Solution to Most of the Hardships Related to Monitoring European Policy Formulation - Research Paper Example

Many nations have embraced economic integration as a long-term goal in their economics. This refers to both developed and developing nations, but most successful, on the developed nations. Most of the economic integration goals are aimed at advancing their national and regional economic powers. Economic integration is subject to not only economic gain but also political and social advantages of member states involved. The European continent is one of the smallest economic regions in the world, despite that most of her countries participated in the colonialism. Europe with countries like Britain and Belgium among others has been always a force to reckon on. Because of the numerous cultural and historical differences, her nations have not managed to fully achieve her economic integration facilitation by the European Union (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). The EU was born after many negotiations before 1944. The idea behind it was to create a common free market for all European nations and foster a healthy relationship between the European nations, which have in the past undergone a hostile history. EU, which acts as an insurance policy against unpredictable global market changes. More so to the countries in partnership, it aims at securing a wider market, expand, and maintain economic stability; enhancing both domestic and foreign investments. The EU’s ultimate price is, to achieve a centralized economy, for her European partnering nations. EU member states negotiate for a common market with one currency and other several policies, ranging from agricultural, industrial, environmental, and workers welfare in general. Politics and European Integration within the EU According to Delanty (1995, p. 125), the rights of a self driven sovereign state does not require limiting the relationship within the trading blocs to operate freely. On this, he claims that nations are free to interact with other nations within a multinational state, without overlooking their relations. The facilitation may be achieved when the relationship between the parties involved, is mutual and no party intend to prejudice over the other, whatever the circumstance. Delanty (1995, p. 127) further claims if the condition is not taken seriously into consideration, political pressure is bound to develop, thus breaking the multinational states in question. Weiler (1999, p. 217) cites that it is the lack of defined nationalistic unity amongst member states that limits the prospects of EU economic, social, and political integration. There have been numerous efforts to forge an integrated European Union. The most vocal ones as seen by the European observers are, creating a common EU flag, citizenship, EU anthem, car number plates, Olympic Games, and history books. Most EU critiques argue that these are doomed to fail due to lack of national consciousness. The only binding factor is commonly shared public pooled money to be shared among the member states. He continues to argue that the EU is an idea by the European powerful nation, to coerce the less powerful nations within Europe to come together, but without full approval and endorsement, of the latter; making the whole process illegitimate and undemocratic (Weiler 1999, p. 278). Observers argue that EU has its own common currency, thus can control both interest and exchange rates. The euro-currency system does not allow the developing as well as the weaker economies to compete. These states cannot receive compensation from their poor resource endowment through adoption of an exchange rate in agreement with their special situations. However, they don’t receive compensation for the loss caused by automatic transfer of resources. The transfer is entailed by the fiscal union members. Weiler further states that the EU’s effort to foster an integrated culture, social, and economic aspects among her member states is bound to fail. This is regardless of all the numerous measures taken by the EU to achieve this mission, amid democratic, artificially, and with it undesirable consciousness of the EU nation as well as the supranational national (1999, p. 280). He further claims that the most important aspect of this union, the European people, are displaced and left out paying loyalty to their various nations within the EU, arguing that with the increasing pressure upon the member states by the union to join the international integration, the more the EU loses legitimacy and influence (Weiler 1999, p. 288). To identify oneself with such erroneous misconception is to be out of touch with realities of our history or chasing a myriad pipe dream of building a Superpower. Respect of Sovereignty and Fundamentals According to Scharpf (1999, p. 186), the pursuit of the sovereignty of one’s state is both a natural and social right. He advances his discussion by adding that the latter should not be mistaken for a misguided nationalism or economic self-sufficiency. However, as a possibility where no one is coerced to join the union, respect the sovereignty of the member states and not judging from power but jurisdiction can establish a formidable international integration (Scharpf 1999, p. 188). Schmitter (2000, p. 316) and Siedentop ( 2000, p. 87) agrees that concepts of the European integration where there is sharing of sovereignty, pooled resources, and same laws and policies set by a union not elected by the majority should not always represent the interests of the majority, because it does not owe them that much. Schmitter adds that within the EU, the member states, disagreement is irrelevant, if unsupported, thus