Hellenic and Roman Periods - Research Paper Example

?Examine the changing tactical relationship between infantry and cavalry during the entire period from c.3000 BC to c.1700 AD. Choosing either infantry or cavalry from one of the following periods (Hellenic and Hellenistic periods, c.500-c.31 BC, Roman Republican and Imperial periods, c.500 BC-c.500 AD, Early and High Middle Ages, c.500-c.1300, and Late Medieval and Early Modern periods, c.1300-1700 AD), what factors (military organization, equipment and tactics) led to that tactical system's dominance in its period? For much of the Hellenic and Hellenistic period, the infantry has dominated the battlefield. As a matter of fact, the case is the same during the Roman period. According to Schmid, it was only during the great Roman defeat at Adrianople by a horde of Gothic horsemen that cavalry became a prominent component of warfare.1 This is quite interesting because horses and horse riding are not entirely alien to both of these civilizations. The preference for the infantry appears to stem from the ideology that came with men fighting on foot in hand to hand combat. Based from the culture, philosophy and norms of the ancient Greeks, they must have seen infantry warfare as nobler. There is something admirable, which could have been appealing to the Greeks, when men endure great hardships, from training and the actual combat, and defeat the enemy in a violent clash. This is hardly surprising. Even today, when battles are recreated in film, for instance, the frontline where the soldiers fight in violent clashes - through a collective spirit and discipline - evoke a sense of pride and inspiration from among us because the condition allow for a great show of valor and bravery. Compare this with going to battle riding atop a horse. The battle strategy for the cavalry is more calculated, requiring a degree of skill, cunning and calculation. In addition, it avoids and could not hold its own in a protracted battle. This was supported by Schmid who pointed out the Greeks might have equated cavalry warfare with the barbarians way of fighting. He said that the Greeks acknowledge the skill and boldness involved but that they generally consider it to be "inferior to the kind of fighting courage needed by the hoplite in the ranks, which did not permit the excuse to run away.2 Even in actual warfare, the Greek cavalry was unwilling or hesitated to face the Greek hoplite. Fagan and Trundle (2010) identified a pattern in this attitude. First they cite numerous instances of defeat by cavalry horses in the hands of the Greek hoplite. There were the cases of Pharnabazus's cavalry defeat at the hands of Athenian infantry and the failure of a Persian-led cavalry in the Pactolus plain against the Greek hoplites in 395 B.C. There are, of course, periods when certain shifts transpired. This can be demonstrated in the case of the Peloponnesian war. The infantry was not extensively used during this time. Instead, the Greeks relied on light troops such as archers, slingers and peltasts.3 This was what happened because the war was mostly typified by raiding and quick attacks. The training of the Greek hoplites meant that they are not suitable to fight most clashes. Therefore, light troops and even cavalry came to be used in the conflicts as well as those that preceded the Peloponnesian War. The changes demonstrate how warfare, particularly the tactics involved in using infantry, light troops or cavalry, is also determined by the nature and characteristics of the enemies that it faces. For instances, in order to defeat the notorious Persian cavalry, Alexander’s tactics involved the development of heavy infantry to serve as a platform of maneuver for his cavalry.4 Similar experience transpired for the Byzantines. The empire heavily copied the Roman warfare strategy but modified them in order to be effective in dealing with its neighbors such as the Saracens. This enemy was notorious for its highly agile mounted archers. As a result, the Byzantines trained its infantry to use bows, which dealt significant damage to the enemy cavalry. Another important variable that dictated the trajectory of evolution of warfare in ancient Greece was the military genius of both Phillip of Macedon and his son, Alexander the Great. Both father and son introduced reforms and innovations to warfare, which has been carried out and perpetuated by his generals and their progeny. For example, they introduced new battle formations and tactics such as the role and maneuvers of the phalanx in battle. Gabriel noted that Phillip’s military innovations completely changed the conduct of war in Greece and raised the level of the Greek military sophistication.5 As Phillip established a new warfare system, his son was the one who effectively implemented them. The core components of the tactics involve the new strategies such as how the army has remained on the battlefield for long periods as well as its swift movement. Phillip and Alexander’s contributions to Greek warfare can also be attributed to the works of Xenophon. Father and son extensively read Xenophon’s account and followed the tactics and strategies contained therein. Particularly, Xenophon’s Anabasis and Cyropaedia were heavily referenced in the strategies employed by Phillips and Alexander. All in all, his contributions include the idea of planning and conducting a retreat.6 Xenophon was also instrumental in the development of cavalry warfare, which the Macedonian army perfected. Drawing from Xenophon’s work, the Macedonian cavalry was divided into several units. It is clear, hence, that the development of Greek warfare, particularly with the dominance of the Greek hoplite or Greek infantry, emerged because of numerous factors. First, there was the Greek perspective. The Greeks found nobility, valor and symbolisms in battles waged using the infantry whereas the use of the force from the mounted horses is considered as barbaric and cowardly. The shift in focus to light troops as well as the increasing use of the cavalry can be attributed to the characteristics of the enemy. The guerilla tactics and raids during the Peloponnesian War were successful. There are several other variables, such as the role of Xenophon’s work. There was also the fact that enemies have different characteristics, which forces an army to adapt. Bibliography Beck, Hans. A Companion to Ancient Greek Government. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. Bose, Partha. Alexander The Great's Art Of Strategy. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. Fagan, Garrett and Trundle, Matthew. Gabriel, Richard. The Great Armies of Antiquity. Westport, C.T.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002 Schmid, Walter. (1992). On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato's Laches. SIU Press. Read More