RISK ASSESSMENT : How-to Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings - Essay Example

? RISK ASSESSMENT How-to Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings INTRODUCTION This document is a risk mitigation and threatassessment report on a municipal structure in a suburban area. This report is intended to identify potential weaknesses and relevant safety features in the courthouse for Patriot County. The risk assessment will be conducted in the interests of relevant safety features and possible design oversights creating vulnerabilities in the case of a terrorist attack. The evaluation of these risk factors will take place in accordance with the federal emergency management agency guidelines, made available from the following link: http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/4608 These guidelines will be implemented in order to assess a local government facility in terms of potential threats from disaster and terrorism. This analysis will include an assessment of the following items: A. Threat identification and rating. B. Asset value assessment. C. Vulnerability assessment. D. risk assessment. E. Consider mitigation options. These items will be addressed in subsequent sections in reference to a municipal courthouse, which will be evaluated based upon the above criteria. The Patriot County Courthouse was constructed 100 years ago and has been renovated four times, but still contains architecture and lining from its original construction despite the installation of modern electrical, plumbing, and wireless Internet systems. The structure has suffered damage from fire on two separate occasions. This damage required additional repair work not included in the four previous renovations. Threat identification and rating The initial step in the process and is threat identification. This includes both natural disasters, and man-made disasters. In some cases, this could include deliberate hostile actions by human operators, but also refers to technological hazards. In this instance, this represents threats to life and property that do not originate from intentional hostility, but are the result of errors made during the course of human activity. This could include a containment failure for hazardous materials, or improper storage of flammable agents leading to fire or explosion. These instances are treated as accidental occurrences, and are not the result of terrorist activity. To be considered terrorism, a particular disaster must be the direct result of unlawful act of violence prosecuted against lives or property with the intent to create courses pressure on a population, or a government in the pursuit of social or political objectives. While in a broad sense technological hazards are included in the threat assessment profiles, the primary focus in this analysis will be the deliberate actions leading to the potential for destruction defined as terrorism. While the prevention of terrorist threats is the principle focus, and awareness of technological hazards is also necessary to the extent that these elements represent potential targets. If a facility contains hazardous or flammable materials, it represents an opportunity for terrorists even if all normal safety protocols are followed to the letter. In the case of the Patriot County Courthouse, the risk as a result of technological hazards instigated by terrorist activity is low. The courthouse does not by virtue of its routine activities contain flammable, or toxic agents with the potential to become hazards against civilians in the structure. Such agents would have to come from outside the facility. However, the courthouse contains a parking garage situated underneath the first floor. The possibility exists for a Van or box truck to enter the parking garage containing high explosives or explosive blast weapons which if detonated with sufficient force would threaten all personnel within the building. The parking garage could easily accommodate a small moving van or delivery truck. The clearance of the garage would not accommodate a typical semi trailer. But there is nothing preventing a delivery truck with a 10,000 pound capacity from entering the parking garage beneath the first floor. The Patriot County Courthouse is intended to serve primarily as a trial court involving cases pertinent to state law. There is no indication of interest in the facility by known terrorist groups, and that no cases concerning suspected terrorism have been tried in the building. Nor does the courthouse contain detention facilities where lawbreakers are detained. Numerous criminal cases are tried in the courthouse, including narcotics crimes concerning the sale and production of illegal methamphetamines. There are no indications at present of planned retaliatory strikes against the courthouse as a result of any convictions that have taken place here. Certain of the individuals prosecuted in the courthouse possess sufficient chemical expertise to prepare rudimentary explosive devices as a consequence of familiarity with the chemical production of methamphetamines. The courthouse itself has local significance, but is not widely known outside of the immediate County. The courthouse has been described in the past by inspectors as being a fire hazard, as a consequence of its original construction. Deliberate incendiary devices represent a medium low threat on a FEMA standard threat rating scale. In the event of an explosion, this danger could be exacerbated. Below is a listing of building features and the estimated threat levels from