The relationship between discrimination and economics - Research Paper Example

The Relationship Between Discrimination and Economics The Relationship Between Discrimination and Economics Introduction The relationship between discrimination and economics may confuse and puzzle even the most eloquent economic theorists. In trying to underpin cause and effect or links, various situations, factors, and variables are considered. These includes governance, policies, market characteristics, culture, tradition, work attitudes, individuals, organizations, environments, cost of living, and other variants that at one point contribute to the complexity of the puzzle. Throughout history, many points of views about understanding the economics of discrimination have been forwarded. Various theories have been established based on focused consideration of one or two factors, cause and effect, as well as historical views that point out to generalized understanding about races, ethnicities, gender, or even physical capability. This paper will try to explore the relationship between discrimination and economics and hope to contribute to the formulation of policy to bridge whatever gaps may be established. Theories on Discrimination and Economy In order to understand the topic at hand, it is important to establish the various theories that have been prevailing in the various schools of thoughts about discrimination and economics. Various theories scoring the relationship between economics and discriminations suggest that: competitive market structure meant lead to less discrimination; market power provides employers the opportunity to pursue objectives other than profit maximization; the absence of rigorous product market competition allowed employers to engage in racial wage discrimination; discrimination is a result of imperfect information and culture-based models of discrimination; functionality hypothesis proposes that dominant group members attempt to maintain socio-economic hierarchies by defining and limiting access to the characteristics that are required for socially desirable positions favoring the dominant group; and the Marxian tradition’s theory that competition among capitals provides the explanation for the persistent black/white wage gaps (Agesa and Hamilton, 2004). Banking on the proposals of Thomas Sowell (1983) and Walter Williams (1982), Majewsky suggested that markets minimize discrimination and state intervention that retards economic progress of racial and cultural minorities. Several myths were presented against historical examination as follows: Myth 1: Discrimination leads to poor economic performance by an ethnic group. Fact: Considered as axiomatic, the myth mentioned contradicts historical examples. Discriminated groups like the Chinese were despised in Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, but today, they control about 70 to 85% of retail in said countries (Majewski, 1988). This, too, can be said of Jews in the West. “From the Roman Empire, through the Middle Ages to the Nazi holocaust, the Jews have endured more religious persecution than any other ethnic minority,” but through hard work, entrepreneurship and education, were able to prosper in most areas around the globe (Majewski, 1998, 23). The second myth was that poor economic performance by an ethnic group was attributed to discrimination. In reality, low income below national average and poor representation in professional occupations among ethnic minorities are prevalent throughout the world. This may not be easily attributed to current practices of discrimination as Majewski (1998) suggested. Another factor that has placed minorities to their marginal status includes banishment from the lands they occupied by colonizers which in turn have given the occupied lands as well as established businesses to their heirs. In this argument, Majewski (1988) presented the different performance levels of three black groups: descendants of immigrants from the West Indies, descendants of free persons of color, and descendants of slaves freed during the Civil War. Among the three, second-generation West Indians earn about 104% of the average national income while blacks in general and as a whole earn only 64%. Their income gaps indicate that blacks’ performance have nothing to do with discrimination. This performance has been attributed instead to culture of which blacks freed after the Civil War developed the attitude of reluctance to accept responsibility as well as doing as little work as possible for the master due to lack of incentives (Majewski, 1988). As Sowell observed (1983) suggested: Much of contemporary social philosophy proceeds as if different patterns of group representation in various occupations, institutions, activities, and income levels must reflect discriminatory decisions by others. Yet this is nowhere demonstrated and in many ways falsifies. Even in activities in which no discrimination is possible, people are not proportionately represented. Activities solely within the discretion of the individual – choices among television programs, card games to play, the age of marriage, or the naming of children – show widely differing patterns between different racial ethnic, and national groups (89). Innate individual ability may be influenced by culture but it can also encourage as well as discourage it in achieving economic success. Cultural differences do not make one inferior or better but it is those who adapt well to their environment that benefits the most regardless of culture (Majewski, 1988). The third myth was that political power is needed for the minority people to succeed economically. This requires strong government support for minorities to prevent exploitation. However, as presented earlier, many successful ethnic groups in the USA such as the Chinese, Jews, Italians, and Japanese only participated in political process after they achieved affluence. In addition, the Irish, considered to be politically successful minority group in the US were not really economically successful (Majewski, 1988). The explanation has been that government actions offer short-term solutions and that welfare subsidies often benefit only the most prosperous of the target groups (Majewski, 1988). An example of this case is the freed slaves after the Civil War when white southern land-owners enforced racial preference through cartels designed to restrict wages paid to blacks. Individual incentives differed from the objectives of the group, of which allowed the productive blacks to seek better wages from other employers, thus breaking the cartel. According to Arrow (1998), discrimination exists in all societies and attributed in attitudes, social relations, residential location, legal barriers, and all levels of economic status: income, wages, prices paid, credits provided. What is notable was the absence of its economic dimension except on the literature specifically addressing it. It is acknowledged that it is part of the many other aspects of economics and moral feelings. On the exploration of Arrow (1998) on the scope and limits of ordinary economic analysis for understanding racial discrimination in markets, he suggested that liberalism rejects racial discrimination thus, signifying that racial identity should not impair an individual’s life chances. It links the study of racial discrimination on economic analysis despite its pervasiveness. Economic discrimination exists in open form and that subtle economic analysis is not necessary. He noted the examples cited by Darity and Mason (year) regarding the help wanted advertisements that specify preferred race and that in the United States, most good jobs were not available to some races. Aside from employers, even labor unions such as craft unions explicitly maintain a color bar. In a specific historical event during the US involvement in World War II when labor unions pledged no-strike, an exception occurred when the Philadelphia rapid transit system attempted to hire blacks and the workers went on strike to prevent it (Arrow, 1998). Another example is residential discrimination with the glaring role of sellers and the agreements that came with the purchase of the property. In a cooperative housing development in the 1950s which the author checked into, the cooperative had liberal Stanford faculty as majority of members, but which specified a limitation on non-white participation to 10% of the whole. Arrow was “assured that it was considered radical and courageous act to set the proportion above zero and that there could be no mortgage financing if they went further,” (Arrow, 1998, 92). It should also be noted how racial discrimination against the blacks did until the 1960s has been regarded by Samuel Johnson as quoted by Arrow (1998, p 92), “too evident for detection and too gross for aggravation.” Arrow’s (1998) invocation of the past serves to inform that “any theory of racial discrimination, including any theory of its economic implications, has to be consistent with these patent facts,” (92). While widespread, the act of discrimination is also expected to change but slowly equating to large residue of discriminatory values since the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Arrow (1998) also pointed out that after the passage of the act, the evidences prior to 1964 are no longer available. When it comes to wages, there was a slight difference in black and white wages but it was the form of available jobs that are limited to blacks, if they were hired at all. In addition, while they were also charged the same rate of housing rental, they were also excluded in many areas (Higgs, 1977). Discriminatory practices have also been reported in automobile markets as well as in mortgage market (Massey and Denton, 1993). Economic Explanation Under the theoretical picture of a market economy, exchange was described as impersonal. This meant that individual agents decide how much to supply and how much to demand. Equilibrium is reached after supplies and demands were added up and that total supply equals total demand. There is no particular relation between supplier and demander but this scenario is incomplete as it would be established that suppliers and demanders indeed have direct personal relations as much as an employer even through his agents have direct personal relations with their employees. In a market-based model, where members of two races receive different wages or charge different prices whether in the commodity or credit markets, there is high possibility that it would be balanced and wiped out by competition (Arrow, 1998). Many employers are after profit maximization. Under the assumption of constant or increasing returns to scale, competition implies the elimination of all except the least discriminatory employers. These non-discriminatory employers would drive out those who are. Under discrimination against consumers (such as the blacks) where sellers of houses and mortgages refuse to sell to black customers, market-based explanation is difficult to pinpoint (Arrow, 1998). Information, beliefs, and