources Generally, the limitations that will be incurred based on the resources that will be employed for the specific tasks assigned to the various forces are directly relative to the operational limitations required for the FDO to be successfully implemented. In line with this, operational limitations will be seen as specific actions that are either required or prohibited by higher authority with the JTF6. But to know the limitations clearly, it is important to first establish the resources that will be needed for the tasks at hand for the various forces. As far as resources are concerned, mention can be made of technologies, weapons and equipment use for the three forces. To this end, three major limitations will be identified, which are directly rooted in rules of engagement for the forces. The limitations are political, legal and ethical restrictions on the military operations in a manner that has been targeted for the specified tasks. Politically, there are limitations on the use of military technologies, where federal and other US laws impose scope of limits to the extent to which military technologies can be explored7. The use of some forms of weapons also has legal restrictions on them, especially as this is merely a flexible deterrent option and not a total military force imposition. Finally, the interest of social groups would have to be protected whiles observing ethical limitations with the use of some equipment that may be found to be intimidating to the public. Resources or relationships necessary to cover implied tasks Generally, assessment on available resources will be said to be inadequate and substandard to a very large extent. However, there can be a mechanism or intervention that can be devised to ensuring that until there are additional logistics or resources, what is at hand can be done with in achieving a successful FDO. One of these means is an internal systems intervention that ensures that there are joint interdependencies. This is because even though the resources currently available may not be adequate to independently ensure the execution of each task, the resources can cover a number of implied tasks that the limitations that have been discussed above bring. In terms of the implied tasks, it is expected that there will be proactive multinational planning documents, enemy and friendly COG analysis products, interviews with subject matter experts, political conditions review and enemy situation analysis8. With these implied tasks covered, it is expected that most, if not all the identified limitation will be overcome. But the joint interdependencies are expected to be done in two major ways or formats. First and foremost, it is expected that implied tasks will be performed consecutively instead of simultaneously. This way, there can be the sharing of resources. Another way is to allow the transfer of resources intra-force where these resources may not have immediate use. Additional resources and authorities external to EUCOM In order to cover limitations affecting the identified tasks, it is important that additional resources and authorities that will be sourced to EUCOM be put in place. But to understand the nature of additional resource or authority that will be needed, it is important to first have a fair understanding of the identified task that the incoming resource or authority will be addressing. As far as the specified task to secure Nakchivan airfield to facilitate force and sustainment flow is concerned, it is expected that there will be additional resources on the use of development technique in combat. This additional resource will help in establishing whether to undertake simultaneous or sequential development of the C2. Alos with the specified tasks to conduct a defensive exercise with 8th AZ Territorial Brigade, it is expected that additional authorities, mostly political will be sourced to take care of political limitations in place. With this specified tasks, a human resource based inclusion is suggested as the key aim of the task is the development of C2 relationships, which require the expert knowledge of authorities with common on interpersonal relationship. Finally, with the specified task to maintain air superiority over Nakchivan region including coordination of Area Air Defense, a more outsourced approach to additional resourcing that makes use of authorities from supporting commands and agencies is required. Recommended command structure for the JTF How the structure and command relationships facilitate unity of effort The entire aim of a successful FDO can be achieved when a number of key principles and values are followed. Whiles following these principles and values, it would be necessary to have in mind the collective focus of the military as a force in mind. One of the most critical principles that can be assured to bring about results is the assurance of unity of the effort. What this means is that the specified tasks as well as implied tasks, and even essential tasks must all be executed in a united effort. This, when done would only go a long way to exemplify the old saying that ‘unity is strength’. But by way of recommendation, it will be reiterated that this will not be done without regard for the chain of command that currently exists. This is because as much as personalized principles may be important the shared military principles of which adherence to chain of command must also be kept intact. As much as command will only flow from the top hierarchy to the next level, it is expected that this will be done in an atmosphere of mutual respect, empathy, courtesy and friendly. As much as possible, all forms of victimization and supremacy vendetta must be avoided so that the structure can be assured of the existence of unit integrity, force mobility and force visibility. Finally, it will be reiterated that it is only when command structure facilitates unity of effort that the need to succeed will be seen as a shared responsibility rather than the responsibility of some few officers at the top. Incorporation of all relevant elements into Structure For the structure to incorporate all relevant elements of deployment such as service components coordination mechanisms and supported relationship, it is recommended that a specific intervention will be used within the command structure. As part of the target goals of the intervention in incorporating all relevant elements, it is suggested that the intervention will have elements of SMART, which refers to specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time bound intervention9. In line with this, the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system is recommended. It will be noted that this is a department-level system that encompasses joint policies, processes, procedures and reporting structures10. Because APEX is a department-level system, it is hoped that it will make the overall desire of facilitating a unity of effort possible. This is because at the department level, there is much ease with the kind of relationship that among personnel within the command structure. Perhaps the strongly component of the APEX will be the fact that it is supported by components of both communications and information technology, which means that access to interactive information, can be easier and more efficient. The incorporation of information technology will also make it possible for peripheral tasks like monitoring, planning and execution mobilization to take place. Reference List Read More