Battle of the Bulge - Research Paper Example

However, the Germans were crushed by the joint armed forces of Bastogne and St. Vith that placed the Germans’ communication lines in danger. The St. Vith encounter chose time over space: the time required to set up a strong shoulder defense on the Bulge’s northern border.2 The triumphant defense of Bastogne’s transportation center pushed German forces into combat grounds and reset the German timeframe.3 Military Tactics of the Battle of the Bulge In the two encounters, a combination of intense and mild defenses was employed successfully.

In the northern side, airborne and infantry forces reinforced the 7th Armored Division stronghold in St. Vith. The 7th Armored Division’s triumphant fighting withdrawal provided an opportunity to assemble a solid defense on the Bulge’s north border.4 This disrupted the timeframe for the German offensive and its troops were not able to recover their strength; hence, the German circumstances for victory were never attained. In the southern side, the traces of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, as well as their crude weaponry and a number of VIII Corps Artillery forces, gave the armament support and mobile counter-offensive force for the overpowered units of the 101st Airborne Division enclosed in Bastogne.

5 The Bastogne stronghold demonstrates how a light force, reinforced with armament support and well-equipped forces, was successful in holding out the assault of heavily armed German troops. This case was adopted as part of the basis for the creation of U.S. light divisions and to validate their importance in a NATO context.6 As a proof to the value of a combination of light and heavy forces in mid- to- high-level fighting, combinations of heavy and light forces have been required for the circumstances of the Army’s Battle Command Training Program’s automated, HQ practice combat games.

They have been proven successful in Iraq as well.7 The capacity to envision the combat zone, as in the focused lens of Napoleon, that defines an exceptional war leader, was shown by General Anthony McAuliffe, Troy Middleton, and Bruce Clarke in making a decision where to battle and how to carry it out. Middleton understood that controlling the major road intersections of Bastogne and St. Vith for the longest possible time was needed to ward off the German forces.8 By choosing to defend these road intersections, Middleton identified the battle’s operational direction.

McAuliffe and Clarke contributed to the cause by understanding the enormity of their task and by confronting excellent strategic battles to control those road intersections and hinder the opponent.9 Another official who was able envision the combat zone and who had an outstanding hold of his battleground was Lt. Col. Creighton W. Abrams, who led the ultimate attack that released Bastogne.10 According to a report: Abrams, when he got into combat, knew everything was going on. How he knew it, nobody knew, but he did.

He knew where every tank was. He knew where every piece of equipment was, and he could command and move his outfit and always defeat the enemy in front of him. It was just that simple.11 Abrams undoubtedly had situational understanding and a general working image of what was taking place. Although Middleton and his commanding officers were able to envision the combat zone after the Germans revealed their plan, the German deception scheme was