expectations influence economic behavior based on rational choice theory where beliefs contrary to experience will be eliminated. This gave rise to the theory of statistical discrimination. Where blacks and whites differ in productivity on the average, causes may include quality of education, cultural differences, or causes that may not be observable. Arrow (1998) pointed out that employers’ experience will cause them to use the observable traits such as race in exchange for the unobservable characteristics that cause the productivity differences Discriminatory Wages Where pure discrimination is practiced, employers may be offered lower wages by the workers discriminated upon. When this happens, the minority wage will be lower at first but eventually, the market process with equalize their wage rates. Employers that hire minority workers at lower wage will make above-average profits. This will attract new firms in the industry that will hire the minority workers at slightly higher offers in order to attract them. This will even out the wage disparity over time (Majewski, 1988; Arrow, 1998). Perceptual discrimination, however, is practiced everywhere. Many employers have pre-conceived notions about prevailing ethnic attitudes that drive to choose the “lower cost” incentive than risk hiring the wrong person simply to acquire the individual information which may cost the firm higher. As Williams (1982) proposed: Since all of us will seek to economize in information expense, we will tend to substitute less costly forms of information for more costly forms. Physical attributes are easily observed and hence, constitute a cheap form of information. If a particular physical attribute is highly correlated with some less easily observed attribute, then the physical attribute may be used as an estimator or proxy for the other (49). An example cited was the observation of a short person, or someone who is female or black as cheap information, yet sufficient to predict attribute or attributes when the circumstances occur. This is equivalent to requiring a five-year experience for a professional task such as editorial work of which less years of experience would require the hiring staff more application letters and resumes to go through and would cost more work hours for the company. In this manner, race, ethnicity, age, or genders are used to predict performance at cheaper cost (Majewski, 1988). Where false judgment is highly to occur, market incentives minimize the number of wrong stereotypes because with competition, an employer is penalized for decisions made from incorrect prejudices. This will mean that the rival/s will have taken the better performers. Those who possessed the correct knowledge of a group’s ability will soon enjoy cost-effective hiring practices as well as gain competitive edge. As employers realize the value of the ethnic group, higher bid will be accorded them by other employers. It is government restriction in labor markets like minimum wage laws that increase the possibility of wrong perceptual discrimination to pervade as it will prevent employees to hire at due to perceived losses at hiring a less competent for a law-required minimum wage (Majewski, 1988). In fact, government regulation of the market may not always lead to discrimination but impacts negatively on low income groups regardless of their race, gender, ethnicity as so much like occupational licensing and other forms of intervention reduces opportunities for people to acquire basic skills. Williams (1982) noted that regulation cut off the bottom rung of the ladder of economic advancement. In this manner, those who will never have a chance at acquiring skills will remain unproductive and with less chance to reach the middle rungs to remain impoverished and less chance at advancement (Majewski, 1988). The rationale is that the segment of the population who has the skills or productivity below the legislated rate will have less chance of employment because it would be unwise to hire workers with less productivity than the required wage. In like manner, high-skilled labor will also be substituted with low-skilled labor or remove the job altogether (Majewski, 1988). Sowell (1983) and Williams (1982) proposed that: cultural differences matter as there are identical characteristics that make some ethnic groups prosper faster, while others perform badly. It is therefore important to consider the cultural values to determine economic performance between groups; the market itself minimizes and even out pure discrimination as employers would soon be charged for their wrong decision based on discrimination; government interventions hurt minorities in two ways: they allow buyers and sellers to discriminate against ethnic groups by forcing employers to decide on the most economic actions based on perceived requirements or through removal of jobs that could have served as skills-acquisition process. Discriminatory Practices Lawler and Bae (1998) noted the various implications of seemingly discriminatory policies as well as preferences of multinational companies in their hiring practices. Females were hired for lower wages but they remain discriminatory in managerial and professional jobs (Adler and Izraeli, 1994). In examining overt gender discrimination – defined as “publicly stated gender requirement for candidates for a particular position in an organization” – Lawler and Bae (1998) established determinants for of the inclusion of explicit gender restrictions in job announcements by multinational