Natural Disaster Management: Cyclone Katrina - Book Report/Review Example

Natural Disaster Management: Cyclone Katrina Introduction Disasters are, unfortunately, all too common occurrences around the world. The damage that these disasters may bring can range from the minimal to the severe. Nevertheless, these disasters can and have brought so much damage to our environment, to our lives, and to our livelihood. This paper shall discuss the natural disaster Cyclone or Hurricane Katrina. It shall first narrate the background information related to this disaster and then indicate a brief timeline of events surrounding the disaster. Such presentation shall follow the PPRR format or the Prevention, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery format. It shall also discuss the psychosocial, mental, and public health aspects of this disaster. The vulnerable populations most affected by the hurricane shall also be discussed and finally, the lessons learned from this incident shall be presented. This paper is being conducted in the hope of improving disaster management and of minimizing the impact of disasters – manmade or natural – in the future. Background Cyclone or Hurricane Katrina was one of the most powerful hurricanes in the history of the United States. In the report of Knabb, Rhome, and Brown (2005) to the National Hurricane Center (NHC), they account that as a category 1 hurricane, it caused fatalities and much damage in southern Florida. They further reported that it reached a Category 5 status over the Gulf of Mexico, and then weakened to a Category 3 hurricane before finally making landfall on the Northern Gulf Coast. The total number of fatalities from the hurricane is estimated at 1833 coming from reports from 5 affected states (Knabb, Rhome, and Brown, 2005). Brief Timeline of Events The National Hurricane Center (2005, as cited by the Government Printing Office, 2005) narrates a timeline of events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. First and foremost, they noted that a tropical depression was first sighted on the 23rd of August 2005 about 200 miles southeast of Nassau in the Bahamas. Two days later, on August 25, it reached hurricane status and was named Katrina (Government Printing Office, 2005). The National Hurricane Center reported that the hurricane may pass between Mobile, Alabama and Grand Isle, Louisiana and that the hurricane was expected to gain strength once it reaches the Gulf of Mexico (Government Printing Office, 2005). At about 5:30 in the afternoon on the 25th of August, 2005, the hurricane made landfall in Florida as a category 1 hurricane (Government Printing Office, 2005). As it moved westward, it increased in intensity and was elevated to a category 2 hurricane. Prevention At 1 pm on the 26th of August 2005, the Governor of Louisiana Kathleen Blanco declared a State of Emergency and activated the state’s National Guard (Government Printing Office, 2005). The Governor of Mississippi Haley Barbour also followed suit and activated his National Guard. The NHC then forecasted that the hurricane would hit near the Louisiana-Mississippi border on August 29. Another warning was issued that hurricane will directly hit New Orleans on August 29. Such report was confirmed by the National Weather Service as they then notified state and local officials of the storm’s path. On the 27th of August, the FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) headquarters then began its 24-hour operations in Washington, D.C (Government Printing Office, 2005). Preparedness On the 27th of August, 2005, the first phase of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan was initiated (Government Printing Office, 2005). The National Hurricane Center (2005, as cited by the Government Printing Office, 2005) indicated that during such phase, citizens in the coastal towns are prompted to evacuate 50 hours before a category 3 or stronger hurricane strikes. The Governor of Louisiana later requested for the declaration of a federal state of emergency for Louisiana; such request was granted by President George Bush. Phase II of the Emergency Evacuation Plan was later initiated. The Mayor of New Orleans declared a State of Emergency for New Orleans and announced that the Superdome will be opened to voluntary evacuees and as a special-needs shelter (Government Printing Office, 2005). The Louisiana Emergency Operations Center then went into 24-hours operation. The National Weather Service advised the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness that the levees may be overtopped and may possibly result to considerable flooding in the area (Government Printing Office, 2005). The NHC then briefed Governors Blanco, Barbour, and Mayor Nagin of the potential impact of the hurricane. Mandatory evacuations of the coastal counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson in Mississippi were ordered next (Government Printing Office, 2005). The NHC also forecasted surge flooding of 15-20 feet for the north-central Gulf coast from Morgan City, Louisiana to the Alabama-Florida border. On the 28th of August, 2005, President Bush issued federal emergency declarations for Mississippi and Alabama, also declaring Florida a disaster area (Government Printing Office, 2005). The Superdome was then opened as a ‘special-needs shelter’. An emergency evacuation of the Orleans Parish was also ordered. The National Hurricane Center (2005, as cited by the Government Printing Office, 2005) documents that on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina’s eye made landfall at Buras on the Louisiana coast. The storm surge was able to overtop the levees causing flooding in the Plaquemines Parish. The eye then moved on to southeast Louisiana. Flooding later began in New Orleans after levees were overtopped in east Orleans