cannot impact much on matters pertaining policy changes (2000, p. 327). This is argued that because of the minimal involvement of the legislature of the member states with just the executive’s involvement. In any democracy, people acknowledge the right of their fellow citizens equally. There is also acknowledgement of the rights of varied sex, races, religion, age, and nationality. Gabel (1998, p. 122) observes that ethnic minorities’ rights are mostly protected within most democracies; majority right and minorities rights differs, though they don’t share such a distanced differences. Concept of a Shared Sovereignty By upsetting the difference between executive and legislature, the executive become dominant over the legislature (Evans, Peter, Jacobson, & Robert 1993, p. 375). This makes them more vocal both at the domestic and international levels. The long term result is a decreasing function of legislators at the expense of European integration. They continue to argue that European integration strengthens the executive against other national institutions (p. 378). Siedentop observes that where the executive is in agreement, they may use this as an advantage to assume domestic opposition, by combining their action at the European level (p. 98). If the player in question is from a powerful nation with veto powers, due to the latter, at times these leaders may decide to seek personal fulfillment other than representing the views of the people he or she represents. This creates democracy wrangles within the European nations within the umbrella of the EU. When these wrangles surfaces, they end up further distancing potential and other willing nations within Europe. This downplays all efforts made by the EU to unite these nations forming one stronger and vocal superpower. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, p. 187), argues that only eight percent of the directors from Europe are implemented by engaging in the national assembly. They also argue that veto power bestowed upon the executives denies the opposition any chance of protesting, thus making the democracy difficult; almost illegal, due to the policies made (King, Keohane, & Verba 1994, p. 201). International negotiations can result into the domestic information being favored over the executives. European Union critiques argue that the EU poses as an imbalance among the European nations and states. It is widely acceptable that the interests and objectives of the union, overrides those of the individual states. These differences may trigger the union to disregard some member countries’ sovereignty, thus threatening their democracy and sovereignty at the expense of international integration. The critiques further observe that the executive may poses political information and influence unavailable to the domestic societal groups. At time, they argue that this information could be detrimental to both parties but when just one party gains access, it empowers the latter to influence or control their actions. These limitations continue to impact negatively on the individual member states, consequently, pushing them further instead of binding him or her together. With the societal and opposition groups feeling alienated, there is always going to raise matters pertaining democracy. This, as seen by most observers, is why communities face a formidable cognitive barrier, while trying to influence European policy. According to the book, False Dawn, European integration can shore up the domestic power of political executives through offering them extra sources of ideological legitimating, related to international cooperation (p. 175). In turn, the national executive acquires tangible resources for seeking assistance from domestic groups. King, Keohane & Verba continue to support their claim by stating that at times, executive may embrace multilateral limitations on national sovereignty to replace unilateral action. They further states that this at time could be driven by the desire to be protected by the larger body, the EU, or the desire by the executive to push for the international policies at the expense of national policies (p. 127). As Scharpf (1999, p. 217) adds, the EU in the European integration can empower the executive domestically while pursuing their goal. This could be facilitated to ensure that leaders within the union, loyal to the policies of the union, remain in power ostensibly to push on with the agendas or policies of the union. This could affect democracy of the sovereign nations, negatively. According to Page (2001, p. 98), domestic due to the extra empowerment by the union, the executives are at times able to override the opposition of their national opposition and other societal groups provided by the European integration. He claims that in certain nations, for instance France and Ireland, parliament is not powerful as power lies within the executive body (p. 105). He continues to support his claim by adding that international corporation’s offer specific chances that they seek the consultation of the legislature, though with no much options. Mostly, this is because they are not entirely involved in making the decisions. This discrimination does not reflect the interests of the union in pursuit of serving many nations. Observers of the European politics hold that the executives possess fundamental advantage of information over their national legislature. This gives them the monopoly to enjoy firsthand information and the power to work upon the gathered legislation. Keohane and Joseph (2001, p. 126) argues that modern parliaments in Europe often provide burdensome agenda that affect the national executives. There is little for the European Union to