How Power and Authority Relate to One Another in Decision Making Contexts - Report Example

Power and Authority Name: Course: Tutor: Date: Introduction There are no single clear definitions of power and authority. This paper attempts to discuss the two conceptions by suggesting some definitions, and analysing how the concepts relate to each other. Additionally, the paper will highlight how the two concepts overlap and their similarities and differences. ‘Power’ and ‘authority’ Can the term “power” be clearly defined? Most people have an intuitive notion of what the term means but still, there is no clear-cut definition of power that is valid in every situation. In this paper, power defined in terms of a relation between people, and is expressed in simple symbolic notation. From this definition is developed a statement of power comparability, or the relative degree of power held by two or more persons. With these concepts it is possible for example, to rank members of the United States Senate according to the “power" they hold over legislation on foreign policy as well as tax and fiscal policy (Dahl, 1956). In general terms, power is understood as the ability to produce an effect or the ability to get what one wants. The concept of power continues to hold great promise for those who wish to understand the role it plays in social relationships (Dahl, March, & Nasatir, 1956). Power has been characterized as "the fundamental concept in social scenic in the same sense energy is the fundamental concept in physics" (Dahl, 1956). In the same perspective, the concept of power presents an equally great problem. In the entire word list of sociological concepts, none is more difficult than the concept of power. Power may be well known, but it is difficult to explain (Bierstadt, 1954, p. 730). In short, it is far easier to appreciate the importance of power in social relations than it is to understand the concept itself. Many past researches and efforts have taken different techniques to describe and evaluate the concept of power. In the paper, the discussion will concentrate on the relationship between decision making approach and power. Decision making is always under the "influence" of power, and this approach conceives of power as the extent to which a target seriously considers the wishes of the agent (Buckley, 1967; Herbert, 1957). This approach reveals the important role which power plays in the dynamics of decision making. The decision making stage in the power episode begins when the target is first aroused to conscious consideration of his or her behaviour regarding those issues of interest to the agent. It ends when the target develops a behavioural intention to act in a certain way regarding those issues. Connecting first arousal to behavioural intention is the process of decision making. If the agent chooses to work through this stage, his or her objective is decision similarity (i.e., similarity between agent desires and target intentions). To achieve decision similarity, the agent can make tactical use of resources to affect target arousal, decision making, or both. The agent, of course, can affect either arousal or decision making directly or indirectly through manipulation of the target's environment. The main problem, however, is not to determine the existence of power but to make comparisons. There can be no gainsaying the fact that Stalin was more powerful than Roosevelt in a great many ways, that McCarthy was less powerful after his censure by the Senate than before, etc. But what, precisely, does this mean? Evidently there is need to define the concepts "more power than," "less power than," and "equal power." Suppose one wishes to compare the power of two different individuals, there are at least five factors that might be included in the comparison: (1) differences in the basis of the people’s power, (2) differences in the means of employing the basis, (3) differences in the scope of thee individuals’ power, i.e., in type of response evoked, (4) differences in the number of comparable respondents, and (5) differences in the change in probabilities (Laski, 2003; Dahl, 1957). The first two of these may be conveniently thought of as differences in properties of the actors exercising power, and the last three may be thought of as differences in the responses of the respondents (Laski, 2003). Now it is clear that the pay-off lies in the last three-the responses. When we examine the first two in order to compare the power of individuals, rulers, or states, we do so on the supposition that differences in bases and means of actors are very likely to produce differences in the responses of those they seek to control. Closely related to power is the concept of “authority,” which is discussed in the following section. There have been a lot of researches on the topic ‘authority’ in the past; however, this subject area seems to have become more and more confused over the years. The concept of authority can be introduced by sketching its relation to the concept of power. There are various types of power; for an account of authority the most important kind of power is the power to make the lives of other people the way one wants them to be especially the power to make them do certain things. The authority can be characterized in terms of the idea of compliance with a directive, and with this can be introduced a corresponding species of power, the