and in the St. Bernard Parishes. The Superdome roof began to leak and later lost air conditioning, plumbing, and its communication system; a generator was able to provide limited lighting (Government Printing Office, 2005). At 10 am on the 29th, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Mississippi. The storm surge topped at 20 feet above normal levels in the Biloxi area. By the afternoon, the state and local first responders’ communications began to fail in the New Orleans and Mississippi area (Government Printing Office, 2005). Response The National Hurricane Center (2005, as cited by the Government Printing Office, 2005) narrates that by mid-afternoon on the 29th of August, search-and-rescue operations were started by the U.S. Coast Guard, the New Orleans Police and Fire Departments, the Louisiana National Guard, and the Louisiana Department of Wildfire and Fisheries. Local officials also immediately began their search and rescue operations. By evening the FEMA Director assured the Governor of Louisiana that 500 buses will be sent to New Orleans the following day. By 10 pm that evening, the Mississippi EMA search and rescue teams arrived and began search and rescue operations (Government Printing Office, 2005). On August 30, the Mayor of New Orleans opened the New Orleans Convention Center as a relocation site for the general population. That same morning, the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defence ordered the US Northern Command to the Gulf Coast in order to provide military assistance (Government Printing Office, 2005). The conditions in the Superdome became dire and rapidly deteriorated because of poor sanitation, massive crowds, and lack of air conditioning (Government Printing Office, 2005). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary then designated Michael Brown to the Principal Federal Official in order to handle response and recovery operations (Government Printing Office, 2005). On the 31st of August, the Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt declared a public health emergency for the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama (Government Printing Office, 2005). He then ordered that school buses be commandeered for the search and rescue operations. Governor Blanco also requested the Governor of Texas to request the opening of the Houston Astrodome for the New Orleans evacuees (Government Printing Office, 2005). The Chief of the federal National Guard Bureau then directed all state Adjutants General to deploy the National Guard troops to Louisiana and Mississippi. The Governor of Louisiana then discussed with President Bush their need for military assistance. Later that day, President Bush held a meeting with his Cabinet members in order to prepare possible federal relief efforts. By evening, buses arrived in New Orleans in order to begin evacuation efforts (Government Printing Office, 2005). On the 1st of September, 2005, bus evacuations of evacuees from the Superdome were commenced. By late evening, the New Orleans Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety requested assistance from the Louisiana National Guard in order to evacuate the Convention Center with the assistance of the New Orleans Police Department (Government Printing Office, 2005). At about noon, about 1000 forces of the National Guard secured the Convention Center in order to implement relief operations (Government Printing Office, 2005). President Bush then ordered 7200 active duty troops to the Gulf Coast, and the evacuation of the Convention Center was then commenced. Just past noon on the 3rd of September, the Superdome was completely evacuated. By late afternoon, the evacuation of the Convention Center was completed. By the 5th of September Cloverleaf and Causeway Boulevards were completely evacuated (Government Printing Office, 2005). According to the DHS (2008), the search and rescue efforts implemented in response to Hurricane Katrina were one of the “largest search and rescue operations in United States history, made notably by the swift execution of rescue plans for Hurricane Rita shortly thereafter”. The Coast Guard was able to deploy hundreds of air and boat crews in order to rescue about 27,000 people and to assist in the evacuation of about 9,000 patients and medical personnel from hospitals and nursing homes. Consequently, about 33,000 lives were saved or medically evacuated (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The Corps pumped about 250 billion gallons of water out of New Orleans. The General Services Administration assisted the FEMA in bringing in about $1 billion worth of supplies, equipment and services to aid the relief efforts. This included gasoline, cots, beds, blankets, sheets, air mattresses, tents, tent bags, travel trainers, land for temporary housing, clothing, ambulances, and trucks (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The FirstGov.gov website was made immediately available in order to post information about finding family and friends of those affected by the landslide. The 911 services were restored and enhanced (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The Department of State dispersed donations of food and supplies from foreign sources. The GSA call-centre agents were able to field in and respond to about 1 million calls and e-mails from hurricane disaster victims. Urban Search and Rescue Teams were also deployed by the FEMA and they were able to save about 6000 lives in the process. They also deployed nurses and physicians who were able to treat about 160,000 individuals in the weeks after the storm (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Immediate housing was also made possible through the actions of the FEMA who were able to move individuals in congregate shelters into suitable transitional