Critical Perspectives on Management and Organizations - Indications of Groupthink - Essay Example

Running Head: Critical Perspective on Management & Organizations Critical Perspective on Management & Organizations [Institute’s Critical Perspective on Management & Organizations Groupthink refers to the preference of group members to have the similar beliefs as well as ideas. It is a way of thinking that individuals undertake while they are extremely involved in a cohesive in-group, as members determined for agreement and ignore their motivation to logically evaluate alternatives. It is the “sharing of fake convictions that every person within the group gives consent about its decisions. Groupthink has played a major role and was the key contributor to the Challenger disaster - In the Report of the Presidential Commission, there was a remark indicating that Thiokol turned very susceptible to Groupthink when they asked for a break from the GDSS. At this moment “they turned insulated, had private discussions in extreme pressure and were frightened of losing likely upcoming revenue should they differ with NASA” (Hughes & White, 2010, p. 131). Each of these aspects is taken as key to the formulation of Groupthink. A few of the indications of Groupthink that caused this tragedy were: Overestimations of the group’s authority as well as unquestioned integrity, for instance, trusting that the group’s position is fair/proper and that everyone else is naturally malevolent, narrow-minded, intrinsic integrity, validation, self-control, and false impression of agreement within the group. These signs initiate a flawed decision procedure with all of the concerned businesses. Throughout the discussions regarding the decision to initiate seemed to be a negative response of the engineers views together with management’s partiality about the details provided to them. This was signified when the majority of the group considered itself as unbeatable due to which the high risk decisions were taken. This situation was explained as the false impression of imperviousness by Irving Janis - ‘the whole thing is going to be perfectly fine as it is an extraordinary group’. The group had an inflated level of confidence and power in their decisions as well as in themselves. Two among three leading NASA representatives in charge for the launch showed a stereotyped analysis of the condition. They thought that they fully understand the nature of the joint issue and never paid any heed to the doubts put forwarded by the MTI engineers. These same two representatives put stress on MTI to modify its point once they initially suggested that the launch should not take place. These representatives pursued MTI staff to confirm that it was not safe to launch which was a complete reversal of standard pre-flight practices. It was this stress that top MTI management was dealing with when they override their engineering team and proposed launch. Stress on dissent group members were thought to be a direct stress to everybody who raised questions regarding the strength of the arguments behind a decision supported by the majority. The self-censorship group members repressed themselves when they had views that were different from the obvious group consensus, which revealed every member’s inclination to reduce his or her significance of the uncertainties and counterarguments. The most apparent proof of self-censorship took place when the Vice President of MTI, who was against the launch initially, give in to pressure from NASA and agreed to its explanations for launch. False Impression of the Unanimity Group members were victim to Groupthink, having a false impression of unanimity with respect to decisions taken by members who were supporting the mainstream view. This symptom was sourced by the false supposition that any member who stayed quiet is giving his or her consent on the majority opinion. No member from NASA ever explicitly approved or even took sides with MTI during the argument. The ‘no response’ and ‘calm’ attitude of NASA was amplified by the fact that the discussion was a teleconference connecting the members from three different places. The group leader as well as other members supported one another by “playing up points of union” (Moorhead et al, 1991, p. 541) in their judgment without completely taken into consideration the points of deviation that might expose upsetting issues. The group disregarded apparent threat signs, being foolishly hopeful, and hence going for severe risks. “Mind guarding group members taken the part of guarding the minds of others within the group” (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989, p. 169). They tried to protect the group from unpleasant facts that might change the mainstream view of the information concerning the correctness of the decision. The top management of Marshall was aware of the fact that the rocket coverings that had been asked to be remodelled were to rectify a fault around five months earlier to this launch. This information in addition to other technological facts about the joint issues were withdrawn from the conference. It was clear that this group was defending the group from harmful, intimidating facts. Although there were various defence programs taking account of mutually supporting protection, dependability and quality assertion tasks, it was believed that they were deliberately disregarded when evaluating any potential safety concerns with the Challenger. Nonetheless, before the disaster the program turned out to be ineffective. The Report of the Presidential Commission mentioned that the loss of efficiency gravely dishonoured the “checks and balances” (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989, p. 171) which are important for ensuring flight security. Failure to Asses Alternatives There were only two alternatives taken into account by the group. No preliminary assessment of every possible alternative took place in the decision making process. “The Flight Readiness Review team had a launch - no launch decision to make” (Esser, 1998, p. 128). Other likely alternatives might have been the postponement of the launch for additional investigation, or to wait until the temperatures arrived at a suitable point. The group was unable to assess alternatives that may have been originally rejected according to early unfavourable information. Top NASA representatives gave time and effort protecting