Critiques: British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign - Book Report/Review Example

?Describing the secretive nature of British Intelligence and its inaccessibility to research scholars until 1970s, this book discusses the level of success that British military attained in Palestine in its campaigns in the First World War, in terms of the efficiency of British military intelligence.1 Owing to reasons discussed above, it was nearly an impossible task for the author to collect all the documents concerned with British military intelligence of that period, and hence the author himself has admitted that his work could not be taken as a conclusive work on the topic2. But still it is hoped in the preface to the book that this work could give some insight into the evolution of military intelligence mechanisms and also the British military action in Palestine in World War II3. In one way, Sheffy’s book has totally negated the role of strategy, planning and resources in winning a war4. Though this could be taken as a blind position in favor of one single stick in a broom, the success of Sheffy is in that he has been able to present a systematic array of evidences to prove his position5. Notwithstanding these strong evidences presented by Sheffy, the argument of Pipes cannot be accepted wholly just because both Sheffy and Pipes in support of him have ignored other political and social factors that led to the victory of the British in this war6. The photograph of a native British secret agent in Palestine during that period, given in the beginning of the book itself provides a vivid view of the nature of British intelligence system of that era and also the way it worked through finding inroads into the local life7. It is the human element of intelligence gathering that is highlighted here, but this photograph seems to be intentionally given by Sheffy so as to emphasize the historic departure of British intelligence from human-centered intelligence gathering techniques to technology-assisted methods. But all the same, the book reminds that even Winston Churchill, as a young recruit in the army in the time of its action against Mahdi, the leader of Sudan who forced his way to Khartoum through a coup in 1899, had praised the effectiveness of even that sort of British intelligence gathering during that campaign8. By citing many similar examples, the author proves the historicity of the human-centered British military intelligence that spans across the early period of Ottoman Empire9. The systematic way in which Britain attained information about the topography of Palestine as early as from the middle of nineteenth century through the setting up of British Palestine Exploration Fund and the way in which British military used this cultural excavations to gather relevant military intelligence is an instance that the author describes as an improvement on the same10. By pointing to how the development of rail system in Palestine and Syria became a matter of military concern for the British, the intricacies of an intelligence operation system is curiously revealed by the author11. The railway development in Palestine was a real headache to the British because it imparted the Ottoman army greater mobility and speedier access to the border regions, says the author12. According to the author, this was one of the moments in history that made technological upgradation a felt need for military intelligence. As the British had been on war with the Ottoman state since 1914, Sheffy has arranged his narrative into two historical parts- the period of 20th century before the onset of the war and the period immediately after that and up to the end of the war13. While looking at the period before the start of the war, attention is focused on how the British military made its plans and how they were linked with the intelligence resources at hand14. When the narrative enters the year of 1914, the transition from war to peace is described through explaining the political strategic power equations between Egypt, Britain, Germany and the Ottoman state.15 How the intelligence information that Germany would get an ally in Ottoman empire became decisive in the design of the military options for Britain is extensively elaborated16. According to Sheffy, the declaration of the war necessitated the adoption of unconventional methods in intelligence gathering and reporting17. Once the narrative of this books leaves over the history of British military intelligence, the importance of human resource in intelligence gathering is brushed aside as a thing of the past and technology takes over as a replacement to it18. The Palestine campaign of British military is presented entirely as an experiential platform where new technologies of intelligence gathering were introduced, practiced and evolved as a successful mechanism. Sheffy has observed that it was the technical skills attained in gathering and deciphering the communication between different enemy wings that helped British military to pursue its offensive in a better way19. In this manner, intercepting using radio, the enemy messages and finding the locations of enemy troupes by way of deciphering the information thus gathered gave the British great headway according to Sheffy20. The initial failure of the British in Gaza is traced back to the failure of military intelligence by Sheffy21. It is mainly described by Sheffy as a result of failure to spot the movements of the Ottoman army22. But there have also been differing opinions sounded suggesting that the Gaza failure was a failure in terms of command rather than military intelligence23. It is also observed that the British offensive was launched from a vulnerable position and at a not so conducive hour24. These opposing versions tone down the weight of the arguments put forth by Sheffy and contradicts his projection of this failure into future on the lines of military intelligence competence25. The method of wiretapping was thus prevalently used in this war26. Another strategy adopted for intelligence gathering in this war was photographic and visual air reconnaissance27. Sheffy has in this manner, attributed the success of British troupes to the technical competence of British military intelligence wing, the techniques including, direction-finding, cryptanalysis, code-breaking and traffic analysis and not to human interventions like spies, POWs etc.28. But the Germans were also well-versed in the use of technology in military intelligence gathering as is evident from their radio interception of British military messages by setting up a wireless station at Damascus and while considering this fact, the question rises whether the victory of British could be entirely attributed to technology29. In any war, the fact is that each element of warfare has its own role in ensuring victory. It was only by 1917 that British could establish an all-encompassing air-strip detecting system but by that time, the victory was almost at hand30. Hence instead of attributing the credit of victory to intelligence technology, it would be more reasonable if this war is seen as a venue at which British military intelligence technology was refined and standardized. The state of Arab nationalism being in its infancy could also have been one reason why the British could attain victory in this war, as is suggested by the website, Jewish Virtual Library. The Arabs were a divided group with some advocating an Islamic state and some standing for secular democracy31. The ability of the British to convince the US of the need to defeat Germany and the consequent American intervention in the war was yet another factor32. The Jewish element involved also had a role in ensuring the British victory as it was this factor that made the US more interested in this matter33. The Jewish element also shifted international opinion in support of the British side. In a broader sense, it was also the colonial resources of the British Empire that provided Britain with enough financial resources to get along with the war as it spanned through years. All these factors that comprise the international socio-political and strategic climate were decisive in the victory of Britain and this is why seeing military intelligence capability as the sole factor of success could become an erratic judgment. Another problem with Sheffy’s book is that it is not very engaging to read. The writing has incorporated too much technical military details thereby making it difficult for a reader who is interested in history alone to concentrate. The unnecessary detailing of routine warfare is a problem that deviates attention from the core issue. The following sentence is an example: During the course of September and October, credible, albeit occasionally exaggerated, information from diplomatic and consular sources reached Egypt about major troop movements from Aleppo southwards; the Ottoman-German treaty; German-Austrian pressure on the Porte to attack the Suez canal; the arrival in Istanbul of German officers, and quantities of bullion and gold coins; and the incitement of the Sinai Bedouin34. Each incident mentioned in this sentence has a historical and dramatic value that could have been made use of by the author by elaborating a little bit on each. But instead of doing that, he has moved on to look at the issue from the military angle alone35. Though it can be argued that this book concerns the military angle alone, there cannot be no harm in making a book on military matters readable and interesting by garnishing it with history and even culture. To conclude, this book has provided valuable information about the development of military intelligence and its technologies in Britain. All the same, it is short-sighted in the sense that this development was not an isolated one but one that was happening on international fronts rather than at a single nation’s war front or a single war’s venue. Bibliography Hughes, Matthew. Allenby and British strategy in the Middle East, 1917-1919, London: Routledge, 1999. Jewish Virtual Library. “Palestine During World War I”. Jewish Virtual Library. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/ww1.html (accessed April 1, 2012). Pipes, Daniel. Review of British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918”. The Middle East Quarterly, 6 (1998). Sheffy, Yigal. British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1998. Read More