homes. Recovery First and foremost, recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina were started with the rebuilding of communities in the hope of meeting long-term housing needs. At President Bush’s urging the Congress allocated $16.7 billion in Federal funds under the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) program in order to repair and rebuild the homes damaged by the hurricane (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Those affected were able to receive grants in order to rebuild their homes and their lives. Mortgage and foreclosure reliefs were also granted to many of these homeowners through the Federal Housing Administration (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The HUD has also been exerting efforts towards arranging the transfer of HUD Real Estate Owned properties in order to make them available for homeless families. Programs and cooperative efforts with other private groups were also forged in order to make the rehabilitative efforts an even bigger possibility. The Universities Rebuilding America Partnership, the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Home Depot, the HANO, and similar private organizations are just some of the organizations who have helped in rebuilding homes and other infrastructure in the areas affected by the hurricane (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Efforts to repair and strengthen infrastructure were also made. Most notably, after the hurricane, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were able to repair and restore 220 miles of floodwalls and levees in the Mississippi and the Louisiana areas. These levees were also protected from overtopping and additional pumping stations were built in order to protect the communities from flooding (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The FEMA released $5.5 billion in order to repair and rebuild damaged public infrastructures like roads, bridges, schools, water systems, public buildings, and other public utilities (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The Department of Transportation also released $2 billion in order to repair highways and bridges in Louisiana and Mississippi. Repairs were also carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard and their efforts enabled the opening of the Port of New Orleans 2 weeks after the hurricane. The National Oceanographic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) were also able to survey wrecks, oil rigs, debris and shoaling in order to keep the commercial lines open (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The U.S. Department of Energy assessed oil, gas, and electricity supplies. Oil refineries have now been restored; electricity supplies have also been returned to normal. The U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration invested $1.3 million to restore the Gulf Coast’s public broadcasting stations; they have also coordinated with the Federal Communication Commission in order to use the private sector satellite to restore communication services to guide and speed up search and rescue efforts (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The US Department of Agriculture also released millions of dollars in order to assist the affected farmers. The Small Business Administration approved billions of dollars of disaster loans to homeowners, renters, and to other business owners in the Gulf coast states. Other agencies also granted loans to these affected citizens. Efforts to restore the environment and the parks in affected areas were also carried out by concerned government agencies with the assistance of various private institutions (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Food, health care, education, and other social services have also been slowly restored by the different government agencies. Psychosocial, Mental, and Public Health Aspects of the Disaster Hurricane Katrina brought, not just, physical effects on the individuals affected, but also psychosocial and mental health problems. On a psychosocial scale, the hurricane is likely to bring post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to hurricane survivors. Siebert (2009) discusses that most survivors of hurricanes would likely go through months of grieving for their loss. The hurricane would affect people in different ways, with some people being more resilient and able to deal with the trauma better as compared to other people. Those with PTSD would most likely experience, nightmares, insomnia, and flashbacks; they would also be hyper-vigilant and would most likely experience stomach distress, hypertension, heart irregularities and even asthma (Siebert, 2009). Acute stress disorder is very much similar to PTSD, only that its effects do not last as long. Anxiety or stress is very common after traumatic experiences affecting about 50-70% of the United States population at some point in their lives; “however only 5%-12% develop PTSD” (Ursano, Fullerton, and Weisaeth, 2007, p. 9). The process of working through the grief would usually determine the impact of the event on the person. Most individuals eventually adjust and learn to cope well; however, others experience difficulties in coping. Studies were able to reveal that many victims and survivors of Hurricane Katrina were emotionally traumatized. A study revealed that about 31.2% of the victims developed anxiety and mood disorders; in New Orleans alone, about 30% of the victims developed PTSD (Bankhead, 2007). The individuals psychologically affected by the hurricane covered a wide range of sociodemographic samples. Many analysts interpret these results to mean that the efforts to address the psychological health of the survivors and victims of the disaster should not be concentrated on specific groups only (Bankhead, 2007). The