and supporting their position, instead of investigating the MTI position. Members of the group were inclined to focus on supportive data and overlooked any information that might have revealed any negative aspect of their chosen alternative. MTI delegates constantly attempted to draw attention towards the inaccuracies in the justification of the NASA representatives. Even following the decision was taken, the disagreement carried on till the MTI was told that it was no longer their concern. External and Internal Risks NASA faced several external as well as internal risks factors, for instance, strategic threats, functioning threats, economic threats, environmental threats and personnel loss about the launch. The inbuilt threats in the management of these companies “involved the malfunction in the control system” (Pace, 1988, p. 213). In view of the fact that they were built on threats of management and control systems caused by agency issues, the managers were disregarding them or perhaps were uninformed about their existence. The actual reason of the space shuttle Challenger disaster was the inconsistent decision making process. This flawed decision-making was not the outcome of any personal error but a large number of individuals within a Groupthink situation. Key Factors behind Challenger Disaster Most importantly, Thiokol had known about the O-ring trouble at least several months ahead of the Challenger launch; nonetheless, the objective was stick to the schedule. NASA was informed about the trouble but it was taken as a low risk condition. Here is the initial factor of inconsistent information that was input into the GDSS. If NASA had been more responsive towards the importance of the O-ring condition, it possibly would have given additional authority to the opinion of the Thiokol engineers suggestions. However, the facts that Thiokol conveyed during the GDSS conference did mention that it would be secure to launch for the estimated temperatures. Second, the choice to postpone the Shuttle launch had turned into a useless choice by the members of the Shuttle squad - ideas forwarded by any group member that would eventually support a programmed launch were met with encouragement by the group and any idea that would cause a postponement was discarded by the group. Third, each and every member of the GDSS thought that he or she should achieve the standards of the group. Even though the Thiokol engineers stood by their advice to delay the launch, they later changed their point of view. Fourth, Thiokol became extremely prone to groupthink when they demanded a break from the GDSS. Here, they turned insulated, had arranged undisclosed discussions under extreme pressure by the possible cancellation of revenue from NASA. All these aspects are thought to be key in the formulation of groupthink (Park, 2000). Fifth, every concerned organization as well as individual was thinking a bit too much about public and political reaction if the launch was postponed since there were already six postponements in 1986, prior to the launch if the Challenger. Sixth, the GDSS was critically damaged - as discussed earlier, the records included incorrect data with respect to the O-rings. Plans, proposals and doubts were implored but not secretly. Those who deviated from the group standards were considered as uninvited members. Conflict management was avoided by NASAs authority over the whole conference session. NASA, sometimes, turned extremely aggressive as well as intimidating. Taking into consideration NASAs approach, no group member or person was ready to be held responsible for any statement or judgment. The situation for such an essential meeting was as well unproductive. Given the fact that a speaker phone and CPU modem was utilized, it was quite simple for NASA to completely disregard the personal views of the Thiokol engineers. If the meeting could have been arranged with all the participants at the same place, the result might not have been same. After the meeting NASA half-heartedly mentioned that it would still call off the launch if Thiokol persisted. Possibly the most considerable fault within the GDSS was when Thiokol asked for a very short confidential discussion with its own members. Till this point, Thiokol stood by its advice to call off the launch. Once disconnected, Thiokol turned a secluded member and the GDSS collapsed completely. After joining the meeting again, Thiokol members had altered its stance and declared that NASA can go ahead with launch. Ways by which Situation Might Have been Avoided To be successful, both task as well as social-emotional functions had to be satisfied; however, a number of individuals could have assisted in filling these leadership positions. The functional tasks carried out by the group members could have been done in a better manner to avoid the disaster. The initiators should have stayed firm on their point of view and not yielded to peer pressure. Although it seemed short-staffed, the evaluators should have had a unit in position, a group of onsite engineers to check particular theories like the consequences of “erosion on O-rings” (Fisher & Kingma, 2001, p. 110) as this had been a setback for quite some time. The top level executives at NASA should have revealed the important facts provided by the data providers, such as Rockwell, Morton-Thiokol, and Marshall Space Flight Center, and should not have influenced the judgments of these organizations to compel for taking a flawed decision. Mulloy, with faith in the earlier Flight Readiness Review evaluations, was uncertain by the engineering investigation, and worried regarding the programme inferences of the temperature restriction of 53-degree on launch the engineers projected. Even though the Morton-Thiokol engineers were determined towards their recommendation to cancel or postpone the launch, they altered their presentation of doubts once “threatened with the possibility of being removed from the program” (Fisher & Kingma, 2001, p. 112). NASA offered no sign of working out on the disagreement or to meet them half way. At this point of the conference, NASA had a duty to the squad of the Challenger to think about other alternatives ahead of giving consent to launch. It seemed that the missing aspects of the maintenance/socio-emotional functions in the decision making process which would have “kept the group harmonious” (Maier, 2001, p. 287). NASA was not