corporations and Thai-owned firms. They found out that some job announcements restrict jobs to male or to female applicants, and some are silent on the issue of gender. At times, both males and females are invited. There are countries like Thailand that lack laws neither restricting gender-based discrimination nor requiring “equal opportunity” among employers. However, the study noted that economic growth did not have an impact on discrimination. In Mexico, the establishment of malaquiladoras (reduced government liabilities) plants encouraged by government expected to increase male employment but instead, female employees were hired due to lower wages, thus allowing a very different outcome (Fernandez-Kelly, 1983). The same case has been noted in Southeast Asia where women were increasingly entering the labor force despite widespread employment discrimination for higher positions. It has been noted that gender preference is generally prohibited in industrialized Western countries; this type of discrimination persists throughout much of Asia. However, it should also be noted that prior to the Civil Rights Act in 1964 in the US, gender discrimination in newspaper advertisements was common, even in other Western countries (Goldin, 1990). The elimination of such employment discrimination was seen to have advanced women economically although lesser known forms of discrimination continue to exist in organizations that claim to provide equal opportunities. Blau and Ferber (1992) proposed that gender discrimination rooted to the taste or preferences on the part of employers, employees, or customers. Preferences may not be related to productivity but usually lead to male-female wage differentials as well as gender-based occupational and industrial segregation even in competitive labor markets. It should be noted that even in these instances, individual workers can make employment decisions based on their personal preferences and needs. This may lead to disparities in occupational or industrial gender distributions and may not necessarily be influenced by employers’ practices. It was found, however, that development and modernization contributed to the decrease of discriminatory practices. This is the consequence of displacement of ascriptive criteria related directly to ability (Jacobs and Lim, 1992). Other studies maintain that economic development often leads to the deterioration of status of women due to greater discrimination in the workplace and that MNCs serve to damage the welfare of women (Ward, 1984). It has been accepted that where prohibited, employers continue discriminatory practices in subtle manner and hardly observable due to lack of explicit expression. In the case of Thailand, the lack of laws that prohibit discrimination lead to employers impose explicit gender-related restrictions on jobs. In the case of the MNC, practices vary depending on the prevailing work culture of the originating country. Culture is often defined by beliefs, practices, attitudes, role expectations and values commonly shared by the members of a specific group (Triandis, 1994). Thus, culture of the originating country may be reflected on the MNC wherever it may operate affecting the actions and behaviors of the firms’ participants. A specific example could be glimpsed from Kashima and Callan’s (1994) observation that the Japanese have collective cultural traits although it may not necessarily mean that national traits dictate organizational work cultures (Hofstede, 1980). Where gender discrimination is concerned, a firm’s home-country may be instrumental to influencing management practices when the culture was entrenched in the parent company about women’s roles in the workplace. This can be transferred through standardized policies and procedures to the subsidiaries. In addition, cultural predisposition of expatriate managers may affect their tastes and preferences, and lastly, host-country nationals employed in managerial positions may have been exposed to MNC originating country socialization such as US practices of employing US-educated applicants while Japanese firms send managerial employees to Japan for extensive training and socialization (Lawler and Bae, 1998). In highly ethnocentric organizations, management practices in foreign subsidiaries are linked to home-country practices even where there are no rigid home-country controls (Laurent, 1986). Experiences of MNCs in the international business and work environments, however, lessens ethnocentricity, thus, globalization has been seen to impact on lesser ethnocentricity among MNCs (Lawler and Bae, 1998). In the study behavioral tendencies for MNCs, Hofstede (1980) developed a series of scales to determine cultural traits that include power distance defined as the extent to which subordinates recognize power differentials; masculinity or values opposing feminine values; individualism or the extent to which personal goals are promoted instead of organizational goals; and uncertainty avoidance or extent to which individuals tend away from risks. In addition, Hofstede also proposed in 1991 the term Confucian dynamism of which the worker will focus on future against present and past. Discriminatory practices may be present on the scales for masculinity, power differentials, Confucian dynamism, and individualism (Lawler and Bae, 1998). It was observed that countries with relatively high scores on the masculinity scale have highly differentiated sex roles, a machismo ethic, and ales dominance (Hofstede, 1980). In this manner, the