Robert Matthews and The Daily Telegraph - Essay Example

 In philosophical circles, Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most misunderstood individuals in recent memory. This obscure ideas and complicated reasoning led to many criticisms of his work and also of his personal character. A 1991 article by Robert Matthews in The Daily Telegraph was particularly scathing, as this article refers to Wittgenstein as a “nutcase”. This article also claims that Wittgenstein had a deranged mind and that he exhibited many of the behaviours of someone suffering from schizophrenia and included quotes from a psychiatrist who supports these claims. This, however, is purely based on the inability of these individuals to understand the complex reasoning behind Wittgenstein’s ideas. It is unfair to call someone a “nutcase” simply because that person does not understand, as many of the greatest thinkers in history have been very difficult to understand at times. Also, just because this reporter and psychiatrist do not agree with the thought process that is being exhibited by Wittgenstein does not mean that his ideas should be discounted entirely, as many other people have found them both useful and important. Perhaps the most effective method of defending Wittgenstein, however, is to show how closely related his ideas are to more renowned philosophers like Soren Kierkegaard and Saint Augustine, since “Wittgenstein received deeper impressions from some writers in the borderland between philosophy, religion, and poetry than from the philosophers, in the restricted sense of the word. Among the former are St. Augustine, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy” (Malcolm 19). If Matthews finds it necessary to criticize Wittgenstein, then he should be able to apply many of the same criticisms to these other two individuals, who heavily influenced the philosophical works of Wittgenstein. Also, by analyzing the works of other philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche, we can see that Wittgenstein’s ideas, while different, do not make him any more of a “nutcase” than any other philosopher throughout history. The article “Revealed: The Great Philosopher was Just a Nutcase”, by Robert Matthews, is a particularly harsh criticism of the philosophical works of Wittgenstein. While Wittgenstein may have been obscure, difficult to understand, and eccentric, he should not be labelled as a nutcase because his work holds a great deal of value. One thing that Matthews does accomplish over the course of his article is to gain the insights of experts in the mental health field in order to prove that Wittgenstein may have had some mental problems. Surely many of his behaviours were not what we could consider normal, but who’s to say what is normal and what is not? Wittgenstein did not act in a manner that was consistent with the rest of society, although he hardly disturbed society in general, so it can be questioned why Matthews felt the need to write this story. Many people have a difficult time understanding what Wittgenstein said during his various philosophical papers, but that surely does not mean that he was crazy. On the contrary, it could mean that everyone else is crazy for not being able to comprehend what he was saying, because it surely made sense to him. Matthews wrote that Wittgenstein’s conclusion that “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent” is particularly baffling, but this is not the case if the reader does not take those words as being literal. What Wittgenstein means by these words is that an individual cannot speak about something if he or she does not have some sort of knowledge on the subject. This is because if this individual does not have any knowledge on the subject, he or she would have nothing to say. I cannot speak on something that I have never heard of because I would not have this ability and, therefore, I would remain silent. What this means is that we do not inherently know everything, but we rather learn through actions and experiences. In order to prove that Wittgenstein was not a “nutcase”, this paper will apply some of his ideas to the ideas on Soren Kierkegaard, who is a well respected philosopher who is cited as being an inspiration for Wittgenstein. By showing that more than one philosopher had similar ideas to Wittgenstein, it possible to discredit what Matthews says about Wittgenstein, unless he wishes to expand this ideology onto other great philosophers. In his work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein makes the claim that we can only know the truth about something if we are able to realize all of the facts about that particular thing. Wittgenstein believes that “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 87), which means that our knowledge is based on our ability to put things into words. If we do not have the capacity to put our thoughts on something into words, then we do not have enough knowledge on this subject to speak. Since we cannot speak on what we do not know, everything that we are able to speak on is something that we do know. Even if the facts about what we are speaking on are wrong, we still hold some knowledge on the subject, given that we are able to speak on it. Also, “knowledge, for Wittgenstein, was intimately connected with doing” (Malcolm 18), which means that in order to speak on something