The Easter Offensive - Research Paper Example

Topic: Lecturer: Presentation: Introduction In 1972, a military campaign was launched by the People’s Army ofVietnam against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the US army in the south of Vietnam specifically between 30th March and 22 October of the same year (Nalty, 76). During this time, the Vietnamese nation is reported to have recorded a massive death turn up. During this time, Dong Ha was the centre of conflict that had been establish by the rivalry between the two groups. The US government together with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) is blamed for the extent to which the Easter Offensive (Andrade, 65). The size and ferocity the offensive unleashed to the waiting American and Vietnamese forces had been under estimated thus leading to them being overwhelmed by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The involvement of John Ripley in the Easter offensive which lasted over three hours is also reportedly the end of the North Vietnam Army push to conquer the south. The following paper is a description of the Easter offensive that occurred in Dong Ha when the NVA’s Push for the Southern Vietnamese nation. It also describes the involvement of John Ripley in combat while still exploring the under looked issues in the mission. The Easter Offensive Before the South Vietnamese Operation Lam Son which was to fail, discussions had been held by the Hanoi leadership on the Easter offensive. This was during the 19th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Lang Dong party in 1971. It is reported that by December that same year the Politburo had resolved to launch a mega attack on the southern region of Vietnam (George 75). This would be favored by the elections that were to take place in the United States the following year. In addition, the US marines in the area were being withdrawn from Vietnam. Consequently, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was increasingly being stretched over the South Vietnam border. It is also reported that the ARVN was increasing losing their ground on the border to an estimated 600 miles to the NRV. Moreover, the ARVN was offensive was a promising memory after the failure of the Laos mission. As described by George (24), ‘This decision marked the end of three years of political infighting between two factions within the Politburo: those members grouped around Truong Chinh, who favored following the Chinese model of continued low-intensity guerrilla warfare and rebuilding the north; and the "southern firsters" centered around Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and supported by First Party SecretaryLe Duan (both of whom supported the Soviet model of big offensives)’ . The decision would be to use a combined mega guerilla attack on the security forces. This is also supported by Nalty (110), who says that ‘The failure of the Tet Offensive of 1968 had led to a downgrading of Giap's influence during the ensuing years, but the victory achieved over South Vietnamese forces during the Laotian incursion brought Giap's strategy back into the ascendant’. Le Duan was given the responsibility of key decision making in the operation which was usually Giap’s throne of formulating the logistical and planning the operation. In addition, a former PAVN chief of staff General Van Tien Dung was awarded the responsibility of actually implementing the offensive. As described by George (93), ‘although North Vietnam had utilized the border regions of Laos and Cambodia as supply and manpower conduits for a decade and a half, it was quickly decided that the main thrust of the offensive would be launched across the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone that separated the two Vietnams’. The offensive would take place in two separate areas where the South Vietnamese forces ground was quite weak. The thought of capturing the South Vietnamese capital would also be a major boost for the NRV since it was a very formidable area for establishing the would be new government. This is also supported by Nalty (108) who argues that, ‘The prospect of seizing a South Vietnamese provincial capital, which could then be proclaimed as the seat of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, was also enticing’. In addition, the Northern Vietnamese Army had made agreements with the Soviet Union to supply them with arms and training. As described by Sorley (403), ‘The soviets are reported to have brought heavy equipment which would be used in the offensive. This included 1,000 T-54 and Type 59 medium and PT-76 light amphibious tanks; hundreds of anti-aircraft missiles, including the shoulder-fired, heat-seeking SA-7 Strela (Grail); anti-tank missiles, including the wire-guided (AT-3 Sagger); and heavy-caliber, long-range artillery’. In the late 1971 the US and southern Vietnam intelligences made a wrong hypothesis. As described by Willbanks (128), ‘U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence estimates of communist intentions were mixed. An offensive was expected, but intelligence as to its timing, location, and size were confusing’. The communist offensive that had been mounted in 1968 had been destroyed. Without the southern support of the NLF who had carried out the 1968 offensive, the northern PAVN was also considered not to posses much threat and an attack was highly unlikely. In addition, the possibility of an attack through DMZ was also ruled out in the deliberations. On the contrary, as explained by Willbanks (129), ‘In January, Defense Intelligence Agency officers briefed Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, stating that PAVN would attack after the Tet holidays and that the offensive would make widespread use of armored forces but Liard dismissed the claims in a US congress’. After some time, the MACV discovered that the PAVN had increased its armory and was suspicious of an attack. They sent warnings to the ARVN and US commanders. George (167) says, ‘The U.S. commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, was convinced an offensive was likely, if not imminent, but he was also convinced that the attack would begin during or near the Tet holidays at the beginning of the year’. The MACV and US intelligence was convinced that the attack would be in II Corps in the central highlands of Vietnam but the attack did not push through. As described by Andrade (201), ‘When the offensive did not occur, both he (Creighton W. Abrams) and his headquarters were ridiculed in the American press for crying wolf’. Due to this, the US ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and General Adams left Vietnam to spend the Easter holidays. Andrade (219) Explains further that ‘When the weekend of Easter 1972 arrived, General Giai had planned to rotate the operational areas of his 56th Regiment (central DMZ) with the 2nd Regiment (based at Camp Carroll) because of a truck shortage, however, the units were moved simultaneously and became hopelessly intermixed and disorganized’. With communications down, the effective operation of the forces was hampered. The 3rd Regiment then fell prone to an attack by the northern PAVN. The offensive started at noon on 30th March 1972. The Northern most Regiment of the ARVN received a whacking in Quang Tri Province where two PAVN factions of an estimated 30,000 soldiers supported by over 100 Tanks attacked I Corps and conquered the five northern most provinces of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese 308th Division and two independent regiments assaulted the "ring of steel" which was the arc of ARVN firebases just south of the DMZ. It is reported that from the west, the ARVN marched out of their base in Laos and headed down into the Quang Tri river. As described by Nalty (35), ‘Significantly, allied intelligence had failed to predict either the scale of the offensive or the method of attack, giving PAVN "the inestimable benefit of shock effect, a crucial psychological edge over defenders who had expected something quite different’. The South Vietnamese General Gai ordered the 3rd Regiment to withdraw from their river Cua Viet base for reorganization and reformulation of plans. The armored elements of the ARVN managed to hold the PAVN insurgents away for a short while. Captain John W. Ripley blew up the bridge on Highway QL-1 in Dong Ha hampering the plans of the soaring PAVN forces. The Northern attack was timely set to coincide with the monsoon winds whose estimated 500 feet cloud cover would hamper much US air aided attacks. Other strongholds of the ARVN were either abandoned or surrendered to the stronger PAVN. Even after three weeks of slow operation implementation by the PAVN the northern side won and series of anarchy and chaos followed with civilians being reported to have been displaced. Conclusion The Easter offensive was a strategically planned military attack. Due to misinformation and miscalculations, the US and ARVN were caught unaware of the ferocity and extent of the offensive. It would be considered that it was fortunate for them that the MACV informed them of the eminent attack but still they did not adequately address the issue. Captain John Ripley is credited with the blowing of the bridge in Dong Ha after a three day cross-fire. References Andrade, Dale. Trial By Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1995 George. H. Turley. Easter Offensive, The: The Last American Advisors Vietnam, 1972. Presidio, 1985. Morrocco, John. War in the Shadows. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. 1988 Nalty, Bernard C. Air War Over South Vietnam: 1968–1975. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000 Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harvest Books, 1999. Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2004.  Read More