Incident Command System - Coursework Example

Table of contents Table of contents 1 Definition of incident command system 2 Implementation of incident command system at a major incident 3 Extended command structures in the incident command system 3 Bronze level extended structure 3 Silver level extended command structure 4 Gold level extended structure command 4 Sectorisation in the incident command system 4 Fire sector 5 Search sector 5 Lobby sector 5 Figure 1: sectorisation when fire lies between search and lobby sectors 5 Figure 2: Sectorisation when fire sector lies below ground 6 The roles of incident commander 6 Responsibilities of operations commander 7 Roles of sector commander 8 Functional officer 8 Roles of functional officer 8 Span of control 9 Cordons in incident command system 9 Inner cordon 9 Outer cordon 9 Tactical modes in incident command system 9 Offensive tactic 10 Defensive tactic 10 Transitional tactic 10 Purpose of instigating incident command system at emergency incidents 10 Incident command system for high-rise buildings 12 The Harrow court incident 13 Steps account of harrow court building fire incident 13 Mistakes committed at Harrow court building 13 Fire incident Management at harrow court building 14 What ought to have happened 14 What ought to have been done 15 Dynamic risk assessment 15 Dynamic risk assessment at the Harrow Court fire incident 15 Fire and rescue service operational philosophy 16 Importance of carrying out dynamic risk assessment 16 Position of dynamic risk assessment at harrow court building 16 Role of inter-agency 17 The police 17 The ambulance 17 Local authority 17 The human resources agency 17 Conclusion 18 Bibliography 18 Definition of incident command system Incident command system (Ronald W, 2003) was developed by a West Yorkshire Fire and Civil Defense Authority known as Ian Gilchrist and is defined as an on-site incident management phenomenon that is structured to ensure responders of incidents have integrated systems in place that are able to handle complexity of any incident. Incident command system addresses incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional restrictions (Bartosh, 2003). Examples of incidents that Incident command system adds value in include outbreaks of fires, floods, terrorists attacks scenario, people held hostage, earthquakes and earth mass movements like landslides. Implementation of incident command system at a major incident Implementation procedures of incident command system involve critical planning (Lesak, 1989) of the incidents and exercising at regional levels. The protocols governing incident implementation involve prior practicing in order to acquaint and enable responders to have knowledge of their roles and responsibilities (Lesak, 1989). This involves dynamic risk assessment to allocate resources and immediately carry out sectorisation, strategizing on tactic mode to be applied in the incident and deployment of inner and outer cordon. Extended command structures in the incident command system The command structure has extended lines of command. These are classified depending on functionality. Examples are: Bronze level extended structure These are forward control point personnel and their main responsibility is to deploy resources for the incident. They are mainly involved with operations during the incident. Silver level extended command structure These are primarily for implementing tactical mode that will be used in the incident. The silver incident commander (national fire protection association, 2000) evaluates the best option of tactic for the incident and announces it to the team. The main roles and responsibilities include helping to develop on-site safety plan, reviewing incident action plan for safety purposes and providing timely accurate assessment of the hazards involved and proposing required control measures. Gold level extended structure command The personnel at this level are responsible for implementing command functions (national fire protection association, 2000) and analyses strategies required to address the incident. The gold incident commander helps to set up an on-site priority plan especially safety of the responders, emergency workers and people involved in the incident. The incident commander at this level also helps in carrying out sectorisation and ensuring resources are used efficiently and cost effectively. Sectorisation in the incident command system Sectorisation ensures period of operation is adhered to within plan of completion. The main sectorisation are: Fire sector It comprises those responsible for putting out the fire Search sector It comprises those in evacuation of persons in the building whether injured or not Lobby sector This comprises those that provide support services Sectorisation in a high rise building (courtesy of Lancashire Fire and Rescue services) Figure 1: sectorisation when fire lies between search and lobby sectors Figure 2: Sectorisation when fire sector lies below ground The roles of incident commander Determining the floor the fire is in Evaluating the layout of the building Determining the location of staircases and elevators to access the site Carrying out sectorisation Determining the appropriate equipment for the incident Evaluating ventilation of the building Responsibilities of operations commander Conducts initial incident evaluation In charge of communication Formulates incident management strategy Develop action plan and assign resources Call for supplementary resources Develops and implements organizational command structure Responsible for reviewing, evaluating and revising incident action plan Responsible for transferring and terminating command Ensuring time scheduled for operations is attained Declaring a staging area for relief personnel Determining lobby area Assigning safety officers in the lobby area or on the fire floor Assigning evacuators Assigning staff to ventilation operations Roles of sector commander Establishing incident priorities Coordinating resource use Ensuring workers and public health and safety Providing response direction Functional officer This can either be any personnel either assigned a duty by incident commander. Roles of functional officer He or she is responsible for operations Involved directly in the mission of response Involved in planning that involves collecting, evaluating