we must have completed some sort of experience that is associated with that thing. For example, if I have never heard of baseball before, I will not have any knowledge of it and, therefore, there is no possible way that I could speak about baseball. Even if I do not know the rules of baseball, I must have some knowledge of it in order to speak about the subject. This ideology of Wittgenstein holds many similarities to those of Soren Kierkegaard, who believed that our knowledge of things came from our interactions with those things. Since we would need to have some sort of interaction with something in order to be able to speak on it, it is possible to see how these two individual hold very similar ideas on human knowledge. While Kierkegaard would not agree that we must be able to speak on a subject in order to hold this knowledge of it, he would agree that we cannot hold this knowledge unless we interact with the subject of the knowledge, which is very similar to having the ability to speak on the subject. In the matter of free will, these two individuals also have somewhat similar ideologies. Wittgenstein believed that the will was in control of the self and not the other way around, as many would argue and he “gives more attention to issues of philosophical psychology and the general status of human knowledge, including knowledge of the external world and other minds” (Klagge 115). He argued that the will is responsible for the self because it is the will that drives the individual to do whatever it is that he or she is doing. Without the will, we would not commit any action, as there would be no reason to do so. Also, the self, according to Wittgenstein, is part of the working world, but not dependent on that world. Therefore, we have our own wills that are not driven by the rest of the world, nor do they control anything other than the self. We do not have any possession over our action, they are simply things that happen over the course of our lives. In this sense, there is not any free will to be had, but simply actions that lead the self in a certain direction. Kierkegaard has both similarities and difference to Wittgenstein, but they are along the same wavelength. Kierkegaard believes that we all have freedom, possibility, and anxiety. Anxiety always has to do with the self because you can only be anxious about yourself. It is normal to be anxious about your own freedom because freedom is based on possibilities. Freedom does not mean doing the actual action, but rather that you have the possibility of doing the action. Actuality is doing the actual action. Therefore, freedom and nothing are the same thing. Anxiety is also about nothing, since it is not directed towards a particular thing or object. Since pure possibility is nothing and taking action is actuality, you only can know the reality of something after you have already done it. You are in a state of innocence and ignorance before you do something. Therefore, our free will acts on possibility. This state of ignorance can bring about restlessness. Restlessness will cause the self to make choices in order get to know itself better. No one can take this freedom away from the self. This restlessness can cause humans to do the very thing that horrifies them the most. Anxiety is the fascination with this attraction to the very thing that repulses you the most. Human error in free will, according to Kierkegaard, comes about because past freedom has no effect on future freedom, so we make the same mistakes over and over again. If you decide that you are never going to do something again, it is still a free decision every time you decide not to do it. That is why, quite often, people will do something that they have said they never would do again. It is still a free decision every time you are tempted. If everyone who said they were never going to smoke again followed through with that promise, there would not be a whole lot of smokers left. Also, after a rough night of drinking, it is common for a hung over person to say that he or she will never drink again. It usually does not work out this way. He or she will have to make the decision to not put him or her self into the position to be hung over, each and every time that he or she is tempted. We are not bound by our past decision. However, since the unknown draws us in, we will always have anxiety to go along with our freedom and possibility. The self will always have freedom, possibility, and anxiety and the will will lead the self into various directions based on this. Since Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein have these similarities in their views of free will, it would be unfair to call Wittgenstein “nutty” without applying the same term to Kierkegaard. Another manner in which the ideologies of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard can be compared is in their views of religion. Wittgenstein would often speak of ethics and religion as being one, which makes sense for him because he did not commit himself to one particular religion. Also, in order “to understand the nature of Wittgenstein's ethical concerns, it is useful to consider his struggles with the problems of confession. In the mid-1930s, Wittgenstein came to be preoccupied, even obsessed, with what he considered a number of sins he himself had committed” (Klagge 133). Wittgenstein’s beliefs are