general public health was affected because of the effects of pollution and disease in the aftermath of the hurricane. After the hurricane, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the Environmental Protection Agency declared that 90% of the water in New Orleans is not potable (Levine, 2005). Levine (2005) further reports that leaks were seen in the broken water pipes and the main water sources; consequently, the whole system in every house has to be flushed out in order to eliminate contamination. Floodwaters in the New Orleans area contained sewage, human and animal bodies, oil, gasoline, and even toxic wastes from household chemicals. Water testing revealed high levels of E. Coli and fecal coliform bacteria; metals like lead, chromium, and arsenic; and oil and oil products like petroleum (Levine, 2005). Houses were declared structurally dangerous because of damage or contamination; re-wiring was also needed because of damage; gas leaks were also reported. The CDC warned possible exposure of the people to asbestos and lead which are both considered carcinogens. Those returning were also at risk for exposure to molds which can cause lung diseases, skin irritations, and other health dangers (Levine, 2005). Medical experts warned about possible outbreaks of contagious diseases like cholera and typhus; fortunately such fear was never realized because the diseases were not endemic to the area. However, Vibrio Vulnificus, a disease similar to cholera managed to kill five individuals; this disease is fatal in 20% of infected individuals and “can be spread through the water into open wounds or through the consumption of infected food or water” (Levine, 2005). Hundreds of people affected by the hurricane later suffered gastrointestinal diseases. This was common in the primary evacuation centres like the Superdome and the Convention Centre as people were packed into these areas with limited water and with poor sanitation. Cases of patients with the West Nile virus were also expected as the floodwaters served as ideal nesting grounds for mosquitoes spreading the virus. Many of the evacuees did not have sufficient medical care and medications. This proved to be a big problem as the incidents of diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular diseases, and other chronic diseases in the area were considered high (Levine, 2005). The hurricane created the following main risks and problems to the residents in the evacuation centres: hypertension, diabetes, new psychiatric conditions, pre-existing psychiatric conditions, rashes, asthma, flu-like illnesses, pneumonia, toxic exposure, other infections, and diarrhoea (Levine, 2005). Vulnerable Populations The vulnerable populations during disasters usually include the inner-city and low-income communities; also those who are physically/mentally disabled; those who speak limited or no English at all; those who are elderly/frail; the children; and finally those who are homeless (Greenberger, 2007). This vulnerable population again bore the brunt of the disaster that is Hurricane Katrina. Those who could not afford to evacuate and to shoulder the costs of lodging, food, and transportation were forced to take shelter in the Superdome. This Superdome, which was never built to accommodate thousands of people, eventually created problems for the evacuees who had to suffer poor plumbing and inadequate sanitation (Greenberger, 2007). And most of those who were flooded and who were killed by the hurricane (either through drowning or injuries) were those who were living in the inner-city metropolitan area. Many elderly patients in nursing homes also died; and in general, the casualties from the hurricane belonged to the elderly population. Foster children were also displaced by the hurricane (Greenberger, 2007). About 5,000 children were separated from their families (Wingate, Perry, Campbell, David, and Weist, 2007). According to Greenberger (2007), these groups are considered vulnerable because they do not have access to the resources that the government and other private health care providers make available in cases of natural or man-made disasters. Most of them do not have access to “private and/or adequate transportation for evacuation, surplus food and water, medical supplies, medical care, or appropriate and safe shelter during an emergency” (Levine, 2007). Efforts to address the needs of the vulnerable population were made by relocating them to the Superdome; however, this proved to be inadequate. As was previously mentioned, the dome was not prepared to meet the needs of thousands of evacuees. Buses made available to transport the elderly and the rest of the vulnerable population also proved inadequate because there were no bus drivers available to drive these buses; most of them have already left the city along with their families (Wingate, Perry, Campbell, David, and Weist, 2007). Lessons Learned In order to optimise outcomes in the management of the next disaster of this kind, there are various measures that may be implemented. Frances Townsend (2006), of the Department of Homeland Security compiled a report of their recommendations to the President on how to improve disaster management. First and foremost, she recommends that there should be a unified management of the national response to disasters. The coordination between the state and the local authorities with the federal authorities failed during the response and recovery phase of the disaster. The federal officials were not accustomed to performing responsibilities which were normally conducted by local officials. They lacked the necessary training in rescuing citizens from the roofs of their homes or from the rising floodwaters. The federal authorities should not be designated as first responders during these disasters because they are