Incident Command System - Harrow Court Incident - Case Study Example

Incident Command (Course Name and Code) (Institution Name) (Students Name) (Students Number) (Tutors Name) 9 August 2008 Many issues surround human beings and environment that may cause a problem any time. Issues such as global warming, floods, terrorism contributes to all dangers that humanity faces. There should be structures that managers this incidents and an example is the Incident Command System that contains a hierarchal command structure. ICS will be discussed and Harrow Court Incident will be taken as an example of benefit that could have resulted if ICS would have been employed. In addition, the different parts and functions of ICS are discussed. Brief History Incident Command System (ICS) was developed in 1970s after the massive fire fighting in California and other catastrophic fires in the urban places of California. These fire results to property loss, injuries and even deaths. From this, it was evident that the existing structure was not able to deal with threats that involved many districts. Hence, it was developed to clarify the command structure during large-scale incidents. It was the embraced by many countries like Australia and United Kingdom (Taylor 1999). Gold Silver Bronze command structure It is used to establish a hierarchical framework that is used for command and control of different levels of incident and disasters. The terms strategic, tactical and operational are grouped, as gold is for strategic, silver for tactical and bronze for operational. Gold Commander formulates strategies that are used in dealing with an incident; the commander is not at the incident site but at a distance office. Silver Commander receives direction from the Gold Commander and breaks these instructions into sets that can be followed by Bronze Commander. Bronze commander is within an incident scene and work in hand with the staff at the site. Bronze Commander is under the police during emergency cases apart from those that are related with Fire and Rescue Incidents (Thom 2001). Span of control This is an integral part of incident command system. It requires distinctive areas or communications of any officer to be limited to enable effectively manage their issue. The span of control mostly deals with communications related issues and it is usually 2- 3 lines in a complex situation and 6 – 7 lines in a stable situation. In most cases, the commander is supposed to limit their span of control to 4 – 5 lines of direct involment. Sectorisation This is the method in which defined boundary of responsibilities is derived. This boundary then defines a Sector as functions or areas of responsibilities. A Sector may either be physical or in parts of services of operations. The size and complexity of an incident may be difficult for an Incident Commander to operate easily; hence, the incident commander will break the incident into sectors and assign a Sector Commander. There are usually two types of sectorisation: specialization or topographical. Roles and Responsibilities Sector Commander is usually appointed for a specific sector that is there, and is supposed to report to the IC or the Operations Commander. The Sector Commander will be the general manager of a given Sector and will be responsible for any risks that affect their sector. Incident Commander is the most senior officer who is in charge of an incident. The role of the Incident Commander is to oversee the overall management of an incident and mostly focuses on the health and safety of the crew, Command and Control, Deployment of Resources, and Tactical Planning. Operations Commander is usually nominated by IC to facilitate in maintaining the span of control. The span of control may involve a complex incident, large or Inter Agency Incident. The Operation Commander must be conversant to all aspects of the incident and be able to coordinate the different sectors (Michael 1999). Command Support They will be called upon to assist the IC in managing an incident. Command Support will be required to manage radio communications and the following functions: To act as a first contact point of an incident, and to enter information to the contact point log form Assist in Liaison with IC with other agencies. Direct the available resources to the required location Record information that concerns sector identification and the officers on duty. Inner and Outer Cordon The inner cordon is that area that the emergency services are at work to rescue casualties and any survivors and to deal with the reason for the emergency. Personnel in this area should have protective gear and ensure that evidence is protected. Outer Cordon is the surrounding of an incident and seals off the area of incidence so that the public could not cross. Tactical Mode This producer assists the Incident Commander in managing any Incident effectively without compromising the safety and health of the personnel. An incident is said to be transition when the crew are committed to an area of an incident and being held back from other areas. When an incident is sectorised, and a tactical mode assessment is made then the mode is either defensive or offensive. Hence, an offensive mode requires the crew to be removed from a hazardous area. Importance of the ICS in an Incident Usually ICS consists of hierarchical of organization and contains procedures in the management of an incident. In addition, it is contains mechanisms and