that there is no goodness, values or meaning in the world, that living the right way involves an acceptance of things the way they are, that once this is accepted, the individual will see the world as the miracle that it is, and that there is no answer to this problem. This is because Wittgenstein did not believe that the words existed to come to a conclusion on this, but it was rather something that just had to be believed, as “the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk on Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language” (Monk 293). This is a blind faith of sorts, as this faith cannot be expressed with words, but it is of the utmost importance. Therefore, our knowledge of God exists, even though we are unable to verbalize much of what we believe because of restraints on our ability to say what we believe, as “the truth, the value, of religion can have nothing to do with the words used. There need, in fact, be no words at all“ (Monk 321). He would also argue that since talk of there being a God has not subsided over time, then God must be as real as anything else. Wittgenstein also rejected many of the arguments that were made in order to prove the existence of God and the non-existence of God, as “both the atheist, who scorns religion because he has found no evidence for its tenets, and the believer, who attempts to prove the existence of God, have fallen victim to the 'other' - to the idol-worship of the scientific style of thinking” (Monk 434). He believed that this belief is not something that someone can be convinced of, but is rather something that is simply there, without convincing being needed. He believes that practicing a religion is a symbolic gesture that is meant to show one’s beliefs, but it does not make these beliefs any stronger, nor is it absolutely necessary in order to prove that these beliefs are true. Also, “he thought that he could understand the conception of God, in so far as it is involved in one's awareness of one's own sin and guilt. He added that he could not understand the conception of a Creator” (Malcolm 59). “Fear and Trembling”, by Soren Kierkegaard, is a philosophical work about human beings and their relationship with God. “Fear and Trembling” focuses on the story of Abraham from the Bible. Abraham was 80-years old and still did not have the son that he desired. He prays to God for a son and God answers his prayers by giving him Isaac. Thirty years later, however, God orders Abraham to kill Isaac as a sacrifice to him, in order to show his loyalty. At the last second God spares Isaac’s life and allows Abraham to sacrifice a ram that was caught in a nearby bush instead. What “Fear and Trembling” does is retell this story from four different viewpoints, with each viewpoint changing the story slightly. In the first version Abraham convinces Isaac that he his going to kill him by his own will, not by God’s because he would rather his own son lose faith in him than lose faith in God. In the second version, Abraham is able to sacrifice the ram instead of Isaac, but his faith in God is lessened because God asked him to kill Isaac in the first place. In the third version, Abraham decides not to kill Isaac at all, and then prays to God to ask forgiveness for having the thought of sacrificing his own son in the first place. In the fourth version, Abraham is not able to go through with killing Isaac and Isaac begins to question his own faith because his father was not able to complete God’s will. These four different versions are looked at from both religious and ethical points of view. Kierkegaard claims that killing Isaac may be ethically wrong, since it is taking the life of another, but it is religiously right because it is following God’s will. Kierkegaard also utilizes this biblical story to differentiate between faith and resignation, as “it would be possible to understand Kierkegaard's 'leap' to a 'perspective of faith' in these categories as well. Abraham was involved in a 'teleological suspension of the ethical.' If this were the complete story, the basis of the charge of 'fideism' would be reasonably clear. If religion operates beyond the limits of the definable world (in a 'suspension of the logical'), then it is necessarily inaccessible to reason. But the idea of multiple 'stages' suggests that a more complex analysis is required” (Creegan 78). Abraham could have simply killed Isaac because God told him to, which would have been resignation, but instead he obeyed him out of the faith that God would not do anything that is ethically wrong. Since Abraham knew that killing Isaac was ethically wrong, he knew that God would spare his son if he had faith without speech. Wittgenstein would say of this that “'the essence of religion can have nothing to do with whether speech occurs - or rather: if speech does occur, this itself is a component of religious behaviour and not a theory.' If language is not essential to a 'definition' of religion, then the possibility of religion could hardly be bounded by the inability to formulate a theory” (Creegan 78). Abraham decided that is was acceptable for him to do something ethically wrong because he was doing so in accordance to God’s will, which is religiously right and “Wittgenstein suggests that a wholly different kind of instruction is operating in coming to a belief in God. The kind of understanding which