ability to get others to act or refrain by issuing directives, that is, by telling them what to do (Laski, 2003; Dahl, 1957). Authority may be defined as the ability or power of one person to make choices that guide the deeds of another. It is a form of relationship involving two individuals, one “superior” and the other “subordinate.” The superior one coins and transmits decisions with the anticipation that they will be honoured by the subordinate. The subordinate expects such decisions and his conduct is determined by them (White, 1939). The relationship of authority can be defined, therefore, in purely objective and behaviouristic terms. It involves behaviours on the part of both superior and subordinate. When and only when these behaviours occur does a relationship of authority prevail between the two people involved. When the behaviours do not occur there is no authority, whatever may be the “paper” theory of organization. The behaviour pattern of the superior involves a command- an imperative statement concerning the choice of a behaviour alternative by the other- and an expectation that the command will be accepted by the other as a criterion of choice (Tead, 1929). The behaviour pattern of the subordinate is governed by a single intermediate decision, or criterion for decision, to “follow that behaviour alternative which is selected for me by the supervisor.” That is, he holds in abeyance his own critical faculties for choosing between alternatives and uses the formal criterion of the receipt of a command or signal as his basis of choice (Tead, 1929). Now since the relation of authority involves a particular criterion of choice as the basis for the subordinate’s behaviour, it is clear that two persons may stand in a relation of authority at one moment and not at the next (Tead, 1929). For the subordinate’s behaviour may be governed at the first moment by a command, and not at the next. Nor does it follow that when two persons recognize each other as “superior” and “subordinate” respectively, all the verbalizations of the first which affect the behaviours of the second are “commands.” The willingness of the subordinate to accept a command, if given, does not imply that all, or even most, of his behaviour choices are governed by commands (Tead, 1929). It is necessary to distinguish, therefore, between specific behaviours which are momentary instances of the exercise of authority, and the roles played by two persons over a period of time which involve an expectation of obedience by the one and a willingness to obey by the other. To take an example that Alvin Goldman uses to make a different point, a skywriter has the ability to make people look up, but he does not tell them to do anything (Goldman, 1972). In reference to this, the ability to get people to do things by telling them to do these things as a directive can be referred to as power (Weber, 1947). Similarly, to have authority is to have the capacity to direct the actions of some other people (Tead, 1929). Of all the modes of influence, authority is the one that chiefly distinguishes the behaviour of individuals as participants of organizations from their behaviour outside such organizations. It is authority that gives an organization its formal structure, and the other modes of influence may best be understood after this structure has been specified (Tead, 1929; Weber, 1947). A question that is certainly difficult to answer is what distinguishes power or authority as a right from other considerations that give one the moral ability to call on others to act in certain ways. Using a concept introduced by Raz, it can be noted that although all such considerations present others with reasons for action, when one has authority, one’s directives are taken as or are, in the case of legitimate authority- defensive reasons for some other people to do what is directed (Raz, 1990). Sometimes, one may have a right to direct another to behave in a certain way because he has an independently existing right that he behaves in that way. An example would be the right to direct someone with hostile intentions to take his hands off that person. He possesses this right because he has an antecedently existing right not to be touched without his or her consent. This can be referred to as a right to direct of this sort a derived right to direct. The right to direct characteristic of authority is not derived in this way from an independent right (or other consideration that makes it the case that the person to whom the directive is addressed ought in any case to perform the action he is directed to perform) (Raz, 1990). It is a right to direct another to perform certain actions even if no independent considerations require their performance. To say that the right to direct involved in authority is not derived from an independent consideration that makes performance of the directed act the right thing to do is not, of course, to say that authority can not be justified. Other considerations can establish the existence of a right to direct (Raz, 1990). From the standpoint of the subject in an authority relation, the phenomenon of content-independence can (with a little oversimplication) be understood as follows. When people speak of such a relation, they have in mind a set of actions that could be performed by the subject, and they suppose that she has some ranking of the alternatives in this set determined by