Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Efforts Employed Against FARC, ELN, and AUC - Research Paper Example

Section/# Counterinsurgency: A Case Study in Colombian and Peruvian Guerilla Groups and the Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Efforts Employed Against FARC, ELN, and AUC Having a long history of political upheaval and civil war, the nations of Peru and Colombia are perhaps the perfect unit of analysis when it comes to attempting to explain and understand the many nuanced groups that have struggled for power. Although the three groups all originate within the boundaries of the same nation, attempting to categorize them in a convenient way beyond this is counterproductive. Each of these groups are distinct in that the way that they have chosen to wage their own insurgency is unique, their funding is unique, their methods, supporters, and the means with which the central governments of Colombia and Peru have chosen to combat them is also unique. As such, these three groups will be analyzed in an effort to show the differences between the varying levels at which the Colombian government has worked to combat them as well as the results of this conflict further helps to illustrate the unique strategies and overall effectiveness upon the continued survival of the respective guerilla movements. As mentioned in the introduction, this analysis will focus specifically on counterinsurgency efforts as they relate to the following three groups in both Colombia and Peru: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejercito del Pueblo (also known as FARC), Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, (also known as the ELN), and the far right movement Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (also known as the AUC). Not surprisingly, based on the political objectives of the respective groups, not necessarily a function of their overall violence, the governments of their respective countries have chosen to prosecute counterinsurgencies in different ways. For purposes of successful counterinsurgency analysis, this brief study will first consider the counterinsurgency efforts of Peruvian authorities in the complete defeat of ELN within their borders. Methodology and Research Questions For the purpose of this analysis, the research has been conducted from a range of qualitative secondary sources which have helped to shed light on the extent to which the governments of Peru and Colombia have successfully prosecuted their respective counterinsurgency wars. Secondly, the research question centers on the overall effectiveness of how these counterinsurgency struggles have been organized, implemented, and the end result of the aforementioned practices. Success is therefore easily determined based upon answering the question regarding whether the counterinsurgency efforts have been effective in either A) encouraging the insurgents to lay down their weapons and join the political process B) have resulted in a complete and total defeat of the insurgency or C) have had little effect and the insurgency is ongoing unabated. As such the research question can be answered by examining the current tactical and/or political situation posed by each of the insurgent groups that will be discussed in this paper. ELN - Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional The case of ELN is unique for a number of reasons. First, the ELN is one of the few guerilla movements that was fought and defeated during the tumultuous battles that were ongoing within the continent between supporters of left and right at the time. Second, the ELN was unique in that it chose to work outside the framework of politics; choosing instead to espouse the Cuban revolutionaries beliefs that “first comes action – then the party”. In this way, ELN relinquished any and all claims to legitimacy it might have claimed with respect to the political process. Further, by distancing themselves from politics in such a manner, they effectively cut themselves off from all support and aid they might have received within their own country; instead, they were forced to rely on resupply and technical/tactical support from fellow communist sympathizers (usually from nations such as Cuba, Bolivia, and the USSR). This fateful miscalculation made it somewhat easier for the Peruvian government to work to divide and conquer the group. With little to no support from Peruvian sympathizers, small numbers of guerilla fighters, and almost all means of technical and tactical support hundreds if not thousands of miles away, the group itself was seemingly doomed from the start as it related to an insurgency movement within the borders of Peru. Additionally, unlike FARC, which will be discussed at greater length later on in this analysis, the ELN did not involve itself with the community to the same level that FARC and other far left revolutionaries sought to. Again, due to the fact that the ELN was more focused on a violent overthrow of the existing regime without working to shore up support in towns and villages, their support network was severely weakened once pressure was put upon them by the central government of Peru. For instance, once the Peruvian military forces fought the groups into the jungles, the ELN had no support system to draw upon and due to the losses of fighters due to casualties and the inability to replace or resupply them, the group quickly fell into disarray (Ortiz 2002, 131). Therefore, the Peruvian government’s victory over the ELN was as much a direct result of incomplete organization on the part of the ELN as it was superior tactics and firepower employed by Peruvian government forces. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly with relation to the Peruvian ELN, due to the fact that they were not irrevocably tied to the land or particular tribes/people groups, the government was able to prosecute the war against them without agitating any particular group. This of course was not the case with FARC; and is perhaps the single biggest reason that the group remains a direct threat to regional stability and political union to this day (McDougall, 2008, 323). By keeping the guerilla threat contained and not allowing it the chance to imbed itself too deeply into the culture or particular regions of the countryside, Peru was able to all but ensure a complete victory over the group; due not only to superior weaponry and supply mechanisms but also to the fact that the will of the people was not in support of the group. FARC - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Conversely, the story of the FARC insurgency is another matter entirely. Beginning its struggle at about the same time that the ELN was born into existence, FARC immediately aligned itself with the proletariat workers and