Define Battle of COP Keating - Essay Example

?Insert Introduction The battle of COP Keating, also known as the Battle of Kamdesh, happened during the United s Army invasion of Afghanistan in the war against terror that was waged following recent rampant terrorist activities, most decisively, the attack and destruction of the twin towers in America’s city of New York on Tuesday, September 11th 2001 that resulted in several civilian deaths. The war is said to be the bloodiest battle for U.S forces after the battle of Wanat in July 2008 which took place only 32 km away from Kamdesh also at the time of the American invasion of Afghanistan. The battle of COP Keating occurred in October 3rd 2009 in Kamdesh, Nuristan province of eastern Afghanistan (35?24?36?N 71?20?29?E / 35.41?N71.34139?E) and according to Executive summary: AR 15-6 investigation re: complex attack on COP Keating--3 Oct 09 saw to a 12-hour close contact battle pitting Taliban insurgents against American military, two Latvian trainers and Afghan coalition forces that nearly became a hand to hand combat. At the time of the attack, the COP was home to approximately 60 cavalrymen from Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division and a couple stationed Afghanistan coalition officers. Commanders and leaders during the battle included Curtis Scaparrotti, Randy George, Dost Muhammed, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Ghulan Faroq (Sanders, 122). At the end of the battle, 8 United States troops had died and a further 22 were left wounded. In addition, eight Afghan soldiers were wounded, together with two Afghan private security guards. A body count by the military confirmed that about 150 to 200 Taliban insurgents died in the firefight that lasted through the day. The United States troops who lost their lives in the battle were Justin T. Gallegos (Tucson, Arizona), Christopher Griffin (Kincheloe, Michigan), Kevin C. Thomson (Reno, Nevada), Michael P. Scusa (Villas, New Jersey), Vernon W. Martin (Savannah, Georgia), Stephan L. Mase (Lovettsville, Virginia), Joshua J. Kirk (South Portland, Maine) and Joshua M. Hardt (Applegate, California). Another 10 Afghan soldiers and 4 Taliban fighters died in the period of October 5th and 6th when Coalition troops carried out operations to determine, locate and destroy the militia behind the October 3rd attack on the COP Keating. The PRT Kamdesh, newly named Camp Keating after death of First Lieutenant Ben Keating who died while transporting an armored supply track to the Naray FOB, was initially intended to be a provincial reconstruction team base (PRT); a strategic location from where supply of weaponry from the Pakistan to the Anti Coalition Militia (ACM) would be minimized and halted. However, the camp proved very difficult to defend in case of attack, as was rampant in the area. Several factors contributed significantly to the area’s threatening insecurity and unsuitability for a military camp in an area as hostile as the Camp Keating. These eventually saw to reason and subsequent planning by the US military to evacuate the area to more populated areas of Afghanistan in order to provide more security and protection to the local civilians. The Combat Outpost (COP) Keating is situated in a valley surrounded on all sides by mountains and a river meandering its way on one side. It would appear like a bowl, greatly reducing any chances of successful defense upon attack. The area is also characterized by rough terrain with sharp rocks and transport via the road was prone to attack by insurgents. The road contractors of Afghanistan had also failed to maintain the road in the area which regrettably led to the death of Lieutenant Ben Keating who had a fatal accident while on transportation duty along the road. This together with the unsuitability of the area for any aircraft landing made any air response and aid during attacks minimal if not late. It is documented that a military chopper had earlier crushed into the terrain while attempting to land in the area killing all its passengers. A landing pad was decided on in the other side of the mountain, considerably far from the camp in case of attack and emergency. The Nuristan province is prone to harsh weather and as added in Executive summary the resident population is hostile toward inhabitation and invasion from any outside force. However, the American military sought to endear the population towards their noble cause and counter their negative suspicion of outsiders with good acts as they attempted to separate the enemy from the people, link the people to their governments and transform the Afghanistan by economic development and creation of a national infrastructure. These maneuvers were met however, with assassinations and warnings to those who attempted to collaborate with the American Forces at a time of “holy war”. The little soldier allocation in this remote rugged area made matters even graver as many troops were deployed in populated areas for civilian security reasons. Warnings and rumors of a planned attack on the combat outpost came in large but were ignored. The insurgents would occasionally wage small fire fights from time to time which were all successfully repelled by the American forces. As more frequent small attacks came, the notion of a larger, much more organized attack was disregarded and ignored. It is said however, as stated in Woods Stuart’s Loitering with Intent that these small prior attacks were mere means the insurgents used to gauge the attack response of the Americans as they planned a mother of all onslaughts. Owing to these disadvantages and risks, the COP was eventually decided to hold no meaningful strategic or tactical value and was hence scheduled for closure. Initially, the COP was determined for closure somewhere around July-August 2009 but plans were delayed for action till mid-October since base supplies were diverted to support intense brigade-level operations in Barge-e Matal in support of ANSF forces. This inevitable intended closure therefore, also, ensured there was no need for any further security reinforcements and fortifications beyond bare minimum in the COP Keating. And finally on October 3rd 2009, at around 3 a.m., the locals of Kamdesh village were woken up and ordered to leave the area and at a few minutes to 6 a.m., the Taliban insurgents, close to 350 in number, attacked the COP Keating. With their superior number and an added advantage from firing from the hills all around gave them an upper hand. The Americans were taken by surprise by a different type of militia that was highly trained. In the ranks of the attackers were a number of insurgents that had previously been trained by the CIA to fight the Soviets. 48 minutes into the firefight, the Cop had been overrun (Woods 56). The insurgents came in with heavy bombardments from all sides of the outpost from B-10s, rocket propelled grenades, anti-aircraft machine guns, Russian-made Dushkas, mortars, snipers and small firearms. The attackers knew their targets well and disabled American mortars instantly, while also simultaneously attacking a nearby outpost Fritsche disabling any means of air support from the area. Latvian operatives and American fighter during the war claimed the Afghan forces were overwhelmed by fire attack from the insurgents and abandoned their positions against command thus allowing the insurgents to gain entry into the compound from these positions. Once in the camp, the insurgents torched most of the barracks as the American troops, pressed in, fought back valiantly in attempts to regain control of the outpost. As the day progressed, Sgt. Armando Avalos and Sgt. Jayson Souter with their teams in attack helicopters destroyed a nearby mosque where the heaviest fire originated. OP Fitsche soldiers regained control of their mortars, as Sgt. Avalos began directing indirect support to regain the COP Keating. The insurgents eventually started retreating at around 5 p.m. but the quick reaction forces from 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment did not arrive until 7 p.m. as the Americans evacuated the area. American choppers later bombed the place to avoid any further looting of ammunition and war arms. Staff Sgt. Clinton Romesha is remembered for his bravery, according to Jake Tapper, during the battle and has since received a medal of honor, the highest award for military service. Sgt. Ty Carter has been recommended for a medal of honor too with the battle of COP Keating producing a plethora of medals: 27 Purple Hearts, 37 Army Commendation Medals with “V” devices for valor, 3 Bronze Stars, 18 Bronze Stars with “V” devices and 9 Silver Stars (Tapper, 75). Works Cited Sanders, C. Executive summary: AR 15-6 investigation re: complex attack on COP Keating--3 Oct 09. S.l. U.S. Central Command, 2010. Print. Tapper, Jake. The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor. S.l.: Little, Brown and Company, 2012. Print. Woods, Stuart. Loitering with Intent 16. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2009. Print. Read More