and disseminating tactic information related to the incident Preparing incident action plan Releasing information to press and overall incident commander if the duties had been relegated May play the role of liaison officer Span of control This refers to the number of persons under a given team leader in a given level. Span of controls expressed as a ratio. For instance, 3 to 1 means one team leader foresee 3 members. Cordons in incident command system There are two types of cordons. These are: Inner cordon They surround the scene of incident to ensure sufficient safety is kept at optimum levels. Inner cordons allow restricted access to the site of incident by allowing personnel only into the site. Outer cordon These form circumference around the inner cordon. They are support personnel from different agencies like ambulance, police and security agents carrying out investigations. Tactical modes in incident command system Safety is a major issue of concern even to responders. The type of tactic employed depends on the risk involved. There are three tactical modes in incident command system Offensive tactic This is applied where the importance of the rescue mission outweighs risks analyzed. The crew brings the hazardous site of incident under control. This may involve getting into the building or lobby area. Defensive tactic This option is followed when the risks evaluated are more than any benefit that can be obtained. The incident is brought under control through use of external or aerial jets of water. Transitional tactic This option arises when both offensive and defensive tactics are in use. It involves sectorisation. Advantages of Instigation of incident command system at emergency incidents Purpose of instigating incident command system at emergency incidents The main aim of instigating incident command system at emergency incidents is to save lives. The incident command system helps to reduce the risk of the whole building being destroyed by the fire. Fires can cause untold damage and this could cost insurance firms a lot of money through compensation of users of the building who are disabled in the incident, lost their lives in the incident, property lost in the inferno. Incident command system therefore helps to reduce the loss that could have been incurred. If the incident command system was not present at emergency incidents, all people and property would be destroyed. Incident command system helps (national fire protection association, 2000) to put the fire under control and this in turn has an effect of reducing spread of the fire within the building and between the buildings. Incident command system comes in with personnel who are able to address any matter of urgency. The staffs of incident command system are competent personalities (national fire protection association, 2000) who are able to multi task. Incident command system operates on an operation schedule for a given incident. This schedule has a completion plan that ensures the fire is brought under control within the minimum time possible and rescue and evacuation is timely done. These tasks are carried out simultaneously. This ensures that persons who are injured get medical attention in time. If the incident commands system was not present in emergency situations, the injured and disabled persons who would have survived if there were immediate medical intervention die due to dehydration. Incident command system for high-rise buildings High rise buildings pose firefighting difficulties (Paton, 1996) that are characterized by difficulties in accessing the building, pronounced ventilations that enhance accessibility of wind that helps to fan the fire and high heat retention abilities that make breathing difficult and occupants or responders may die of lack of oxygen. If water has to be delivered into one floor, by the time firefighters manage to deliver it, they may encounter fierce fires that may make it difficult to bring it under control. High rise building involve determination of floor in which the fire has broken (Paton, 1996), methods of accessing the floor, analysis of the building layout, determination of the stairways or elevators, analysis of affected lifts and dynamic risk assessment. There is need to analyze equipments to be used, how they will be delivered to the floor below the affected floor, evaluation of standpipes and if they are dry or wet. Ventilations analysis that becomes difficult at night. High rise buildings pose a problem to tactical mode (Flin, 1996) to be used. Transitional tactic is most employed as it combines both offensive and defensive tactic modes. High rise building also pose a challenge of staging area and circumference of inner and outer cordons. These challenges make it hard for strategy formulation on health and safety of the responders and occupants of the high rise building (Flin, 1996). Another problem posed by high rise building lies in determination of incident action plan. These problems are partly solved through sectorisation. Tasks are divided and every command staff takes his or her responsibility. This ensures the rescue mission is completed in time and causalities are attended on the site. Incident command system uses incident action plan that helps to ensure safety is achieved as they carry out their mission. The Harrow court incident Steps account of harrow court building fire incident Mr. and Mrs. Natalie had fallen drunk before retiring to their beds. They left a candle that lay on a television lit. The candle had no metallic base and caused fire outbreak on burning the television (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Mr. Brown who lived in flat No. 95, 16th floor woke up to smell of smoke that came from a lower floor and called 999 to report the fire incident that he believed was in Flat No. 89 on 15th Floor. On his way out via the rear stair, Brown met MS Cuffe and Ms. Holt leaving flat no. 91, 15th floor. Mr. Brown later established it was flat No. 85 that was on fire and descended stairs to meet the fire rescue team to correct his claim (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Mistakes committed at Harrow court building Harrow court fire incident was characterized by inadequate dynamic risk assessment and failure to follow fire incident safety rules and regulations. The reporting of the incident was wrong as