her assessment of the applicable content-dependent reasons. Her acceptance of authority consists, in part, in her willingness to regard the fact that one of the actions in this set is directed by the person whose authority she acknowledges as a sufficient reason to perform it even though it is not the action that she, consulting content-dependent reasons, ranks first. According to Bierstadt (1954), authority exists only when it can not be questioned and whn qutin start to arise about it, it is perceived to have been weakened. These leads back to the point of the “inferior” and “superior” people. Thus, the superior people only maintain their authority as long as the inferiors cannot question them. How power and authority relate to one another in decision making contexts It is customary to begin a discussion of power with a consideration of authority or vice versa and then to player within a social association will be in a position to perform his own will in spite of resistance (Blau, Scott, 1962, p. 27). The authors define authority as: the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons (Blau, Scott, 1962, p. 28). The definition above fails to delineate clearly the concepts. Confusion results from defining each as a variant of the other. For example, authority is defined as "legitimate power" and power as "informal authority". Furthermore, for some, power is what makes authority effective (Weber, 1925, p. 30). One resolution of these difficulties is to view power and authority as end points on a single continuer and to differentiate between them on common dimensions. Barnard's definition of authority suggests the difference: Authority is the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to or "member" of the organization as governing the action he contributes (Barnard, 1948, p. 161) The critical difference is implied in the phrase "by virtue of which it is accepted". The underlying rationale of acceptance of authority, only implicit in this phrase, is examined below. Drawing on Blau and Scott (1962), the criteria of authority are presented and the rationale for such criteria is offered. Four properties of authority follow: 1. Authority is invested in a position. An incumbent has authority because of one's position, regardless of one's personal characteristics. 2. Voluntary compliance by subordinates is a characteristic of an exercise of authority. Subordinates accept voluntarily the responsibilities conferred on them by authority. 3. Another characteristic of authority is the suspension by subordinates of their judgment in advance of a command or decision. The target of control is committed to execute the command before it is issued. 4. The final, and perhaps most abstruse criterion, is that authority can arise only in a collective context. In such a context a common value orientation about the appropriateness of control by authority reinforces the pattern of acceptance. This property of authority permits an individual to reject authority while at the same time the collectivity helps the official enforce his or her authority over a recalcitrant individual (or minority). So long as a majority is willing to enforce authority, that authority exists. These elements are highlighted in figure 1. Figure 1: Authority and power systems Buckley (1967) Four questions can be used to illustrate each of the properties in figures 1: Why is authority invested in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)? Why do people willingly pay taxes? Why do people follow in detail the filing instructions of the IRS without question? Why fellow citizens expect each other to accept the authority of the IRS? The same answer (for the common good!) to all four questions is the key to rationale for authority and its opposite, power. To attempt control of others is to imply desired goals or ends. But whose goals and how are these goals established? The "virtue" Barnard refers to is the nature of the goals and the degree of consensus associated with goal formulation and promotion. What legitimizes authority is the promotion or pursuit of collective goals that are associated with group consensus. The polar opposite, power is pursuit of individual or particularistic goals associated with group compliance (Barnard, 1948). What "legitimizes" an exercise of authority is the structure of official positions in conjunction with the pursuit of compatible individual and collective goals and group consensus about the nature of goals and how they are to be pursued. (Buckley, 1967) These relationships (see Figure 1) help explain why what is conceptually libelled an exercise of authority in a formal organization may actually be, or may be experienced as, power. Commands to adhere to organizational policy may not be viewed as legitimate when group consensus or group goals are not associated with establishing that policy. Organization students' confusion on authority can be understood in terms of misapplication of the term. Control in situations where goals are not established by consensus (or a wide majority), and hence do not represent collective goals, is not authority. Rather, organization goals when established unilaterally by those few in the hierarchy and pursued by compliance of lower level participants are power situations. In this case, power is the means of control even if it has the trappings of legitimacy. Under these conditions, the rejoinder of the