Analysis of the FTAA Case Study and the FTAA after Action Reports - Essay Example

Abstract In November 2003, the Free Trade Area of the Americas Summit (FTAA) summit was scheduled to take place Miami, Florida. Before the commencement the summit had received significant opposition from the anti-global “fair trade” mob. Conscious of the challenges that had been witnessed in past such meeting such those Seattle, Montreal, and Genoa for several years, the City of Miami Police Department organize an inter-agency law enforcement endeavor. The aim of the front was to provide security for the (FTAA) Summit and equivalently provide sufficient opportunity for protesters to communicate their opinions concerning the creation of the FTAA. This mission is regarded as the largest joint law enforcement operation in Miami’s history and perhaps the country’s as well. While the operation had its fair share of pitfalls, the FTAA action was overall successful because the Summit went on uninterrupted and thousands of protesters worked out their freedom to free speech. This paper touches on key challenges and their cause, viable solution to such problems, ramification of solutions, and policy recommendation by the county board commissioners. The analysis will focus on the three after Actions reports by the city of Miami PD, and civilian investigate panel report and the independent FTAA review panel. Key words: FTAA planning, prisoner processing, training, and unified command After the end of FTAA summit, it was time to reflect and evaluate the performance the combined law enforcement and identify the challenges experienced. At-least with reference to the after action reports, the challenges arose from the way operation was conducted and were further heightened by aggressive protesters’ tactics. The first two reports however are little biased because they are compiled the two protagonist groups – the law enforcement and the protesters as each party try to blame the other. The independent review panel is the most reliable because it not only involved all parties at arriving conclusions, but also it used interviews or public hearings to identify the real challenges. The key issues included training, organization and deployment, non-unified command, excessive use of force, labor concerns, and communication. Prior to summit, a series of law enforcement training for the FTAA was initiated because of the unprecedented in capacity, concentration and the huge number of command agencies. The Miami Police Department Commander headed this six-month exercise. The training was intended to educate the different police personnel both the Miami police department and the partnering agencies on most recent techniques in civil unrest management, strategies and tactics, public emancipation and restraint. Such training and application were necessary for the success of the mission. As per the Miami PD after-action report, a joint operation enforcement were given equal voice in the decision-making process in initial planning stage. That is during operation each agency ought to receive direction from the operation center (Reynardus 12) According to the plan, the city on Miami PD was to lead the joint law enforcement agencies. However, the MDPD did not relinquish command to the Miami PD or any other force in the mission instead the MDPD made respondents to the Miami PD requests (12).Despite the joint operation, disunity of the FTAA control made it difficult and impracticable to determine police actions accountability and lead to throwing blames against each other. This resulted to answers like “we don’t know who is responsible for that” as a response to questions about specific police actions (9). The third issue is about the use of force in operations by the joint law enforcement team. According to MDPD during the public hearing, only two types of weapons were employed. The less-lethal weapons particularly the “pepper spray “canister and the pepper ball ammunitions were used. The use of the two did not conform to the operating standard procedure which in chapter 31 states, “Chemical agents will not be used unless all reasonable efforts of control have failed.” (13).As about prisoner processing procedure, there was no significant problem since prisoner processing sites existed at Metrorail station. However, those who were arrested complained of too tight handcuffs but no one filed plaintiff during retention Finally was the issue of community labor. Prior to the event, the city on Miami PD met AFL-CIO representatives to plan the cause of action as about bus routes. The plans were casual and verbal agreement with Miami police and did not inform the MDPD officers. The MDPD blocked some routes that contradicted the agreement something that led to AFL-CIO and FLARA protests. They felt that the police did not accord protesters same protection as it did with the FTAA ministerial. Events to show police readiness to defend the ministerial from attack were more evident than measures to protect committed peaceful protesters (14). Root causes of the issues. It is evident that there was a six-month massive training prior to the commencement of the ministerial summit. The training was to equip the Joint law enforcement team fully in terms of strategies and new modus operandi as about combating civil unrest. Large amount of resources and time was spent in this exercise, yet according to the After-Action Report document, little resources were used as pertaining to citizenry freedom of free expression (Nunez 1).It is further evidenced from the FTAA task force training report whereby no item describes protesters’ rights. This disregard of the rights to expression is one of the causes of aggressive unrest among civilians. From the onset of the mission, there existed significant differences in the way the two major police departments (MD and MDPD) perceived the oncoming summit. There variation in approaches was obvious with the city of Miami police depicted as undisciplined whereas the county officers