proceeded to push for a Marxist collectivist ideology. As such, FARC was a substantial player in the Colombian civil war from the outset and has survived until the current time (Brodzinsky et al 2011, 12). Of the three insurgent groups that are discussed in this brief analysis, FARC is perhaps the most compelling to research in that it is an example of a violent insurgent/terrorist group that has continued to thrive and to survive regardless of the fact that both Colombian and US governments have actively sought to constrain and/or eliminate the group entirely (Marks 2008, 50). Therefore, the success story of FARC bears analysis in that it has resisted some of the most sophisticated counter-insurgency experts that currently exist and continues to be a powerful force in the dynamics and political process, as well as drug smuggling cartels, of Colombia. Although FARC would be extremely happy to take all the credit for their 60 plus years of insurgency survival, the fact of the matter is that the heavy handed tactics of the United States and Colombian governments at the outset of the civil war all but ensured that the rebel group would exist for a very long time; both in reality and as a figment of freedom fighters in the hearts and minds of many of the local populace. Beginning in the late 1950’s, the United States began to take note of the ongoing civil war that was enveloping Colombia. Due to the Truman Doctrine, the United States was obliged to protect its sphere of influence from the threat of communist insurgencies. Accordingly, CIA “survey teams” combined with US Special Forces began to penetrate the apparatus of Colombian security forces by the late 1950’s. These advisors encouraged Colombian leadership to institute “Plan Lazo”, as it would be known. As such, the plan involved the Colombian military, along with its American advisors, to strike a powerful death blow to the FARC forces . The plan involved calling for both military and civil action programs in violent areas. Although the civil actions did not stir up a great deal of discontent, the military actions most certainly did. This was due to two distinct ways in which the actions were carried out. Firstly, non-linear warfare was employed as the Colombian military at the behest of their American handlers recruited civilians into pseudo-military “Civil Defense” forces which worked alongside the traditional Colombian military. Due to the way these groups were arranged, trained, and equipped, they varied deeply from the more traditional forces. Additionally, the nature of these groups and what assignments they were tasked with is still an item that is up for a considerable amount of debate. Suffice it to say that the same regiments that the standard military was beholden to were not always employed on the “Civil Defense” forces. As such, the levels of brutality and cruelty that these groups employed on regions that were known to have heavy support for the FARC absolutely can be determined to cause a backlash and even further support for the groups that the “Civil Defense” forces as well as Colombian military and US advisors were trying to combat. One such attack in particular can be seen as impetus for further support of the FARC among the native population due to the heavy handed nature of the ways in which the counterinsurgency war was fought. In an attempt to reassert control over many lost territories, the Colombian forces, at the behest of their American handlers, began to attack many of the communities that supported communist revolutionaries in the hinterlands in an attempt to provide a decisive blow to their operational support mechanisms that the group enjoyed. This tactic was employed in 1962 throughout much of the year. Due to the asymmetrical warfare that was employed combined with the “Civil Defense” forces and their overall lack of responsibility, the end result was that over 1000 villages were attacked over the course of the year; many of these villages not having any armed personnel within their borders whatsoever. However, due to the heavy handed practices of the Colombian government and their proxies the Civil Defense forces, support for FARC ballooned as territories that had never been too particularly fond of central government control immediately rallied to the side of the FARC. Surprisingly, although Plan Lazo was an unmitigated failure with respect towards winning the hearts and minds of the Colombian people in the countryside and encouraging them away from the embrace of the communist revolutionaries, Colombia continued to employ the failed tactics of Plan Lazo for over 20 years – well into the 1980’s. As such, it is not particularly surprising that FARC and the Colombian civil war is one of the longest running conflicts still in existence in the continent of South America. AUC - Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia The final guerilla group that this brief analysis will undertake to analyze with respect to the counterinsurgency efforts put forward to stop it is the AUC. Previously, this analysis has reviewed the Peruvian arm of the ELN which was eradicated due to precise actions on the Peruvian military’s part coupled with an incomplete and ill-thought out support mechanism which the group had at that time in Peru. Secondly, FARC was analyzed as a 50 plus year old civil war that was botched from the opening salvos by a heavy handed counterinsurgency method employed by an overzealous Colombian and US government action plan. As such, the similarity thus far has been South American far left groups clashing with the governments of their host states. However, the next group that this analysis considers is a far right group that is diametrically opposed to leftists and espouses a militantly capitalist model as its core belief system. As such, the AUC claimed to operate as a counter balance to the wave of far left groups that were pervading the politics and guerilla movements in Colombia. However, what was unique about the AUC is that the group practically got a free pass from the government (Hristov 2010, 17). Occasionally, when the group would cross the line and some semblance of a wrist slap would be given so as to placate those leftist in politics that the law really and truly worked both ways; however, the truth of the matter and analysis of the data yields a far different result. According to official police records, in 2000 alone, the AUC could be directly connected to 804 assassinations, 203 kidnappings, and 75 separate massacres with a total victim count of 507 (Sweig 2002, 127). Additionally, it has been surmised by others that one of the main reasons that the government has gone so soft on the group is the fact that they are secretly supporting it. Some sources go so far as to suggest that the government