this instruction promotes is a wholly different kind of understanding from the seeing of any single thing” (Creegan 91). By having faith in God, Abraham knew that whichever decision he decided to make would turn out being the right one. By retelling the story of Abraham, Kierkegaard demonstrates that we must not judge actions on how they appear, but rather focus on how things turn out in the end. It is easy to pass judgment on someone’s actions as they happen, but it is important to wait until the end to decide whether or not the action was unethical or not because it can always turn out differently. This is similar to going to sleep early when you know that you will have to be up early in the morning. You are going to sleep early, even if you are not necessarily tired, so that you will not be tired in the morning when you have to wake up. It is making a decision in the present because of what you believe will happen in the future. Abraham does this when he decides to kill Isaac because he knows that it is an unethical thing to do, but he decides to suspend the present because of what he believes will happen in the future. In this case he must suspend the ethical as well because he believes that in the end God will allow for an ethical conclusion. In this particularly case, Abraham was able to hold his religious concerns over this ethical concerns and follow what God told him to do. This proves his faith in God and allowed for him to appear more faithful and keep his only son at the same time. Of this, Wittgenstein would argue that he has “the desire to transcend the boundaries of reason and to take Kierkegaard's 'leap of faith'. This desire in all its manifestations was something for which Wittgenstein had the deepest respect, whether in the philosophies of Kierkegaard or Heidegger” (Monk 326) and this is because Kierkegaard is able to come to this conclusion without having any concrete knowledge. He is able to believe in something without being able to experience it, which is a quality that Wittgenstein finds honourable, since “the mystical and ethical aspects of his work are stressed and linked to existentialist thinkers like Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, and Nietzsche” (Klagge 196). “Fear and Trembling” presents tensions between a number of different things. The tension between ethical thinking and religious thinking is at the forefront, as this tension creates a very uncomfortable position for Abraham, since “in seeing what cannot be expressed that we come near to the nature of the mystical” (Klagge 226) and this can be quite frightening. This is because Abraham is torn between the ethical and the religious because he believes that it is his ethical duty to spare Isaac’s life, but yet his religious duty to trust him God and sacrifice him. We live in a society where ethical behaviour is what allows society to function properly. Abraham knows that part of being an ethical person is not killing another human being, but he also realizes that he must have faith in God. He eventually decides that his personal relationship with God is more important than his relationship with society in general and decides to go through with the act of killing his son. Abraham also did not desire to kill Isaac, so it is not like he was committing this act for pleasure, which would be very unethical. Kierkegaard believes that while ethical behaviour is very important to society, an individual person can only become close to God through faith and that Abraham’s faith in God was what eventually allowed Isaac’s life to be spared. If Abraham did not have faith in God, then Isaac may not have been spared because then Abraham would deserve to be punished. Abraham’s individual faith was tested by God in this story and he passed the test by showing his faith in God. In this story, Kierkegaard attempts to get the point across about the difference between blind obedience and true faith. If Abraham had killed Isaac simply because God had told him to, then this would have been a story about blind obedience, or like the knight of infinite resignation. What Abraham did, however, was believe that God would not make him actually kill Isaac, like the knight of faith. This is a somewhat confusing situation because it is unclear when a person is simply following orders or when a person has faith that the end result will be an ethical one. Kierkegaard also points out, however, that just because Abraham has faith in this, does not necessarily mean he believes it. To believe something means that it will happen that way without question, while to have faith means that there is a chance of being wrong. If Abraham knew for certain that God would spare his son, then this would not have been a test of any sort for him. It was the question of what would happen in the end that made this a leap of faith for Abraham. He had to have faith that Isaac would not die in this situation, even though he believed that he was going to have to kill him. What this story does is point out some of the problems with ethics. Ethics are a set of rules that are place that protect the majority of people. There are, however, certain situations where making decisions based on ethics can actually harm people. Ethics were created to create a favourable conclusion to a variety of situations, but this problem is that human beings cannot tell what the conclusion