described as well trained and disciplined. Further decision to select the Miami PD as the leading outfit and the one to make critical decisions irritated MDPD command. The MDPD officers felt that they made a huge contribution of 3500 sworn officers while the Miami PD had 1500 sworn personnel (Nunez 1).This decision never augured well with the county officers despite making commitment to work as per the plan. These differences played a significant role in weakening the Joint enforcement actions. One major cause of use of force by police is warranted whenever any control measures fail and all reasonable avenues are exhausted. The police employed this tact on Thursday 20th when thousands of protesters crowded streets of downtown Miami. Mixed among them were roughly 500 – 600 hardcore Anarchists and rabble rousers, armed with smoke bombs, knives, bricks, and all manner of crooked arms. The police officers were bombarded with urine, feces, and paint by the protestors. Such humiliations provoked the county police to respond with less-lethal munitions, including Pepper ball and “Super Sock” rounds and led to unfortunate injuries to innocent journalists. One factor that led to aggressive protests was because Joint law enforcement team’s actions portrayed bias in treatment of the protesters compared to FTAA ministerial protection. The blocking of bus routes disregarded early agreement between FLARA and the Miami police. The police successively defended the FTAA ministerial from disturbance, but little effort was put in place to safeguard the peaceful demonstrators from attack. This considerable lack of balance of duty was evident in police deployment of agencies. The feeling of neglect made the peaceful demos turn violent Training in readiness to FTAA should be inclusive in addressing matters of all parties –the protesters and the ministerial. The MDPD and Miami PD should avail resources, develop written materials for huge protest preparation, that practically addresses constitutional freedom of expression, and persuade police officers to embrace trust in government by engaging both visitors and protesters equal respectable handling. Communication should be initiated with protester organizations and federations so that the police acknowledge demonstrators’ expectation based on negotiations. A viable solution is provided for in the police rules of engagement on force continuum and result negligence should be addressed. The continuum spells out the steady increase in response to aggression – verbal, physical, mechanical, or chemical forces and other unrest control strategies. The authorities need to re-emphasize the pre-existing guidelines that all use of less-lethal weapons, including “pepper spray,” occurs only after exhausting all reasonable available measures. They should further employ a court temperament of FTAA arrests in training to ensure that police arrest only persons liable to the crime and not only individuals simply in scene of action. Unity is essential in such multiple employments of law enforcement agencies. These are different forces with unique views and strategies and therefore a harmonizing deal ought to be invoked to ensure balance and accepting others' ideas. It will allow or insure that there will be only one standardized command and control system, where every agency obligates to a common agenda of protecting persons, property, and constitutional rights. Such clear chain of command with an adequate communication will indemnify accountability for all participants and agency actions. It will further allow law enforcement agencies cooperate in the preparation of after action report that is not biased or against any agency. A major community concern that was witnessed was that of the MDPD disregarding the agreement made earlier between AFL-CIO and FLARA with the Miami police. Considering that this agreement was verbal and casual, the agencies including the MDPD should adopt formal, written agreements to insure the protection of lawful demonstrations from disruption, as well as the protection of the subject event from disruption. Consequently allow other operations such bus business to go on uninterrupted. Once all the above main solutions are adopted, the resulting ramification is the reduced incidents of crime, destruction of property and respect upheld among the people of any region where such incidents occur. The large outlay of time and resources in training and deployment will be reflected in an efficient unrest control with minimal damage to both protesters and visitors. Consequently, there will be no need to use of lethal weapons with embracing negotiation and communication. Harmonization of divergent views and ideology while striking a balance among the law enforcement team will result in the formation of a unified team and operations go smoothly without sabotage. My final policy recommendation to the county manager and the board of commissioners profoundly draws its proposal from the challenges faced by FTAA joint law enforcement operations command. The county manager’s policy should (1). Develop Written materials for the mammoth protest preparation that proactively addresses demonstrators’’ constitutional rights while building trust between government protestors. (2). Re-emphasize the pre-existing guidelines that all use of less-lethal weapons, including “pepper spray,” occurs only after exhausting all reasonable available measures. (3). Enclose guidelines that insure unified and clear chain of command where each agency involved commits to the common agenda.(4). Policy of written agreement format, therefore shunning instances of dishonor that leading to demos. References Docstoc.com,. (2014). FTAA after Action Review. Retrieved 11 October 2014, from http://www.docstoc.com/docs/89875998/FTAA-after-Action-Review Nunez, E. (2008). FTAA Conference Case Study (1st ed., pp. 1-7). Reynardus, J. (2014). Independent Review Panel.Civilian Oversight of Miami-Dade Police and Corrections & Rehabilitation Departments (1st ed.). Read More