ready to understand the engineer’s opinion concerning the threats linked with the launching of the Challenger. The managers within this organization were not ready to maintain open communication channels. Within the shuttle program, there were incessant security measures, which were supposed to concentrate on the possible risks, including the preparation and implementation of plans to avoid any disaster, flight system defence and engineering security requirements. In the teleconference, it was obvious that not a single person involved with the group decision-making process thought about taking the suggestion from a security personnel or a quality assurance engineer. In the same way, there was no representative of security in the Mission Management Team. A number of concerns were evident such as the following of practices concerning the coverage conditions which were not ‘to the point’ and hence were unable to get important information to the appropriate management levels. During all of the research that had been done, small or no trend analysis was done on “O-ring erosion” and “blow-by” issues (Shirey, 2012, p. 69). As the flight rate goes up, the Marshall security, consistency and quality assurance personnel were declining, which negatively influenced the safety of Challenger. Several procedures as well as inaccuracies were ignored earlier than the launch of the Challenger. At launch, all points marked as mandatory by the Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document were ignored. A “forward avionics bay closeout board was not verified” (Shirey, 2012, p. 71) as installed. Landing equipment voids were not reloaded and group unit indicators were not confirmed in final vehicle closeouts. In External Tank propellant loading while getting ready for launch, the “liquid hydrogen 17-inch disconnect valve was released before decreasing the pressure in the Orbiter liquid hydrogen manifold, through a technical inaccuracy by the console machinist” (Shirey, 2012, p. 71). The three conditions that confirm the main “engine pneumatic isolation valve actuation” (Pidgeon & OLeary, 2000, p. 21) were not met as exclusively required in the Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document. A main engine pneumatic regulator operational evaluation, which confirms the redundancy of individual valves, was not confirmed in flow situation. The leak test steps for testing port Number 4, subsequent to setting up the plug, were accidentally missed out from the Operations & Maintenance Instructions. The humidity meter examination necessity was not met since the engines were not within the controlled setting. The managerial constitution and chain of command jammed effective communication of technological issues. Warning signs were ignored, individuals’ views were repressed and key facts regarding technical concerns did not reach the higher levels. What was discussed with parts of the group was that O-ring erosion was not an issue to be taken into account. Conclusion In retrospect, this was certainly a Groupthink decision making practice. It was among the most unpleasant calamities in the history of America as well as NASA. Hence, every possible step should be taken to prevent Groupthink before it starts. It has been revealed that soon after Thiokols presentation to NASA, the majority of the GDSS group members were extremely worried about the O ring condition and thought that the views forwarded by Thiokol engineers were the reason for serious consideration of calling of the launch. Nonetheless, only some particular senior executives were authorized to vote their ‘opinion’, which they did orally and on the order of NASA. However, it is believed by the majority of researchers that had there been a universal anonymous vote, a decision to terminate the launch would have been taken (Pidgeon & OLeary, 2000, p. 18). The factors which cause the Challenger disaster can be traced back to the setting up of the shuttle program. NASA and Thiokol were not able to retain a quality assurance program through MSS, as was started with the Apollo program, because of various source stress and political demands. The GDSS employed for the launch assessment included wrong information. Engineers from the GDSS did not have confidence in the testing systems employed for producing the data components within the GDSS. Moreover, the whole conference was managed poorly. The decision to go on with launch the Challenger Shuttle along with its subsequent devastation had a huge effect on the public as well as the on management of the space program. Challengers exceptional duty and the death of all seven crew members paved the path for dialogue and studies on the way managers use decision support system to tmake decisions that will influence public trust. References Esser, J. K. (1998). Alive and well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 73(2), 116-141. Esser, J. K., & Lindoerfer, J. S. (1989). Groupthink and the space shuttle Challenger accident: Toward a quantitative case analysis. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2(3), 167-177. Fisher, C. W., & Kingma, B. R. (2001). Criticality of data quality as exemplified in two disasters. Information & Management, 39(2), 109-116. Hughes, P., & White, E. (2010). The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster: A classic example of Groupthink. Ethics & Critical Thinking Journal, 2010(3), 123-140. Maier, M. (2002). Ten Years after A Major Malfunction. Reflections on “The Challenger Syndrome”. Journal of Management Inquiry, 11(3), 282-292. Moorhead, G., Ference, R., & Neck, C. P. (1991). Group decision fiascoes continue: Space shuttle Challenger and a revised groupthink framework. Human Relations, 44(6), 539-550. Pace, R. C. (1988). Technical communication, group differentiation, and the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger. Journal of technical writing and communication, 18(3), 207-220. Park, W. W. (2000). A comprehensive empirical investigation of the relationships among variables of the groupthink model. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21(8), 873-887. Pidgeon, N., & OLeary, M. (2000). Man-made disasters: why technology and organizations (sometimes) fail. Safety Science, 34(1), 15-30. Shirey, M. R. (2012). Group Think, Organizational Strategy, and Change. Journal of Nursing Administration, 42(2), 67-71. 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