Joe Soss Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Leaning and Political Action - Term Paper Example

Underlying policies are political agencies, motives and ends. The brand of certain policies determines to a large extent the political involvement of certain groups. At the same time, some individuals approach policymakers and government institutions using their own experiences and interactions with government employees who carry out policies. This personal experience, whether positive or negative, moulds the degree of political participation. Governments who manufacture, espouse, and enforce certain policies. Feedback from respondents and a revelation of their perceptions are critical in gauging satisfaction, political participation and success of policy ventures. Also, the character of institutions patterned after types of government bears considerable weight in the latitude for political activism to modify, revoke, renew or revamp policies. Joe Soss’ “Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Leaning and Political Action” attempts to define the link between party politics, government institutions such as welfare and the political participation of welfare beneficiaries. Soss points out that welfare recipients are not prone to being involved in voting or political activism. Because of the disillusion in unfulfilled electoral promises, the invasive questions of social welfare officials, and the pressure to meet more burning priorities such as food, shelter, and employment, persons depending on the welfare system are unlikely to be active or return political favors to the government. In this case, Soss emphasizes the characteristic “quiescence” (Soss 1999) of the poor masses to whom the government gives alms in exchange for its support. Another reason for the general apolitical sentiment among welfare beneficiaries is that welfare policies are structured in such a way that the less the welfare respondents reveal concerning their personal lives, the better. They have learned that to survive, they have to don a facade which would put them in the good graces of the government who endows them with benefits through certain social policies. Internal efficacy is the term used to describe the confidence possessed within an individual or group to transact business with government and carry out policies which initiate or forward change. In this case, low internal efficacy begets low expectations and political immobility. Both Joe Soss and Edella Schlager concur that the effect of policies can depend on variables contained within different programs and demographic data such as age, sex, race, residence, education and income. Schlager classifies this type of policy classification as social construction theory which stipulates that for each policy, there exists a target population with definable traits. Soss recognizes that government systems broadly target groups, categorize, and even stereotype using raw data for example, “welfare mothers.” Based on the layout of the policy, these target populations such as welfare recipients feel either encouraged or discouraged in political participation. Target populations consider their interaction with various government departments as representative microcosm of “big government,” therefore they arrive at conclusions originating from their dealings and responses from public agencies. According to Soss’ study, levels of active partisanship and the success of policies are linked to education. In this group analysis, program subjects who are more educated, feel more empowered, tend to claim legitimate rights of government organization and make informed decisions. As a result, they have high internal efficacy (Soss 1999). The paternalistic structure of policies which fosters the relationship between government and welfare recipients is one influencing factor which contributes to political passivity. Policies are developed which compel program subjects to divulge information, threaten to sever benefits, implement regular assessments to prove eligibility for continued financial support, and discourage outspokenness. These formatted policies incorporate intermediaries such as the welfare caseworkers who wield power over welfare participants to such an extent that only compliance and reticence would be acceptable before government officials who had such authority over their livelihood and existence (Soss 1999). Also welfare respondents are set to a disadvantage since they do not know the intricacies of the system; however their only weapon is subjection to authority to keep up the semblance of need. Soss posits that autonomous policies share all the aforementioned characteristics. Target populations labor under a mindset of low internal efficacy or inferiority complex which makes them unwilling and unable to mobilize themselves for meaningful policy changes. They are not cognizant of their rights, they are not acquainted with the ins and outs of government operations, and they heavily depend on caseworkers to provide information. As a result of their powerlessness, they assume a political indifference, believing that big government will do what it wants despite the desires of citizens and petitions for policy changes. On the other hand, democratic policymakers forge a genre of peer relationship between government and welfare recipients varies according to program. Democratic policy structures encourage active participation, urge feedback and initiative, empower participants to make decisions, demand more proactiveness, and are more directly approached so no need arises for intermediaries. For example, in Soss’ examination of the SSDI program, there are neither caseworkers nor regular reports. Recipients feel at liberty to express themselves. Also, the structure of this policy hinges on the active participation of the beneficiaries. This policy-making body views efficiency as active participation to satisfy the needs of clients. External efficacy denotes the competency of government staff to fulfill the needs of clients or target populations. Schlager believes that the theory of common pool resources is also a method of policy-making which foments reciprocity, collective action, incremental change, institutional responsibility to provide explanation to the individual. The institution plays a significant role in the lives of the target population; however, it still has overarching autonomy to make unilateral decisions (Schlager 1999). Schlager also applies the multiple streams theory/framework of David Kingdon who observes three principal streams in policymaking: the problem stream, the policy stream and the political stream. These streams are mutually exclusive and focus on the impacts of events, the policymaking communities which draft proposals and the inspection of public opinion, lobbying groups and government regime changes. Hence, one places little stress on individual decision-making. The punctuated-equilibrium theory is a policy dynamic in which institutions possess innate power to effect policy change, however, owing to separate and overlapping departments and jurisdictions, a “policy stasis” is produced. Soss likens this type of policy organization as “complicated”. The complicated scenario involves bureaucratic chaos, convoluted avenues, abstruse laws, lack of coordination among government officials, and ill-timed responses. The perceived complicated model of government also baffles the members of certain target groups and as a result, political participation is greatly minimized. Nevertheless, in the punctuated-equilibrium theory, the possibility is open towards change and like the democratic policy entrepreneurs, policies would be adjusted to fit demands. These policy alterations are minor. Also since the government controls the venues which shape policy such as state or federal departments or institutions, in the long run, government ultimately remains with the upper hand. Schlager refers to Paul Sabatier who masterminded the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF policy framework gleans and utilizes data from scientific research and practical cases and crafts tailor-made policies to suit the target population (Bandelow 2005). Through the actions of lobbying parties and interest groups, policy change occurs. Policymakers pay attention to not only the directives of government, but also the demands of population cross sections advocating a particular policy stance. In this regard, Soss realizes that policymakers often urge the policy beneficiaries to vote a particular way in time of elections as a means of requiting the favor and retaining power. Sabatier calls these highly active advocacy groups as political ‘subsystems.’ References: Bandelow, N.C (2005). “Advocacy Coalitions, Policy-Oriented Learning and Long-Term Change in Genetic Engineering Policy: An Interpretist View,” . Web 09 April 2011. Ike, R. M. (2009). “Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Approach to Critical Theory and Belief Systems in Policy Making,” Political Studies Association, University of Newcastle. . Web 09 April 2011. Sabatier, P. A., Jenkins-Smith, H.C., eds (1993). Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder: Westview Press. Schlager, E. (1999). “A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, Models of Policy Processes,” in Paul Sabatier, ed. Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Soss, J. (1999). “Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Leaning and Political Action” The American Political Science Review, 93 (2), 363-380. . Web 09 April 2011. Read More