Mr. Brown gave the wrong address to the flat and had to wait outside to correct the anomaly. The first responders didn’t check if there were supporting fire control measures in place. This contributed to a lapse of fire safety measures. The fire fighters entered into the building without water to fight any fire or protective fire gears. The fire fighters didn’t close the door to the flat upon rescuing Mr. Natalie. This increased ventilation that led into rapid spread of fire that burned down the plastic trunking that held the cables. It’s the cables that entangled fire fighter Wornham and caused his death. The increased fire trapped fire fighter Miller in the flat (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Fire incident Management at harrow court building Generally, fire procedures were followed. Dynamic risk assessment was carried out when firefighter Wornham was entangled by molten plastic and miller had died in flat 85, 14th floor. Sectorisation was carried out well and this helped to bring the fire under control. Procedures on first aid were followed following freeing of fire fighter Wornham who was rushed to hospital immediately. The other casualties of the fire incident Mr. Miller and Mrs. Natalie were to undergo forensic examinations. This agrees with specifications of fire service procedures (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). What ought to have happened Mr. and Mrs. Natalie should not have left a burning candle on a television. Mr. Brown should have confirmed the exact location of the fire before reporting the incident. The fire fighters ought to have carried out dynamic fire risk assessment and sectorisation. They should have had protective clothing to protect themselves from risks of fire. The fire fighter should have closed the door that increased ventilation and led into increase and spread of fire (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). What ought to have been done The door shouldn’t have been left open as this would have reduced ventilation. Windows should have been closed. Mr. Brown, Ms. Cuffe and Ms. Holt should have broken the door to the flat and helped to extinguish the fire as they waited for the fire rescue (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). The candles should have had handling procedures in place and the building should have had fire resistant partitions (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005) Dynamic risk assessment Dynamic risk assessment ensures every command staff knows exactly his or her role and responsibilities. Dynamic risk assessment ensures safety plan and incident action plan is followed. Immediately after arriving at the incident site, the incident commander, accesses magnitude of fire and immediately provide advice on tactical mode to be used, rescue measures to be taken and equipment s to be used (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Dynamic risk assessment at the Harrow Court fire incident The harrow court fire incident was characterized by a late implementation of dynamic assessment. There was a reporting error of the fire incident by Mr. Brown. Sectorisation was done after fire fighter Miller and Wornham had suffered gravely (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Mr. Miller and Mr. Wornham as the first responders should have considered safety measures before embarking on the rescue mission (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Fire and rescue service operational philosophy The philosophy of fire rescue service is to save life, carry out evacuation and save property by following safety guidelines as determined by risks of fire (Brunacini, 1991). Importance of carrying out dynamic risk assessment To determine the tactic mode to be used To determine sectorisation To determine span of control To determine if there is need of requesting additional resources To determine immediate priorities To determine incident action plan To determine safety measures to be implemented Position of dynamic risk assessment at harrow court building Dynamic risk assessment was carried out after the fire had already burnt two fire fighters namely Miller and Wornham. There was inefficient planning due to incorrect reporting. Role of inter-agency The police Police provide security, keep public from the incident site and collect information concerning the fire outbreak (Schmitt, 1994). The ambulance They offer first aid to the victims of fire outbreak (Ronald W, 2003). Local authority The structural engineering should have checked if Harrow Court met building regulation act and if there have been any fire risk assessment report in place to foster safety among the users of the high rise building. The local authority structural engineering department would have evaluated if the building mechanical and electrical installation contravened safety (Fire Service Inspectorate, 2002). The human resources agency Human resources agency would have provided additional personnel and volunteers to help in search and rescue operations (Flin, Incident command: Decision Making and Team Work, 1995a). Conclusion There is need to have proper dynamic and continuous risk assessment in the event of a fire incident. There should be training of incident command staff and introduction of refresher courses to evaluate preparedness of the firefighters for their tasks. High rise building should be installed with automatic sprinkler system, smoke detectors and standpipes whether wet or dry. Safety measures should be followed by all users of high rise building. The building should meet building regulation act and have fire safety order 2005 be practiced by all users of the building. Bibliography Agency, F. e. (2003). Federal Response Plan-9230.1PL. Bartosh, D. (2003). incident command management in the era of terrorism. police executive reaserch foru . Buckle, P., & Mars, a. S. (2000). new approaches to assessing vulnerability and resilience. Australian journal of emergency management, Winter , 8-14. Flin, R. (1996). sitting in the hot seat: leaders and teams for critical incident management. wiley . Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services. (2005, February 2nd). Investigating Into Deaths of Fire figher Jeffrey Wornham , Fire Fighter Michael Miller and MS. Natalie Close. Lesak, D. (1989). 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