five potential sources of terrorist attack: cyber attack (CA), the vehicle bomb (VB), suicide bomber (SB), also including chemical or biological agents, (CH), (BI). Architectural: CA 1 VB 4 SB 1 CH 3 BI 1 Administration: CA 2 VB 3 SB 1 CH 2 BI 1 Security: CA 1 VB 2 SB 2 CH 2 BI 1 Daycare: CA 1 VB 1 SB 2 CH 2 BI 2 Asset Value Assessment The next step in the process of threat assessment and risk management is the identification and quantification of the value of the site in question. This includes an evaluation of the total assets of the facility in order to gain a better understanding of what measures can and should be taken to protect it, as part of a cost/benefit analysis. In a broad sense, an assess is described as any valuable resource requiring defense and protection as a matter of vital interest. This can include not only important buildings, but expensive pieces of equipment, money, as well as information which could include classified intelligence or intellectual property. There are a series of necessary tasks pursuant to the assessment and identification of an asset; existing layers of defense should be evaluated. The most critical assets present at a given facility must be identified and prioritized. At the facility, the most essential functions as well as what capabilities are necessary to maintain them must be identified. All structural or information elements pertaining to the principal function of the facility must be known. With these factors it is possible to quantify the value of the asset in accordance with a FEMA rating system. In the case of the Patriot County Courthouse, the courtroom itself is essential for the routine of business of the facility, yet it does not contain irreplaceable items or equipment. The offices on the floor above the courtroom contain computerized information with hard copies for backup. The offices above the courtroom also contain personnel; this includes judicial offices including ancillary personnel and clerks essential for the efficient prosecution of the court's business. To judge these assets, it is necessary to identify the first line of defense. This includes a single officer stationed at a metal detector on a rotating shift requiring at least one officer present during normal operational hours. The officer is armed. A straight hallway 80 feet long lies between the metal detector and the courtroom itself. The more sensitive assets are above, and can be reached after crossing to stairwells. These distances can be considered the second line of defense. The judicial offices and those of the County clerks are separated by a single hallway 60 feet long on the second floor. This would make it more difficult for a single attacker to threaten both the sensitive court records and the judge at the same time. The third line of defense involving the protection of the critical assets is limited. The digital files contain password protections and a firewall to protect the information, but neither of these options are equivalent to the sophistication found in similar systems at a federal facility. In terms of physical protections, no safety measures currently exist in the parking garage beneath the court room itself. Vulnerability assessment For the purposes of this assessment, the vulnerability is defined as a flaw or weakness which could be exploited by an aggressor with the ability to render an asset susceptible to disaster or hazard damage, either constituting bringing hazardous materials into a facility, or misusing materials already present in order to trigger a technological disaster. In the case of the Patriot County Courthouse as previously stated, there are no hazardous materials routinely present during the normal operations of the facility. A hostile agent would have to introduce them. As mentioned above, there is a potential structural weakness based upon the parking garage. If a truck bomb were to be detonated in the parking garage, there is potential injury to personnel, but it is unlikely that this would threaten the court records in the offices unless the blast is sufficient to entirely collapse the structure. In this case, the principal assets likely to be at risk would be personnel. The building does not contain vehicle anti-ram devices, and in case of an explosion the blast pressure in the parking garage could spread horizontally, but it would be confined vertically. Other forms of terrorism are possible as a result of the ventilation system in the building, as well as the placement of the windows. The windows in the courtroom are too small to allow the egress of personnel, and are placed above the height of an adult. This feature would prevent ventilation of the courtroom in case of a chemical or biological attack. It is theoretically possible to deliver a biological or chemical agent into the centralized ventilation system if such a device or container could be smuggled past the single officer and the metal detector. The courthouse does possess an alarm system, which could be activated in the event of unknown release of biologically harmful agents into the facility, or in the case of a fire. There are no dedicated detection systems for chemical or biological agents. In addition to the potential weakness represented by a bomb in the parking garage, with only a single officer on duty at the front entrance it might be theoretically possible for an aggressor to ambush this officer and commence an assault upon personnel or the dissemination of hazardous materials, incendiaries, or explosives. Based on FEMA's vulnerability rating