means by which an incident team can be controlled, availability of facilities and equipments and smooth communication. This is a system, which is developed to manage an incident until the situation goes back to normal or when the operation is not needed. The services that are availed by the ICS include meeting different types of incidents and there relevant complexity, bringing in different personality from various agencies under a common terminology, maintain logistical and administrative support to the operational staff and ensure that all the duties that are undertaken are cost effective due to prevention of duplication of duties. If the issue of the ICS was not existent, there could have been different problems. There could have been chaos and individualism since each personnel tries to save a different mission. Different agencies that are involved will course conflict or collision of duties and responsibilities. Due to scrambling to solve the incident or assist in it, more damages could result and additional injuries to both the personnel and the victims could be increased. Incident Command System in High Buildings The circumstances that concerns high-rise buildings are different in terms of floors and level, there should be detailed guidance and understanding of sectorisation principles in such issues. This is because the Sector Commander may not be physical present at the situation due to factors such as smoke and when there are cases that affect external and internal sectorisation are required (Patrick 2002). There are certain conditions that stipulate that it is better not to sectorise a high-rise building due to barriers in information flow between the Incident Commander and the crew. There may arise cases that require external surveillance – external sectorisation that uses features such as the aerial appliances will require operating in the normal model. While at a times, they may be required to operate a single fire sector, which calls upon the external and support sectors to work in conventional model or way. In addition, there might be different personnel who are working in an area that require different operations such as searching, ventilating, and salvage operations. In managing issues that are associated with high rise buildings sectorisation is good since it divides the duties and concentration in one point can be easily be achieved. In this way, the work force is split, and the ability of each solving an issue is increased and conflicts are completely removed. When each sector has a person who directs the required accomplishment, other floors will be accomplished depending on the scenario at that floor by the other commanders. Incidents occur differently and due to the fact building are sectored by the nature of the floors, sectorisation application will be easily applied and positive benefits will be evident. Harrow Court Incident It was an incident that occurred in the 15th floor of Harrow Court, Silam Road - Stevenage. Harrow court is a residential building with 18 floors. Two fire fighting appliances were sent from Stevenage Fire Station after they received distress. The fire was seen either in the 14th or 15th floor. Three fire fighters located the fire in the 14th floor, and they made entry in the 85th flat, rescued one occupant, and returned to rescue the second occupant. One of the fire fighters had laid out the hose line, but he was not successful when charging it. The other two fire fighters re-entered the room without any means to defend themselves from fire development. When they were in the flat, there was fire development, one of the fire fighters escape but was entangled by cables that had fallen in front of the door. Two fire fighters died in the incident and one woman. Some mistakes that occurred included the fire fighters re-entering the flat without the protective hose lines. There breathing apparatus were defective and the apparatus failed to work. The high-rise building procedures were inadequate and were not followed. This was because the recommendations that were proposed by the HSE were not followed. The management of the incident was poor, the breathing apparatus failed to satisfy the requirements through the guidance of HM Inspectorate. In addition, incident command procedures that were issued by HM Inspectorate were not fully followed and some parts were inadequate and omitted some provisions of the national guidance. Through the Harrow Court incident, it was evident that there was poor training and organizational weakness in training of the fire fighting personnel. The two fire fighters, while others were receiving instructions they went straight to assist the distressed, this brings in issues that are related to individualism. The incident or mostly the death of the two fire fighters would have been prevented if the crew and the management had cooperated. If the fire fighting station had followed the required procedures and the policies that were directed to them by HM Inspectorate, the mission may have been successful. Most of the fire fighters and crew were not fully trained or did not receive refresher courses that concerned fire fighting; if they did, the fire fighters could not have died. The resources that they were allocated were poor, the breathing masks failed to function and the horse pipe did not charge. Through this, it is evident that the management of required resources and the state of the resources was poor. From this viewpoint, the