not properly trained in these matters. Command centres for disasters should be immediately set-up; and the different members of the disaster team should know his or her place in this temporary hierarchy. With the various government agencies and officials who may be called in to assist, there may sometimes be a problem with ‘who will be in charge’. One team or official may feel like he should ‘head’ the operation, and another official may also feel the same way. Orders may be issued by anyone and such orders may be followed by those who occupy lower positions in this hierarchy. Conflicts and inconsistencies in these orders may cause misunderstanding and confusion. Consequently, this may create more problems and possibly duplication of efforts in the search and rescue operations (Townsend, 2006). The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (2009) points out that it is important to be realistic; and for disaster drills to include all critical functions and areas. These drills should simulate real disasters in order to adequately assess the responsiveness of the search and rescue teams during these disasters. They should be as realistic as possible in order to enable accurate measures of efficiency. Another important lesson learned in this disaster is to “anticipate disruptions in communications services, possibly for extended periods of time” (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2009). Alternate means of communication should be prepared in order to ensure that communication would still be possible in the midst of the disaster. Alternate ways of communication may include two-way radios, cellular phones with out-of-state area codes and text messaging capability, satellite phones, or personal data assistants or PDAs (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2009). The White House was also able to come up with its own set of recommendations in order to improve disaster management. It recommends the creation of a regional structure which would call on the DHS to develop and create Homeland Security Regions which would be fully staffed to manage and coordinate all preparedness activities during emergencies (Carafano and Keith, 2006). The report also recommends the training of the National Guard for deployment during homeland security missions. There is, therefore, a need to “incorporate the Guard into planning and preparation for the federal response to catastrophic disaster” (Carafano and Keith, 2006). It is also prudent to improve and strengthen the public health response. In this instance the White House recommends that the Department of Health and Human Services should come up with a realistic medical response plan to implement during catastrophic disasters; this includes leading a unified public health and medical command (Carafano and Keith, 2006). And finally, there is also a need to create a culture of preparedness. This challenge is posed on the different agencies and officials in the government to make the citizen’s welfare a priority. Different agencies and officials are challenged to step up to the plate and encourage community and individual preparedness. And as these agencies now do their part, so should we (Carafano and Keith, 2006). We should take the time to know the plan and to also know the community plan in order to make possible the highest degree of preparedness in any emergency. Works Cited Bankhead, C. (03 December 2007) Psychological Effects of Hurricane Katrina Persist. Medpage Today. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.medpagetoday.com/Psychiatry/AnxietyStress/7563 Carafano, J. And Keith, L. (23 February 2006) Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned: Solid Recommendations. Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from http://www.heritage.org/research/homelandsecurity/wm998.cfm Greenberger, M. (27 August 2007) Preparing Vulnerable Populations for Catastrophic Public Health Emergencies. The Horizon Foundation. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.thehorizonfoundation.org/ht/d/ArticleDetails/i/13456 Knabb, R., Rhome, J., and Brown, D. (23 August 2005) Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina. National Hurricane Center. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf Lessons Learned From Hurricane Katrina: Preparing Your Institution for a Catastrophic Event (2009). Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.ffiec.gov/katrina_lessons.htm Levine, J. (21 September 2005) Hurricane Katrina: a public health and environmental disaster. World Socialist Website. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/sep2005/katr-s21.shtml Rescued, New Orleans (2005) U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/sr109-322/ch5.pdf Seibert, A. (2009) The Psychological and Emotional Effects of Hurricanes On Survivors: From PTSD to Resilient Immunity. Survivor Guidelines. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.survivorguidelines.org/articles/sieb13katrina.html The First Year After Hurricane Katrina: What the Federal Government Did (16 October 2008) Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.dhs.gov/xfoia/archives/gc_1157649340100.shtm Townsend, F. (26 February 2006) The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. MSNBC. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/060223_katrina-lessons-learned.pdf Ursano, R., Fullerton, C., Weisaeth, L. (2007) Textbook of Disaster Psychiatry. New York: Cambridge University Press Wingate, M., Perry, E., Campbell, P., David, P., and Weist, E. (May 2007). Identifying and Protecting Vulnerable Populations in Public Health Emergencies: Addressing Gaps in Education and Training. National Center for Biotechnology Information. Retrieved 12 October 2009 from the World Wide Web: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1847489/ Read More