and the AUC forces on friendly terms (Robinson 1999, 34). Indeed, such reports are collaborated by Human rights watch which claims that there are numerous elements within the Colombian military that collaborate/tolerate AUC paramilitary groups. Although punitary actions have been known to take place, clashes between the police/government forces and the AUC are a rare occurrence. Furthermore, questions exist with respect to the sources of funding the AUC continues to enjoy. For instance, due to the groups militant anti-union and anti-communist party views, it can be seen on many levels as friendly to corporations that do business in Colombia. As such, a recent court case Doe vs. Chiquita Brands International revealed that international food giant Chiquita had paid AUC in excess of 1.7 million USD to protect its interests in Colombia (Political Conditions 2011, 41). Further, it was later determined that Chiquita was also responsible for using one of its ships as part of a smuggling operation to bring the group over 3400 AK-47 assault rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition (International Rights Advocates 2010, 1). Lastly, the group is heavily involved in the growth, processing, and exportation of cocaine. As such, the Commission for Human Rights reported that up to 70 of the operating budget for the rebel group came from money earned on the cocaine trade (Datamonitor 2010, 3). In this way, the varying layers of complexity between the AUC and the Colombian government can be seen as a function of how closely they operate and at times ignore one another with respect to the illegal activities that are taking place. Although the purpose of this analysis is not to raise one group up as worse than another, it is nonetheless interesting to note the different counterinsurgency operations (or lack thereof) that result as a direct correlation to the views and degrees of cooperation that exist between the guerillas and the government. In this way, groups such as FARC continue to exist on the periphery of the political spectrum; continually clashing with police and government forces. Whereas groups such as the AUC engage in equally criminal behavior; yet, due to the nature of the groups they in turn support and the money they generate – they are left practically unmolested by the central government. It must be noted that what makes or breaks an insurgency is not the size of the opposing force, not introduction of a superior belief or economic system, not overwhelming force, not brutality, or even the overall level of resolve. Instead, as is demonstrated by the cases involved in this analysis, that the single most important factors involve pinpointing and carefully defining who and exactly what is the enemy; rather than risking inflaming a populace and running them into the arms of rebel groups. Secondly, as was illustrated by the case analysis involving the AUC, it is the responsibility of government to maintain strong institutions that strongly discourage complicity and corruption within its ranks (Romero 2011, 19). For it is this type of corruption that works to blur the lines between insurgent and government forces (Colombian Senator Accused of Aiding Rebels 2011, 1). Therefore, if the populace begins to lose faith in their own government with respect to honesty and increasing levels of corruption that is exhibited within the ranks of the civil service, military, and police, the battle is nearly all but lost before it can be completed. In conclusion, this analysis has briefly compared the insurgency and counterinsurgency of three of South America’s most notorious rebels. The most prominent lessons that can be learned are concentric around an appropriate response for an appropriate problem. Ignoring the danger that rebels pose with respect to national sovereignty, drug trafficking, destabilization and the like is not an option. Conversely, attacking the problem head on with a tenacity that mirrors the tactics and violence used by the rebel groups themselves only serves to steal the resolve of the party that the central government is engaged in conflict with. Further, the loss of trust by the population effected by a full onslaught of government force usually tends to drive the effected population firmly in the arms of the rebels that the government is trying to subdue. As such, a precise and measured response is truly the only reasonable option for a government to engage upon as a means of dislodging and defeating a dangerous ideology or non-native rebel threat within their homeland. References Brodzinsky, Sibylla. 2011. "New FARC offensive suggests shift in Colombian rebels' strategy." Christian Science Monitor, June 16. N.PAG. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). Hristov, Jasmin. 2010. "Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal Gangs? Towards a New Conceptualization of Paramilitarism in Colombia." Labour, Capital & Society 43, no. 2: 13-56. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). Marks, Thomas A. 2008. "A MODEL COUNTERINSURGENCY: Uribe's Colombia (2002-2006) vs FARC." Military Review 49-64. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). McDougall, Alex. 2009. "State Power and Its Implications for Civil War Colombia." Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 4: 322-345. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). Ortiz, Roman D. 2002. "Insurgent Strategies in the Post–Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia." Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 25, no. 2: 127-143. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). Porch, Douglas, and Maria Jose Rasmussen. 2008. "Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?." Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 6: 520-540. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). Robinson, Linda. 1999. "A finish to the fight?." U.S. News & World Report 127, no. 4: 34. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). Romero, Simon. 2011. "Venezuela Asked Colombian Rebels to Kill Opposition Figures, Analysis Shows." New York Times, May 10. 11. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). Sweig, Julia E. 2002. "What Kind of War for Colombia? HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF?." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5: 122-141. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). 2011. "Political Conditions." Colombia Country Review 39-65. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). 2010. "DATAMONITOR: Colombia." Colombia Country Profile 1-75. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). 2010. "Colombian Senator, Accused of Aiding Rebels, Is Dismissed." New York Times, September 28. 7. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 28, 2012). Read More