add. This is facilitated because these European nations have faith in their higher institutions. Similarly, if the EU is sensitive to the right and feelings of her member states, maybe these institutions could have faith in the EU. They further states that following the current trends within the EU, countries with veto powers and the power to suggest will have considerable merit in policy making (Keohane & Joseph 2001, p. 134). The executives require retaining a majority in parliament. Keohane and Joseph observes that in some countries, the government can implement European regulations without involving the member’s states legislature, more so on matters that falls on the scope of the executives constitutional decree- making powers (Keohane & Joseph 2001, p. 129). They assert that on the flipside due to frequent check from varying governments. Further, this makes the EU more transparent as well as less corrupt than almost any national government within Europe (Keohane & Joseph 2001, p. 137). This would not only place the EU at a better place to collect and redistribute the available resources, evenly, and without any in or outside interference. However, this can be achieved only if the EU could fully regard all the nations as equal, without prejudicing some on the basis of supremacy or inferiority. The EU has suffered democratic issues according to Phelan (2001). The reason behind the latter as they cite is that there exist malaise of democratic participation, which could wide or transform, depending on the institutional flexibility (Keohane & Joseph 2001, p. 27). According to Martin (2000, p. 257), the executives strongly strengthened at national level against domestic societal groups and opposition. The national parliaments have been compromised as democracy problems arise as a result of international integration. The dilemma behind the quagmire as argued by Martin (2000, p. 259), is that the executives are well placed to provide gains provided by the policies that political actors would otherwise block. This is despite that the EU does not always dissolve every policy change against legislature. Empowering these democracies and involving the nations rather than just the executives would further strengthen the Union. Conclusion In the midst of all the effort to unite the European countries, much need to be put into consideration to avoid making this ambitious dream become a pipe dream, with the EU being subject to the European political objectives. Much consideration and emphasis need to be laid on the respecting the sovereignty of all the European nations-upholding true democracy among the involved democracies and much sacrifice, to help realize this dream. Organized groups can provide solution to most of the hardships related to monitoring European policy formulation. This is an indicator that if the issues are amicably addressed, the European Union could be a force to reckon. From opening up and widening their regional markets to sharing the dream of uniting her people to become one, there are a number of issues to be put into consideration. On the other side, when the policies of the union seems to be overriding those of the member states, the much desired unity, is bound to fail. The union strengthens the executives at national level against domestic societal groups and opposition. This in a democratic society overrides the interest of the majority, thus making unacceptable under any democracy. For the EU to operate free from her member’s interference there is needed to involve her member states legislature collectively in her decision-making on matters of policy, to check her operations. This will create a greater sense of belonging, thus the much desired unity. Failure to which, the union will remain just an unattainable goal; where the powerful nations dictates over the lesser nations. This will keep on pushing other nations away, for fear of subjecting their citizens to such unbalanced uncertainty as this is overrides all the possible benefits, regardless of the need. References Delanty, G 1995 Inventing Europe, Idea, Identity, Reality, London, Macmillan. Evans, P. B., Harold, K., Jacobson, M & Robert, P 1993, Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press. Gray, J 1998, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism, London, Granta. Gabel, M. J 1998, Interests and Integration: market liberalization, public opinion and European Union, Ann Arbour, University of Michigan Press. Keohane, R. O & Joseph, S. N 2001, Between centralization and fragmentation: the club model of multilateral cooperation and problems of democratic legitimacy, Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=262175 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.262175 King, G., Keohane, R & Verba, S 1994, Designing social inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Martin, L. L. (2000). Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Page, E. C 2001 Governing by Numbers. Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy- Making, Oxford – Portland, Hart Publishing. Phelan, W 2001, Does the European Union strengthen the state? Democracy, executive power and international cooperation, retrieved from http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Phelan95.pdf Scharpf, F 1999, Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford, Oxford University Press. Schmitter, P 2000, How to democratize the European Union … and why bother? Lanham MD, Rowman & Littlefield. Siedentop, L 2000, Democracy in Europe, Allen Lane, Penguin Press. Weiler, J.H 1999, The constitution of Europe: “Do the new clothes have an emperor? and other essays on European integration, New York, Cambridge University Press. Read More