work and employment pattern restricts some jobs explicitly for males, and other jobs explicitly for females. On the other hand, where individualism is high on the work culture of an organization, the personal productivity and achievement of individuals is encouraged and noted. On the opposite is collectivism where group affiliation and consciousness is emphasized. Objective competence and skills become the factors for job performance evaluation while the collectivist may emphasize certain criteria such as gender, age, social affinity, or class. In this manner, discrimination may be more apparent in the collectivist culture. It was also observed by Charles (1990) that the rise of individualism also resulted to the decrease of sexism in work and business organizations. In power differentials and Confucian dynamism, tradition play a big role in practicing discrimination and patriarchal systems are high on both. These cultures exclude women from important roles in society although Confucian dynamism may emphasize time factors such as long-term (eastern focus) and short-term (western focus). As for risk aversion behaviors, this has been considered individual and highly dependent on personal preferences or prejudices of individual managers, and not organizational in nature. Reskin (1993) suggested that the shifting economic conditions that influence labor supply and demand usually affect the willingness and ability of employers to practice discriminatory practices. There had been little changes about jobs but the preferred type of workers may not be available, thus, substitution becomes the option. Labor shortages, too, lead to reduced gender segregation in US metropolitan areas (Abrahamson and Sigelman, 1987). In Singapore, it has been observed that economic growth and development resulted to greatly diminished gender discrimination (Chan and Lee, 1994). This has also been observed in East and Southeast Asian countries especially in Chinese communities where female participation at all levels are open especially where labor shortage is present. Thailand where Chinese presence is also strong showed the same pattern of employment practices (Lawler and Bae, 1998). MNCs exhibited ethnocentricity in behavior with respect to the management of host-country nationals but individualism showed more weight in the practice of discrimination as compared to masculinity. In economy, there is strong economic growth where “equal opportunity” is highly espoused (Lawler and Bae, 1998). Thus, increased level of home-country individualism tend to result in a net decrease in overt discrimination. The observed marginal effects of individualism and masculinity for the “equal opportunity” alternative run counter to expectation so that it was proposed that explanation lies in the labor market conditions encouraging “equal opportunity” ads: acute labor shortages linked to fast economic expansion (Lawler and Bae, 1998). The authors suggested that where discrimination may still be prevalent, a need to convince applicants about the gender issue should be emphasized although job restrictions based on gender may still prevail. It should be noted by now that aside from the United States, Australia and the European Union has also explicit laws about discrimination since 1970s requiring member countries to adopt and implement anti-discriminatory employment policies. Whiles Japan also passed its anti-discrimination legislation in 1986, implementation and enforcement was weak (Steinoff and Tanaka, 1994). Overall, it was observed by Lawler and Bae (1998) that “the likelihood of Western companies placing gender-based job ads is generally lower than for Asian companies, it is not insubstantial.[…] about 25% of all ads by American companies specify gender as a job requirement; 31% for German companies, 25% for French companies, and 25% for UK companies (versus 52% for Japanese companies and 46% for Thai companies),” (147). Agesa and Hamilton (2004) In Gary Becker’s (1957) examination of relationship between market forces and the ability of employers to engage in discrimination suggested that employers in non-competitive industries have more latitude to discriminate. It was also suggested that profit in noncompetitive industries allows employers to afford the cost of appeasing their taste for racial wage discrimination while employers in competitive industries face a cost disadvantage relative to rivals and have less opportunities for discriminatory practices. The examination of the effect of market concentration on the black and white wage differential have been seen as problematic due to the uncertainty of the relationship between market concentration and racial wage discrimination: studies used the fixed-effect industry approach to estimate the black/white wage differential constraining understanding that the stricture of wages is the same for all industries; and literature have focused on the portion of the racial wage differential that is due to racial differences in returns to attributes as a measure of employers’ latitude to discriminate which does not include the entire racial wage gap (Agesa and Hamilton, 2004). Using a more finely defined industry classifications of census data of 82 industry categories, and the large number of observations to estimate individual wage equations by industry and race for workers in manufacturing industries, Agesa and Hamilton (2004) examined the market structure and wage discrimination relationship. The combination of industries into a small number of broad categories was