subordinates may not be anticipated correctly. The responses, when power is experienced or perceived instead of authority, may be in Etzioni's terms calculative-involvement or alienative-involvement (Buckley, 1967; Erwin, 1946). Power and authority, two forms of control, can be conceptualized as the end points of a continuum of control. Buckley offers tentative definition of the end points. Power is de- fined as: Control or influence over the actions of others to promote one's goals without their consent, against their will or without their knowledge or understanding (Buckley, 1967, p. 186). Authority is defined as: The direction or control of the behaviour of others for the promotion of collective goals based on some ascertainable form of their knowledgeable consent (Buckley, 1967, p. 186). Power actually exercised may range from force through manipulation of symbols, information, and environment, to contingent rewards. A critical characteristic of power is the emphasis on private-goal orientation rather than collective goal orientation. In contrast, "authority refers to an informed, voluntary compliance ... or a distinctiveness of the goal orientation of the controllers as well as the controlled" (Buckley, 1967, p. 186). From the discussion above, two things become quite clear. Firstly, as Raz (1990) and others have emphasized, while to accept authority is to exercise one’s will in accordance with someone else’s directive rather than one’s own judgment (of what the applicable directive-independent reasons require), it does not involve a surrender of judgment in the further sense of declining to exercise one’s judgmental capacities. One remains free, as someone subject to authority, to consider what the applicable directive-independent reasons require as long as one does not act on the resulting judgment. Indeed, we can go further. Not only does one remain free to do this, but doing so may be a necessary part of the procedure by which one determines whether authority is legitimate. Whether there is reason to accept preemption may depend in part on what there would be reason to do in the absence of preemption (Raz, 1990; Frederick, 1974). Secondly, as Raz has also emphasized, preemption is to be distinguished from the outweighing of one reason by another (Raz, 1990). Pre-emptive reasons are to be understood as simply added to and balanced against the reasons that one already acknowledges. Rather, pre-emptive reasons exclude and take the place of other reasons. The difference between this and outweighing can be brought out by reverting to our discussion of exclusionary reasons. Such reasons may tip the balance of considerations supporting a certain action but they do this not by taking a place alongside other considerations on the scale of reason, but by removing certain other considerations from the scale. Of course, pre-emptive reasons are not merely exclusionary; they are considerations pre or con of action in their own right. But because they are in part exclusionary, they take a place on the scale of reason by knocking other considerations off (Raz, 1990). No one has to be entrusted with power, because anyone invested with influence must, with the force of an unalterable social law, become a tormenter and exploiter of society. People are in fact enemies of all authority, for they realize that authority and power corrupt those who put them into effect them as much as those who are forced to comply with them. Under its baneful influence some become ambitious despots, lusting for power and greedy for gain, exploiters of society for their own benefit or that of their class, while others become slaves. How power and authority overlap, and/or differ from one another. Similarities and differences Gamson has offered an analysis of power and authority which contrasts "authorities" and "potential partisans". Authorities are those for any social system that make binding decisions for the members of that system. Potential partisans may be defined as "that set of actors who for a given decision are affected by the outcome in a 'significant' way" (Gamson, 1968, p. 32). To indicate that a decision is binding implies that it can be implemented without further review. A decision has authority if it is accepted, or if it is not accepted, legitimate force can be used to enforce it (Gamson, 1968). Enforcement is possible because of the collective nature of authority. If authority is not accepted by an individual but is enforced by the other members of a social system, then that authority is intact. The traffic violator is expected by other citizens to accept traffic laws. Such laws represent collective goals and consensus about the necessity for traffic regulation in spite of occasional violators. Authorities are decision makers who seek to achieve collective goals. Partisans seek to influence authorities to alter their decisions so as to increase the benefit of the decision outcome to themselves. Particularistic goals are sought by the partisan by the use of influence. Authorities seeking collective goals attempt to counter the influence of partisans. Partisans seek to reduce the authority of the decision makers, who in turn seek to reinforce their authority. Both the influence of the partisans and the counterinfluence of the authorities are generally referred to as a power. Here, the action of the partisans is called influence and the action of the authorities to counter this influence is social control. To restate the relationship, authorities are the initiators of social control, and they are the recipients of influence. Potential partisans have the opposite roles - as initiators of influence and the target of social control. "Thus, social control and influence are the inverse of each other" (Gamson, 1968, p. 37) Gamson's (1968) perspective compliments Buckley's view in at least three significant ways: 1. The conceptual distinction between authority and power becomes secondary to a detailed discussion of influence and social control. 