resources should be managed and lacking resources should be allocated. Dynamic Risk Assessment This is the method in which the changing circumstances that is associated with an incident is continuously assessed. So has to enable in developing the necessary control measures to ensure that certain level of safety is maintained. There are different philosophies that are associated with Fire and Rescue Services. However, the common ones are to picture the scenario before deciding what to do. The philosophers’ further say that anything is salvageable, but those issues that have burned out or completely ruined should be left at that, and concentrate on those issues that can be salvaged (Rick 2003). The difference between dynamic risk assessment and generic assessment risk is the place and time of application. Generic is usually applicable in a stable condition such as a hospital scenario. This means that the situation is stable and not changing but trying to predict where problems can come from. In this incident, dynamic risk assessment was not done well. This is because the fire fighters were not able to analyze the situation before going back for the second time. They could have checked the preventive or supportive equipments such as the horse pipe and the smoke apparatus. Poor risk assessment contributed to the death of the fire fighters and the woman. If they had done risk assessment, they could have known the type of risks that they were going into and take the required precautions. Liaison Agencies Agencies come to assist the personnel and crew who are trying to solve an incident. There are different liaisons agencies that can be in an incident are and they range from media to the police. They help in ensuring that the personnel and people who are involved in an incident are assisted in the right way and at the fastest speed. The liaison agencies advices the Incident Commander on issues that makes solving the problem easier. They give the IC strategies and like the media, they tell the public how and in what way the Incident Commander requires assistance. Police as liaison agencies maintains order in the place of incidence. The ambulances with the help of parametric ensure that those people who have been affected by an incident are taken care of. The local authority ensures that any resources such as the fire fighting equipments are available and provide any documentation that is required in solving the incident. Environmental agencies try to see what effects the incident could have in relation to the environment. The governmental agencies helps in issues such as providing finances, ensuring the right apparatus are there and other issues that affect the government in general (David 2001). Other agencies that could have been involved in the Harrow Court Incident include the housing department and social services that could have provided information concerning the habitants of the building and the general nature of the flats. The local authority and mostly the structural engineer could have provided drawings that show the facilities, services that are in the building. Conclusion The structural nature of an incident command system has helped to solve many issues that are relevant in managing an incident. Since its inception in California it has gone through many countries in there application with most of these countries succeeding in its application. The distinctive hierarchical nature of commands, and how other agencies are incorporated makes solving incidents easy with minimal consequences. The role and responsibilities of the different commands are clearly defined and will not cause conflict or duplication of duties. Dividing an incident into sectors is important in ensuring that the incident is put into parts, which can be easily managed. Understanding the type of risk that is associated with any incident is important to reduce any risks and impacts to the crew. Harrow Court Incident is an example of a poorly managed incident that led to the death of three people. The equipments and apparatus that are devoted for incident management should be in good form and the crew should be at their peak every time – they should be fully trained. Liaisons agencies and other stakeholders’ contribution to an incident is usually important. The additional services that they provide ensure that the problem is solved with the right specialty. They come with a wide field of expertise and equipments that they provide are of great importance. They advice and strategize with the Incident Commander to obtain a suitable solution to a problem. Bibliography David, M. (2001), Organizational Structure, (New York, Prentice Hall Publishers) Kibble, P. (2004), Fire and Rescue Management, (Washington, Washington Publishers) Kelvin, W. (2004), Management: Incident Operation, (London, Oxford University Press). Michael, H. (1999), Decision Making in Incident Management, (Australia, Fontana Books). Mark, J. (2005), Incident Command System, (London, Cambridge University Press) Patrick, J. (2002). Management of Incidents. (New York, Barron’s Educational Series) Rick, M. (2003), Incident Management, (Stanford, Stanford University Press). Richard, V. (2002), Command Structure in Management, (New York, New York Publishers). Taylor, L. (1999), Plans and Developments in Incident, (New Haven, Yale University Press) Thom, M. (2001), Organizational Policy Implementation, (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Read More