seen by Agesa and Hamilton (2004) as problematic due to results in excessive aggregation of industry market concentration rations. It conceals the variance from more precisely defined industries that might lead to other important results. In addition, first-stage wage estimates were computed with and without controls for occupation categories. This assumes that occupation choice is exogenously determined while excluding controls lead to estimates of a reduced form model that allows endogenous occupational classification (Agesa and Hamilton, 2004). Agesa and Hamilton (2004) found that the black wage disadvantage was large in relation to the white wage advantage. Disparities were measured relative to average industry wages and that whites made up the majority of the sample in the study’s sample industries. Plant size and capital to labor ratios influence wages but to a marginal level as determinant for black/white wage gap. Noncompetitive market structure and foreign competition insignificantly influence the white wage advantage and the black wage disadvantage. In examining the effects of competition on the portions of the white advantage and black disadvantage that are due to differences in returns to attributes, it was found that noncompetitive market structure gives employers the latitude to discriminate. Agesa and Hamilton (2004) suggested that, “there is no signi?cant difference in the discriminatory portion of the white wage advantage between competitive and noncompetitive industries,” (131). In addition, it was established that foreign competition increases the discriminatory portion of the white wage advantage contrary to the expectation that foreign competition reduces wage discrimination. Using occupational controls in the estimation of wage disparity, the study also found little evidence that competitive industries are less discriminatory. The opposite is found where occupational controls were excluded. The study concluded that there is little evidence that international competition reduces racial wage disparities. There was mixed evidence that domestic competition reduces employers’ latitude to provide white wage premiums or black wage discounts. Where occupational controls are used, wage disparity points to little relationship between competition and discrimination. The study suggested for the need to incorporate alternative theories of discrimination into the conventional view in consideration of other factors such as dominant groups maintain unearned or inherited advantage or privilege. Here, there is the presence of a dominant group, a subaltern group, and an environment where there is competition for social rewards (Darity, 2001). The dominant group dictates the premarket characteristics of the subaltern group, in addition to highlighting the cultural, cognitive, and motivational deficiencies of the subaltern group thus decreasing their competitiveness. It is at this stage that discrimination is used to offset their gains in competitive skills while at the same time denying the presence of discrimination. Aside from this, Williams and Kenison (1996) also challenges the neoclassical belief that industrial sorting by race and gender is independent of industrial wages but dependent on discrimination, market structure, worker skills, and perception of skills. Competition among capitalists leads to labor segmentation that keeps overall wages low. Here, race and gender is used as indicator to segment labor resulting to racial hierarchies of industrial composition and wage inequalities. Functionality theory also supports the notion that discrimination segments the labor force allowing preferred occupational niches available only to the dominant racial, ethnic or gender group (Agesa and Hamilton, 2004). Analysis and Conclusion After careful consideration of the discussion about discrimination, theories about the economics of discrimination, and the factors that affect or influence the prevalence of the practice, it can be observed that there is in fact an almost unseen force that keeps discrimination in all societies. In many countries especially the democratic ones, the various rights and prerogatives of individuals are protected by laws so that preferences in many matters may not be legally questioned. Many practices and choices of an individual are attributed to his rights and privileges. It is therefore logical that when an individual uses his preference over a logical or more socially acceptable one, he is only exercising his right to choose. One such act that is specific to economic results may be in picking an immediate successor for an important job, such as that of an owner of a firm hiring his senior manager or even executives. It is a given that many firms are identified as “family-run” or “family-owned”. It will into be surprising to see the various family members occupying the highest or choice positions in such organizations. Already, the theory of preference is in practice. Preference has not been due to race, ethnicity, gender, disability or ability, or even age, but blood relations. This practice, although can be easily attributed to “collective” or the opposite of individualist societies, surprisingly, is prevalent in western societies where individualism is enforced or encouraged. This practice may not be questionable in “eastern” or Asian countries where the organization usually starts with the family and the focus of goals and aims. It should be understood by now that it is both present in western and eastern cultures or countries. Considering