2. The interaction between those in and subject to authority is made explicit. 3. Hierarchy and authority are not necessarily related. Buckley (1967) focuses on authority, consensus, and goals, and Gamson on power divided into influence and social control and their interaction. These latter issues are examined next. Perhaps the most significant implication of power as viewed here is on the conceptualization of authority. Authority is both complex and tenuous; authority and power are polar opposites, distinct conceptually because of: 1. The nature of goals pursued, and 2. The degree of agreement among organization members of the desirability of those goals and means to obtain them. In practice, authority and power merge imperceptibly with each other. It is not uncommon for individuals actually to believe that their personal goals are in the common interest. Fair trade laws, non-stringent strip-mining legislation, tradesmen's licensing status, large marketing budgets, expanded computer capacity, and in- creased support are generally justified on the basis of the common good: preserved competition, lower cost fuel, improved community health, increased sales, improved information flows, and better education. Where these are not the actual goals sought, influence is being exercised on those in positions of authority, but when common goals are actually pursued by those in the hierarchy, their motives may be suspect. In such situations, exercises of authority are experienced as power by some of those controlled. At times, particular goals may not easily be classified into common vs. personal. Such blurred distinctions make differentiating authority from power problematic. This view of power has implications for Barnard's (1948) acceptance theory of authority, more specifically for the range of subordinate behaviour in response to authority. The author presented a view of authority from the partisan's perspective that can now be modified to incorporate influence. Barnard (1948) conceived of three subordinate responses to a command or decision by authorities: acceptance, indifference, and rejection. Conclusion As it has been discussed, it is empirically difficult to distinguish between authority and power. Given the argument presented in this paper, authority conceptually and empirically differs from power only in terms of the nature of goals sought as well as responses of those controlled. It has been noted that power and are generally exercised in pronounced ways when the subjects upon whom the concepts being exercised are willing to obey. However, when the subjects develop the ability to question, the concepts of power and authority are perceived to be weakened. It has also been noted that authority involves consensus building, in which decision are made though collective goals. When consensus lacks in any given situation then authority is said to be lacking. On the other hand, power is achieved when unilateral decisions are made by those at the helm of any organization without necessarily consulting other concerned parties below them. As such it has been note that no should be trusted with power since there is a tendency by everyone in power to use the associated influence to oppress and exploit the society. In practice however, authority and power are intertwined an it common for individual possessing them to believe that the personal objectives are in common interest with other people’s, when in fact they are not. References Barnard, C. I. (1948). The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Bentham, J. (1998), A fragment on Government, Oxford: Clarendon Press Bierstadt, R. (1954). The problem of authority. New York:McGraw Hill. Blau, P. M., & W. Scott, R. (1962). Formal Organizations San Francisco: Chandler. Buckley, W. (1967). Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.' Prentice-Hall. Dahl, R. A., March, J., &: Nasatir, D. (1956). Influence ranking in the United States Senate. Read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C. Dahl, R.A. (1957), The concept of Power. Behaviour Science, pp. 201-215 Erwin, H. S. (1946) The Techniques of Executive Control, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 6th ed., p. 57. Frederick, W. F. (1974). Political Power, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition, Pp. 697-702 Gamson, W. A. (1968). Power and Discontent, Homewood, III: Dorsey Press. Herbert, A. S. (1957). Models of Man. New York: Wiley. Laski, H.J. (2003). Authority in the Modern State.London: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. Raz, J. (1990). Authority. New York :New York University Press. Tead, O. (1929) Human Nature and Management, New York, McGraw Hill, p. 149. Weber, M. (1925). Irirtschafl uwl Gesellschaft. Tllbingen:. I. C. B.Mohr, 1925. 2 vols. 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