scale, the threat of a deliberate assault on the front entrance in order to inflict casualties as an act of terrorism is deemed medium-low – equivalent to a 4. While vulnerabilities do exist, there are no present indications that such an attack is likely, nor is there a history of such attacks occurring in the past. The weakness of the structure in terms of a car or truck bomb is rated between a five and six, while there are no present indications that such a threat is likely – the accommodation of a vehicle containing high explosives has the potential to inflict severe structural damage if detonated in the right location, outside the reach of the officer on duty. Risk Assessment The assessment process includes an estimation of specific risk to the facility in question. The essential questions are the likelihood of a threat occurring, and the consequences of the occurrence. FEMA employees of risk assessment matrix, considering a range of factors: one of which is to identify known threats that pose a risk to lives and property on the premises, as well as the value of assets and personnel. Known weaknesses capable of exploitation should be identified, and from these factors a better assessment of risk is possible. Two categories of potential risk are outlined below, reflecting the actual structural weaknesses and ways in which a terrorist might exploit them, and the risk to the facility concerning administrative or personnel vulnerability. The matrix consists of an assessment of the value of a particular aspect of the facility, an estimation of the probable threats to this aspect based on the five criteria listed under threat identification and rating, and another judgment rating the vulnerability. For the purposes of Patriot County Courthouse, administration includes both the judge and the County clerks. Administration: Asset Value - 8. Threat Ratings: CA 3 VB 3 SB 3 CH 4 BI 2 Vulnerability Ratings: CA 4 VB 3 SB 2 CH 3 BI 4 Architectural: Asset Value 5. Threat Ratings: CA 1 VB 3 SB 3 CH 2 BI 2 Vulnerability Ratings: CA 1 VB 6 SB 5 CH 2 BI 2 Again, while there are plausible holder abilities in the architecture and operations of the courthouse, the vulnerability ratings must also take into account the fact that there are no known threats at present constituting a likelihood for terrorist activity. In terms of prioritization, the judge is the highest rating official – but the court records are essential in order to meet the caseload for the courthouse. In terms of structure, the courtroom is not especially valuable by itself, yet a bomb placed underneath it has the potential to disrupt the operations of the entire facility until expensive reconstruction could take place. The possible vulnerabilities of court records could be given a priority of 4 on a 1 to 5 scale. If a threat is indicated, efforts to secure the parking garage against a high explosive attack should be given a priority of 5. Mitigation Options While there are many possible safety measures. That might be implemented to alleviate the weaknesses outlined above, the threat assessment is necessary in order to prioritize the most likely threats based on a cost-benefit analysis. This section will identify plausible strategies to reduce risk factors. One of the vulnerabilities estimated is a possibility of determined assailants launching a surprise attack and overpowering the single guard on duty. While it is always advantageous to have more trained security personnel, and budgetary limitations may prevent hiring or stationing multiple officers. One possibility would be to increase the overlap in the shift changes. I know officer is permitted to leave until his or her replacement arrives. The schedules of shift changes could be adjusted so that multiple officers happened to be on duty during the busiest hours of activity for the court. If a terrorist intends to inflict maximum damage upon civilian personnel, then such an attack would be planned for the busiest hours. If overlapping shifts cause multiple officers to be present during these times, the likelihood of the officers being overpowered is diminished. This option has the potential of being efficient, and far more cost-effective than hiring another officer full-time. However, The possibility still exists that a determined aggressor will observe the courthouse and attack just as the second officer is safely away. In terms of the parking garage vulnerability, the best options might involve expansions or modifications. The parking garage could be closed off and reserves for authorized personnel only, with an external parking space made available for all others. If space does not permit the construction of an additional parking lot, structural reinforcements are a possibility for the building itself. Additional support pylons could avert the likelihood of a collapse in the case of the detonation. A detailed analysis would be necessary in order to determine whether these enhancements or an additional parking lot is most cost-effective. The least expensive option is likely to be improved security at the entrance to the parking garage. A dedicated officer should be present at a control gate with the authority to search any vehicles attempting to enter. This mitigates the risk of a truck bomb being smuggled into a structural weak point, but without a modification of the building. Multiple measures could be employed as structural constraints and budgetary concerns permit. SOURCE: FEMA guidelines: http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/4608 : accessed: 9/18/2013 Read More