that the current economic identity or various industries today are now global or international, it is therefore conclusive that preferential attitudes are practiced from top-down, a support to the functionality theory already discussed earlier. Another observation about economics and the disparity of wages and incomes are the segregation of members of any given society, if not the segregation of societies. There are high societies or classes, upper middle, lower middle, upper lower, and many others that only segmentation artists or agents and their superiors may fully understand. This is applied in marketing theories in order to determine the capacity of buyers as well as their fitness to be provided the marketing communication to convince the consumer about the products or services he should avail (emphasis is from the author). Here, with the focus on the buyer or consumer, a product, as well as income and wages cannot be far behind. It cannot be said that where a certain product has been sold, there is equal sharing of income derived from it. It is up to the owner as well as his most immediate executives to determine what portion of the income goes to the workers. Once again, there is a decision-maker that dictates the distribution of incomes or wages and the workers are the least voices to help in this process. So, how can a logical being suggest that there is no discriminatory practice in the determination of wages paid to workers in this instance when this is a prevailing market practice? Next is the already provided for theory about inherited power, wealth, business enterprise, properties, and other economic determinants. In the history of mankind, there have always been the dominant individual or groups observed by Darwin et al as the fittest in a competitive world. They usually include the best and most fit warriors who subdued the leaders before them or against them. Aided by the mentally superior ministers, they were able to decree laws that outlived time and defied boundaries. Many of these laws were enacted to protect acquired properties and wealth so that the dominant leaders will pass on their legacies and power to their next of kin. This has been the model of which imperialists were able to conquer worlds apart from the west. This very nature of conquest has been discriminatory that original occupants of lands and properties, or possessor of wealth were banished and replaced by these conqueror imperialists. They soon are left having only a few. However, it does not mean that conquered societies did not have their own segregation, segmentation, and discriminatory practices because as already proposed earlier, they do. These are prevalent and societal characteristics that are common among all societies. The South Americans, Native Americans, Africans, and Asians have their premium families, middle class, and lower class as much as the British have their royalty and their working class. In fact, all these classifications are discriminatory in nature. The World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank are only some of the more popular organizations today that adhere and promote the imperialist notions about controlling and dictating “inferior” classes of nations to absorb whatever kind of work or business culture that they require. These organizations also help MNCs to assimilate in conquered nations that may have contradictory practices, culture, or tradition. Every other international trade organization actually works towards the achievement of integration of these laws and enactments to facilitate faster trade. In reality, these practices are helping towards the achievement of a less discriminatory global society that the neoclassical theorists were dreaming of. But this is recent phenomenon made possible by China’s low cost labor and various industries that now encompass the previously exclusive “knowledge economy”. It is succinct to acknowledge, though, that western market economy was the force that made this integration a reality. It does not, however, guarantee that discrimination would soon end. There would still be many factors that contribute to it and it is discussed below. Another consideration to understand about is economic performance. While the various factors presented about were realities that contribute to discriminatory economics, performance as already pointed out by the neoclassicists is paramount to achieving equality at all fronts. There are in fact various individuals or groups that perform better in their economic situations. Again, various factors influence their performance including inheritance, social standing, adoptability, attitude, industry, skills, knowledge, and even physical attributes. The author have chosen to exclude culture as culture in this manner is part of the inheritance that an individual have acquired, and this, subject to changes over time where will and determination prevail. This means that economic success becomes dependent on the individual. Despite the challenges that an individual may be presented, success can be considered as an option and no amount of discriminatory practices can prevent him from achieving his goals if he wills to succeed economically. Discrimination is an innate part of societal characteristic that may be considered a challenge for those who are discriminated upon. Economically, discrimination is a practice to maintain economic status of those who are dominant. They practice discrimination to sustain their advantage. 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