will be until it is reached. This means that we can never be sure of the exact path we need to take in order to reach the desired conclusion. According to Kierkegaard, faith in God takes the uncertainty out of these situations because it takes away the need to predict the conclusion. This is because God will always provide us with the best possible conclusion as long as we have faith in him. Faith allows us to see that even an unethical action can result in a desirable conclusion because God’s will is the ultimate good and he knows what the conclusion will be. Therefore, human beings should trust in God, even when doing so might go against society’s ideas of ethics. While doing this might cause some hardships because he or she will not know if he or she has passed the test of faith until the very end, it will be worth it in the end that that person is able to pass God’s test and become a knight of faith. The knight of infinite resignation is representative of those who will hold up ethical law no matter what. He has no faith and he will sacrifice absolutely everything in order to hold up these laws. He gives up his own personal desires in order to allow for a great good, which is an ethical society. This knight can always explain his actions because all he is doing is living up to an ethical code, which is based on reason and justice. Therefore, his actions are motivated by a universal good, which ignores any person relationship with God. Living this sort of life can be very difficult because it means giving up any personal privileges in order to keep a just society. This knight, however, cannot act with faith because he does not understand what faith is. He is bound by the ethics by which he lives his life and he will always know why he does everything. The knight of faith, however, has no idea why he does what he does, but he has faith that it will all work out for him in the end. The knight of faith is admired heavily, but he can never be emulated because faith is something that comes from within and cannot be learned nor taught. This is because “the desire for 'proof of God's existence' is not a request for a causal explanation; instead, it is a demand for the justification of an attitude. Both the search for the answer and the result of finding the answer are only expressible in terms of an individual's life (Creegan 90). In order to truly believe, however, an individual must ignore this desire and believe from within, which can be a very difficult thing to accomplish. Ludwig Wittgenstein was a unique philosopher because, often times, he did not have the answers. He believed that the truth could be something that was within the individual or it could also be something entirely different. Perhaps one of the reasons why he is so highly criticized is because people do not understand a philosopher who does not believe that he holds all of the answers. Over the course of this essay, however, it is possible to see how Wittgenstein ideas can be applied to the work of other philosopher, namely Soren Kierkegaard, which should give him more credibility. Wittgenstein should not be labelled as a “nutcase” because his ideologies are not as obscure any many might think. He does make some valid points about religion, knowledge, and free will because he is able to realize his limitations as a human being. Also, while not religious himself, he realizes the value in religion, if it utilized properly. By applying his ideas to those of Kierkegaard, it is possible to come to a deeper understanding of why Abraham acting in the manner in which he did, as Abraham was able to embrace the faith that he could not verbalize nor see. This was a blind leap of faith that proved his faith in God. Wittgenstein would say of this situation that “life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what bring this about; but I don't mean visions and other forms of sense experience which show us the 'existence of this being,' but, e.g., sufferings of various sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us an object. Nor do they give rise to conjectures about him. Experiences, thoughts, - life can force this concept on us. So perhaps it is similar to the concept of object” (Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 86). This means that Abraham’s life experiences led him to have this faith in God despite the fact that he could not see God or verbalize his faith. Through comparing Wittgenstein with Kierkegaard, it is possible to discount anyone who believes that he was a “nutcase” and open up the eyes of those who believe he may be to a whole new realm of possibilities. Sources Creegan, Charles L. Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality and Philosophical Method. London: Routledge. 1989. Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling. trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. Klagge, James C. Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001. Malcolm, Norman. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001. Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. New York: Penguin Books. 1990. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value. ed. G. H. von Wright with H. Nyman, trans. Peter Winch. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1980. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. New York: Routledge Classics. 2001. Read More